# STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH v. RANOJIRAO SHINDE & ANR

- **Citation:** [1968] 3 S.C.R. 489
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1968-03-21
- **Case number:** Civil Appeals Nos. 1730 .and 1731of1966
- **Bench:** M. Hidayatullah, R. S. Bachawat, C. A. Vaidialingam, K. S. Hegde, A. N. Grover
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/state-of-madhya-pradesh-v-ranojirao-shinde-anr-4435
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

Constitution of India, Arts, 19(1)(/), (5) and 31-Enactment abolishing cc.oh grant-If violative of Art. 19(1)(/) and 31(2)-Choses in
action and money, i/ could be acquired under Art. 31(2).
Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Cash Grants Act (M.P. 16 of 1963)-
lf violates Art. 19(l)(f) or Art. 31(2) of the Constitution.
'The appellant.State abolished by an executive order cash grants payable by it. This order was quashed by this Court. Thereupon the State
passed the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Cash Grants Act, 1963 to abolish
the c~b grants, but provided for the payment of certain comjlensation to
the grantees-;-respondents. Tho respondents challenged the vires of the
Act before the High Court The High Court held the Act to be ultra
vires of Art. 19(1) (f) of the Constitution and not saved by sub-Art.
(5) thereof. In appeals by certificate, this Court,
HELD : ·The Act is either violative of Art. 31 (2) or, in the !lltemative, Art. 19(1)1f) of the Constitution. (490 F]
Choses in action and money could not be acquired under Art. 31(2}.
If it is held that State by the exercise of its pOwer of eminent domain can
acquire choses in action and money belonging to its . citizens, by paying
a fraction of the money taken as compensation, the fundamental right
gnaranteed under Art. 19(1 )(f) would be deprived of all its contents and
that Article will cease to have any meaningful purpose.
Article 31(2)
must be construed harmoniously with .Art. 19(1)(1). If so constr'Jed,
it is obvious that the public purpose contemplated by the Article does not
include enrichment of the colfe'rs of the State. Further the compensation•
referred to in Art. 3112) is the just equivalent of the value of the property
taken. (495 E-H]
A law which authorises the State to deprive a persOn of bis property
must be a valid law. It must not violate Art. 19(1)(f) which means that
it must satisfy the r~uirements of Art. 19(5). The word "law" used in Art.
31(1) 'indicates its limitations and refers back to Art. 19 and any law
made under Art. 31( I) can be sustained only if the restrictions it imposes,
are reasonable and in the interest of general public. The Act which empowers the State to approp'riate some one else's property for itself solely
with a view to augment the resources of the State cannot be considered
as .a reasonable restriction in the interest of the general public. If Art.
19(5) is inteqireted to mean that the State can take by authority of law
anyone's property for the purpose of increasing its assets or revenues, the
g\Jarantee gjveli by Art. 19(1)(f) would become illusory [496 D-497 _El
Madhorao Phalke v. State of Madhya Bharat [1961) I S.C.R. 957,
Kamuhwar Prasad v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1962 S.C, 1166, Stale of
Bihar v. Kcmeshwar Singh, [1952) S.C.R. 889, Kavalappara Kottarathil
Kochunl v. State of Madril$, [1960] 3 S.C.R. 887, followed.
Bombav Dyein11 and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v.
State of Bombay,
[1958] S.C.R. 1122, referred to.
I
-490
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1968] 3 s.c.R.

## Text

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STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
v.
RANOJIRAO SHINDE & ANR.
March 21, 1968
[M. HIDAYATULLAH, C.J., R. S. BACHAWAT, C. A. VAIDIALINGAM,
K. S. HEGDE AND A. N. GROVER, JJ.]
Constitution of India, Arts, 19(1)(/), (5) and 31-Enactment abolishing cc.oh grant-If violative of Art. 19(1)(/) and 31(2)-Choses in
action and money, i/ could be acquired under Art. 31(2).
Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Cash Grants Act (M.P. 16 of 1963)-
lf violates Art. 19(l)(f) or Art. 31(2) of the Constitution.
'The appellant.State abolished by an executive order cash grants payable by it. This order was quashed by this Court. Thereupon the State
passed the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Cash Grants Act, 1963 to abolish
the c~b grants, but provided for the payment of certain comjlensation to
the grantees-;-respondents. Tho respondents challenged the vires of the
Act before the High Court The High Court held the Act to be ultra
vires of Art. 19(1) (f) of the Constitution and not saved by sub-Art.
