# STATE OF MAHARASHTRA ETC v. MADHA VRAO DAMODAR PATILCHAND AND ORS. ETC

- **Citation:** [1968] 3 S.C.R. 712
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1968-04-10
- **Case number:** Civil Appeals Nos. 2239 to 2250 of 1966
- **Bench:** M. lln>AYATULLAH
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/state-of-maharashtra-etc-v-madha-vrao-damodar-patilchand-and-ors-etc-4336
- **Pages:** 12

## Headnote

J, c. SHAH,
s. M. SIKRI,
R. S. BACHAWAT,
G. K. MITTER, C. A. VAIDIALINGAM
.
AND K. S. HEGDE, JJ.]
Constitution 'of Jndic, 1950, Art. JIB-Maharashtra Act 13 of 1962
amending the Maharashtra State Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act (27 of 1961)-1961 Act mentioned In Ninth Schedule, but
not amending Act-Amending Act if protected by Art, JIB-Seventeenth
Amendment, if valid-Entry 35, of List II of Seventh Schedule-Scope
of-Order passed under Defence of India Rules, r. 12SB-lf overrides
s. 28 of the Maharashtra Act 27 of 1961.
The Maharashtra State Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act,
1961, as amended by Act 13 of J962, was passed for securing the distri·
bution of agricultural land to subserve the common good by imposing
a ceiling on the holding of agricultural land. Section 28 of the Act is,
intt7 alia, concerned with ensuring supply of sugarcane to factories and
ensurin~ that the persons to whom surplus land is granted, after it has
vested 1n the State Government, also supply it at fair price.
The Godavari Sugar Mills was a public limited company owning two
factories fOlr the manufacture of ·sugar and allied prequels and held large
area• of land for the purpese of cultivation of sugarcane for its factories.
Jn proceedings under the Act, large areas of land held by the Mills were
declared surplus. The valid'ty of the Act was challenged on the following grounds: (I) Article 31B does not protect the Amending Act 13 of
1962 from challenge on the ground of violation of fundamental rights,
because, in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution as amended by the
Constitution (Seventeenth) Amendment Act, 1964, only the Maharaahtra
Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961, was included and
not the Amending Act of 1962, (2) Jn spite of the detjsion of this Court
in Go/ak Nath v. State of Puniab, (1967] 2 S.C.R. 762, the Seventeenth
Amendment is invalid; (3) The State Legislature was not competent to
enact the impugned Act; and ( 4) The order passed by the Sta•e Govern.
ment under r. l 25B of the Defence of India
Rules.· teserving certain
areas for the factories mentioned by the schedule to the order--One of
which was Mills-and prohibWng (a) the working of certain power
crushers, (b) the export of sugarcane from the reserved areas except in
accordance with a permit issued by the Collector, and (c) the purchof sugarcane for crushing or for manufacture of gur, gul or jaggery by
a khandsari unit or by a crusher not belonging to a grower or body of
growers of sugarcane except in accorda'lce with a permit issued by the
Collector, rendered ineffective s. 28 of the impugned Act.
HELD: (I) Even on a strict interpretation of Art. 31B the only requirement laid down by the Article for protecting an enactment from
challenge on the ground . of violation of fundamental rights is that the
Act should be specified in the Ninth Schedule. Ordinarily, if an Act is
referred to by its title, it means the Act with all the amendments made
in it up to the date of reference, and there is no reason for not applying
this rule of interpretation to the Ninth Schedule. Certain amending Acts
are, no doubt, mentioned in the Ninth Schedule, but the only reason for
A
B
c
0
E
F
G
H
MAHARASHTRA V. PATILCHAND
713
A
inserting them expressly was that some States, out of abundant caution,
recommended their amending Acts to be specifically inserted in the
Ninth Schedule. (719 D-E, F, H; 720 C-D]
B
Observations in Shri Ram Narain v. Tlw Simla Banking and Industrial Co. Ltd., [1956) S.C.R. 603, 614, explained.
(2) The result arrived at in Go/aknath's case was that the Se...,nteenth
Amendment was valid and this result is binding on this Bench of this
Court. (721 CJ
( 3) The impugned Act, apart from s. 28, is a law with respect to
Entry 18 of List II which deals with 'Land etc.' and Entry 42 of List ID,
which deals with 'Acquisition and Requisition of Property.' Section. 28
itself falls within Entry 35 of List II which deals with 'Works, laru!S and
buildill,11

## Text

•
712
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA ETC.
v.
