# STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND ORS v. VISHNU PRASAD SHARMA AND ORS

- **Citation:** [1966] 3 S.C.R. 557
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1966
- **Bench:** A. K. Sarkar, K. N. Wanchoo, J. R. Mudholkar Jj
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/state-of-madhya-pradesh-and-ors-v-vishnu-prasad-sharma-and-ors-3601
- **Pages:** 16

## Headnote

Land Acquisition Act (1 of 189'4), ss. 4, 5-A, 6, 17, 48 and 49Notification under s. 4-lf could be followed by more than one notification
under s. 6.
After the issue of a notification under s. 4 (1) of the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894, by which it was declared that lands in certain \illages were
likely to be needed for a public purpose, a number of notifications, in
respect of different items of land specified in the notification under s. 4(1),
were successively issued under s. 6.
The validity of the
last of them
was challenged by the respondents, by a writ petition in the High Court.
The High Court allowed the petition holding that a notification under
s. 4(1) could be followed only by one notification under s. 6, and therefore it was not open to the Government to issue sucoessive notifications
with respect to different parts of land comprised in one notification under
s. 4.
In appeal to this Court, by the State,
HELD : The High Court was right in holding that there can be Dll
successive notifications under s. 6 with respect to land in a locality speci·
fled in one notification under s. 4(1). [572 C-DJ
Per Sarkar, J. Sections 4, 5-A and 6 of the Act read together indicateo
that the Act contemplates only, a single declaration under s. 6 in respect
of a notification under s. 4. There is nothing in ss. 17 and 49(2)(3) to
lead to a contrary view.
There is nothing in the Act to support the view that it is only a
withdrawal under s. 48 that puts a notification under s. 4 completely out
of the way. [560 G; 561 C; 561 BJ
Per Wanchoo and Muclholkar, JJ. Sections 4, 5-A and 6 are integrally
11
conne.cted and without the notifications under ss. 4 and 6 no acquisition
can take place, because, they are the basis of all proceedings which follow.
The notification under s. 4(1) specifies the locality in which the land
is to be acquired and under s. 4(2) survey is made to decide what particular land in the locality specified in the notification is to be acquired.
Another purpose of the notification under s. 4(1) is to give opportuni!}
to persons owning land in the locality to make objections under s. S·A.
Section S-A specifically provides that the Collector shall hear all objections
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made before him and then make only one report to the Government
containing his recommendations on the objections.
When such a report
is received by the Government, it must give a decision on all the objections at one stage and decide once for all what particular land out of the
locality notified under s. 4(1) it wishes to acquire and then issue a declaration under s. 6. At the stage of s. 4, the land is not particularised
but only the locality is mentioned; at the stage of s. 6 the land in the
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locality is particularised and thereafter the notification under s.
4(1)
having served its purpose exhausts itself. The sequence of events from a
notification of the intention to acquire nnder s. 4 to the declaration under
s. 6, leads to the conclusion that once a declaration under s. 6 particularil·
ing the area ia issued, the remaining non-particularised area in the nofl.
MllSup.C.I./66-4
558
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1966] 3 S.C.R.
ication under s. 4(1) stands automatically released. The intention of Ibo
legislature was that one notification under s. 4( I) should be followed by
survey under s. 4(2), objections under s. 5-A heard, and thereafter, ono
declaration under •. 6 issued. U the Government requirm more land in
that locality, there is nothing to prevent it from issuing another n0<i4cation under •- 4(1) making a further survey if necessary, hearing objections and then making another declaration under s_ 6, whereas Ibero Is
likely to be prejudice to the owner of the land if there is great delay
between tho notifications under s. 4( I) and s. 6.
Even if it were poasible
to issue two notifications under s. 6 in the special ci.rcumstanci:s arisiag
out of the application of s. 17 ( 4), all that is possible is, to issue one
notification relating to l"nd to which s. 17(1) a

## Text

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STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND ORS.
v.
VISHNU PRASAD SHARMA AND ORS.
F'ebruary 9, 1966
(A. K. SARKAR, K. N. WANCHOO AND J. R. MUDHOLKAR JJ.J
Land Acquisition Act (1 of 189'4), ss. 4, 5-A, 6, 17, 48 and 49Notification under s. 4-lf could be followed by more than one notification
under s. 6.
After the issue of a notification under s. 4 (1) of the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894, by which it was declared that lands in certain \illages were
likely to be needed for a public purpose, a number of notifications, in
respect of different items of land specified in the notification under s. 4(1),
were successively issued under s. 6.