(5) thereof. In appeals by certificate, this Court,
HELD : ·The Act is either violative of Art. 31 (2) or, in the !lltemative, Art. 19(1)1f) of the Constitution. (490 F]
Choses in action and money could not be acquired under Art. 31(2}.
If it is held that State by the exercise of its pOwer of eminent domain can
acquire choses in action and money belonging to its . citizens, by paying
a fraction of the money taken as compensation, the fundamental right
gnaranteed under Art. 19(1 )(f) would be deprived of all its contents and
that Article will cease to have any meaningful purpose.
Article 31(2)
must be construed harmoniously with .Art. 19(1)(1). If so constr'Jed,
it is obvious that the public purpose contemplated by the Article does not
include enrichment of the colfe'rs of the State. Further the compensation•
referred to in Art. 3112) is the just equivalent of the value of the property
taken. (495 E-H]
A law which authorises the State to deprive a persOn of bis property
must be a valid law. It must not violate Art. 19(1)(f) which means that
it must satisfy the r~uirements of Art. 19(5). The word "law" used in Art.
31(1) 'indicates its limitations and refers back to Art. 19 and any law
made under Art. 31( I) can be sustained only if the restrictions it imposes,
are reasonable and in the interest of general public. The Act which empowers the State to approp'riate some one else's property for itself solely
with a view to augment the resources of the State cannot be considered
as .a reasonable restriction in the interest of the general public. If Art.
19(5) is inteqireted to mean that the State can take by authority of law
anyone's property for the purpose of increasing its assets or revenues, the
g\Jarantee gjveli by Art. 19(1)(f) would become illusory [496 D-497 _El
Madhorao Phalke v. State of Madhya Bharat [1961) I S.C.R. 957,
Kamuhwar Prasad v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1962 S.C, 1166, Stale of
Bihar v. Kcmeshwar Singh, [1952) S.C.R. 889, Kavalappara Kottarathil
Kochunl v. State of Madril$, [1960] 3 S.C.R. 887, followed.
Bombav Dyein11 and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v.
State of Bombay,
[1958] S.C.R. 1122, referred to.
I
-490
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1968] 3 s.c.R.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 1730
.and 1731of1966.
Appeals from the judgment and order dated August 18, 1964
.of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Misc. Petition Nos. 21
.and 22 of 1963 (G.).
I. N. Shroff, for the appellant (in both the appeals).
B. Sen, P. W. Sahasrabuddhe, S. K: Dholakia and A. G.
Ratnaparkhi, for the respondent (in both the appeals).
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Hegde, J. In these connected appeals by certificates the ques·
non that arises for decision is whether the Madhya Pradesh Abo·
lition of Cash Grants Act of 1963 {Act No. XVI of 1963) is
.ultra vires the provisions of tbe Constitution. The respondents in
these appeals were entitled to receive cash grants from tbe Government of Madhya Pradesh. The impugned Act abolished such
grants but provided for the payment of certain compensation to tbe
:grantees. The respondents <;hallenged the vires of the Act before
the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Miscellaneous Petitions
Nos. 21 and 22 of 1963, on various grounds. The High Court
rejected ;111 the contentions advanced on behalf of the respondents
excepting one namely that the Act is ultra v/res of Art. 19(l)(f)
of the Constitution and is not saved by sub-Art. (5) thereof. After
-Obtaining from the High Court certificates under Art. 133(1)(c),
the State of Madhya Pradesh has filed these· appeals. The State
is challenging the correctness of the decision of the High Court to
·the extent it went against it.
The respondents on their part, in
addition to supporting the findings of the High Court which are
in their favour, relied also on the other pleas taken by them before
the High Court.
As we are of the opinion that the impugned
Act is either violative of Art. 31 (2) or, in the alternative, Art.
19(1) (f) of the Constitution, we have not !bought it necessary
to go into the other contentions ta_ken on behalf of the respondents.
Before the impugned Act was enacted, the State of Madhya
Bharat which forms part of the new State of Madhya Pradesh,
purported to abolish the cash grants payable by it by ineans of
an executive order. That order was unsuccessfully challenged by
Madhorao Phalke and others before the High Court.
