# STATE OF MAHARASHTRA v. MOHANLAL DEVICHAND SHAH

- **Citation:** [1965] 3 S.C.R. 461
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1965-03-23
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeals Nos. 198 and 199 of 1963
- **Bench:** K. N. Wanchoo, J. R. Mudholkar Ands. M. Sikri
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/state-of-maharashtra-v-mohanlal-devichand-shah-3506
- **Pages:** 6

## Headnote

Minimum Wages Act, 1948 (11 of 1948), s. 2(b)
Part I
Entry 8-Stone breaking or stone-crushing in a quarry-Jur1sd1ctwn
whether of Central or State Government-Competency to file complaint.
The Labour Inspector, appointed under the Minimum Wages
Act, 1948 filed two complaints before the Judicial Magistrate al!eging that the respondent, doing quarrying
operation wmk, had
contravened certain provisions of the Minimum
Wages
(Control)
Rules, 1950. The respondent, inter alia, submitted that the Inspector
wos not authorised to file the complaint, and only an Inspector
appointed by the State Government was competent to file the complaint. The Judicial Magistrate held that the word "mine" in sub-cl.
(i) of s. 2(b) of the Act, does not include a stone quarry and therefore, the appropriate government was the State Government and
not the Central Government. The appellants' appeals were dismissed by the High Court. In appeal to this Court.
HELD:
An examination of the definition of "appropriate
Government" in s. 2(b) of the Minimum Wages Act in the context
and background of GDvernment of India Act, 1935, and the Mines
Act, 1923, shows that the word "mine" in s. 2(b)(i) includes quarries.
Also stone breaking or stone crushing in a quarry is within Entry
8 in Part I of the Schedule of the Act. Since the employment in
stone breaking or stone crushing is in a quarry, it is within the
jurisdiction of the Centrc:-.1 Governm-ent, because it is a scheduled
employment in a rn.ine v.:1ithin the meaning of s. 2(lf'(i}. Therefore,
the Inspector appointed under the Act
was competent to file the
complaints. [465F: 466A-B, D] ·
Madhya Pradesh Mi.neral Industry Association v. The Regional
Labour Commissioner, Jabalpur, [1960] 3 S.C.R. 476, applied.

## Text

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STATE OF MAHARASHTRA
v.
MOHANLAL DEVICHAND SHAH
March 23, 1965
[K. N. WANCHOO, J. R. MUDHOLKAR ANDS. M. SIKRI, JJ.]
Minimum Wages Act, 1948 (11 of 1948), s. 2(b)
Part I
Entry 8-Stone breaking or stone-crushing in a quarry-Jur1sd1ctwn
whether of Central or State Government-Competency to file complaint.
The Labour Inspector, appointed under the Minimum Wages
Act, 1948 filed two complaints before the Judicial Magistrate al!eging that the respondent, doing quarrying
operation wmk, had
contravened certain provisions of the Minimum
Wages
(Control)
Rules, 1950. The respondent, inter alia, submitted that the Inspector
wos not authorised to file the complaint, and only an Inspector
appointed by the State Government was competent to file the complaint. The Judicial Magistrate held that the word "mine" in sub-cl.
(i) of s. 2(b) of the Act, does not include a stone quarry and therefore, the appropriate government was the State Government and
not the Central Government. The appellants' appeals were dismissed by the High Court. In appeal to this Court.
HELD:
An examination of the definition of "appropriate
Government" in s. 2(b) of the Minimum Wages Act in the context
and background of GDvernment of India Act, 1935, and the Mines
Act, 1923, shows that the word "mine" in s. 2(b)(i) includes quarries.