The validity of the
last of them
was challenged by the respondents, by a writ petition in the High Court.
The High Court allowed the petition holding that a notification under
s. 4(1) could be followed only by one notification under s. 6, and therefore it was not open to the Government to issue sucoessive notifications
with respect to different parts of land comprised in one notification under
s. 4.
In appeal to this Court, by the State,
HELD : The High Court was right in holding that there can be Dll
successive notifications under s. 6 with respect to land in a locality speci·
fled in one notification under s. 4(1). [572 C-DJ
Per Sarkar, J. Sections 4, 5-A and 6 of the Act read together indicateo
that the Act contemplates only, a single declaration under s. 6 in respect
of a notification under s. 4. There is nothing in ss. 17 and 49(2)(3) to
lead to a contrary view.
There is nothing in the Act to support the view that it is only a
withdrawal under s. 48 that puts a notification under s. 4 completely out
of the way. [560 G; 561 C; 561 BJ
Per Wanchoo and Muclholkar, JJ. Sections 4, 5-A and 6 are integrally
11
conne.cted and without the notifications under ss. 4 and 6 no acquisition
can take place, because, they are the basis of all proceedings which follow.
The notification under s. 4(1) specifies the locality in which the land
is to be acquired and under s. 4(2) survey is made to decide what particular land in the locality specified in the notification is to be acquired.
Another purpose of the notification under s. 4(1) is to give opportuni!}
to persons owning land in the locality to make objections under s. S·A.
Section S-A specifically provides that the Collector shall hear all objections
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made before him and then make only one report to the Government
containing his recommendations on the objections.
When such a report
is received by the Government, it must give a decision on all the objections at one stage and decide once for all what particular land out of the
locality notified under s. 4(1) it wishes to acquire and then issue a declaration under s. 6. At the stage of s. 4, the land is not particularised
but only the locality is mentioned; at the stage of s. 6 the land in the
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locality is particularised and thereafter the notification under s.
4(1)
having served its purpose exhausts itself. The sequence of events from a
notification of the intention to acquire nnder s. 4 to the declaration under
s. 6, leads to the conclusion that once a declaration under s. 6 particularil·
ing the area ia issued, the remaining non-particularised area in the nofl.
MllSup.C.I./66-4
558
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1966] 3 S.C.R.
ication under s. 4(1) stands automatically released. The intention of Ibo
legislature was that one notification under s. 4( I) should be followed by
survey under s. 4(2), objections under s. 5-A heard, and thereafter, ono
declaration under •. 6 issued. U the Government requirm more land in
that locality, there is nothing to prevent it from issuing another n0<i4cation under •- 4(1) making a further survey if necessary, hearing objections and then making another declaration under s_ 6, whereas Ibero Is
likely to be prejudice to the owner of the land if there is great delay
between tho notifications under s. 4( I) and s. 6.
Even if it were poasible
to issue two notifications under s. 6 in the special ci.rcumstanci:s arisiag
out of the application of s. 17 ( 4), all that is possible is, to issue one
notification relating to l"nd to which s. 17(1) applies and another notifiaction relating to land to which s. 17 (I) cannot apply, and that is because of the special provisions contained in s. 17 (I) and s. 17 ( 4) ""d
not becauSe of the provisions of ss. 4, 5-A and 6.
~tion 48 (I) only
confers a special power on Government of withdrawal from
•C'!uisition
without cancelling the notifications under ss. 4 and 6, provided, po&'iCllSion
of the land covered by the notification under s. 6 was not taken.
It
cannot be said that tho only way in which the notification under s. 4( I)
can come to an end is by withdrdwal under s. 48( I) and that unless
action is tak.m under that section the notiJication under s. 4 (I) would
remain alive.
Section 49(2) and (3) also provide for a special case.
The order of the Government under s. 49(2), ordering the •C'!uisition
of the whole of the land, C\'CD though under a. 6 only part of the land
may have beai declared, may be taken to serve the purposo of the notification under s. 4(1) in such a special case; but it does not follow that
successive notifications under •- 6 can be i!oued with rospeot to land in the
locality specified in the notiftcation under t. 4( I). [566 D-567 B; 567 P.
H; 569 B, C; 570 A-B, C; 571 F, 0)
0VIL APPELLATF. ]URJSDicnON : Civil Appeal No. 1018 of 1963.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated February 21, 1962,
of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Misc. Pe!ition No. 275 of
1961.
C. K.
Daphtary,
Attorney-General, M. Adhikari, Advocate·
General,
Madhya Pradesh, H. L. Khaskalam and /. N. Shroff,
for the appellants.