But in appeal this Court in Madhorao Plialke v. State of Madhya Bharat(')
·quashed the order in question. holding that the grants in question
were recognised by the kalambandis of 1912 and 1935 issued by
the Rulers of Gwalior and those knlambandis are existing laws
within the meaning of Art. 372 of the Constitution and consequently the same could not be abrogated by means of an executive
·order. Jt may be noted that in that appeal, the appellant challeng-
(1) [1961] I S.C.R. 957.
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M.P. STATE v. RANOJIRAO (Hegde, I.)
491
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ed the order in question on two grounds, namel>:-(1) tha~ as his
right to receive the cash grant had been statutorily recognised by
the State of Gwalior, it was not open to the Government of Madhya
Bharat to extinguish that right merely by an executive ord~r, and
(2) that that right being property the same could not be dives_ted
without payment of compensation under Art. 31 of the Constitution. This Coun allowed the appeal on the first ground ~~ consequently it did not <jeal with the second. After the dec1s1on of
this Court in that case, the impugned Act was enacted by the
Madhya Pradesh legislature on April 5, 1963. It received the
assent of the President on July 25, 1963 and was published in
the Madhya Pradesh Gazette Extraordinary on August 2, 1963.
The Act comes into force on such date as the Government may
by notification appoint. Even before that notification was issued,
the petitions from which these appeals arise were instituted in ·the
High Coun. We are given to understand that in view of those.
petitions, the Act has not yet been brought into force.
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The long title of the Act says that it is an Act to provide for
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the discontinuance of cash grants in Madhya Pradesh and to make
provisions for other matters connected therewith. It contains
twelve sections. Section 11 sets out the short title, extent and commencement of the Act. Section 2 defines some of the expressions
found in the Act.
Section 3 is the most important section. It
purports to abolish certain cash grants. · Section 4 provides for
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statement of claims by the grantees. Section 5 provides the manner of determining the compensation payable. Section 6 prescribes that appeal, revfsion and review under the Actto be in. accordance v.ith Madhya Pradesh Act No. 20 of 1959. Section 7 provides for the determination of disputes as regards the title of any
grantee. Section 8 bars the jurisdiction of civil courts to . issue
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an i~junction against any person in respect of any proceedings
pendmg before the competent authority under s. 5 which shall
have the effect of staying the proceedings.
Section 9 prescribes
the quantum of compensation payable. Section 10 deals with the
mode of payment of compensation.
Section 11 empowers the
State Government to make rules for carrying out all or any of
the purposes of the Act.
Section 12 says that if any difficulty
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arises in giving effect to the provisions of the Act, the State Government may by order make such provisions not inconsistent v.ith
the purposes of this Act as appears to be necessary or expedient
for removing the difficulty.
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In these appeals we are mainly concerned with the vires of s
3 read ""!tit the defin_ition of "cash grant" in s. 2(1 ).
If sectio~
3 read with s. 2(1) 1s held to be ultra vi1'11s of the Constitution,.
then the who!~ Act falls t? .the gro~ll~ as the rell!aining sections
of the Act are merely subsidiary or mc1dental provisions. Section
L7Sup.C.J/68-7
492
SUPREMB COURT JUlPOllTS
(1968] 3 S.C.R.
3 ( •) provides that notwithstanding anything contained in any
law, custom, usage, sanad or a decree or order of a court or other
authority whatsoever, all cash grants shall be discontinued and
cease to have effect from the commencement of this Act.
But
the proviso thereto makes certain exceptions with which we are
not concerned in this case.
The case of the respondents falls
within the main part. They do not have the benefit of the proviso. A cash grant as defined in s. 2 (1 )( ••) includes a grant of
(*) '
13. Abolition of certain cash grtin1s-(_t) Notwithstanding anything
contained in any law, custcm, usage. sanad or a decree or order of a ccurt or
other authority whatscever, all cash grants shall be disc_ontinued and cease-to
have effect from th~ commencement of this Act ;
Provided that where the grantee is a person specified in column (1) of the
Table below~hecashgrantmay, at the option ofthe grantee exercised in such
rnal}ner, within such period and in such fonn as may be prescribed, be continued
sub1ect to the contlitions and· during the Period mentioned in the corresponding
entry in column (2) of the said Table~
TABLE
(!)
