# STATE OF MAHARASHTRA v. KAMAL AHMED MOHAMMED VAKIL ANSARI & ORS - **Citation:** [2013] 5 S.C.R. 128 - **Court:** Supreme Court of India - **Decided:** 2013-03-14 - **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 445 of 2013 - **Bench:** P. Sathasivam Ano Jagdish Singh Khehar - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/state-of-maharashtra-v-kamal-ahmed-mohammed-vakil-ansari-ors-29064 - **Pages:** 72 ## Headnote Evidence Act, 1872 - ss.5 to 16, 17 to 31, 32 and 60 - Appreciation of evidence - Two different cases relating to the 2006 bomb blasts in local trains of Mumbai Suburban Railways - C Separate trials - Different accused in the two cases - Respondents were accused in the first case - Three persons accused in the second case, who were not accused/co-accused in the first case, made confessional statements before officials holding the rank · of Deputy Commissioners of Police who were witnesses in the first D case -Prayer made by respondents to summon the said witnesses as defence witnesses - Tenability - Held: Not tenable - Respondents could not be pennitted to summon said witnesses ,, as defence witnesses, in order to substantiate confessional statements made by the three accused in the second case - Said E witnesses could not vouchsafe the truth or falsity of the confessional statements - Their evidence did not fall within the realm of admissibility with reference to ''facts in issue" or "relevant facts" - Whilst it was pennissible to the accused-respondents to rely on the confessional statements made by the three accused F in the second case, it was open to them to do so only through the persons who had made the confessional statements - Only the three accused in the second case who made the confessional statements could vouchsafe for the same and be produced as defence witnesses by accused-respondents, for their statements fell in the realm of relevance u/s. 11 - And if said three accused G appear as defence witnesses in the first case, protection available to a witness u/s. 132, would also extend to them, if they are compelled to answer questions posed to them, while appearing as defence witnesses - Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime H 128 STATE OF MAHARASHTRA v. KAMAL AHMED MOHAMMED 129 VAKIL ANSARI Act, 1999(MCOCA)-ss.3(1)(ij, 3(2), 3(3), 3(4), 3(5)-IPC-ss.302, A 307, 324, 325, 326, 327, 427, 436, 1208, 121-A, 122, 123, 124A, 201, 212 - Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 - ss.10, 13, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 40 - Explosives Act, 1884 - ss. 6, 98 - Explosive Substances Act, 1908 - ss.3, 4, 5, 6 - Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984 - ss.3, 4 - Railways Act, 1989- ss.151, B 152, 153, 154. Evidence Act, 1872 - ss.5 to 16 - Admissible evidence - Expanse/sphere of - Held: Is postulated in s.5 - Evidence may be given "of every fact in issue" and of such other facts expressly ''declared to be relevant': and of no other facts - ss. 6 to 16 define C "relevant facts': in respect whereof evidence can be given. Evidence Act, 1872 - s.6- Rule of ''res gestae" incorporated in s. 6 -Admissibility under - Determining test - Case regarding bomb blasts in local trains of Mumbai Suburban Railways - Confessions made by accused in another case sought to be D admitted as evidence - Held: The confession_s were not spontaneous reactions arising out the bomb blasts which was the ''fact in issue" and could not be said to have contemporaneously arisen along with bomb blasts, hence, were not admissible under the rule of res gestae. E Evidence Act, 1872 - s. 11 - Realm of relevance under - Held: Facts inconsistent with ''facts in issue" are included in the realm of relevance - Likewise, facts making existence or non-existence of a ''fact in issue" highly probable or improbable, also included in the realm of relevance - In order to be relevant uls. 11, such F statement ought to be "a statement about the existence of a fact': and not 'a statement as to its existence". Evidence Act, 1872 - ss. 17 to 31 - Admissions and confessions -Admissibility and inadmissibility of - Held: An admission or a confession to be relevant must pertain to a "fact G in issue" or a ''relevant fact" - In that sense, s. 5 (and consequently ss.6 to 16) inescapably intertwined with admissible admissions/ confessions - Admissibility of admissions/ confessions, would depend on whether they would fall in the realm of "facts in issue" H 130 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2 ## Text _Characters 0–39,774 of 155,065. