# STATE OF MYSORE v. H. SANJEEVIAH

- **Citation:** [1967] 2 S.C.R. 361
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1967-01-16
- **Bench:** K. Subba Rao, J.C. Shah, S. M. Sik.Ri, V. Ramaswami, C. A. Vaidialingam
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/state-of-mysore-v-h-sanjeeviah-3965
- **Pages:** 7

## Headnote

Madras Forest Act (II of 1900), s. 37-Power to make rules regulating
transit of forest
produce-Rule
2,
provisor-:-1 hese
pro.h.ibiiing
removal of forest produce b!!tween 10 p.1n. and ~un-r1~·e and cond~tionally
permitting removal between sun-set and 10 0.111.-.Sucll restrlction..r; <>n
contractors whether prohibitory .or regulatory-Whether within rule making power.
Constitution of India, Arts. 301, 304, 305-Freedom of trade-Proviso to Rule 2 framed under s. 37 of Madras Forest Act whether restrictive of such freedom, whet Im saved by Art. 304-W hetlier 'existing /aw'
for the purpose of Art. 305.
Section 37 of the Madras Forest Act, 1900, gave power to the State
Government to make rules regulating the transit of forest produce. Rule :Z.
fr;.med thereunder prohibited the removal of forest produce without a
permit. After the promulgation of the Constitution in 1950 two provisos
were added to the said rule the first of which prohibited the issue of
permits allowing forest produce to be removed between sun-set and sunrise, while the second permitted such removal between
sun-set and !O
p.m. on certain conditions. The respondent who was a forest contractor
filed a writ petition in the High Court challenging the validity of the provisos on the ground that they were beyond the rule making power under
s. 37 of the Madras Forest Act and were restrictive of his freedom of
trade and commerce declared by Art. 301 of the Constitution. The petition was allowed and the State appealed.
HELD: (i) Power to impose restrictions of the nature contemplated
by the two provisos to r. :Z. is not to be found in any of the clauses of
sub-s. (2) of s. 37. By sub-s, (l) the State Government is invested with
the power to "egulate transport of forest produce "in transit by land or
water." The power which ti-c State Government may exercise is however
power to regulate transport of forest produce, and not the power to prohibit or restrict transport. Prima facie, a rule which totally prohibits the
movement of forest produce during the period between sun-set and sunrise is prohibitory or restrictive of the right to transport forest produce.
A rule regulating transport in its essence permits transport, subject to certain
i conditions devised to pwmote transport: such a rule aims at making transport orderly so that it does not harm or endanger other persons following
a similar vocation or the public. and enables transport to function for the
public good. [364 G-H; 365 A]
Automobile Transport (Rajasthan) Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan, [1963]
1 S.C.R. 491, relied on.
·
If the ll_rovisos are in truth restrictive of the right of transport of the
~ores! produce, however good the grounds appa·rently may be for restrictmg the transport of forest produce. they cannot on that account tramform the power conferred by the provisos into a power merely regulatory
~~
-
.
(ii) Article 301 in terms prohibits the impos;tion of any restriction
on trade, commerce and intercourse throughout the territory of India and
361
361
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1967] 2 S.1;;.R.
by the enactment of the two provisos clearly restriction is imposed on the
freedom of trade. The provisos to the rule
must therefore be deemed
to be invalid as infringing the guarantee under Art. 30 I of the freedom
of trade commerce. and intercourse. (366 C-D]
The provisos were not protec:ed by Art. 305. Section 37 which
conferred power to make rules was .. existing law" within the moaning of
that expression in Art. 305 but the rules made in exercise of that power
after the Constitution cannot be deemed to be
0 cxisting law". The mere
fact that there was authority in the State under a pre-Constitution
Act
to make
rules which may impose restrictioQS
o_n trade, commerce and
intercour~. but which was not exercised, will not make the rule made
in exercise of the authority after the Constitution .. existing law" within
the meaning of the Constnution. (366 G]
Ka/vat1i Stores v. Stale of Orissa, A.LR. (1966) S.C. 1686, relied on.
Kas