(i) A widow
{ii) A minor
(a) in the case of a male
{b) in the case of a female
(iii) A person above the age of 60
years.
(2)
So long as she remains a widow.
Till the date he attain& 21 years Qf
age.
Till the date of her marriage or till
she attains 21 years of age, which·
ever is earlier.
DUl'iDg his life ·time.
(iv) A person· subject to physical During his life time.
"disability or ·mental . infirmity
owin'g to which he is incapable of
earning his Uvelihood.
· (2) Upcn th~ disc.>ntinu1nc~ of a cash grant under su~ection (1), it shall
not bJ obligatory on the grantee to perform the function or discharge the duty, if
an"y attached to such grant".
c••) "2(1)-'Cash grant' means a grant of money which is enforcea,,le by
th'e grantee against the State Government on the c:Iate of the coming into force
-0f this Act but does not include-
(i) a grant of money for-
(a) services of public temPles, mosque or .church; .or (b) W'?rship ~r
public temples, mosque or.church; or (c) readingpuran in pubhc
temples; or (d) pcrformirig Kirlan in public temples;
(ii) a grant of money to charitable or religious institutions;
(111') a grant of. money or pension or annuity or special or perpetual annuity
sanctio.ned under-
(i:i) s. S .of the Central Provine<.& and Berar Revocation of Land Revenue Exemptions Act, 1948 (XXXVII of 1948);
(b) s. 77 or s. 81-A of the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary
Rights (Estate~ Mahals Alienated Lands) Act, 19SO (1 of 1951);
(c) s. 41 of the Vindhya Pradesh Abolition of Jagirs and Land Reforms
·
Act, 1952 {XI of 1952);
(d) the orders relating to Jagirs in Bhopal 'lhekam Khosravi, 1949,
para 30' read with s. 45-A of the· Bhopal Abolition of Jagirs and
Land Reforms Act, 1953 (No. X of 1953); and
(e) sub-s. (2) of s. 160 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code,
1959, (20 of 1959);"
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M.P. STATE v. RANOJIRAO (Hegde, !.)
493
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money which· is enforceable by the grantee against the State Goverliment on the date of the coming into force of the Act but does
not include those granis which are specifically excluded.
This
definition takes in all the cash grants whatever may be the nature
or origin of those grants. The definition of a cash grant is wide
enough to include cash grants sanctioned by ex-Rulers in lieu of
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J agirs or other properties resumed or even payments agreed to be
made in lieu of loans given to the Rulers.
Different considerations may arise if the grants abolished are gratuitous payments,
grants in lieu of services to be rendered or other resumable grants.
But as mentioned earlier, the definition of cash grants in s. 2(1)
does not make any distinction between the various types of cash
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grants.
Hence, the said definition will have to stand or fall as
a whole, there being no basis for severing some out of the several
grants included therein. It is impennissible for this Court to rewrite that clause ·and confine the definition only to such of the
cash grants which the legislature might be competent to abolish.
The doctrine of severability is applicable only if it is possible
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to separate the legal from the unconstitutional portion of the provision. If it is not possible to do so, the entire provision has to be
struck down as unconstitutional. see Kameshwar Prasad v. State
of Bihar(').
The High Court has come to the conclusion that a "cash
grant" is property within the meaning of that expression in Arti1:
cles 19(l)(f) and 31. This conclusion was not challenged before
us. It is obvious that a right to a sum of money ·is property.
There was controversy before the High Court whether the
abolition of cash grants under the Act . can be considered as acquisition under Art. 31 (2). It was urged before that Court on
behalf of the State that that abolition of cash grant amounted
I' to compulsory acquisition of property f<JI'. public purpose and as
the Act has prescribed the compensation payable to grantees the
acquisition in question is completely protected by Art. 31(2). The
High Court replied this contention opining that as the law in
question cannot be considered as having transferred the rights of
the grantees as proyided in Art. 31 (2A) the State cannot seek
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the protection of Art. 31 (2). This conclusion is debatable. It
is possible to view the discontinuance of the payment of cash
grants under s. 3 as a statutory transfer of rights of the grantees
to the State. But there is no need to pursue this line of reasoning
for reasons to be stated presently. Though the language of Art.
31 (2) prima facie comprehends movable properties including
choses in action and money there are valid grounds to hold that
H · choses in action and money are outside the reach of Art 31 (2).