MADHA VRAO DAMODAR PATILCHAND AND ORS. ETC.
April 10, 1968
[M. lln>AYATULLAH, C.J.,
J, c. SHAH,
s. M. SIKRI,
R. S. BACHAWAT,
G. K. MITTER, C. A. VAIDIALINGAM
.
AND K. S. HEGDE, JJ.]
Constitution 'of Jndic, 1950, Art. JIB-Maharashtra Act 13 of 1962
amending the Maharashtra State Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act (27 of 1961)-1961 Act mentioned In Ninth Schedule, but
not amending Act-Amending Act if protected by Art, JIB-Seventeenth
Amendment, if valid-Entry 35, of List II of Seventh Schedule-Scope
of-Order passed under Defence of India Rules, r. 12SB-lf overrides
s. 28 of the Maharashtra Act 27 of 1961.
The Maharashtra State Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act,
1961, as amended by Act 13 of J962, was passed for securing the distri·
bution of agricultural land to subserve the common good by imposing
a ceiling on the holding of agricultural land. Section 28 of the Act is,
intt7 alia, concerned with ensuring supply of sugarcane to factories and
ensurin~ that the persons to whom surplus land is granted, after it has
vested 1n the State Government, also supply it at fair price.
The Godavari Sugar Mills was a public limited company owning two
factories fOlr the manufacture of ·sugar and allied prequels and held large
area• of land for the purpese of cultivation of sugarcane for its factories.
Jn proceedings under the Act, large areas of land held by the Mills were
declared surplus. The valid'ty of the Act was challenged on the following grounds: (I) Article 31B does not protect the Amending Act 13 of
1962 from challenge on the ground of violation of fundamental rights,
because, in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution as amended by the
Constitution (Seventeenth) Amendment Act, 1964, only the Maharaahtra
Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961, was included and
not the Amending Act of 1962, (2) Jn spite of the detjsion of this Court
in Go/ak Nath v. State of Puniab, (1967] 2 S.C.R. 762, the Seventeenth
Amendment is invalid; (3) The State Legislature was not competent to
enact the impugned Act; and ( 4) The order passed by the Sta•e Govern.
ment under r. l 25B of the Defence of India
Rules.· teserving certain
areas for the factories mentioned by the schedule to the order--One of
which was Mills-and prohibWng (a) the working of certain power
crushers, (b) the export of sugarcane from the reserved areas except in
accordance with a permit issued by the Collector, and (c) the purchof sugarcane for crushing or for manufacture of gur, gul or jaggery by
a khandsari unit or by a crusher not belonging to a grower or body of
growers of sugarcane except in accorda'lce with a permit issued by the
Collector, rendered ineffective s. 28 of the impugned Act.
HELD: (I) Even on a strict interpretation of Art. 31B the only requirement laid down by the Article for protecting an enactment from
challenge on the ground . of violation of fundamental rights is that the
Act should be specified in the Ninth Schedule. Ordinarily, if an Act is
referred to by its title, it means the Act with all the amendments made
in it up to the date of reference, and there is no reason for not applying
this rule of interpretation to the Ninth Schedule. Certain amending Acts
are, no doubt, mentioned in the Ninth Schedule, but the only reason for
A
B
c
0
E
F
G
H
MAHARASHTRA V. PATILCHAND
713
A
inserting them expressly was that some States, out of abundant caution,
recommended their amending Acts to be specifically inserted in the
Ninth Schedule. (719 D-E, F, H; 720 C-D]
B
Observations in Shri Ram Narain v. Tlw Simla Banking and Industrial Co. Ltd., [1956) S.C.R. 603, 614, explained.
(2) The result arrived at in Go/aknath's case was that the Se...,nteenth
Amendment was valid and this result is binding on this Bench of this
Court. (721 CJ
( 3) The impugned Act, apart from s. 28, is a law with respect to
Entry 18 of List II which deals with 'Land etc.' and Entry 42 of List ID,
which deals with 'Acquisition and Requisition of Property.' Section. 28
itself falls within Entry 35 of List II which deals with 'Works, laru!S and
buildill,11> vested in or in the po!ISOSSion of the State,' as that section only
C
deals with lands which have vested in the State. The'refore, the · State
Legislature was competent to pass the enactment. [721 F-0; 722 A.CJ
D
E
F
( 4) If an order made under the Defence of India Rules is in conJlict
with the provisions of s. 28 of the impugned Act, the order would ovemde
the section. But the order passed by the State Government, in the instant
case, was not in conllict with the section and the two could stand together.
