# STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS v. RELIANCE INDUSTRIES LTD. & ORS

- **Citation:** [2017] 10 S.C.R. 330
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2017-09-15
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 1699 of2007
- **Bench:** Arun Mishra, Mohan M. Shantanagoudar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/state-of-maharashtra-ors-v-reliance-industries-ltd-ors-31614
- **Pages:** 60

## Headnote

Land Acquisition Act, 1894:
C
ss. 3(a) and 49 - Acquisition of part of building - Without
acquiring land underneath such building - When the ownership of
the land lies with the Government - Permissibility- Held: Definition
of 'land' under s. 3 (a) is of wide connotation - The definition includes
benefits arising out of land and things .attached to the earth or
D permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth - Since the
owner of the building is different from the owner of the land, and if
portion of that building is required/or public purpose, it is open to
the State to acquire that portion of building u!s. 49 - Only the interest
belonging to the owner has to be acquired - Government itse(f being
the owner of the land, is not required to acquire the land - It was
E required only to acquire the private interest (in the building) - Such
acquisition would not amount to overreach of the State's power of
eminent domain or violation of Art. 300A of the Constitution -
Constitution of India - Art. 300A.
F
Interpretation of Statutes:
Rules of interpretation - Interpretation must depend on the
text and context - A statute is best i11te17Jreted when one knows why
it was enacted - The Act must be looked at as a whole and
discovered, what each Section, each clause, each phrase and each
word was meant and designed to say as to fit into the Scheme of the
G entire Act - No part or word of statute can be construed in isolation.
H
Words and Phrases:
/iVord 'includes' - Meaning of; in the context of s. 3(a) of
Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
330
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS. v. RELIANCE
331
INDUSTRIES LTD. & ORS.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
A
HELD: 1. The definition of land is of wide connotation. It
cannot be construed in narrow sense to render provisions. of the
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 otiose or impracticable. The definition
of "land" u/s. 3(a) of Land Acquisition Act is inclusive and it
includes benefits arising out of land, and things attached to the
B
earth or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth.
Provisions of Section 49 of the Act make it clear besides the
inclusive definition under Section 3(a), that there can be
acquisition of part of b.uilding or house and owner has the option
to express his desire that the whole of it should be acquired and c
not the part, as the case may be. The court has the power to
decide on a question being referred under the second proviso,
whether land proposed to be taken forms part of the house,
manufactory or building. The court has to take into consideration . ·
the question whether land proposed to be taken is reasonably
required for the full and unimpaired use of the house, manufactory D
or building. If the court holds otherwise, obviously the possession
of the land shall not be taken. There can be acl}uisition of the
house or building or manufactory under the provisions of Section
49(1) or acquisition of part. It is not a case where any of the owners
of the building has desired that whole 'or building be acquired. In
case such intention would have been expressed, it would have
been incumbent to acquire the whole of the building. [Paras 12,
16 and 19] [342-F, G-H; 344-E-G; 349-B]
Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay & Ors. v.
Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. (1991) Supp. 2 SCC 18:
[1990] 3 Suppl. SCR 365; P. Rami Reddy & Ors. v.
State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. (1988) 3 SCC 433:
[1988] 1 Suppl. SCR 443; Mrinalini Roy & Ors. v. State
of West Bengal & Ors. 1975 (1) CLJ 57 - relied on.
2.1 The definition of land in section 3(a) is inclusive. It has
E
F
to be seen in the context of each and every provision in the Act
G
to find out as to the meaning to be given to the inclusive definition.
By the interpretation given to the word 'land', there is no
question of taking away very meaning of the land but the acquisition
of the right in the land can only be with respect to the right of the
H
332
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2017] 10 S.C.R.
A owner. Obviously, only the interest belonging to the owne

## Text

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A
B
[2017] 10 S.C.R. 330
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS.
v.
RELIANCE INDUSTRIES LTD. & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 1699 of2007)
SEPTEMBER 15, 2017
[ARUN MISHRA AND
MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, JJ.J
Land Acquisition Act, 1894:
C
ss. 3(a) and 49 - Acquisition of part of building - Without
acquiring land underneath such building - When the ownership of
the land lies with the Government - Permissibility- Held: Definition
of 'land' under s. 3 (a) is of wide connotation - The definition includes
benefits arising out of land and things .attached to the earth or
D permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth - Since the
owner of the building is different from the owner of the land, and if
portion of that building is required/or public purpose, it is open to
the State to acquire that portion of building u!s. 49 - Only the interest
belonging to the owner has to be acquired - Government itse(f being
the owner of the land, is not required to acquire the land - It was
E required only to acquire the private interest (in the building) - Such
acquisition would not amount to overreach of the State's power of
eminent domain or violation of Art. 300A of the Constitution -
Constitution of India - Art. 300A.