S. V. Gupte, Solici10r-Ge11ernl and J. B. Dadachanji, for the respondents.
S. N. Kacker and J. P. Goyal, for the intervener.
SARKAR, J. delivered a separate opinion. The Judgment of
WANC!IOO and MUDHOLKAR, JJ. was delivered by WANCHOO, J.
Sarkar, J.-My learned brother Wanchoo has set out the facts
fully in his judgment and that relieves me of the necessity of stating
them again.
The question that has arisen is whether a number of declarations
under s. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 can be issued su=ively in respect of different pieces of lands included within the locality
specified in a notification issued under s. 4 of the Act. My learned
brother has said that ss. 4, 5A and 6 of the Act have to be read
together and so read, the conclusion is clear that the Act contemA
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M. P. STATE V. v. P. SHAllMA (Sarkar, J.)
55~
plates only a single declaration under s. 6 in respect of a notification
under s. 4. I so entirely agree with his reasonings for this view
that I find it unnecessary to add anything to them. But it was
said that there are other considerations which indicate that our
reading of these sections is unsound. In this judgment I propose
to deal only with these considerations.
It was said that the Govermnent may have difficulty in making
the plan of its project complete at a time, particularly where the
project is large and, therefore, it is necessary that it should have
power to make a number of declarations under s. 6. I am wholly
unable to accept this argument. First, I do not think that a supposed
difficulty would provide any justification for accepting an interpretation of a statute against the ordinary meaning of the language
used in it. General considerations of the kind suggested cannot
authorise a departure from the plain meaning of words. Secondly"
I cannot imagine a Government, which has vast resources, not
being able to make a complete plan of its project at a time. Indeed,
I think when a plan is made, it is a complete plan. I should suppose
that before the Government starts acquisition proceedings by the
issue of a notification under s. 4, it has made its plan for otherwise
it cannot state in the notification, as it has to do, that the land is.
likely to be needed. Even if it had not then completed its plan,
it would have enough time before the making of a declaration
under s. 6 to do so. I think, therefore, that the difficulty of the
Government, even if there is one, does not lead to the conclusion that
the Act contemplates the making of a number of declarations
under s. 6. I would like to observe here to avoid confusion that
we are not concerned now with extension of a completely planned
project conceived later. The present contention is not based on
any difficulty arising out of such a ease. It was said that if the
Government has not finalised its plan when it makes a declaratio11
under s. 6, it would have to start fresh acquisition proceedingt!
beginning with a notification under s. 4 to provide for the complete
plan if it could not make any more declarations and in such a case,
in conceivable circumstances, it may have to pay more for the land
that it then sought to acquire. This argument concedes that even
if the Government has no• been able to make its plan when making
a declaration under s. 6, the result is not that it cannot acquire any
more land later when the plan is completed. The real point,
therefore, of the present argument is that the Act should be so interpreted that the Government should not be put to extra cost when
it has been u'nable to complete its plan at a time. This seems to
me to be a strange argument. First, there is no reason why the
Act s)J.ould provide for the Government's failure to complete the
plan. Secondly, the argument is hypothetical for one does not
know for sure whether a later acquisition will cost more or lessr
Arguments on hypothetical considerations can have· little weight'
in interpreting statutes. But even otherwise, this view of the matte ..
560
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1966] 3 S.C.R.
does not support the argument. After the issue of a notification
under s. 4, an owner of land in the locality notified cannot have full
beneficial enjoyment of his property; he cannot, for example, build
on his land for if he does so and the land is acquired, he will get
no compensation for the building put up and will lose the costs
incurred for it. If it is a justification for saying that a number of
declarations can be made under s. 6 because otherwise the Government may have to pay more,
it seems to me that it is at least an
equal justification for saying that such declarations cannot have
been contemplated by the Act because that would mean an avoidable
deprivation of the owners of their beneficial enjoyment of lands
till such time as the Government is able to make its plan. As the
Act is an expropriatory Act, that interpretation of it should be
accepted which puts the least burden on the expropriated owner.
The Government could, of course, always make a complete plan
at a time and I am unable to hold that the Act contemplated that
it need not do so and go on making declarations from time to time
as its plan goes on taking shape even though the result might be to
i11crease the hardship of persons whose lands are taken away.