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39774 for what follows._ A [2013] 5 S.C.R. 128 STATE OF MAHARASHTRA v. KAMAL AHMED MOHAMMED VAKIL ANSARI & ORS. (Criminal Appeal No. 445 of 2013) B MARCH 14, 2013 [P. SATHASIVAM ANO JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, JJ.] Evidence Act, 1872 - ss.5 to 16, 17 to 31, 32 and 60 - Appreciation of evidence - Two different cases relating to the 2006 bomb blasts in local trains of Mumbai Suburban Railways - C Separate trials - Different accused in the two cases - Respondents were accused in the first case - Three persons accused in the second case, who were not accused/co-accused in the first case, made confessional statements before officials holding the rank · of Deputy Commissioners of Police who were witnesses in the first D case -Prayer made by respondents to summon the said witnesses as defence witnesses - Tenability - Held: Not tenable - Respondents could not be pennitted to summon said witnesses ,, as defence witnesses, in order to substantiate confessional statements made by the three accused in the second case - Said E witnesses could not vouchsafe the truth or falsity of the confessional statements - Their evidence did not fall within the realm of admissibility with reference to ''facts in issue" or "relevant facts" - Whilst it was pennissible to the accused-respondents to rely on the confessional statements made by the three accused F in the second case, it was open to them to do so only through the persons who had made the confessional statements - Only the three accused in the second case who made the confessional statements could vouchsafe for the same and be produced as defence witnesses by accused-respondents, for their statements fell in the realm of relevance u/s. 11 - And if said three accused G appear as defence witnesses in the first case, protection available to a witness u/s. 132, would also extend to them, if they are compelled to answer questions posed to them, while appearing as defence witnesses - Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime H 128 STATE OF MAHARASHTRA v. KAMAL AHMED MOHAMMED 129 VAKIL ANSARI Act, 1999(MCOCA)-ss.3(1)(ij, 3(2), 3(3), 3(4), 3(5)-IPC-ss.302, A 307, 324, 325, 326, 327, 427, 436, 1208, 121-A, 122, 123, 124A, 201, 212 - Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 - ss.10, 13, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 40 - Explosives Act, 1884 - ss. 6, 98 - Explosive Substances Act, 1908 - ss.3, 4, 5, 6 - Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984 - ss.3, 4 - Railways Act, 1989- ss.151, B 152, 153, 154. Evidence Act, 1872 - ss.5 to 16 - Admissible evidence - Expanse/sphere of - Held: Is postulated in s.5 - Evidence may be given "of every fact in issue" and of such other facts expressly ''declared to be relevant': and of no other facts - ss. 6 to 16 define C "relevant facts': in respect whereof evidence can be given. Evidence Act, 1872 - s.6- Rule of ''res gestae" incorporated in s. 6 -Admissibility under - Determining test - Case regarding bomb blasts in local trains of Mumbai Suburban Railways - Confessions made by accused in another case sought to be D admitted as evidence - Held: The confession_s were not spontaneous reactions arising out the bomb blasts which was the ''fact in issue" and could not be said to have contemporaneously arisen along with bomb blasts, hence, were not admissible under the rule of res gestae. E Evidence Act, 1872 - s. 11 - Realm of relevance under - Held: Facts inconsistent with ''facts in issue" are included in the realm of relevance - Likewise, facts making existence or non-existence of a ''fact in issue" highly probable or improbable, also included in the realm of relevance - In order to be relevant uls. 11, such F statement ought to be "a statement about the existence of a fact': and not 'a statement as to its existence". Evidence Act, 1872 - ss. 17 to 31 - Admissions and confessions -Admissibility and inadmissibility of - Held: An admission or a confession to be relevant must pertain to a "fact G in issue" or a ''relevant fact" - In that sense, s. 5 (and consequently ss.6 to 16) inescapably intertwined with admissible admissions/ confessions - Admissibility of admissions/ confessions, would depend on whether they would fall in the realm of "facts in issue" H 130 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 5 S.C.R. A or "relevant facts" - That in tum to be determined with reference to ss.5to 16. Evidence Act, 1872 - ss. 17 to 31 - Admissions and confessions - Held: Are exceptions to the "hearsay" rule - The Evidence Act places them in the province of relevance, B presumably on the ground, that they being declarations against the interest of the person making them, they are in all probability true. Evidence Act, 1872 - ss. 17 to 31 - Admissions and confessions - Admissibility - Held: Person who made the C admission/confession (or afwhose behest, or on whose behalf it was made), should be a parfy to the proceeding because that is the only way a confession can be used against him.' Evidence Act, 1872 - ss. 17 to 31 - Admissions and confessions - Admissibility -· Held: Only such a4missionsl D confessions are admissible Which are made