F
Interpretation of Statutes:
Rules of interpretation - Interpretation must depend on the
text and context - A statute is best i11te17Jreted when one knows why
it was enacted - The Act must be looked at as a whole and
discovered, what each Section, each clause, each phrase and each
word was meant and designed to say as to fit into the Scheme of the
G entire Act - No part or word of statute can be construed in isolation.
H
Words and Phrases:
/iVord 'includes' - Meaning of; in the context of s. 3(a) of
Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
330
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS. v. RELIANCE
331
INDUSTRIES LTD. & ORS.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
A
HELD: 1. The definition of land is of wide connotation. It
cannot be construed in narrow sense to render provisions. of the
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 otiose or impracticable. The definition
of "land" u/s. 3(a) of Land Acquisition Act is inclusive and it
includes benefits arising out of land, and things attached to the
B
earth or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth.
Provisions of Section 49 of the Act make it clear besides the
inclusive definition under Section 3(a), that there can be
acquisition of part of b.uilding or house and owner has the option
to express his desire that the whole of it should be acquired and c
not the part, as the case may be. The court has the power to
decide on a question being referred under the second proviso,
whether land proposed to be taken forms part of the house,
manufactory or building. The court has to take into consideration . ·
the question whether land proposed to be taken is reasonably
required for the full and unimpaired use of the house, manufactory D
or building. If the court holds otherwise, obviously the possession
of the land shall not be taken. There can be acl}uisition of the
house or building or manufactory under the provisions of Section
49(1) or acquisition of part. It is not a case where any of the owners
of the building has desired that whole 'or building be acquired. In
case such intention would have been expressed, it would have
been incumbent to acquire the whole of the building. [Paras 12,
16 and 19] [342-F, G-H; 344-E-G; 349-B]
Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay & Ors. v.
Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. (1991) Supp. 2 SCC 18:
[1990] 3 Suppl. SCR 365; P. Rami Reddy & Ors. v.
State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. (1988) 3 SCC 433:
[1988] 1 Suppl. SCR 443; Mrinalini Roy & Ors. v. State
of West Bengal & Ors. 1975 (1) CLJ 57 - relied on.
2.1 The definition of land in section 3(a) is inclusive. It has
E
F
to be seen in the context of each and every provision in the Act
G
to find out as to the meaning to be given to the inclusive definition.
By the interpretation given to the word 'land', there is no
question of taking away very meaning of the land but the acquisition
of the right in the land can only be with respect to the right of the
H
332
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2017] 10 S.C.R.
A owner. Obviously, only the interest belonging to the owner has
to be acquired and as per Section 49 of the Act, there can be
acquisition of the part of the house, building or manufactory. Once
option has not been exercised by the owner by insisting that whole
of the building be acquired, it would be only of the interest which
B is existing in the part of building, house or manufactory. [Paras
20, 25) [349-B-C; 354-E-G]
c
D
C.l.T. Andhra Pradesh v. Mis. Taj Mahal Hotel,
Secunderabad (1971) 3 SCC 550; S.K. Gupta & Ors.
v. K.P Jain & Anr. (1979) 3 SCC 54 : (1979] 2 SCR
1184; P Kasilingam & Ors. v. PS.G. College of
Technology & Ors. (1995) Supp. 2 SCC 348 : [1995] 2
SCR 1061 - relied on.
Jagir Singh v. State of Bihar (1976) 2 SCC 942 : [1976]
2 SCR 809; Reserve Bank of India v. Peerless General
Finance & Tnvestment Co. Ltd. & Ors. (1987) 1 SCC
424 : [1987] 2 SCR 1 - held inapplicable.
2.2 Interpretation must depend upon the text and the
context. They are the basis of interpretation. If the text is the
texture, context is what gives the colour. Neither can be ignored.
Both arc important. That interpretation is best which makes the
E
textual interpretation match the contextual. A statute is best
interpreted when one knows why it was enacted. If the statute is
looked at, in the context of its enactment, with the glasses of the
statute-maker, provided by such context, its scheme, the sections,
clauses, phrases and words may take colour and appear different
F
than the statute is looked at without glasses provided by the
context. The Act must be looked at as a whole and should be
discovered what each section, each clause, each phrase and each
word is meant and designed to say as to fit into the scheme of the
entire Act. No part of a statute or word of a statute can be
construed in isolation. [Para 27] [355-B-D]
G
2.3 The Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was enacted since the
Act of 1870 was found entirely ineffective for the protection either
of the persons interested in lands taken up or of the public purse.
The object of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was to amend the
then existing law for acquisition of law for public purpose and to
H determine the adequate amount of compensation to be paid on
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS. v. RELIANCE
333
INDUSTRIES LTD. & ORS.
account of such acquisition. The word 'includes' has been A
interpreted by looking at the definition as a whole in the scheme
of the entire Land Acquisition Act and by reference to what
preceded the enactment and the reasons for it. (Paras 28, 29]
355-E-F]
2.4 The word 'include' is opposite to the word 'exclude'. If B
the interpretation as suggested by the respondents is accepted,
then the definition of the land could not become an inclusive
definition but the definition of "land" excludes certain factors.