Reference was then made to sub·ss. (1) and (4) of s. 17. These
give the Government the power to take possession of waste and
arable lands included in the notification under s. 4 on the expiry
of fifteen days from the publication of the notice mentioned in s. 9
and before the making of the award, without holding the enquiry
contemplated by s. 5. It was said that if a notification under s. 4
included both arable and waste lands as also lands of other descriptions,
it will be necessary to issue two separate declarations
under s. 6 in respect of the different kinds of lands. It was also
said that the vesting in respect of the two kinds of lands in the
Government would also be by stages. All this, it was contended,
would support the view that more than one declaration under
s. 6 was contemplated in such a case. I do not feel called upon to
express any opinion whether in such a case a number of declarations
under s. 6 is contemplated. It is enough to say that it is not contended that this is a case of that kind. Therefore, it cannot be said
that the disputed declaration under s. 6 was in this case justified
under s. 17. On the contrary, if the contention thats. 17 contemplates more declarations than one under s. 6 be correct, that would
be because the statute specifically so provided for a particular
case. It must follow that without a special provision, more than
one declaration under s. 6 was not contemplated.
The next contention was that s. 48 which gives the Government
power of withdrawal from acquisition before taking possession implies that a notification under s. 4 remains in force for all purpose
till such withdrawal, and if it so remains in force, successive declarations under s. 6 must be permissible for otherwise it would be
useless to keep the notification under s. 4 in force. The substance
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M. P. STATE v. v. p. SHARMA (Wanchoo, I.)
561
of this argument is that the only way to get rid of a notification under
s. 4 is by a withdrawal of the acquisition proceedings under s. 48;
if the proceedings are not withdrawn, the notification remains and
then there may be successive declarations. This argument seems
to me clearly ill founded. Now a notification under s. 4 will be
exhausted if a declaration is made under it in respect of the entire
area covered by it. Likewise, it seems to me that if the correct
interpretation is that only one declaration can be made under s. 6,
that also would exhaust the notification under s. 4; that notification
would no longer remain in force to justify successive declarations
under s. 6 in respect of different areas included in it. There is
nothing in the'Act to support the view that it is only a withdrawal
under s. 48 that puts a notification under s. 4 completely out of the
way. The effect of s. 48 is to withdraw the acquisition proceedings,
including the notification under s. 4 with which it started. We are
concerned not with a withdrawal but with the force of a notification
under s. 4 having become exhausted. That is a different case and
has nothing to do with a withdrawal.
Lastly, we were referred to sub-ss. (2) and (3) of s. 49. These
sub-sections state that where a claim for compensation is made
on the ground of severance of the land acquired from the remaining
land of the owner for which provision is made under s. 23, if the
Government thinks that the claim is unreasonable it may, before the
making of the award, order the acquisition of the whole land and in
such a case no fresh declaration under s. 6 will be necessary. It
is contended that these provisions support the view that successive
declarations under s. 6 were contemplated. I do not think they
do so. In any case, even if they did, then that would be because
in a particular case the statute specially provided for successive
declarations under s. 6. The present is not that special case.
Furthermore, as I have said in connection with the argument based
on s. 17, the fact that a special provision was necessary to enable
successive declarations under s. 6 to be made would go to support
the view that without a special provision there is no power given
by the Act to issue successive declarations under s. 6.
I would for these reasons dismiss the appeal with costs.
Wanchoo, J.-The only question raised in this appeal on a
certificate granted by the Madhya Pradesh High Court is whether
it is open to the appropriate government to issue successive notifications under s. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, No. 1 of 1894,
(hereinafter referred to as the Act) with respect to land comprised
within one notification under s. 4(1) of the Act. The question
arises in this way.
On May 16, 1949, a notification was issued under s. 4 (1}
of the Act by which it was declared that lands in eleven villages
including village Chhawani was likely to be needed for a public
5 62
SUPl!.BNB COURT R'EPOl!.TS
[1966] 3 S.C.R.
purpose, i.e., the erection of an iron and steel plant. It appears
that thereafter notifications were issued under s. 6 with respect to
the villages notified in the notification under s. 4(1) and it is not
in dispute that a number of such notifications under s. 6 were
i•ued with respect to village Chhawani and some land in that
village was acquired under those notifications, the last of such
acquisitions being in the year 1956. Thereafter on August 12,
1960, another notification under s. 6 of the Act was issued by the
appropriate government proposing to acquire 486 · 17 acres of land
in village Chhawani and the area which was proposed to be acquired
was demarcated on a map kept in the office of the Collector of Durg
for inspection. The notification also stated· that the provisions
of s. 5-A of theAct shall not apply thereto. Thereupon the respondents who are interested in some of the land notified filed a writ
petition in the High Court challenging the validity of the notification under s. 6. The principal contention raised on their beluJf was that the notification under s. 6 of the Act was void as it
had not been preceded by a fresh notification under s. 4(1) and the
notification under s. 4(1) issued in 1949 had exhausted itself when
notifications under s. 6 with respect to this village had been issued
previously and could not support the issue of another notification
under s. 6. In substance the contention of the respondents in
their petition was that a notification under s. 4( I) could be followed
only by one notification under s. 6 and that there could be no
successive notifications under s. 6 with respect to lands comprised
in one notification under s. 4(1).