(722 G-Hl
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 2239
to 2250 of 1966.
Appeals from the judgment and order dated October 25; 1963
of the Bombay High Court in Special Civil Applications Nos. 970,
884, 692, 963, 959 and 1124 to 1130 of 1963 and Civil Appeal
No. 694 of 1967.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated March 9, 10, 1965
of the Bombay High Court in Special Civil Application No. 1642
of 1963.
C. K. Daphtary, Attorney-General, M. S. K: Sastri and S. P.
Nayar, for the appellant (in C.A. Nos. 2239 to 2250 of 1966).
F. S. Nariman, D. S. Nargo/kar and K. R. Chaudhuri, for the
respondents (in C.A. No. 2239 of 1966).
R. V. S. Mani, for intervener No. 1 (in C.A. No. 2239 of
G
1966).
D. P. Singh, for intervener No. 2 (in C.A. No. 2239 of 1966).
F. S. Nariman, Bhuvanesh Kumari, 0. C. Mathur, Ravinder
Narain, D. M. Popat, S. I. Thakore and B. Part"4sarathy, for the
appellants (in C.A. No. 694 of 1967).
H
C. K. Daphtary, Attorney-General and S. P. Nayar, for respondents Nos. 1 to 3 (in C.A. No. 694 of 1967). ·
S, K. Mehta, for the intervener (in C.A. No. 694 of 1967).
114
SUPREME COURT REPOllTS
[1968) 3 S.C.R.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Sikri, J.-This judgment will dispose of Civil Appeal No. 694
of 1967 and Civil Appeals Nos. 2239-2250 of 1966.
·
In September 1963, the appellants in Civil Appeal No. 694
of 1967 filed a ·petition under Arts. 226 and 227 of the
Constitution (Special Civil Application No. 1642 of 1963) in the
B
High Court of Judicature at Bombay challenging the validity of
the Maharashtra State Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings)
Act, 1961 (Maharashtra Act XXVII of 1961) as amended by
Maharashtra Act Xffi of 1962-hereinafter referred to as the
impugned Act.
The first appellant is a public limited company
and ciwns two factories for the manufacture of sugar and allied
products situate at Taluka Kopergaon in Ahmednagar District
C
of the State. of Maharashtra. The first appellant also held large
areas of land in several villages in Taluka Kopergaon for the purpose of cultivation of sugarcane for its factories. In the proceedings under the impugned Act large areas held by the first appellant
were declared surplus.
Various persons had earlier filed similar petitions in the High
I>
Court challenging the validity of the impugned ~t. The High
Court by Its judgment dated October 25, 1963, disposed of them.
The High Court held that "the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands
(Ceilings on Holdings)• Act, 1961, is a valid piece of legislaticin
and Within the competence of the State Legislature to enaet, except
that the provisions of s. 2.8 thereof offend Art. 14 of the ConstituE
tion and are void.
The effect· of our decision however would
not be to entitle the petitioners to get any declaration that their
lands which are held by an induStrial undertaking are exempt
from the operation of the Act nor that the orders passed by the
first respondent on the 28th of February 1963 are null. and vold
and have no legal effect. The lands will vest in the State but they
F
will not be entitled to deal With the lands under any of the provisions of s. 28." The High Court, subject to the above declaration, dismissed the petitions. The State having obtained certificates of fitness under Art. 132(1) of the Constitution filed appeals
Nos. CA 2239-2250 of 1966 against the above mentioned judgment.
G
After this judgment, the Constitution was amended by the
Constitution (Seventeenth) Amendment Act, 1964-hereinafter
referred to as the Seventeenth Amendment-which came into
force on June 20, 1964. This amendment included 44 more
Acts, as items 21 to 64, in the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution. Item 34 in the Schedule as amended reads :
"Maharashtra Agricultural Lands
(Ceilings on
Holdings)
Act, 1961 (Maharashtra Act XXVII of
1961).
H
A
D
E
G
H
MAHAllASHTRA v. PAT!LCHAND (Sikri, J.)