The expression 'land' includes benefits arising out of the land
and things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to
anything attached to the earth. The portion of the building cannot C
survive independent of the building and the building without the
land. The word "land" should be understood having been covered
by the elongated definition since it defines with inclusiveness
that part of the building. (Para 29] [355-F-H]
2.5 In the present case, owner of the land is the State D
whereas the owner of the building is a respondent. Since, building
cannot stand without the land, the building also becomes part of
the land. However, since the owner of the building is different
from the owner of the land, and if a portion of the building is
required for public purpose, it is open for the State to acquire
that portion of the building by paying adequate compensation in
respect of that portion of the building, as well as, in respect of
proportionate diminution of the user, if any of the land, under·
Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, in accordance with
law. (Para 30] (356-B-C]
E
F
3. The object of the Act is to compensate the owner
adequately. The purpose of the Act is to make additions for the
public purpose and to award to the owners/ interested persons
compensation in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The
acquisition has been made for the public purpose in the instant
case. When flats can be sold independently, obviously they can
G
be acquired also. As all the rights in the floor are being acquired
and the land beneath it need not be acquired more so it belongs
to the Government, there can be valid acquisition of such floors
independently without land in such cases. [Para 33] [360-E-F;
361-A]
H
334
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2017] 10 S.C.R.
A
Gimar Traders v. State of Maharashtra, 2011 (3) SCC
1 : [2011) 3 SCR 1;
T. L. Prakash Ram Rao v. The
District Collector. Ananthapur & Ors. (1993) 2 AP LJ
421 (HC) - distinguished.
4.1 The instant matters arc of dual ownership. In both the
B cases owners of the building are not the owners of the land. The
land belongs to State of Maharashtra or Port Trust. In such a
situation where the Government is the owner of the site, obviously
Government could not have acquired the land and in the case of
its own ownership, there was no necessity for the acquisition of
C land. [Para 34] [361-C)
Hari Chand & Ors. v. Secretary of State AIR (1939)
PC 235 - relied on.
R. Umraomal & Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu & Anr. AIR
1986 Mad. 63 - approved.
D
4.2 When the Government was having interest in the land
and acquires a land under the provisions of the Land Acquisition
Act, the Government acquires the sum total of private interests
subsisting in them. If the Government has itself an interest in
the land it is only to acquire other interest outstanding therein,
E the Government interest cannot be acquired under the Act though
an investigation can be made of such interest, bl!t that would not
make the subject of acquisition. [Para 41) [367-E-F]
F
G
Collector of Bombay v. Nusserwanji Rattanji Mistri and
Ors. AIR 1955 SC 298 : [1955] SCR 1311; Special
Land Acquisition Officer and Rehabilitation Officer,
Sagar v. M.S. Seshagiri Rao & Anr. AIR 1968 SC 1045
- relied on.
Secretaty of State v. Allahabad Bank Ltd. AIR 1939
All, 34; Raja Shyam Chunder Mardrai & Ors. v. The
Secretary of State for India in Council (1907-08) 12
CWN 569; Dasarath Sahu & Ors. v. Secy. of State AIR
1916 Pat. 330 (1); Makhan Lal & Ors. v. SeCJ'. of State
AIR 1934 All. 260 - overruled.
5. If the ownership of the land with owner of the building
and owner has required by expressing desire that the whole of
H
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS. v. RELIANCE
335
INDUSTRlES LTD. & ORS.
the building w'ith land be acquired. Only then Section 49 of the
A
Act would not empower the acquisition of any building or part
thereof de hors the underlying land. The land upon which the
building is standing need not be acquired and there is no necessity
to acquire it. There can be acquisition of part of the building or
the house or manufactory as the owners have not exercised their B
option to insist for acquisition for whole of the building as such
only the rights which they have in the particular floors are being
acquired. Under proviso to Section 49(1) there can be acquisition
of land beside the part of the building, house or manufactory and
when the land is proposed to be taken, the dispute as to whether
it docs or does not form part of the house, manufactory or building, C
the Collector shall refer · the determination of such question to
the Court. Where part of building that too a multi-storied building
is being acquired, the land need not be acquired more so when
· the owner of building is not the owner of land and his entire
interest in part of building can be acquired. [Paras 44, 49] [373D
A-D; 382-G)
State of Bihar & Am: v. Kundan Singh & Anr. AIR 1964
SC 350 : (1964) SCR 382; S.P. Jain v. Krishna Mohan
Gupta & Ors. (1987) 1 SCC 191 : [1987] 1 SCR 411relicd on.
Jagannath Ganeshram Agrawal & Anr. v. State of
Maharashtra & Anr. AIR 1986 Born. 241 - approved.
Saramma Itticheriya v. State of Kera/a & Ors. AIR 2008
Ker 72 - distinguished.