The petition was opposed on behalf of the appellant, and it
was contended that it was open to the appropriate government to
issue as many notifications as it deemed fit under s. 6 of the Act
with respect to lands comprised in one notification under s. 4( I)
and that it was not correct that the notification under s. 4(1) was
exhausted as soon as one notification under s. 6 was issued with
respect to a part of the land comprised in the notification under
s. 4(1), and that it was always open to the appropriate government
to issue successive notifications under s. 6 so long as these notifications were with respect to land comprised within the notification
under s. 4(1).
The High Court has accepted the contention of the respondents
and has held that a notification under s. 4 (I) can only be followed
by one notification under s. 6 and that it is not open to the appropriate government to issue successive notifications with respect to
parts of the land comprised in one notification under s. 4 and that
as soon as one notification is issued under s. 6, whether it be with
respect to part of the land comprised in the notification under s.
4(1) or with respect to the whole of it, the notific_atiol! under s. 4(1)
is exhausted and cannot support any further nohficauon under s. 6
of the Act with respect to parts of land comprised in the notifiA
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M. P. STATE V. v. p, SHARMA (Wanchoo, J.)
563
A
cation under s. 6. In consequence the petition was allowed and the
notification dated August 12, 1960 quashed. The appellant then
applied to the High Court for a certificate which was granted; and
that is how the matter has come up before us .
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The question whether only one notification under s. 6 can be
issued with respect to land comprised in the notification under s.
4(1) and thereafter the notification under s. 4(1) exhausts itself
and cannot support any further notification under s. 6 with respect
to such laud depends upon the construction of ss. 4, 5-A and 6 of
the Act and on the connection between these provisions. Before
however we deal with these provisions we may briefly refer to the
scheme of the Act and the background in which these provisions
have to be interpreted.
The Act provides for the exercise of the power of emineni
domain
and
authorises the
appropriate
government to
acquire lands thereunder for public purpose or for purposes of a
company. The proceedings begin with a notification under s. 4
(1). After such a notification it is permissible under s. 4(2) for any
officer of government, his servants and workmen to enter upon
and survey the land in such locality, to dig or bore into the subsoil, to do all other acts necessary to ascertain whether the land is
adapted for the purpose for which it was needed, to set out the
boundaries of the land proposed to be taken and the intended line
of the work proposed to be made thereon, to mark boundaries etc.
by placing marks and fences and where otherwise the survey cannot
be completed to cut down and clear away any part of any standing
crop, fence or jungle. While the survey is being done under s. 4
(2), it is open to any person interested in the land notified under s.
4 (I) to object under s. 5-A before the Collector within thirty days
after the issue of the notification to the acquisition of the land or of
any land in the locality. The Collector is authorised to hear the
objections and is required after hearing all such objections and
after making such further enquiry as he thinks necessary to submit
the case for the decision of the appropriate government together
with the record of the proceedings held by him and a report containing his recommendations on the objections. Thereafter the appropriate government decides the objections and such decision is final.
If the appropriate government is satisfied after considering the
report that any particular land is needed for a public purpose or
for a company it has to make a declaration to that effect. After
such a declaration has been made under s. 6 the appropriate government directs the Collector under s. 7 to take order for the acquisition
of the land. Sections 8 to 15 provide for the proceedings before the
Collector. Section 16 authorises the Collector to take possession
after he has made the award under s. 11 anil thereupon the land
vests absolutely in the government free from all encumbrances.
Section 17 provides for special powers in cases of urgency. If a
564
SUPRBMI! COURT RBPORTS
[1966] 3 S.C.R.
person is not satisfied with the award of the Collector, ss. 18 to 28
provide for proceedings on a reference to court. Sections 31 to
34 provide for
payment of compensation. Sections 38 to 44
make special provisions for acquisition of land for companies.
Section 48 gives power to government to withdraw from the acquisition of any land of which possession has not been taken. Section
49 provides for special powers with respect to acquisition of house,
building or manufaclory and of land severed from other land.