without'any coercion, threat ofpromise. · · · · · Evidence Act, 1872 - ss. 25 and 26 - Confessions made · before a police officer or while in police custody - 1; admissible - E Held: A confession should.be uninfluenced, voluntary and fairAnd since it may not be possible to presume, that admissions/ confessions are tininfli.Jenced, voluntary and fair, i.e., without coercion, threat or promise, if made to a police officer, 'or while in police custody,·· the same are· rendered 'inadmissible. F Evidence Act, 1872 ~ s. 27 -Admissibility under- Held: Gamut of the bar contemplated ulss.25 and 26, is marginally limited by way of a proviso thereto, recorded in s.27 - Thereunder, a confession has been made admissible, to the extent of facts "discovered" on the basis of such confession. · G . Eviqence Act, 1 B72 - ~- 30 .- Ordinarily, a confessional statement is admissible only as against an accused who bas made it- But there is only one exception - Exception provided for in s.30 whereunder a confessional statemenican be used even against a co"a~qused - For such admissibility, the person making H .. the confession 'besides lmpficating himself, should also implicate STAT!= OF MAHARASHTRA v. KAMALAHMED MOHAMMED 131 VAKIL ANSARI others jointly tried with him - In that situation alone, such· a A confessional statement is relevant even against the others implicated. Evidence Act, 1872 - s. 32 - Secondary evidence is permissible when the issue relates to the cause of a person's death, or the circumstances of a transaction which resulted in his B death - But such permissibility, would extend orify:to the exigencies expressly enumerated in s. 32. ' ·.· " ·· -• ' Evidence Act, 1872 - s. 60 - Direct! primary e~idence. - .Oral evidence in respect of a fact, must be of a primary,~atun/;:lt ifvould be evidence of a primary nature, if it satisfies tlie ~tate·_of facts C described as "direct" in s.60 - Oral evidence canno(be hearsay, for that would be indirect/secondary evidence oi the ladtin issue (or the relevant fact). Maharashtra Control of Organise,d C['ime Act,, 1.9~9.- s.18. - 0 Confession made to police officer (not below the rank of Deputy ·• Commissioner of Police) - Admissibility- Interpretation of s.18 - Overriding effect - Held: S.18 of the'MCOCA th'ough a nonobstante clause, overrides the mandate c0ntained in 's's. 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act, by rendering a· confession as admissible, even if !ti~ made to a police officer (pC(.tbelow -~he' rank 'of Dep!lty . E Comm1ss10ner of Po/tee) - However, s. 18 of the MCOCA makes such confessional statements admissible,. only ioi 1¥he trial of such person, or co-accused, abettor or conspirator" - Evidence Abt, 1872 - ss.25 and 26. · , ·• · ·' - · · · · ' . ; ' ~ ' ' .. Maharashtra Control of Orgai:iised _Crim,.e,.t~.qt,,,1999; s.18 - Interpretation of - Strict interpretation - Held: Since s. 18 .of the MCOCA is an exception tC? the role !aid dpwn in ss.25 an~ 26 of the Evidence Act, the same will have to be i(lterpretecl_ strj_c_tly, _and for the limited purpose contemplated t[lereUJJ,der" Evid~nce Act, 1872 - ss. 25 and 26. ~i ' .../I' • • F On 11.7.2006, there were seven bomb blasts·in seven different first class compartments of local trains of Mumbai Suburban Railways which resulted in·the death-of 187 persons and severe injuries to 829 persons. In connection with the said bomb blasts, MCOCA Special Case no.21 of H 132 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 5 S.C.R. A 2006 was filed against the accused-respondents for offences punishable under Sections 302, 307, 324, 325, 326, 327, 427, 436, 120B, 121-A, 122, 123, 124A, 201, 212 IPC read with Sections 3(1)(i), 3(2), 3(3), 3(4), 3(5), the MCOCA, read with Sections 10, 13, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 40 of Unlawful Activities B (Prevention) Act, 1967, read with Sections 6, 9B of the Explosives Act, 1884, read with Sections 3, 4, 5, 6 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908, read with Sections 3, 4 of the Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984, read with Sections 151, 152, 153, 154 of the Railways Act, 1989, C read with Section 12(1 )(c) of the Passports Act, 1967. According to the prosecution, the accused-respondents were members of the Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI), a terrorist organization and had conspired to plant bombs at Mumbai's local trains to create panic in furtherance 0 of terrorist activities being carried out by SIMI in India. As against the accusations contained in Special Case no.21 of 2006, in another MCOCA Special Case no.4 of 2009, it was alleged by the prosecution, that the accused therein were members of the Indian Mujahideen ("IM"), also allegedly E a terrorist organization, and that all bomb blasts in Mumbai since the year 2005 had been carried out by the IM. During the course of investigation