Harsook Das Bal Kishan Das v First Land Acquisition
Collector (1975) 2 SCC 256 : (1975] Suppl. SCR 79 - .
referred to.
6.1 Article 300A of the Constitution of India interdict taking
of the property for a public purpose without. compensating the
owner for its loss. In case entire ownership of the land does not
E
F
lie with the owner, only the right which is capable of being acquired
G ·
would be acquired not something Which is non-existent. The
building or part can be acquired and there. is no question of
acquisition of the land in such cases. In adjudication of the
compensation as per the provisions of Section 23, the State is
not depriving the respondents of their property. There is
H
336
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2017] 10 S.C.R.
A
acquisition of land by fair procedure along with reasonable
compensation. The action has been taken by the State in
accordance with law. The action is legally justified. Thus, there
1s no question of eminent domain being misused or violation of
provisions of Article 300A. [Para 521 (383-F-Hf
B
c
6.2 It is also not correct to say that owner of the land is
deprived of his ownership rights over the land when the State
purports to acquire only a building or portion thereof standing on
his land, without acquiring the underlying land. The respondents
arc not the owner of the underlying land. Secondly, the acquisition
of a particular floor as per the provision of section 49 of the Act is
permissible and the entire interest of owner in a particular portion
has been acquired for that he would be compensated. It is not
the case of partial acquisition of the interest on a particular tloor.
When without selling the land, in a building, a particular floor can
be sold why there could not be acquisition of particular floor for
D public purpose. [Para 53] [384-A-C]
6.3 The owner has the right to use and enjoy a particular
portion but owner cannot set up a plea for acquisition of an interest
when he does not have that particular right or interest or title.
His right to manage it, right to decide, how it shall be used, right
E
to income from it has to be in accordance with the law. Right of
individual has to give way to the public purpose on being duly
compensated by way of fair procedure. [Para 54] [384-H; 385-A]
7. The entire interest of the owner has to be acquired and
that has been precisely done in the instant case. When land and
F
building once married becomes one unit, neither land nor building
can thereafter be valued separately. But this would not come in
the way of determining the valuation of a particular floor, all the
aspects of the owners interest and the bundle of other rights can
be taken into consideration including support provided by the
land and value of the land in the locality etc. Value of the part of
G the building can also be accordingly assessed. [Paras 57, 58] [386F-G; 388-H; 389-A-B]
H
State of Kera/av. PP. Hassan Kaya AIR 1968 SC 1201 :
(1968] SCR 459 - relied on.
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS. v. RELIANCE
337
INDUSTRIES LTD. & ORS.
State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Prasad 1952 SCR 889;
A
Trisha/a Jain & A11r. v. State of Uttaranchal & Anr.
[2011) 8 SCR 520; Kiran Tandon v. Allahabad
Development Authority (2004) 10 SCC 74- referred to.
Salmond on Jurisprudence, (12"' ed.1966) at pp. 246247, 413 - referred to.
B
Case Law Reference
(1990) 3 Suppl. SCR 365
relied on
Para 17
[1988] 1 Suppl. SCR 443
relied on
Para 18
1975 (1) CLJ 57
relied on
Para 19
c
(1971) 3 sec 550
relied on
Para 20
[1979] 2 SCR 1184
relied on
Para 21
[1995] 2 SCR 1061
relied on
Para 22
(1976) 2 SCR 809
held inapplicable Para 23
[1987] 2 SCR 1
held inapplicable Para 23
D
[2011) 3 SCR 1
distinguished
Para 31
(1993) 2 AP LJ 421 (HC)
distinguished
Para 32
AIR (1939) PC 235
relied on
Para 34
AIR 1986 Mad. 63 .
approved
Para 35
E
AIR 1939 All. 34
overruled
Para 36
(1907-08) 12 CWN 569
overruled
Para 37
AIR 1916 Pat. 330 (1)
overruled
Para 38
AIR 1934 All. 260
overruled
Para 39
[1955] SCR 1311
relied on
Para 41
F
AIR 1968 SC 1045
relied on
Para 42
[1964] SCR 382
relied on
Para 45
AIR 1986 Born. 241
approved
Para 46
[1987) 1 SCR 411
relied on
Para 46
[19751 Suppl. SCR 79
referred to
Para 47
G
AIR 2008 Ker 72
distinguished
Para 47
[1952] SCR 889
referred to
Para 50
[2011] 8 SCR 520
referred to
Para 51
H
338
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2017] IO S.C.R.
A
[1968) SCR 459
(2004) 10 sec 74
relied on
referred to
Para 57
Para 58
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1699
of 2007
B
From the Judgment and Order dated 10.03.2006 of the High Court
of Judicature at Bombay in Writ Petition Nos. 1956 of 1994 and W. P.
No.1384ofl997.