It will be seen from this brief review of the provisions with
respect to acquisition of land that ss. 4 and 6 are the basis of all the
proceedings which follow and without the notifications required
under ss. 4 and 6 no acquisition can take place. The importance
of a notification under s. 4 is that on the issue of such notification
the land in the locality to which the notification applies is in a sense
freezed. This freezing talccs place in two ways.
firstly the market
value of the land to be acquired has to be determined on the date
of the notification under s. 4(1) : [see s. 23(1) firstly].
Secondly,
any outlay or improvements on or disposal of the land acquired
commenced, made or effected without the sanction of the Collector
after the date of the publication of the notification under s. 4(1)
cannot be taken into consideration at all in determining compensation : (see s. 24, seventhly).
It is in this background that we have to consider the question
raised before us. Two things are plain when we come to consider
the construction of ss. 4, SA and 6. The first is that the Act provides
for acquisition of land of persons without their consent, though
compensation is paid for such acquisition; the fact however remains
that land is acquired without the consent of the owner thereof and
that is a circumstance which must be borne in mind when we come
to consider the question raised before us.
In such a case the provisions of the statute must be strictly construed as it deprives a
person of his land without his consent. Secondly, in interpreting
these provisions the court must keep in view on the one hand the
public interest which compels such acquisition and on the other
the interest of the person who is being deprived of his land without
his consent. It is not in dispute that it is open to the appropriate
government to issue as many notifications as it deems fit under s.
4(1) even with respect to the same locality followed by a proper
notification under s. 6 so that the power of the appropriate government to acquire land in any locality is not exhausted by the issue
of one notification under s. 4(1) with respect to that locality. On
the other hand as the compensation has to be determined with
reference to the date of the notification under s. 4(1) the person
whose land is to be acquired may stand to lose if there is a great
delay between the notification under s. 4(1) and the notification
under s. 6 in case prices have risen in the meantime. This delay
is likely to be greater if successive notifications under s. 6 can be
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M. P. STATE v. v. p, SHARMA (Wane/zoo, J.)
565
issued with respect to land comprised in the notification under s. 4
with greater consequential loss to the person whose land is being
acquired if prices have risen in the meantime. It is however urged
that prices may fall and in that case the person whose land is being
acquired will stand to gain. But as it is open to the appropriate
government to issue another notification under s. 4 with respect
to the same locality after one such notification is exhausted by the
issue of a notification under s. 6, it may proceed to do so where
it feels that prices have fallen and more land in that locality is
needed and thus take advantage of the fall in prices in the matter
of acquisition. So it is clear that there is likely to be prejudice
to the owner of the land if the interpretation urged on behalf of the
appellant is accepted while there will be no prtjudice to the government if it is rejected for it can always issue a fresh notification
under s. 4(1) after the previous one is exhausted in case prices have
fallen. It is in this background that we have to consider the question raised before us.
As we have said already, the process of acquisition always begins
with a notification under s. 4(1). That provision authorises the
appropriate government to notify that land in any locality is needed
or is likely to be needed for any public purpose. It will be noticed
that in this notification the land needed is not particularised but
only the locality where the land is situate is mentioned. As was
observed by this Court in Babu Barkya Thakur v. The State of Bombay,(1) a notification under s. 4 of the Act envisages a preliminary
investigation and it is only under s. 6 that the government makes
a firm declaration. The purpose of the notification under s. 4(1)
clearly is to enable the government to take action under s. 4(2) in
the matter of survey of land to decide what particular land in the
locality specified in the notification under s. 4(1) it will decide to·
acquire. Another purpose of the notification under s. 4(1) is to
give opportunity to persons owning land in that locality to make
objections under s. 5-A. These objections are considered by the
Collector and after considering all objections he makes a report
containing his recommendation on the objections to the appropriate
government whose decision on the objections is final. Section 5-A
obviously contemplates consideration of all objections made to the
notification under s. 4(1) and one report thereafter by the Collector
to the government with respect to those objections. The government then finally decides those objections and thereafter proceeds
to make a declaration under s. 6. There is nothing in s. 5-A to
suggest that the Collector can make a number of reports dealing
with the objections piecemeal. On the other hand s. 5-A specifically provides that the Collector shall hear all objections made
before him and then make a report i.e. only a single report to the
government containing
his recommendation on the objections.
(1 [1961] I S.C.R. 128).
566
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1966] 3 S.C.R.
It 5eems to us clear that when such a report is received from the
Collector by the government it must give a decision on all the objections at one stage and decide once for all what particular land
out of the locality notified under s. 4(1) it wishes to acquire.