Also stone breaking or stone crushing in a quarry is within Entry
8 in Part I of the Schedule of the Act. Since the employment in
stone breaking or stone crushing is in a quarry, it is within the
jurisdiction of the Centrc:-.1 Governm-ent, because it is a scheduled
employment in a rn.ine v.:1ithin the meaning of s. 2(lf'(i}. Therefore,
the Inspector appointed under the Act
was competent to file the
complaints. [465F: 466A-B, D] ·
Madhya Pradesh Mi.neral Industry Association v. The Regional
Labour Commissioner, Jabalpur, [1960] 3 S.C.R. 476, applied.
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeals Nos.
198 and 199 of 1963.
Appeals from the judgment and order dated February 4,
1963, of the Bombay High Court in Criminal Appeals Nos. 779 &
780 of 1962.
S. C. Patwardhan, B. R. G. K. Achar for R. H. Dheber, for
the appellant.
Avadh Behari, for respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Sikri, J. These are two appeals by certificate, granted by
the High Court of Judicature at Bombay against its judgment
dated February 4, 1963, in Criminal Appeals Nos. 779 and 780 of
1962, By this judgment the High Court affirmed the order of
L/P(N )4SCI-3
461
SUPREME COUR'r REPORTS
(1965] 3 8,C,R.
acquittal passed against the respondent by the Judicial Magistrate,
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First Class, Vadagaon (Mawal).
The relevant facts are as follows :
The Labour Inspector
(Central), Bombay-I, appointed under the Minimum Wages Act
(XI of 1948) (hereinafter called the Act) by the Central Government filed two complaints in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate
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alleging that the respondent had contravened certain provisions of
the Minimum Wages (Central) Rules, 1950. It was alleged that
the respondent was doing quarrying operation work in quarry
survey Nos. 23(1) Kusegaon village near Lonavala, and while carrying on this quarrying operation work he, failed to observe
certain provisions in the Rules.
The respondent submitted a c
written statement admitting the facts but he contended, inter alia,
that the Inspector was not authorised to file the complaint and it
was only an inspector appointed by the Maharashtra State who was
competent to file a complaint. The Judicial Magistrate, treating
this as a preliminary objection, came to the conclusion that the
Inspector was not entitled to file the complaint. According to him, D
the word "mine" in sub-cl. (i) of s. 2(b) of the Act does not include
a stone quarry and, therefore, the appropriate Government was
the State Government and not the Central Government.
There
upon he acquitted the accused of the offence under s. 22A, read
with s. 18, of the Act and for contravening certain rules of the
Minimum Wages (Central) Rules, 1950.
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The State then filed two appeals before the High Court. The
High Court also came to the conclusion that the Inspector was
not competent to file the complaints but the reasoning of the High
Court was different. It was of the opinion that "a stone quarry
can fall within the category of a mine as defined in the Mines Act
of 1952 or the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development)
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Act of 1957." But even so, according to it, "the Schedule does
not mention either a mine or a stone quarry and item No. 8, viz.,·
Employment in stone breaking and stone crushing, cannot, therefore, be said to be an employment in respect of a mine whether
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in its broadest sense so as to include a stone quarry or in narrow
sense as given in the Oxford English Dictionary." The High
Court further held that 'unless, therefore, the Parliament amends
item No. 8 of the Schedule so to include the operation of
stone-breaking and stone-crushing in a stone quarry or in all mines
including a stone quarry, it is not possible to hold that the appropriate Government would be the Central Government, merely on
the
that, in its widest connotation, the words 'stone quarry'
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may fa 11 within the ambit of the word 'mine'."
Section 2(b) of the Act defines "appropriate government" as
follows:
"2(b) "appropriate government" means-
(i) in relation to any scheduled employment carried on
STATE V, MOHANLAL (Sikri, J.)
463
by or under the authority of the Central Government
or a railway administration or in relation to a mine,
oilfield or major port, or any corporation established
by a Central Act, the Central Government, and
(ii) in relation to any other scheduled employment, the
11
State Government."
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Sub-clause (g) defines 'scheduled employment" to mean an employment specified in the Schedule, or any process or branch of
work forming part of such employment.