Dr. Kylasanatha Pillai, Nishant Ramakantrao Katneshwarkar,
Ms. DeepaKulkarni, Arpit Rai, Ad vs. for the Appellants.
c
Basava Prabhu S. Patil, K. V. Vishwanathan, Sr. Advs., Kumar
Anurag Singh, Hasan Mw·taza, Alok Kumar, Kumar Shivam, Rajesh
Kumar, Ms. Amrita Sarkar, Ms. Nidhi Agrawal, Ashok Mathur, Advs.
for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
D
ARUN MISHRA, J. I. The State of Maharashtra has come up
in appeal against the common judgment dated I 0.3.2006 passed by the
High Court in two writ petitions being W.P. No.1956/1994 filed by
Reliance Industries Ltd. & another and W.P. No.1384/1997 filed by
Express Newspapers and another against State of Maharashtra and
E
others. In both the cases, part of the building had been sought to be
acquired under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
(hereinafter referred to as "the Act"). In both the cases the owners of
building do not own the land. In Express Newspapers the land belongs
to the Government and in the case of Reliance Industries, the ownership
of the land is with the Port Trust. The question which arises for
F
consideration is whether, under the Act, acquisition of part of the building
can be made without acquiring land underneath to such building. The
High Court has quashed the acquisition, sans the land, as unsustainable.
2. In W.P. No.1956of1994, the premises admeasuring 1478 sq.
mts. on the third floor of the building i.e. "Reliance Centre" at 19,
G Walchand Hirachand Marg, Ballard Estate, Bombay is the premises.
The Controller of Accommodation had requisitioned the said
accommodation under the provisions of section 6(4)(a) of the Bombay
Land Requisition Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as "the Requisition
Act"). It had been allotted for use and occupation by Anti Corruption
H Bureau, Prohibition and Intelligence Bureau of the Government of
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS. v. RELIANCE
339
INDUSTRIES LTD. & ORS. [ARUN MISHRA, J.]
Maharashtra and was also partly occupied by Deputy Controller of A
Rationing, Region-A, Department of Civil Supplies.
3. W.P. No.1679 of 1991 was filed by Reliance Industries Ltd.
challenging the requisition order dated 23.1.1970 in view of the judgment
of this Court, disapproving withholding of requisitioned property for an
unreasonable period of time.
B
4. The State Government issued a notification under section 4 of
the Act to acquire the entire third floor premises admeasuring 167 .SO sq.
mtrs. in the building. Notice was issued for the purpose of an inquiry
under section SA on 28.12.1992 that was served on 02.01.1993. ln pending
writ petition an amendment application was filed to incorporate the c
challenge to the land acquisition proceedings. However, on objections
being filed, the writ petition was disposed of with liberty to challenge the
acquisition proceedings independently. Declaration under section 6 was
issued on 23.6.1994. Notice under section 9 of the Act was issued on
29.7.1994 which was served on 2.8.1994. Thereafter, Reliance Industries
Ltd. filed fresh writ application out of which the present appeal arises.
D
5. In W.P. No.1384 of 1997, the respondent - Express
Newspapers - is the lessee of the land owned by the Government. The
building is known as "Express Building" at Plot No.18, Block No.I; Back
Bay Reclamation, Bombay. The Governor of Bombay had granted the
registered lease on 13.3.1956. The second floor comprised in 4500 sq.ft. - E
was sought to be acquired.
6. Earlier vide order dated 25.9.1968 the said floor of Express
Newspapers building was requisitioned for use of State Government
and was allotted to the 5t11 appellant, i.e., Controller of Rationing, Food &
Civil Supplies Department. Since the requisitioning continued for an unduly
F
long period, Express Newspapers Ltd. filed W.P. No.226911992. During
the pendency of the same, the State Government initiated the acquisition
proceedings by issuing a notification under section 4 with respect to the
second-floor premises admeasuring about 325.15 sq.mtrs. needed for
Food & Civil Supplies Department to accommodate the office of the
G
ControllerofRationing, Food & Civil Supplies. Notice under section 9 of
the Act was issued. Thereafter, declaration issued under section 6 of the
Act was withdrawn. Subsequently, a fresh notification under section 4
was issued on 28. 7. 1996 in relation to the vacant premises of second
floor admeasuring 345.18 sq.mtrs. Objections were filed, an inquiry under
H
340
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2017] 10 S.C.R.
A section SA of the Act was held, followed by a declaration under section
6 which came to be issued on 17.4.1997 and notice under section 9 on
23 .7 .1997. Thereupon, writ petition had been preferred out of which the
appeal arises.
B
7. The High Court has held that without acquisition of land, part
of the building could not be acquired. The definition of'building' in section
3(a) of the Act is an inclusive one. The land would include all benefits
arising out ofland for the purpose of acquisition as well as things attached
to the earth or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth.