## Text

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STATE OF MYSORE
v.
H. SANJEEVIAH
January 16, 1967
[K. SUBBA RAO, C. J., J.C. SHAH, S. M. SIK.RI, V. RAMASWAMI
AND C. A. VAIDIALINGAM, JJ.j
Madras Forest Act (II of 1900), s. 37-Power to make rules regulating
transit of forest
produce-Rule
2,
provisor-:-1 hese
pro.h.ibiiing
removal of forest produce b!!tween 10 p.1n. and ~un-r1~·e and cond~tionally
permitting removal between sun-set and 10 0.111.-.Sucll restrlction..r; <>n
contractors whether prohibitory .or regulatory-Whether within rule making power.
Constitution of India, Arts. 301, 304, 305-Freedom of trade-Proviso to Rule 2 framed under s. 37 of Madras Forest Act whether restrictive of such freedom, whet Im saved by Art. 304-W hetlier 'existing /aw'
for the purpose of Art. 305.
Section 37 of the Madras Forest Act, 1900, gave power to the State
Government to make rules regulating the transit of forest produce. Rule :Z.
fr;.med thereunder prohibited the removal of forest produce without a
permit. After the promulgation of the Constitution in 1950 two provisos
were added to the said rule the first of which prohibited the issue of
permits allowing forest produce to be removed between sun-set and sunrise, while the second permitted such removal between
sun-set and !O
p.m. on certain conditions. The respondent who was a forest contractor
filed a writ petition in the High Court challenging the validity of the provisos on the ground that they were beyond the rule making power under
s. 37 of the Madras Forest Act and were restrictive of his freedom of
trade and commerce declared by Art. 301 of the Constitution. The petition was allowed and the State appealed.
HELD: (i) Power to impose restrictions of the nature contemplated
by the two provisos to r. :Z. is not to be found in any of the clauses of
sub-s. (2) of s. 37. By sub-s, (l) the State Government is invested with
the power to "egulate transport of forest produce "in transit by land or
water." The power which ti-c State Government may exercise is however
power to regulate transport of forest produce, and not the power to prohibit or restrict transport. Prima facie, a rule which totally prohibits the
movement of forest produce during the period between sun-set and sunrise is prohibitory or restrictive of the right to transport forest produce.
A rule regulating transport in its essence permits transport, subject to certain
i conditions devised to pwmote transport: such a rule aims at making transport orderly so that it does not harm or endanger other persons following
a similar vocation or the public. and enables transport to function for the
public good. [364 G-H; 365 A]
Automobile Transport (Rajasthan) Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan, [1963]
1 S.C.R. 491, relied on.
·
If the ll_rovisos are in truth restrictive of the right of transport of the
~ores! produce, however good the grounds appa·rently may be for restrictmg the transport of forest produce. they cannot on that account tramform the power conferred by the provisos into a power merely regulatory
~~
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.
(ii) Article 301 in terms prohibits the impos;tion of any restriction
on trade, commerce and intercourse throughout the territory of India and
361
361
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1967] 2 S.1;;.R.
by the enactment of the two provisos clearly restriction is imposed on the
freedom of trade. The provisos to the rule
must therefore be deemed
to be invalid as infringing the guarantee under Art. 30 I of the freedom
of trade commerce. and intercourse. (366 C-D]
The provisos were not protec:ed by Art. 305. Section 37 which
conferred power to make rules was .. existing law" within the moaning of
that expression in Art. 305 but the rules made in exercise of that power
after the Constitution cannot be deemed to be
0 cxisting law". The mere
fact that there was authority in the State under a pre-Constitution
Act
to make
rules which may impose restrictioQS
o_n trade, commerce and
intercour~. but which was not exercised, will not make the rule made
in exercise of the authority after the Constitution .. existing law" within
the meaning of the Constnution. (366 G]
Ka/vat1i Stores v. Stale of Orissa, A.LR. (1966) S.C. 1686, relied on.
Kasi Prasad v. Sate of Orissa, A.1.R. <!963) Orissa 24, disapproved.
Article 304 which is an exception to Art. 301 had no application to
the case because that Article saved cenain laws from the operation of
An. 301 if the law was passed by the Legislature of a State. The provisos
to -J. 2 were not made by the Legislature of the Stale; they were made
by the Executive Goverrunent in exercise of delegated authority.
Moreover they had not been shown to be reasonable restriction on the freedom
of trade commerce and intercourse imposed in the public interest so u
to satisfy the terms of Art. 304(b). 1367 D-EJ
CML APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1010 of
1965.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated
July 11, 1963 of the Mysore High Court in Writ Petition No. 1601 of
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1962.
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S. V. Gupte, Solicitor-Genera/, R. Ganapathy Iyer and
Dhebar, for the appellant.
G. R. Ethiarajulu Naidu, K. Rajendra Chaudhuri and
Chaudhuri, for the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
R. 1j.
_,/
K.R.
Shah, J. By s. :7 of the Mysore Forest Act 11 of 1900 the
State Government is authorized to make rules to regulate the "transit of ... forest produce". In exercise of the powers conferred by
s. 37 the State Government of Mysore has framed rules to regulate the "transit of timber, firewood, charcoal and bamboos from
all lands." By r. 2 framed on October 13, 1952 it was provided
that no person shall import forest produce into, export forest produce from, or move forest produce within, any of the areas specified
in Sch. 'A' (hereinafter referred to as the Scheduled area), unless
-.uch forest produce is accompanied by a permit prescribed in r. 3.
•_ J April 15, 1959 the State of Mysore issued a notification adding