in Special Case no.4 of 2009, some of the accused therein had confessed that they, as members of the IM had carried out bomb blasts, in Mumbai Suburban trains on 11.7.2006. In fact, 'the accused Sadiq lsrar Shaikh, F Arif Badruddin Shaikh and Ansar Ahmad Badshah', in Special Case no.4 of 2009, had made these confessional statements under Section 16 of the MCOCA, which were recorded by high ranking police officials. The confessional statement of Sadiq lsrar Shaikh was recorded by Vishwas G Nangre Patil, Deputy Commissioner of Police (witness at serial no. 64 in Special Case no.21 of 2006). Likewise, the statement of Arif Badruddin Sheikh was recorded by Miland Bharambe, Deputy Commissioner of Police (witness at serial no.65 in Special Case no.21 of 2006). And, the statement of H Ansar Ahmad Badshah was recorded by Dilip Sawant, STATE OF MAHARASHTRA v. KAMAL AHMED MOHAMMED 133 VAKIL ANSARI Deputy Commissioner of Police(witness at serial no. 66 in A Special Case no.21 of 2006). Chitkala Zutshi, the then Additional Chief Secretary, Home Department (witness at serial no. 63 in Special Case no.21 of 2006) had granted sanction for the prosecution of the aforesaid accused in Special Case No.4 of 2009 on 21.2.2009, by relying inter alia B on the confessional statements made by Sadiq lsrar Shaikh, Arif Badruddin Shaikh and Ansar Ahmad Badshah; The accused in Special Case no. 4 of 2009, are different from the accused in Special Case no. 21 of 2006 and Special Case no. 4 of 2009, is not being jointly tried with Special Case C no. 21 of 2006. In Special Case No.21 of 2006, after the prosecution closed its evidence, the witnesses were examined in defence by the accused-respondents. In order to establish their own innocence, the accused-respondents filed application for D summoning the said three Deputy Commissioner of Police i.e. Vishwas Nangre Patil, Miland Bharambe and Dilip Sawant (witnesses at serial nos. 63, 64 and 65); and Chitkala Zutshi, the then Additional Chief Secretary, Home Department (witness at serial no.66) as defence witnesses. The Trial Court E declined the prayer made by the accused-respondents for summoning the witnesses at serial Nos.63 to 66. The High Court however held that the evidence sought to be adduced by the appellants was relevant and admissible; and that the appellants were entitled to have the witnesses in question F summoned, and examine them as witnesses for the defence. In the present appeal emerging out of Special Case no. 21 of 2006, the first question for determination was, whether the confessional statements recorded before the witnesses at serial nos. 64 to 66, by persons who were not accused in G Special Case no. 21 of 2006, would be admissible in Special Case no. 21 of 2006. Alternatively, the question that required consideration was whether the said confessional statements were admissible under Sections 6 and 11 of the Evidence Act not as confessional statements, but as "relevant facts". H 134 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 5 S.C.R. A Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD:1. When a question pertaining to the admissibility of evidence before an Indian court arises, it has to be determined with reference to the provisions of the Evidence Act. Alternatively, the question may be determined under a B special enactment, which may .either make such evidence admissib_le, or.render it inadmissible. The special enactment relied upon in the present controversy is, the MCOCA. Therefore, the questions ·posed for determination in the present case, will have to be adjudicated on the basis of the C provisions of the Evidence Act, and/or the MCOCA. [Para 11] [155-D-F] 2.1. It is relevant in the first instance to describe the expanse/sphere of admissible evidence. The same has 1>een postulated in Section 5 of the Evidence Act. Under Section D 5, evidence may be given "of every fact in issue" and of such other facts which are expressly "declared to be relevant", and of no other facts. For the present controversy, the facts in issue are the seven bomb blasts, in seven different first class compartments, of local trains of Mumbai Suburban E Railways, on 11. 