Tl 5
The petition of the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 694 of 1967
(Special Civil Application No. 1642 of 1963) was dismissed by
the High Coun by its judgment dated March 10, 1965. The
High Coun held that the Seventeenth Amendmen.t had put s. 28
and other provisions of the impugned Act beyond challenge on
the ground that they were inconsistent with or take away or
abridge any fundamental rights. The High Court also held that
the impugned Act was not rendered inoperative because ot ·the
Defence of India Act, 1962, and the Rules made thereunder.
The appellants having obtained certificate of fitness under
Art. 133(l)(a) have appealed.
·
Mr. F. S. Nariman, who .appears for the appellants in Civil
Appeal No. 694 of 1967 and for the respondents in Civil Appeals
Nos. 2239-2250 of 1966 submits the following.points before as:
( 1) That Art. 3 lB does not protect from challenge
on the ground of violation of fundamental rights the
provisions of Acts amending the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceilings on Holdings) Acts, 1961, as originally enacted :
(2) That the Seventeenth Amendment in spite of
the decision of this Court in I. C. Go/ak Nath v. State
of P11njab(') is invalid;
(3) That the State Legislature was not competent
to enact the impugned Act in so far as it affects sugarcane farms held by Industrial undertakings and lands on
'vhich sugarcane is grown; and
(4) ·That the Defence of India Act (LI of 1962)
and the Rules made thereunder override or render in·
effective s. 28 of the impugned Acl
In order to appreciate the points raised before us it is necessary to notice the scheme of the impugned Act and set out the
;:elevant provisions.
The preamble of the impugned Act gives broadly the general
purpose of the Act. It reads :
"Whereas, for securing the distribution of agricul·
tural land as best to subserve the common _good, it is
expedient in the public interest to impose a maximum
limit (or ceiling) on the holding of agricultural land in
the State of Maharashtra; to provide for the acquisition
of land held in excess of the ceiling, and for. the distribution thereof to landless and other persons; and for
II) (1967 2S.C.R. 762.
l
.!
' '
716
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[l 968] 3 s.c.R.
matters connected with the purposes aforesaid; it is
A
hereby enacted •.•• "
The provisions of the impugned Act carry out these objectives by
imposing a ceiling on holding of land (Chapter II) and determination, declaration and vesting of surplus land (Chapter IV).
Chapter V deals with determination and payment of compensation. Chapter VI deals with distribution of surplus land. ChapB
ter VII is concemed with procedure and appeal, and in-Chapter
VIII various miscellaneous provisions are made. We may notice
s. 21, s. 27 and s. 28 in detail. lfnder s. 21 the Collector makes
a declaration stating therein his decision, inter alia, on the area,
description and full particulars of the land which is delimited as
surplus land. Under sub-s. (2) the Collector notifies this area,
C
and under sub-s. ( 4) after a lapse of a certain time the Collector
takes possession of the land which is delimited as surplus. The
elfect of thus taking possession, in brief, is that '.'the surplus land
shall be deemed to be a<;guired by the State GOvernment for the
purposes of the Act and shall accordingly vest fu the State Govem·
ment." Section 27 directs distribution of surplus land in the
I>
~of priority set out in sub-ss. (2), (3), (4) and (5), For
instance, sub-s. (2) gives priority to a tenant who was rendered
. landless because the person to whom the surplus land belonged
had resumed land from his tenant for pel'SQnal cultivation under
any tenancy law.
Sub-s. (5) provides:
"(5) Thereafter all surplus land (including surplus land which has not been gran~ under sub-section
(2) or ( 3) . or ( 4) shall be olfered in the following order
of priority, that is to say,-
. (i) a petson from whom any land has been resumed by his landlord for pel'SQnal cultivation under any
tenancy Jaw .and who in consequence thereof has been
rendered landless, provided that such persQn is a resident of the village in which die surplils land for distri~
blition is si"!ate, or within five miles thereof;
( i-a) serving members of the armed forces, and ex
servicemen;
. (i·b) a joint fanning society or a farming society,
the members of which answer to any of the following
descriptions, namely :-
(i) serving members of the aniled forces,
(ii) ex-servicemen,
(iii) agriculfural labourers,
(iv) landless persons, or
( v) small holders;
F
G
H
..
•
A
B
c
MAHARASHTRA v; PATILCHAND (Sikri, /.)
717
Provided that the majority of members of such
society are serving members of the armed forces or exservicemen;
(ii) a joint farming society, the members of which
answer to the one or more of the following descriptions,
namely:-
agricultural labourer or
landless person or
small holder;
(iii) a farming society, the members of which answer to the one or more of the following descriptions,
namely:·-
agricultural labourer or
landless person or
small holder;".