In other words, the High Court has held all the structures or the trees or
any material attached or fastened to the land to be acquired, would also
C be the subject matter of acquisition along with such land. But under the
provisions of the Act without the land to which the things are attached or
permanently fastened, such things by themselves and singularly cannot
be the subject matter of acquisition. Though the term 'include' would
D
E
F
G
suggest the definition of "Land" to be exhaustive and extensive, an
interpretation of the term has to be in the context of and cannot be in
isolation. The acquisition under the Act cannot be merely of the benefits
out of or the things attached or permanently fastened to the land without
acquiring the land itself. The High Court has further held that a part of
the house or building which can be acquired in the absence of objection
in that regard by the owner, would necessarily include the land underneath
or appurtenant to such part of the house or building. Merely because
there is dual ownership, it would not mean that acquisition proceedings
under the said Act could be oflimited interest in the land.
8. Against the judgment and order passed by the High Court, the
appeals have been preferred by the State of Maharashtra, this Court
has directed maintenance of status quo. Application for subsequent
events has also been filed indicating that efforts have been made to get
the pre·mises vacated and to withdraw the acquisition proceedings.
However, acquisition has not been withdrawn so far. In our opinion, it is
of no consequence, as acquisition cannot be withdrawn.
9. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants has submitted
that under the Act a part of the building can be acquired without acquiring
the land on which the building has been built. The true pwport and meaning
of the expression 'land' has not been correctly appreciated by the High
Court. It was submitted that part of the building without the land on
H which the building is built, is covered by the expression 'land' as defined
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS. v. RELIANCE
341
INDUSTRIES LTD. & ORS. [ARUN MISHRA, J.]
under the Act. Learned counsel has further submitted that the definition
A
is inclusive definition. It has not been correctly interpreted by the High
Court. Same is of wide amplitude. When the Government or the Port
Trust owns the land and only a part of the building was required, its
acquisition could have been made without acquisition of the land. It was
not necessary for the Government to acquire its own land. Section 49 of B
the Act contemplates the acquisition of not only of a house or building
but also a part of house or building. The concept of dual ownership is
well settled. There is no reason why building itself or part thereof
belonging to an independent owner cannot be acquired. There arc very
many things that can be acquired under the Act without acquiring the
land such as fisheries etc. Government has to acquire what it is capable
of acquiring and not something more that was required to be acquired.
Under section 16 of the Act, property acquired vests with the Government
free from all encumbrances. The term 'encumbrance' means a claim,
lien or liability attached to the property. The persons who are holders of
such encumbrance arc entitled to compensation.
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10. It was submitted on behalf of the respondents that definition
of the 'Land' under section 3(a) of the Act, is inclusive but it does not
define the land to mean "benefits to arise out ofland, and things attached
to the earth or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth".
It was vehemently urged that the inclusive definition couldn '!'take away
the ordinary meaning of 'land'. The definition only provides for what it
E
additionally includes. It was further submitted that the object of the Land
Acquisition Act provides the context in which expression 'land' is to be
interpreted. The Act contemplates the acquisition of the land in the
ordinary sense of the term and a mere building without the underlying
land cannot be acquired under the Act. It was· further submitted that
F
section 49 of the Act does not empower the acquisition of any building
or a part thereof de hors the underlying land. For that reliance has been
placed upon the second proviso to section 49(1). It was also urged by
learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents that acquisition of
a building or a part thereof without acquiring the underlying land would
be an overreach of State's power of eminent domain. The State has an
G
obligation to compensate the owner for his land. This restriction on State's
power is inherent in the doctrine of eminent domain. It was also contended
that owner of the land is deprived of his ownership rights over his land
when the State purports to acquire only a building or part thereof, standing
on his land without acquiring the underlying land. The owner has the
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A right to possess the thing which he owns. He also has a right to use or
enjoy the thing owned. Other's right of ownership also coincides if the
building is compulsorily acquired. No person would want to buy the
underlying land from the owner. Thus, the owner of the land would be
deprived of his right to obtain a fair income or value of the land upon
B alienations. Thus, upon acquisition of a building, State also deprives the
landowner of the right in his land. By not acquiring the land the State
would be avoiding its obligation to compensate the owner for its land .
... Interpretation of section 3(a) of the Act has to be consistent with the
· · 'limitation on the State's power of eminent domain interpreted in Article
300A of the Constitution oflndia.
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11. Following questions arise for our consideration:
I.
Meaning of land under section 3(a) of the Act.
II. Interpretation of term 'includes'.
III. Object and scheme of Act.
IV. Whether State to acquire its own land underneath
building or other interest?
V. Acquisition of part of building without land under section
49 of the Act.
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VI. Violation of Article 300A by acquisition in part.
VII. Whether valuation method of building mandates acquiring
ofland?
!:
In Re : Meaning of land under section 3(a) of the Act
F
12. It is necessary to consider definition of'land'. Section 3(a) of
the Act defines the expression 'land' which is extracted hereunder:
"3. Definitions. - In this Act, unless there is something repugnant
in the subject or context, -
(a) the expression "land" includes benefits to arise out ofland,
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and things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to
anything attached to the earth"
H
The definition of"land" is inclusive and it includes benefits arising
out of land, and things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to
anything attached to the earth.