7 .2006. Thus far, there is no serious dispute. But then, evidence may also be given of facts which are "declared to be relevanf' under the Evidence Act. Under the Evidence Act, Sections 6 to 16 define "relevant facts", in respect whereof evidence can be given. Therefore, Sections F 5 to 16 are the provisions under the ·Evidence Act, which alone have to be relied upon for determining admissibility of evidence. [Para 12] [155-F-H; 156-A] 2.2. Sections 17 to 31 of the Evidence Act pertain to admissions and confessions. Sections 17 to 31 define G admissions/confessions, and also, the admissibility and inadmissibility of admissions/confessions. An analysis of the aforesaid provisions reveals, that an admission or a confession to be relevant must pertain to a "fact in issue" or a "relevant fact". In that sense, Section 5 (and consequently H Sections 6 to 16) of the Evidence Act are inescapably STATE OF MAHARASHTRA v. KAMAL AHMED MOHAMMED 135 VAKIL ANSARI intertwined with admissible adm'issions/ confessions. A Therefore, admissibility of admissions/confessions, would depend on whether they would fall in the realm of "facts in issue" or "relevant facts". That in turn is to be determined with reference to Sections 5 to 16 of the Evidence Act. The parameters laid down for the admissibility of admissions/ B confessions are, however, separately provided for under the Evidence Act, and as such, the determination of admissibility of one (admissions/confessions) is clearly distinguishable from the other (facts in issue/relevant facts). [Para 13] [156B-E] C 2.3. Admissions and confessions are exceptions to the "hearsay" rule. The Evidence Act places them in the province of relevance, presumably on the ground, that they being declarations against the interest of the person making them, they are in all probability true. The probative value of an o admission or a confession does not depend upon its communication to another. Just like any other piece of evidence, admissions/confessions can be admitted in evide.nce only for drawing an inference of tru.th. Therefore, truth of an admission or a confession can not be evidenced, E through the person to whom such admission/confession was made. The position, however, may be different if admissibility is sought under Sections 6 to 16 as a "fact in issue" or.as a "relevant fact". (Para 15] [156-H; 157-A-C] Law of Evidence, by M. Monir, fifteenth edition, Universal Law F Publishing Co. - referred to. 2.4. The scheme of the provisions pertaining to admissions/confessions under the Evidence Act (spelt out in Sections 17 to 31) makes admissions/confessions admissible (even though they are rebuttable) because the G author of the statement acknowledges a fact to his own detriment. This is based on the simple logic that no individual would acknowledge his/her liability/culpability unless true. [Para 17] [157-F-G] 2.5. An examination of the provisions of the Evidence H 136. · SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 5 S.C.R. • A . Act would reveal, that only such admissions/confessions are .; admissible as can be stated to have been made without any . coercion, threat or promise: Section 24 of the Evidence Act provides, ttiat a confession made by an accused person is irrelevant in a criminal proceeding, if such confession has B been caused by inducement, threat or promise. Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act exclude, from the realm of . admissibility, confessions made before a police officer or · while in police custody. Jhere can be no doubt, that the logic contained in the rule enunciated in Sections 25 and 26 is founded on the same basis/truth out of which Section. 24 of :. C the Evidence Act emerges. Thata confession' should be .uninfluenced, voluntary and fair. And since it may not be · possible to presume, that admissions/confessions 'are uninfluenced, voluntary and fair, i.e., without coercion, threat . or promise', if made to a police officer, or while. in police D . custody,· the same are rendered inadmissible. There is, . therefore, a common thread in the' scheme of admissibility of admissions/confessions under the Evidence Act, namely, { . . . • :'- I .. • ' ' . ' · that the admission/confession is admissible only as against ."the person who'. had made such admission/confession. E .. Nciturally, it would be inappropriate to implicate a person on :. the basis of a statement made by another. Therefore, the next 1 . '' '. .. I -'. • . '. ' • ; ' ..... N • • • . ~logical conclusion, that the person who has made, the 'admission/confession (or at whose.behest, or on whose behalf it is made), shouid be a party' to the proceeding ·· F because that is the only way a confession can be used against him. Section.24 of the Evidence Act leads to such a . conclusion .. Under.Section 24, a confession made~'by an ;, accused person:·, is rendered irrelevant "against the •·accused person'.';in the circumstances referred to above. G . Likewise, Section 25 of the Evidence Act contemplates, that : : a confession made to a police ·officer cannot be proved :•as ·against a person accused of any offence". Leading to the . ·inference, that a confession is permissible/admissible only as against the person who has made it,· unless the same is H . rendered inadmissible .under' so.me.express provision. / STATE OF MAHARASHTRA v. KAMAL AHMED MOHAMMED 137 VAKIL ANSARI Under Section 26 of the Evidence Act, a confession made A by a person while in custody of the police, cannot "be proved as against such person" (unless it falls within the exception contemplated by the said Section itself). The