The Schedule is divided into two parts, and Part I contains
entry 8-Employment in stone breaking or stone crushing. Section
22 prescribes the penalties for certain offences and s. 22A provides
that "any employer who contravenes any provisions of this Act
or of any rule or order made thereunder shall, if no other penalty
is provided for such contravention by this Act, be punishable with
fine which may extend to five hundred rupees." Section 22B deals
with the cognizance of offences and provides that "no Court shall
take cognizance of a complaint against any person for an offence ...
under clause (b) of section 22 or under section 22A except on a
complaint made by, or with the sanction of, an Inspector."
The first question which arises is whether the quarry which
the respondent is alleged to be working and in which the employees
are alleged to be carrying on the operation of stone breaking or
stone crushing is a mine, within s. 2(b). Learned counsel for the
appellant has drawn our attention to the definition of the word
"mine" in the Mines Act, 1952 (XXXV of 1952), and the Mines
Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 (LXVII of
1957). Section 2(j) of the Mine Act defines 'mine', and the relevant part of the definition is as under:
""Mine" means any excavation where any operation for
the purpose of searching for or obtaining minerals has
been or is being carried on, and includes-
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(iv) all open cast workings."
The word 'minerals' is defined to mean all substances which can
be obtained from the earth by mining, digging, drilling dredging,
hydraulicing, quarrying or by any other operation and
mineral oils (which in turn include natural gas and petroleum).
The learned counsel says that a quarry is a mine within this definition.
In the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Deve10pment)
Act, 1957, the expressions 'mine' and 'owner' have the meanings
assigned to them in the Mines Act, 1952. The learned counsel
contends that this meaning should be read into the Minimu111
Act
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464
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1965] 3 S.C.R.
The learned counsel for the respondents relies on the observations of this Court in Pandit Ram Narain v. The State of Uttar
Pradesh(') that "it is no sound principle of construction to interpret
expressions used in one Act with reference to their use in another
Act. The meanings of words and expressions used in an Act ml)st
take their colour from the context in which they appear." The
learned counsel further contends, relying on a number of English
decisions, that in its primary signification the word 'mine' means
underground excavations or underground workings.
He relies in
particular on the speech of Lord Macnaughten in Lord Provost
and Magistrates of Glasgow v. Farie(').
The House of Lords was
concerned in that case with the interpretation of s. 18 of the Waterworks Clauses Act, 1847, which was in the following terms:
"The undertakers shall not be entitled to any mines of coal,
ironstone, state, or other minerals under any land purchased by them, except only such parts thereof as shall
be necessary to be dug or carried away or used in the
construction of the water-works unless the same shall
have been expressly purchased, and all such mines,
excepting as aforesaid, shall be deemed to be excepted
out of the conveyance of such lands, unless they shall
have been expressly named therein and conveyed
thereby."
The appellants in that case had purchased from the respondent a
parcel of land for the purpose of erecting waterworks and the conveyance contained a reservation. of the "whole coal and other
minerals in the land in terms of the Waterworks Clauses Act,
1847." Under the land was a seam of valuable brick clay.
The
respondent worked this clay in the adjoining land, and having
reached the appellants' boundary, claimed. the right to work out
the clay under the land purchased by the appellants. The House
of Lords held that common clay, forming the surface or subsoil
of land, was not included in the reservation in the Act, and that the
appellants were entitled to an interdict restraining the respondent
from working the clay under the land purchased by them. It is
true Lord Macnaughten first construed the. word 'mjne' in this
enactment to mean
underground
excavations or underground
workings, and then proceeded to construe the section. But Lord
Watson was of the opinion that the word 'mine' did not necessarily
mean underground excavations. He said that "it does not occur
to me that an open excavation of auriferous quartz would be generally described as a gold quarry; I think most people would call it
a gold mine." Later he observed that "the word 'quarry' is, no
doubt, inapplicable to underground excavations but the word
'mining' may without impropriety be used to denote some quarries.