In the United States of America, opinion is divided among the
(I) A.!.R.1962 S.C. 1166.
494
SUPREME COUllT REPOllTS
[1968] 3 s.c.R.
jurists whether money and choses in action can be acquired in
the exercise of the power of eminent domain though the prepondel:'llllce of opinion appears to be that it is impermissible.
But
so far as we are concerned; this question is concluded by the decisions of this Court. In State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh(1)
this Coun held that under Art. 31 (2) of the Constitution, money
and choses in action could not be acquired. Mahajan, J. (as he
then was), speaking for the majority, after quoting with approval
certain passages from Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, observed (at pp. 943-44 of the Report) :
"It was not necessary to decide in this case whether
under the comp_ulsory acquisition power the State has
the power to acquire choses in action or money, but
it cannot be seriously disputed that such an acquisition
amounts to a forced loan and that the desired result
can be more appositely obtained in exercise of the police
power of the State than of the power of eminent
domain or compulsory acquisition of property and that
compensation in such a case is the same amount of
money that is being taken and in the case Of a chose
in action the amount of money that it would produce.
In this situation it cannot be. held that fifty per cent of
the outstanding arrears
was compensation
in
any
sense of that expression for this acquisition. The true
position is that the State took over all the arrears and
decided to ·refund fifty per cent of them and forfeit the
rest. The validity of this acquisition has to be decided
independently of the acquisition of the estates. It has no
connection with land reform or with any public purpose. It stands on the same footing as other debts due
to zamindars or their other movable properties, which
it was not the object of the Act to acquire. As already
stated, the only j)urpose to support this acquisition ·is
to raise revenue t6 ·pay compensation to some of the
zamindars whose e5tates are being taken.
This piirp0se does not fall within any definition, however wide,
of the phrase 'public purpose' and the law therefore to
this extent is unconstitutional."
In the same case, Mukherjea, J. (as he then was) observed:
"Taking money under the right of emineni domain
when it must · be compensated by money afterwards,
could be nothing more. or less than a forced loan and it
is difficult to say that it comes under the head of acquisi-
(1) (!952) S.C.R. 889.
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M.P. STATE v. RANOJ.IRAO (Hegde, J.)
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lion or requisitioning of property •.•• and is embraced
within its ordinary connotation."
Chandrasekhar Aiyar 1., in that very case held that though money
and choses in action are movable property and would prima facie
come under the power of compulsory acquisition the power under
Art 31 (2) could not be used to support such acquisition "on
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the ground that generally speaking there would be no public purpose in their acquisition"'.
The majority view in that case was
followed by this Court in Bombay Dyeing and Manufacturing Cb
Ltd. v. The State of Bombay(1 ). That case considered the validity of s. 3 (1) of the Bombay Labour Welfare Fund Act which
provided that there should be constituted a fund called the Bouie
bay Labour Welfare Fund and notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the same specified in sub-s. (2) ihereof shall be paid into the fund. Section 3
(2) provided inter alia :
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"The Fund shall consist of :-
(a) all fines realised from the employees;
(b) all unpaid accumulation."
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The Court held following the decision of this Court in State of
Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh(') that the provision in question is,c _
invalid and is not protected by Art 31 (2).
;.
From the above decisions it follows that choses in action anif': '
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money could not be acquired under Art. 31 (2). If it is held that
State by the exercise of its power of eminent domain can acquire
choses in action and money belonging to its citizens, by paying
a fraction of the money taken as compensation, the fundamental
right guaranteed under Art. 19(1 )(f) would be deprived of all ilS' _
contents and that Article will cease· to have any meaningful p111-f ·
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pose.
The power conferred under Art. 31 (2) is not a taxing-<
power.
That power cannot be _utilised for enriching the coffers(
of the State. _ It is true that the abolition of tbe cash grants would'
augment the resources of the State but that cannot be considered
•as a public purpose under Art. 31 (2). If it is otherwise it would
be permissible for the legislatures to enact laws acquiring the public debts due from the State, the annuity deposits returnable by
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it and provident fund payable by it by providing for the payment
of some nominal compensation to the persons whose rights are
acquired as the acquisitions in question would augment the resources of the State. But nothing so bad can be said to be within
contemplation of Art. 31 (2).