gamut of the bar contemplated under Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act, is however marginally limited by way of a proviso thereto, B recorded in Section 27 of the Evidence Act. Thereunder, a confession has been made admissible, to the extent of facts "discovered" on the basis of such confession (this aspect, is not relevant for the present case). The scheme of the provisions pertaining to admissions/confessions depicts a c one way traffic. Such statements are admissible only as against the author thereof. [Para 18) [158-A-B, E-G; 159-DH; [160-A-B] 2.6. It is, therefore clear, that an admission/confession can be used only as against the person who has made the same. The admissibility of confessions which have been made by the accused (Sadiq lsrar Shaikh, Arif Badruddin Shaikh and Ansar Ahmad Badshah, in Special Case no. 4 of 2009) who are not the accused in Special Case no. 21 of 2006, will lead to the clear conclusion, that they are inadmissible as admissions/confessions under the provisions of the Evidence Act. Had those persons who had made these confessions, been accused in Special Case no. 21 of 2006, certainly the witnesses at serial nos~ 64 to 66 could have been produced to substantiate the same (subject to the same being otherwise permissible). Therefore, the evidence of confessional statements recorded before the witnesses at serial nos. 64 to 66 would be impermissible, within the scheme of admissions/confessions contained in the Evidence Act. [Para 19) [160-C-F] 2.7. The issue in hand can also be examined from another perspective, though on the same reasoning. Ordinarily, a confessional statement is admissible only as against an accused who has made it. There is only one exception to the aforesaid rule, wherein it is permissible to D E F G H 138 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 5 S.C.R. A use a cenfessional statement, even against person(s) other than the one who had made it. The aforesaid exception has been provided for in Section 30 of the Evidence Act. As is evident from a perusal of Section 30, a confessional statement can be used even against a co-accused. For such B admissibility it is imperative, that the person making the confession besides implicating himself, also implicates others who are being jointly tried with him. In that situation alone, such a confessional statement is relevant even against the others implicated. Insofar as the present controversy is c concerned, the substantive provision of Section 30 of the Evidence Act has clearly no applicability because Sadiq lsrar Shaikh, Arif Badruddin Shaikh and Ansar Ahmad Badshah have not implicated any of the accused-respondents. The importance of Section 30 of the Evidence Act, insofar as the 0 present controversy is concerned, emerges from illustration (b) thereunder, which leaves no room for any doubt, that unless the person who has made a confessional statement is an accused in a case, the confessional statement made by him is n~t relevant. None of the accused ~n Special Case no. 4 of 2009 is an accused in Special Case no. 21 of 2006. E As such, in terms of illustration (b) under Section 30 of the Evidence Act, the confessional statement made by the accused in Special Case no. 4 of 2009, cannot be proved as a confessional statement, in Special Case no. 21 of2006. This conclusion has been recorded, on the admitted position, that F the accused in Special Case no. 4 of 2009 are different from the accused in Special Case no. 21 of 2006. And further because, Special Case no. 4 of 2009 is not being jointly tried with Special Case no. 21 of 2006. Therefore, even though Section 30 is not strictly relevant, insofar as the present G controversy is concerned, yet the principle of admissibility, conclusively emerging from illustration (b) under Section 30 of the Evidence Act, persuades this Court to add the same to the underlying common thread, that finds place in the provisions of the Evidence Act, pertaining to admissions/ H confessions. That, an admission/confession is admissible STATE OF MAHARASHTRA v. KAMAL AHMED MOHAMMED 139 VAKIL ANSARI only as against the person who has made it. [Para 20] [160A F-G; 161-E-H; 162-A-D] 2.8. Human conduct per se restrains an individual from accepting any kind of liability or implication. When such liability and/or implication is acknowledged by the individual as against himself, the provisions of the Evidence Act make B such confessional statements admissible. Additionally, since a confessional statement is to be used principally as against the person making it, the maker of the confession will have an opportunity to contest the same under Section 31 of the Evidence Act, not only by producing independent evidence C therefor, but also, because he will have an opportunity to contest the veracity of the said confessional statement, by effectively cross-examining the witness produced· to substantiate the same. Such an opportunity, would also b.e available to all other co-accused who would be confronted o with a confessional statement made by an accused against them (as in Section 30 of the Evidence Act), as they too would have an.opportunity to contest the confessional statement made by the.accused, in the same manner as the author of the confession.