Dr. Johnson defines a quarry to be a stone mine". He arrived at
the conclusion that "the word 'mine' must be taken to signify all
(') [!956] S.O.R. 664 at G73,
(') 13 A.O. 657,
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STA1'E v. MOltANLAL (Sikri, J,)
465
excavations by which the excepted minerals may be legitimately
worked and got."
In our opinion, as stated in Halsbury's Laws of England,
Third Edition, volume 26, p. 317, the word 'mine' is not a definite
term, but is one susceptible of limitation or expansion according
to the intention with which it is used.
In s. 2(b) of the Act; we
have to see the context in which
word has been used, What
the legislature is purporting to do is to demarcate the jurisdiction
of the State Governments and the Central Government in respect
of minimum wages to be paid to persons employed in the employments enumerated in the Schedule.
Entry 35 in List I of Schedule
VII of the Government of India Act, 1935, was "regulation of
labour and safety in mines and oilfields." Entry 36 read "regulation of mines and oilfields and mineral develooment to the extent
to which such regulation_ and development under Dominion control
is declared by Dominion law to be expedient in the public interest."
It is not seriously contested that in Entries 35 and 36 the word
'mines' would include quarries. The Mines Act, 1923 (IV of 1923)
which was the existing law when the Government of India Act
came into force, made provisions regarding health and safety in
mines and regulated hours and limitations of employment in the
mines. The word 'mine' had been defined to mean any excavation where any operation for the purpose of searching for or obtaining minerals has been or is being carried on, and includes all
works, machinery, tramways and sidings, whether above or below
ground, in or adjacent to or belonging to a mine, provided that
it shall not include any part of such premises on which a manufacturing process is being carried on unless such process is a process
for coke making or the dressing of minerals. Therefore, if we
examine the definition of 'appropriate government' in s. 2(b) in
the context and in the background of the Government of India Act
anc\ the existing law, it seems to us that the Central Legislature
must have intended to include quarries in the word 'mine', otherwise it would be rather incongruous that some matters such as
health and saftey, hours and employment in quarries should be
regulated by the Central Government and minimum wages by the
State Governments. Further, there is no indication whatsoever in
the Act that the word 'mine' has the narrower meaning suggested
by the learned counsel for the respondent.
If the word 'mine' is held to include a quarry, the next question that arises is whether stone breaking or stone crushing in a
quarry is within the Schedule.
While interpreting Entry 8 in the
Schedule, this Court observed in Madhya Pradesh Mineral Industry
Association v. The Regional Labour Commissioner, Jabalpur(')
as follows:
"When we speak of stone-breaking or stone-crushing normally we refer to stone in the sense of "piece of rock"
(') [1060] 3 S.C.R. 476.
466
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1965] 3 s.c.R.
and that would exclude maganese. Employment in
stone-breaking or stone-crushing in this sense would
refer to quarry operations."
This Court thus read Entry 8 to refer to quarry operations, and we
hold that stone-breaking or stone-crushing in a quarry is within the
Schedule.
Thus reading item 8 of the ·Schedule and s. 2(b) of the Act
together, it seems to us. that the definition demarcates the jurisdiction of the Central Government and the State Governments in this
way:
If the employment in stone-breaking or
is
in a quarry then it is within the jurisdiction of the Central Government; if the employment in stone-breaking or stone-crushing is not
in a quarry, it is the State Government that will have jurisdiction.
We are unable to appreciate the observations of the High Court
that the operation of stone-breaking and stone-crushing in a stone
quarry does not fall within item 8 of the Schedule and that it is
necessary that Parliament should amend item 8 of the Schedule.
In the result, we hold that the Inspector was competent ·to
file the complaints and the Magistrate and the High Court should
not have acquitted the respondent on the ground of his being incompetent to file the complaints. The appeals are allowed and
the judgment of the High Court and the order of the Magistrate
are reversed and the cases remitted to the Magistrate to proceed
with the complaints in accordance with law.
Appeals allowed.
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