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS. v. RELIANCE
343
INDUSTRIES LTD. & ORS. [ARUN MISHRA, J.]
13. When we consider the scheme of the Act, section 4 provides
A
that no person shall enter into any building or upon any enc.dosed court or
garden attached to a dwelling house without giving notice in writing for
the purpose of preliminary investigation when the land is required for
public purpose.
14. Section 49 of the Act deals with the acquisition of part of B
house or building. The provision is extracted hereunder:
"49. Acquisition of part of house' or building. - (1) The
provisions of this Act shall not be put in force for the purpose of
acquiring a part only of any house, manufactory or other building,
if the owner desires that the whole of such house, manufactory c
or building shall be so acquired:
Provided also that, if any question shall arise as to whether any
land proposed to be taken under this Act does or does not form
part of a house, manufactory or building within the meaning of
this section, the Collector shall refer the determination of such D
question to the Court and shall not be take posses~ion of such
. land until after the question has been determined.
In deciding on such a reference the Court shall have regard to
the question whether the land proposed to be taken, is reasonably
require for the full and unimpaired use of the house, manufactory
or building.
(2) If, in the case of any claim under section 23, sub-section (1 ),
thirdly, by a person interested, on account of the severing of the
land to be acquired from his other land, the [appropriate
Government] is of opinion that the claim is unreasonable or
excessive, it may, at any time before the Collector has made his
award, order the acquisition of the whole of the land of which
. the land first sought to be acquired forms a part.
(3) In the case lasthereinbefore provided for, no fresh declaration
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or other proceedings under sections 6 to I 0, both inclusive, shall
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be necessary; but the Collector shall without delay furnish a copy
of the order of the [appropriate Government] to the person
interested, and shall thereafter proceed to make his award under
section 11."
,
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15. The provision contained in section 49 makes it clear that there
can be acquisition of part of house or building but if the owner thereof
desires that whole of his house or manufact01y or building shall be so
acquired, the provisions can not be used for the purpose of acquiring a
part only of any house, manufactory or other building and when a part is
proposed to be acquired, owner has right to object that the whole building
or house should be acquired and not the part, and the owner at any time
before the Collector has made his award under section 11, by notice in
writing, withdraw or modify, his expressed desire that the whole of such
house, manufactory or building shall b'e so acquired. Second proviso
makes it clear that if any question arises whether any land proposed to
C be taken under the Act does or does not form part ofa house, manufactory
or building within the meaning of section 49(1 ), the Collector shall refer
the determination of such question to the court and shall not take
possession of it until after the question has been determined, and the
court while deciding such a question whether the land proposed to be
D taken is reasonably required for the full and unimpaired use of the house,
manufact01y or building.
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16. In our opinion, provisions of section 49 of the Act make it
clear besides the inclusive definition under section 3(a), that there can
be acquisition of part of building or house and owner has the option to
express his desire that the whole of it should be acquired and not the
part, as the case may be. The court has the power to decide on a
question being referred under the second proviso, whether land proposed
to be taken forms part of the house, manufactory or building. The court
has to take into consideration the question whether land proposed to be
taken is reasonably required for the full and unimpaired use of the house,
F
manufactory or building. If the court holds otherwise, obviously the
possession of the land shall not be taken. There can be acquisition of the
house or building or manufactory under the provisions of section 49( I)
or acquisition of part. It is not a case where any of the owners of the
building has desired that whole of building be acquired. In case such
intention would have been expressed, it would have been incumbent to
G acquire the whole of the building.
H
17. In Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay & Ors. v.
Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. (1991) Supp. 2 SCC 18 this court had
considered the definition of"land'' which is an inclusive definition and
has observed that its accompaniments are land which is being built upon
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS. v. RELIANCE /
345
INDUSTRIES LTD. & ORS. [ARUN MISHRA, J.]
I
or is built upon or covered with water; benefits to arise out of land;
A
things attached to the earth, This Comi has held thus:
"26 The question then is whether it is a land? Indisputably the
definition of 'land' also is of an inclusive definition. Its
accompaniments arc land which is being built upon or is built
upon or covered with water; benefits to arise out ofland: things
B
attached to the eaiih or pem1anently fastened to anything attached
to the earth and rights created by legislative enactment over any
street. The question is whether the tank is attached to the ea1ih?
In Stroud's Judicial Dictionary (5th edn. Vol. 1) relied on by the
learned counsel for the appellant, the word 'attached' has been
defined at page 217 thus:
C
"This word docs not always mean physically fastened; it may
also mean, superineumbent upon. Thus, in citing the judgment
of Cockburn, C.J., Laing v. Bishopswearmouth, that whatever
is 'attached' to premises has to be estimated for the purpose
of ascertaining its rating value."