That Article must be construed
harmoniously with Art. 19(1)(f).
If so construed, it is obvious
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that the public purpose contemplated by that Article does not include enrichment of the coffers of the State. Further the compensation referred to in Art. 31 ( 2) is, as held by this Court in various
(I) [1958] S.C.R. 1122.
(2) !1952] S.C.R. 889.
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SUPREME COURT llBPOllTS
[1968] 3 S.C.R.
decisions, is the just equivalent of the value of the property taken.
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If for every rupee acquired fifty paisas or less is made payable as
compensation the vi()lation of Art. 31 (2) would be patent and
in tliose circumstances the exercise of the powers by the legislature
would be considered as a fraud on its powers and consequently
the legislation will be struck down as a colourable piece of legisla-
~
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It is true that in State of Bihar v. K.ameshwar Singh(') and in
Bombay Dyeing and Manufacturing Co Limited v. Stat8 of Bom·
bay('), this Court was considering the question of taking of monoy
by the State that was in the hands of others, but in this case we
are. concerned with the abrogation of the liability of the Government. But we fail to see any difference in principle in these two
sets: of cases. In the former case the Government was compulsorily taking others' property and in the latter it seeks to appropriate to itself the property of others which is in its hands.
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It was next urged that the impugned Act, even if it is held not
to be protected by Art. 31(2) is still valid under Art. 31(1). The
said Article says that no person shall be deprived of his property
save by authority of law.
A law which authorises the State to
deprive a person of his property must be a valid law.
It must not
violate Art. 19(1 )(f) which means that it must satisfy the requirements of Art. 19(5). In Kava/appara Kottarathi Kochuni v.
State of Madras(•) this Court laid down that the word "law"
used by Art. 31(1) indicates its limitations and refers back to
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Art. 19 and any law made under Art. 31 (1) can be sustained
only if the restrictions it imposes are reasonable and in the inteD
rest of the general public, . The Act which empowers the State to
appropriate some one else's property for itself solely with a view
to augment the resources of the State, cannot be considered as a
reasonable restriction in the interest of the general public. That
conclusion of ours receives support from the ratio of the decisions of this Court in State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh(') and
in Bombay Dyeing and Manufacturing Co. Limited v. Stale of
Bombay(') wherein Venkatarama Aiyar, J.
speaking for the
Court, observed :
"Assuming that the correct position is what the respondents contend it is that the case falls within Art.
19(l){f), the question that has still to be determined is
whether the impugned Act could be supported under
Art. l 9(S). There was some discussion before us as to
the scope of this provision, the point of the debate being
whether the words _'imposing
reasonable restriction'
(I) [1952) S.C.R. 889.
(2) (1958) S.C.R. 1122.
(3) [1960] 3 S.C.R. 887,
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M,P, STATE v. RANOJIRAO (Hegde, J,)
497
would cover a legislation, which not merely regulated
the exercise of the rights guaranteed by Art. 19(1 )(f) but
totally extinguished them, and whether a law like the
present one which deprived the owner of his properties
could be held to fall within that provision. It was argued
that a law authorising the State to seize and destroy
diseased cattle, noxious drugs and the like, could not
be brought within Art. 19 ( 5) if the word 'restriction'
was to be narrowly construed, and that accordingly . the
power to restrict must be held to include, in appropriate
case&, the power to prohibit the exercise of the right.
That view does find support in the observations of Lord
Porter in Commonwealth of Australki v. Bank of New
South Wales(') :
but the present legislation cannot
be sustained even on the above interpretation of the
word "restriction", as s. 3 ( 1) of the Act. deals· with
moneys and money cannot be likened to diseased cattle
or noxious drugs so as to attract the exercise of police
power under Art. 19 ( 5). It appears to us that whether
we apply Art. 31(2) or Art, 19(5), the impugned Act
cannot be upheld and it must be struck down."
If Article 19(5) is interpreted to mean that State can take by authority of law anyone's property for the purpose of increasing its
assets or revenues, the guarantee given by Art. 19(1)(f) would
become illusory, a proposition to which this Court cannot subscribe.
For the reasons mentioned above we are unable to uphold
the validity of Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Cash Grants Act. .
These appeals accordingly fail and are dismissed with costs with
one set ol hearing fee.
Y.P.
Appeals disriwed.
(I} (1950] A.C. 235.