It
has to be satisfied under s. 6 after considering the report made
under s. 5-A that a particular land is needed for a public purpose
or for a company and it then makes a declaration to that elTcct
under s. 6.
Reading ss. 4, 5-A and 6 together it seems to us clear
that the notification under s. 4(1) specifies merely the locality in
which the land is to be acquired and then under s.
4(2) survey
is made and it is considered whether the land or part of it is adapted
to the purpose for which it is required and maps are prepared of
the land proposed to be taken. Then after objections under s. 5-A
have been disposed of the government has to decide what particular
land out of the locality specified in the notification under s. 4( I)
it will acquire. It then makes a declaration under s. 6 specifying
the particular land that is needed.
Sections 4, 5-A and 6 in our opinion are integrally connected.
Section 4 specifies the locality in which the land is acquired and
provides for survey to decide what particular land out of the locality
would be needed.
Section 5-A provides for hearing of objections
to the acquisition and after these objections are decided the government has to make up its mind and declare what particular land
out of the locality it will acquire. When it has so made up its
mind it makes a declaration as to the particular land out of the
locality notified ins. 4(1) which it will acquire. It is clear from this
intimate connection between ss. 4, 5-A and 6 that as soon as the
government has made up its mind what particular land out of the
locality it requires, it has to issue a declaration under s. 6 to that
elTect. The purpose of the notification under s.
4(1) is at this
stage over and it may be said that it is exhausted after the notification under s. 6. If the government requires more land in that
locality besides that notified under s. 6, there is nothing to prevent
it from issuing another notification under s. 4( I) making a further
survey if necessary, hearing objections and then making another
declaration under s. 6. The notification under s. 4(1) thus infonns
the public that land is required or would be required in a parti·
cular locality and thereafter the members of the public owning
land in that locality have to make objections under s. 5-A; the
government then makes up its mind as to what particular land in
that locality is required and makes a declaration under s. 6. It
seems to us clear that once a declaration under s. 6 is made, the
notification under s. 4(1) must be exhausted, for it has served its
purpose. There is nothing in ss. 4, 5-A and 6 to suggest that s. 4
(I) is a kind of reservoir from which the go".ernmen~ may from llm.c
to time draw out land and make declarations with respect to It
successively. If that was the intention behind sections 4, 5-A and
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M. P. STATE v. V. p. SHARMA (Wanchoo, J.)
567
6 we would have found some indication of it in the language used
therein. But as we read these three sections together we can only
find that the scheme is that s. 4 specifies the locality, then there
may be survey and drawing of maps of the land and the consideration whether the land is adapted for the purpose for which it has
to be acquired, followed by objections and making up of its mind
by the government what particular land out of that locality it needs.
This is followed by a declaration under s. 6 specifying the particular land needed and that in our opinion completes the process
and the notification under s. 4(1) cannot be further used thereafter. At the stage of s. 4 the land is not particularised but only
the locality is mentioned; at the stage of s. 6 the land in the locality
is particularised and thereafter it seems to us that the notification
under s.
4(!) having served its purpose exhausts itself. The
sequence of events from a notification of the intention to acquire
(s. 4(1)) to the declaration under s. 6 unmistakably leads one to the
reasonable
conclusion that when once a declaration under s. 6
particularising the area out of the area in the locality specified in
the notification under s. 4(1) is issued, the remaining non-particularised area stands automatically released.
In
effect
the
5Cheme of these three sections is that there should be first a notification under s. 4(1) followed by one notification under s. 6 after
the government has made up its mind which land out of,the locality
it requires.
It is urged however that where the land is required for a small
project and the area is not large the government may be able
to make up its mind once for all what land it needs, but where as
in the present case land is required for a large project requiring
a large area of land government may not be able to make up its
mind all at once. Even if it be so there is nothing to prevent the
government from issuing another notification under s. 4 followed
by a notification under s. 6. As we have said before, the government's power to acquire land in a particular locality is not exhausted
by issuing one notification under s. 4(!) followed by a notification
under s. 6. The interpretation which has commended itself to
us therefore does not deprive the government of the power to
acquire more land from the same locality if later on it thinks that
more land than what has been declared under s. 6 is needed. It
can proceed to do so by a fresh notification under s. 4(1) and a
fresh declaration under s. 6. Such a procedure would in our
opinion be fair to all concerned; it will be fair to government where
the prices have fallen and it will be fair to those whose land is being
acquired where the prices have risen. Therefore as we read these
three sections we are of opinion that they are integrally and intimately connected and the intention of legislature was that one
notification under s. 4(1) should be followed by survey under s. 4
(2) and objections under s. 5-A and thereafter one declaration
518
SUPRBMB COURT REPORTS
[1966] 3 S.C.R.
under s. 6.