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18. The meaning of"land" has also been considered by this Court
in P Rami Reddy & Ors. v. State of'Andhra Pradesh & Ors. ( 1988) 3
SCC 433. This Court has discussed the question that arose in the context
of the meaning of the expression 'land' in paragraph 5(2)(a) of the Fifth
Schedule to the Constitution and section 3( 1) of the Schedule to A.P.
Scheduled Area Land Transfer Regulation, 1959. This Comi has laid
down thus:
"21 Another argument which did not succeed in the High Court
E
has been hopefully persisted with in this Court. The expression
"Land" has been used in its restricted sense in para 5(2)(a) of F
the Fifth Schedule and therefore the impugned provisions
prohibiting the transfer oflands along with structures thereon by
employing the expression "immovable property" is not in
accordance with law. Such is the argument. This argument is
devoid of merit for two reasons: Firstly, there is no reason to
G
believe that "land" has not been employed in its legal sense. The
expression "land" in its legal sense is a comprehensive expression
which is wide enough to include structures,-if any, raised thereon.
While this proposition hardly needs to be buttressed, support can
be sought from the following sources:
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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The Dictionary of English Law [ 1959 edn., Vol. 2, p.l 053 by
Earl Jowitt]
LAND, in its restrained sense, means soil, but in its legal
acceptation it is a generic term, comprehending every species of
ground, soil or earth, whatsoever, as meadows, pastures, woods,
moors, waters, marshes, furze, and heath; it includes also houses,
mills, castles, and other buildings; for with the conveyance of the
land, the structures upon it pass also. And besides an indefinite
extent upwards, it extends downwards to the globe's centre, hence
the maxim, Cujus est so/um ejus est usque ad cae!um et ad
inf'eros; or, more curtly expressed, Cujus est so/um ejus est
a/tum (Co. Litt. 4-a).
Words and Phrases Judicially Defined (By Roland Burrows-Vol.
III, 1944 edn., p.206)
The word "land" would be variously understood by different
D
persons. To a farmer the word "land" would not mean his farm
buildings; to a lawyer the word would include everything that
was upon the land fixed immovable upon it. Smith v. Richmond
per Lord Halsbury, L.C., at p. 448.
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The Law Lexicon
The word "land" is a comprehensive term, including standing
trees, buildings, fences, stones, and waters, as well as the earth
we stand on. Standing trees must be regarded as part and parcel
of the land in which they are rooted and from which they draw
their support.
22. Secondly, to interpret the expression "land" in its narrow
sense is to render the benevolent provisions impotent and
ineffective. In that event the prohibition can be easily
circumvented by just raising a farmhouse or a structure on the
land. The impugned provisions were inserted by the Amending
Regulation precisely to plug such loopholes and make the law
really effective. The High Court was perfectly justified in repelling
this meritless plea. It is therefore not possible to accede to this
submission."
(Emphasis supplied)
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS. v. RELIANCE
347
INDUSTRIES LTD. & ORS. [ARUN MISHRA, J.]
19. A Division Bench of the High Comi of Calcutta considered in
A
Mrina/ini Roy & Ors. v. State of West Bengal & Ors. 1975 (1) CLJ 57
question whether the acquisition of fishery for the purpose ofreclamation
of Southern Salt Lake area was valid or not. It upheld acquisition. The
Court held that fishery is included in the definition of the land. Aforesaid
matter travelled to this Court in Mrinalini Roy Ratna Prova Monda!
B
& Ors. v. State of West Bengal & Ors. (1997) 9 SCC 113, this court
considered the expression 'land' under the Act thus;
"2. It is not necessary to narrate all the facts in these cases.
Sut1ice it to state that notification under Section 4(1) of the Land
Acquisition Act; 1894 (for short "the Act") was published on 145-1956 for reclamation of the fisheries in the lands comprising
C
caqastral plots enumerated in the notification, of an extent
admeasuring more or less 8760.53 acres. Declaration under
Section 6 was published on 5-1-1971 declaring that the land for
the reclamation of the Southern Salt Lake area was published.
We arc concerned presently to an extent of 1495.93 acres only.
It was contended in the High Court and also repeated by Dr S.
Ghosh, learned Senior Counsel, that the "land", as defined under
Section 3(a) does not include fisheries; that is made explicit by
the West Bengal Amendment Act, 1981 bringing fishery within
the ambit of the word "land" .~t would indicate thatthe authorities
have llllderstood that the Act does not apply to acquisition of the
fisheries rights and, therefore, the acquisition was without
authority of law. In support thereof, Dr Ghosh placed reliance
on the judgment of the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court
in Pasupati Roy v: State of WB. [AIR 1974 Cal 99] and State
of WB. v. Suburban Agriculture Dairy & Fisheries (P) Ltd.
[1993 Supp (4) SCC 674] (SCC paras 6, 13, 14 and 16) and in
State of WB. v. Shebaits of lswar Sri Saradia Thakurani
[AIR 197 l SC 2097] (AIR at p. 2098, para 3).