- Illustration (b) under Section 30 of. the E Evidence Act contemplates a situation wherein the author of the .confessional statement is not a co-accused. Illustration . (b) renders such confessionaLstatements inadmissible. There is no:room for:testing the veracity of the said· confessional statement,·either,at.the hands of the person· who made it, or by the person against whom it is made, F Illustration (b) under Section 30 makes such a .confessional statement inadmissible· for the sole. reason, that the. person who made the confession,· is not a co-accused in the case. Again, the underlying, principle brought out through. illustration (b) under Section 30 of the Evidence Act is;:that a G confessional statement is relevant only and ·only,. if the. author of confessional sta.tement himselfis an accused in a case, wh.e.re -the c~nfessionai statem~nt is being proved. In the pre_s~nt, co1,1tr()ver~Y, _th,e ~~-thor~.<)f the confessi_y a person who has since died, or by the persons who H cannot be found, or by those who have become incapaQ-le STATE OF MAHARASHTRA v. KAMAL AHMED MOHAMMED 145 VAKIL ANSARI of giving evidence, or by those whose attendance cannot be A procured without an amount of delay. It is clear, that secondary evidence is permissible when the issue relates to the cause of a person's death, or the circumstances of a transaction which resulted in his death. But such permissibility, would extend only to the exigencies expressly enumerated.in Section 32 of the Evidence Act. The situations wherein secondary evidence is permissible under Section B 32 of the Evidence Act include statements made by persons who have since died, or statements made by persons who cannot be found, or statements made by persons who have c become incapable of giving evidence, or statements made by persons who cannot be procured without an amount of delay or expense. Neither of these exigencies exists insofar as the present controversy is concerned. The authors of the confessional statements (Sadiq lsrar Shaikh, Arif Badruddin 0 Shaikh and Ansar Ahmad Badshah) in Special Case no. 4 of 2009, are very much available and their presence can be procured by the accused-respondents to be presented as defence witnesses on their behalf. In the aforesaid view of the matter, it is not possible to accept, that the accusedrespondents can place reliance on Section 32 of the Evidence Act, in order to lead evidence in respect of the confessional statements (made by Sadiq lsrar Shaikh, Arif Badruddin Shaikh and Ansar Ahmad Badshah), by recording evidence to the statements of the witnesses at serial nos. 63 to 66. [Paras 36, 37] (184-H; 185-A;189-D-H; 190-A-B] E F 3.6. In order to render Section 32 of the Evidence Act, admissible for recording the statements of witnesses at serial nos. 63 to 66, in lieu of the confessional statements made by Sadiq lsrar Shaikh, Arif B.adruddin Shaikh and Ansar Ahmad G Badshah, counsel for the accused-respondents had placed emphatic reliance on Article 20 of the Constitution of India. Relying on sub-Article (3) of Article 20, it was the contention of the counsel for the accused-respondents, that since no accused can be compelled to be a witness against himself, H 146 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 5 S C.R. A it would not be open to the accused-respondents to summon Sadiq lsrar Shaikh, Arif Badruddin Shaikh and Ansar Ahmad Badshah, and thereby compel them to be . witnesses against themselves. The plea advanced is clearly not available to the accused-respondents in view of the B protection afforded to a witness who would find himself in such a peculiar situation under Section 132 of the Evidence Act. Section 132 of the Evidence Act clearly negates the basis of the submission, adopted by the accusedrespondents, for being permitted to lead secondary C evidence to substantiate the confessional statements made by Sadiq 1srar Shaikh, Arif Badruddin Shaikh and Ansar Ahmad Badshah. Accordingly, it is reiterated that the confessional statements made by the ·accused (Sadiq lsrar Shaikh, Arif Badruddin Shaikh and Ansar Ahmad Badshah) 0 in Special Case no. 4 of 2009 cannot be proved in evidence, through the statements of the witnesses at serial nos. 63 to 66. ·The authors of the confessional statements (Sadiq lsrar Shaikh, Arif Badruddin Shaikh and Ansar Ahmad Badshah) may be produced as defence witnesses by the accusedrespondents, for their statements would fall in the realm of E relevance under Section 11 of the Evidence Act.