There is nothing in ss. 4, 5-A and 6 which supports
the construction urged on behalf of the appellant and in any case
it seems to us that the construction which commends itself to us
and which has been accepted by the High Court is a fair construction keeping in view the background to which we have referred.
Even if two constructions were possible, which we think is not so,
we would be inclined to the construction which has .commended
itself to us because that construction does not restrict the power
of the government to acquire land at any time it deems fit to do
and at the same time works fairly towards persons whose land
is to be acquired compulsorily.
It now remains to consider certain other provisions of the
Act to which reference has been made on behalf of the appellant
to show that successive notifications under s. 6 are contemplated
with respect to land in a locality specified in the notification under
s. 4(1). The first provision is
contained in s.
17(4). Section
17(1) gives power to government in cases of urgency to direct that
the Collector should take possession of the land before the award
is made and such possession can be taken on expiration of fifteen
days from the publication of the notice under s. 9(1).
Further
such possession can only be taken of waste or arable land and on
such possession being taken such land vests absolutely in the government free from all encumbrances. To carry out the purposes of
s. 17(1), s. 17(4) provides that the appropriate government may
direct that the provisions of s. 5-A shall not apply in cases ofurgency
and if it so directs, a declaration under s. 6 may be made in respect
of the land at any time after the publication of the notification under
s. 4(1). It is urged that this shows that where the land notified
under s. 4(1) includes land of the kind mentioned ins. 17 (I) and
also land which is not of that kind it would be open to government to make a declaration under s. 6 with respect to the land
mentioned in s.
17( I) immediately after the notification under
s. 4(1)
while notification with respect to the land which is not
of the kind mentioned in s. l 7( I) can follow later after the enquiry
under s. 5-A is over and objections have been disposed of. So it
is urged that more than one declaration is contemplated under
s. 6 after one notification
under
s. 4(1).
There arc two
answers to this argument.
In the first place where the land
10 be acquired is of the kind
mentioned in
s.
17( l) and
also of the kind not included in s. 17( I) there is nothing to
prevent
the government
from issuing two notifications under
s. 4(1) one relating to land which comes within s. 17(1) and the
other relating to land which cannot come within s. 17(1). Thereafter the government may issue a notification under s. 6 follow~ng
the notification under s. 4(1)
with respect to the land to which
s. 17(1) applies while another notification under s. 6 with respect
to land to which s. 17(1) does not apply can follow after the enquiry
under s. 5-A.
So section 17(4)
does not necessarily mean that
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M. P. STATE v. v. p. SHARMA (Wanchoo, I.)
569
there can be two notifications under s. 6 where the provisions of
that section are to be utilised, for, the government can from the
beginning issue two notifications under s. 4 and follow them up
by two declarations under s. 6. But even assuming that it is possible to make two declarations under s. 6 (though in view of what
we have said above this is not necessary and we express no final
opinion about it) where the land to be acquired is both of the kind
mentioned ins. 17(1) and also of the kind not comprised therein,
all that the government can do in those circumstances after one
notification under s. 4 (l) comprising both lands is to issue one
notification under s. 6 comprising lands coming within s. 17(1)
and another notification under s. 6 with respect to land not coming
within s. 17(1) sometime later after the enquiry under s. 5-A is
finished. This however follows from the special provisions contained ins. 17(1) and (4) and in a sense negatives the contention
of the appellant based only on ss. 4, 5-A and 6. It may be added
that that is not the position in the present case. Therefore even
if it were possible to issue two notifications under G. 6 in the special
circumstances arising out of the application of s. 17( 4), all that
is possible is to issue one notification relating to land to which
s. 17( 1) applies and another notification relating to land to which
s. 17(1) cannot apply. Further if both these kinds of land are
included in the notification under s. 4(1), the issue of two notifications under s. 6 follows from the special provisions contained
ins. 17(1) ands. 17(4) and not from the porvisions of ss. 4, 5-A
and 6. The present is not a case of this kind, for the notification
under s. 4(1) in this case issued in May 1949 did not contain any
direction relevant to s. 17(4). It is true that the declaration under
s. 6 dated August 12, 1960 contains a direction under s. 17(4),
but the effect of that merely is to allow the government to take
possession of the land within 15 days after the issue of notice under
s. 9(1).
This is on the assumption that a direction under s.