Section 28 which is the subject matter of special attack
D
provides:
"28 (1) Where any land held by an industrial
undertaking is acquired by, and vests in, the State
Government under section 21, such land being land
which wail being used for the purpose of producing or
providing raw material for the manufact\lre or produc1:
tion of any goods, articles or commodities
by the
undertaking, the State Goveniinent shall take particular
care to ensure that the 3C'1Uisition of the land does not
affect adversely the production and supply of raw material from the land to the undertaking.
F
G
H
(2) Notwithstanding any'lhing contained in section
27, but subject to any rule8 made in this behalf, for the
purpose of so ensuring the continuance of the supply
of such raw material . to the undertaking, and generally
for the full and efficient use of the land for agriculture
and its efficient management, the State GoVemment-
( a) may, if it is in the opinion . of that Government necessary for the purpose aforesaid (such opinion
being formed after considering . the representation of
persons interested therein) maintain
the integrity of
the area so acquired, in one or more compact blocks; -
and
(b) may, subject to such terms and conditions
(including in particular, conditions which are calculated
to ensure the full and continuous supply of raw mate-
·riai to the Ulldertaking, at a fair price), grant the land,
718
SUPl.EMB COUl.T llBPO&TS
[1968] 3 S.C.ll·
or any part thereof, to a joint farming· socioty (or a
member thereof) consisting as far as possib~ of-
( i) persons who had previously leased such land to
the undertaking,
(ii) agricultural labour (if any) employed by the
undertaking on such !and,
(iii) technical or other stall engaged by the undertaking on such land, or in relation: to the production of
any raw ll!aterial,
(iv) adjoining landholders who are small holders,
( v) landless persons :
Provided that, the State Government may-
( a) for such period as is necessary for the setting
up of joint farming societies as aforesaid, being not
more than three years in the first instance (extensible
to a further period not exceeding two years} from the
date of taking possession of the land, direct that the
.land acquired, or any part thereof, shall be cultivated
by one or more fanns run or managed by the State, or
by one or more corporations (including a company)
owned or controlled by the State;
(b) grant to the landlord so much of the surplus
land leased by him to the undertaking, which together
with any other land held by him does not exceed the
ceiling area (but if the landtord be a public trust and
and major portion of the income from t.he land is being
appropriated for purposes of education or ~edical relief,
grant the entire land to the public trust} on condition
that the landlord, or as the case may be, the public trust
lease the land to a farm or corporation described in
clause (a) aforesaid, and thereafter, in the case of a
landlord (not being a public trust) that he becomes a
member of the joint farming society, and in the ~
of
a public trust, that it lease the lafid to a joint farming
society.
( 3) The State Government may provide that,-
( a) for the breach of any term oi condition referred
to in clause (b) of sub-section (2), or
(b) if the landlord to whom the land is granted fails
to lease the land to the farm or corporation or to become a member of a joint farming society; Qr
( c) if it considers after such inquiry &j it thinks
fit, that the production and supply of raw material to
A
B
c
;--"
D
E
,
F
G
H
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
MAHARASHTRA V. PATILCHAND (Sikri, J.)
719
the undertaking is not maintained at the level or in the
manner which, with proper and efficient management
it ought to be maintained, or
( d) Jor any other reason it is undesirable in the
interest ci~ the full and efficient cultivation of the land,
that the joint farming society should continue to cultivate the land,
the grant shall, after giving three months' notice of
termination thereof and after giving the other party
reasonable opportunity of showing cause, be terminated,
and the land resumed.
Thereafter, the State Government may make such other arrangements as it thinks fit
for the proper cultivation of the land and maintenance
of the production and supply of raw material to the
undertaking."
Regarding the first point raised by the learned counsel for the
appellant, it seems to us that the High Court was right in holding
that Art. 3 lB does protect the impugned Act from challenge on
the ground of violation of fundamental rights.
There is no doubt
that Art. 3 lB should be interpreted strictly. But even interpreting it strictly, the only requirement which is laid down by Art. 31B
is that the Act should be specified in the Ninth Schedule.
Now
the question arises whether the impugned Act has been specified
in the Ninth Schedule or not. It is true that what is mentioned
in entry 34 of the Ninth Schedule is "The Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961 (Maharashtra Act
XXVII of 1961)" which may be referred to as the Principal Act.
and no mention is made of the Amending Act, namely, Maharashtra Act XIII of 1962. Ordinarily if an Act is referred to by
its title, it is intended to refer to that Act with all the amendments
made in it upto the date of reference.
For instance, the Constitution refers to 'the General Clauses Act, 1897, in Art. 367. This
Article provides that "unless the context otherwise requires, the
General Clauses Act, 1897. shall, subject to any adaptations and
modifications that may be made therein under Ariicle 372, apply
for the interpretation cif this Constitution as it applies for the
interpretation of an Act of the Legislature of the· Dominion of
India." If the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is accepted it would mean that for the purposes of the interpretation of the Constitution the General Clauses Act, as originally enacted in 1897, would alone be taken into consideration.
We can hardly imagine that this was the intention of the Constit11tion makers.
Further, when one refers to the Code of Civil Procedure or the Criminal Procedure Code or the Indian Penal Code
one ordinarily ·means to refer to them as amended up to date.
There is no reason why this ordinary manner of referring to Act>
720
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1968) 3 s.c.R.
should not be borne in mind while interpreting the Ninth
Schedule.
It is true that some amending Acts are mentioned in the Nmth
Schedule apart from the principal Acts. For example, the Madras
Estate (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari)
Act,
1948
(Madras Act XXVI of 1948) is mentioned in item 9, while the
Madras Estates
(Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari)
Amendment Act, 1950 (Madras Act I of 1950) is mentioned in
item 10. Further item 20 specifically mentions the West Bengal
Land Development and Planning Act, 1948 (West Bengal Act
XXI of 1948), as amended by West Bengal Act XXIX of 1951.
But then there ate many other Acts which had be•:n amended
before they were inserted in the Ninth Schedule, anc; Ne can hardly imagine that Parliament intended only to protect the Acts as
original!y passed and not the amendments made up to the date of
their incorporation into the Ninth Schedule. The. reason for this
express insertion of certain amending Acts seems to be that some
States, out of abundant caution, recommended that their amending
Acts be specifically inserted in the Ninth Schedule. It is true that
for some purposes an amending Act retains its jndividua!ity, as
observed by Jagannadhadas, J., in Shri Ram Narain v. The Simla
Banking and Industrial Co. Ltd. (1) :
"In the present case what we are concerned with is
not the meaning of any particular phrase or provision
of the Act after the amendment but the effect of the
amending provisions in their relation to and effect on
other statutory provisions outside the Act.
For such a
purpose the amendment cannot obviously be treated as
having been part of the original Act itself so as to enable the doctrine to be called in aid that a later Act
overrides an earlier Act."
These observations, however, do not lead to the conclusion that
when an Act is referred to by its title it is not intended to include
the amendments made in it.
Accordingly we must overrule the first submission made by
the learned counsel for the appellant and hold that Art. 3 lB protects the impugned Act including the amendments made in it upto
the date of its incorporation into the Ninth Schedule.
The impugned Act cannot, therefore, be challenged on the ground that
it violates Arts. 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution. We, accord-.
ingly, agree with the High Court that s. 28 which was originally
held by the High Court to violate Art. 14 of the Constitution is
now protected under Art. 31B from attack on the ground that it
infringes Art. 14.
(I) (19S6] S. C.R. 603, 614.
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
R
MAHARASHTRA v, PATILCHAND (Sikri, /,)
721
Coming to the second point, the learned counsel merely mentions the point.
He says that there was no majority for any particular ratio as five Judges held the Seventeenth Amendment to be
void because it contravened Art. 13(2), but by applying the doctrine of "prospective overruling" they declared that their decision
would not affect the validity of the Seventeenth Amendment.
Hidayatullah, J., as he then was, on the other hand did not apply
the doctrine of "prospective overruling", but held s. 3 ( 2) of the
Seventeenth Amendment to be bad. The other five Judges held
that the Seventeenth Amendment was a valid amendment of the
Constitution.
We are, however, bound by the result arrived at
by this Court in that decision and the result that the Seventeenth
Amendment is valid is binding on us.
We may mention that
Mr. Mani, appearing for one of the interveners, also raised this
point but ultimately asked for permission to be allowed to withdraw 'the point.
Coming to the third point, the learned counsel for the appellant contends that s. 28 is a law with respect to entry 52 of List I,
and therefore beyond the competence of the State Legislature.
The entry reads thus :
"52. Industries, the control of which by the Union
is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the
public interest."
He points out that one of the industries specified in the Schedule
to the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 (LXV
of 1951) is "sugar''. He says that the whole object of s. 28 of
the impugned Act with regard to lands held by industrial undertakings who were producing sugarcane was to ensure the production of sugarcane and its supply to the sugar factories and this
object falls squarely within entry 52, List I. In the alternative
he urges that the State Legislature had no authority to legislate
adversely on matters falling within item 52. There is no doubt
that the impugned Act, apart from s. 28, is a law with respect
to entry 18 of List II and entry 42 of List III. These entries read
as follows:
"Entry 18, List II :
Land, that is to say, rights in or over land, land
tenures including the relation of landlord and tenant, and
the collection of rents, transfer and alienation of agricultural land, land improvement and agricultural Joans;
colonization.
Entry 42, List III :
Acquisition and Requisition of property."
It is' no tseriously disputed that apan from s_. 28 the rest of
the impugned Act is a law with respect to entry 18, List II and
entry 42 List III. .
722
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1968] 3 S.C.R.
It is not necessary to consider whether s. 28 can be sustaini:d
-0n the ground that it is an ancillary or subsidiary matter to the
Jaw made under entry 18 List II and entry 42, List III, for, in our
.opinion, s. 28 falls within entry 35 list II, which reads :
"Works, lands and buildings vested in or in the
possession of the State."
It will be noticed that s. 28 only deals with lands which have
vested ip the State.
There cannot be any doubt that the Stat"
Legislature is competent to enact provisions regarding the production and supply of raw materials from land which bas vested in
the Stale and for the full and efficient use of such 'land and ic;
efficient management.
Coming now to the last point, the learned counsel for the
appellants urges that by virtue of Art. 251 of the Constitution
s. 28 can no longer be effective as it is repugnant to the Defence
of India •Act and the Rules made thereunder. He says that under
s. 3(2) (26) of the Defence of India Act, 1962, the Central Government is enabled to make orders providing for "the control of
agriculture (including the cultivation of agricultural land and
crops to be raised therein) for the purpose of increasing the pro·
duction and supply of foodgrains and other essential agricultural
products."
By notificalion dated October 30, 1963, the Govern··
ment of Maharashtra made an order whereby it "reserved each of
the areas specified in coJumn ( 3) of the Schedule hereto annexed
for the factory respectively specified against it in column
(2)
thereof'', and made other provisions regarding the purchase and
export of sugarcane. In the Schedule the following areas w~r~
made reserved areas for the appellant, the Godavari Sugar Mills
Limited:
;'Areas comprised within the limits of the following
talukas.
·
(i) Kopergaon of Ahmednagar District.
(ii) Shrirampur of Ahmedabad District."
This order was made by the Government of Maharashtra in the
exercise of its powers under r. 125-B of the Defence of India
Rules.
The learned counsel is right that to the extent valid orders made
under the Defence of India Rules conflict with the provisions in
s. 28, the orders would override s. 28 of the impugned Act. But
it has not been shown to us on the material available here how the
order dated October 30, 1963, is in conflict withs. 28.
The order
first reserves certain areas for the factories mentioned in the Sche·
dule, and then prohibits the working of certain power crushers and
·also prohibits the export of sugarcane from the reserved area;
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
A
B
c
MAHARASHTRA V. PAT!LCHAND (Sikri, J.)
723
except in accordance with a pennit issued by the Collector of the
District. It furtjler prohibits the purchase of sugarc1111e for crushing or for manufacture of gur, gul or jaggery by a khandsari unit
or by a crusher not belonging to a grower or body of growers of
sugarcane except under and in accordance with a permit issued by
the CoJ!ector.
Section 28, inter alia, is concerned with ensuring
the supply of sugarcane to the factories and ensuring that the persons to whom -the land is granted also supply it at fair price. It
seems to us that the provisions of s. 28 can stand together with
the order dated October 30, 1963. In our opinion there .is no
force in the point raised by the learned counsel.
In the result Civil Appeal No. 694 of 1967 is dismissed. The
other appeals
(Civil Appeals Nos. 2239-2250 of 1966) are
allowed, judgment of the High Court, insofar as it declared s. 28
void, set aside and the petitions out of which these appeals arose
dismissed. There will be no order as to costs in all the appeals.
V.P.S.
C.A. No. 694 of 1967 dismissed,
other appeals allowed.