a proviso to r. 2 which read as follows :
"Provided that no such permit shall authorise any
person to transport forest produce between sun-set and
sun-rise in any of the areas specified in Schedule "A".
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MYSORE V. H. SANJEEVIAH (Shah, J.)
363
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By another notification dated September 14, 1960, the State Government introduced the second proviso to r. 2 which read :
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"Provided further that permission may be granted to
timber merchants on their requisition to transport timber
up to IO P.M. (22 hrs.) under the following conditions :-
(i) the party who wishes to avail of the concessions
should pay a cash deposit of Rs. 1,000 as security for due
"compliance with the timber transit rules as in force;
(ii) that the deposit may be forfeited to Government
for breach of any
of the conditions of the Timber
Transit Rules."
·
The respondent who is a dealer in timber filed a petition under
Art. 226 of the Constitution for an order quashing the two provisos
to r. 2, on the grounds inter alia that the two provisos were beyond
the rule-making authority conferred upon the State Government by
s. 37 of the Mysore Forest Act II of 1900, and that in any event the
provisos imposed unauth01ised restrictions on the freedom of trade,
commerce and intercourse. The High Court of Mysore lield
that by the provisos inserted in r. 2 the State Government
had while seeking to regulate the transport of timber "stopped transport altogether", and in doing so the State Government acted in
excess of the powers conferred upon it by s. 37 of the Act. The
High Court also held that the two provisos were not saved by Art.
305 of the ConGtitution and since the function of the two provisos
was not regulatory but prohibitory, they were violative of Art. 301
of the Constitution and must be struck down as unconstitutional.
With special leave granted by this Court, the State of Mysore has
appealed to this Court.
Section 37(1) of the Mysore Forest Act 11 of 1900 provides :
"The control of all rivers and their banks as regards
the floating of timber, as well as ihe control of all forest
produce in transit by land or water, is vested in the State
Government which may make rules to regulate the transit
of any forest produce."
Sub-section (2) provides :
"Such rules may, among other matters,
(a)
(b) prohibit the import, export, collection, or moving of
forest tiroduce without a pass from an officer au:horised
to issue the same, or otherwise than in accordance with the
conditions of such pass;"
364
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1967] 2 S.C.R.
By r. 2 which is framed in exercise of the power under s. 37 (2) (b),
a person intending to transport forest produce must obtain a pass
from an authorised officer. The rule so made is clearly regulatory
of the right to transport forest produce.
But a restriction is imposed
on the right to transport forest produce by the two provisos incorporated in the rule in 1959 & 1960.
By the first proviso the holder
of a pass is not authorised to transport forest produce between the
hours of sun-set and sun-rise in any area specified in Sch. 'A', and
by the second proviso it is provided that the restriction imposed by
the first proviso may be relaxed between the hours of sun-set and
IO P.M. if the person wishing to avail of the
concession
makes
a cash deposit
of
Rs. 1,000 as
security for due
compliance
with
the
"timber
transit
rules".
By
the
terms ofthe two provisos there
is an absolute
prohibition
against transportation of forest produce between the hours of 10
P.M. and sun-rise, and a qualified prohibition between the hours
of sun-set and I 0 P.M. If a transporter of forest produce makes a
cash deposit of Rs. 1,000 as security, he may be permitted to
transport forest produce between the hours of sun-set iuid IO P.M.
It was contended on behalf of the State that the two provisos
were regulatory and not prohibitory. It was urged that every injunction in the form of a prohibition cannot be regarded as a restriction
upon the right to transport, and reliance was placed upon the form
of els. (b), (j) and (I) of sub-s. (2) of s. 37. What is decisive in each case, .:
it was submitted, is not the form of the rule, but the substance thereof,
and that the provisos sought merely to regulate transport of .(Qr~st
produce. Clause (b) of s. 37(2) prohibits import, export, collCCtron
and movement of forest produce without a pass. The prohibition
is, it is common ground, regulatory of the right to transport fotest
produce.
Under cl. Ul rules may be made imposing prohibition
against the closing up or obstruction of the channel, or banks of any
river used for the transport of forest produce, and under cl. (1) rules
may be made prohibiting absolutely or subject to conditions, the
establishment of sawpits, or saw mills or any other sawing contrivance.
But els. (j) & (I) do not operate to prohibit or restrict the
transport of any forest produce.
Power to impose restrictions of the nature contemplated by the
two provisos to r. 2 is not to be found in any of the clauses of subs. (2) of s. 37.
By sub-s. (I) the State Government is invested with
the power to regulate transport of forest produce "in transit by
land or water."
The power which the State Government may
exercise is however power to regulate transport of forest produce,
and not the power to prohibit or restrict transport. Prima facie,
a rule which totally prohibits the movement of forest produce during
the period between sun-set and sun-rise is prohibitory or restrictive
of the right to transport forest produce. A rule regulating transA
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MYSORE v. H. SANJEEVIAH (Shah, /.)
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port in ·its essence permits transport, subject to certain conditions
devised to promote transport : such a rule aims at making transport
orderly so that it does not harm or endanger other persons following
a similar vocation or the public, and enables transport to functign
for the public good. It was observed by one of us (Subba Rao, J.)
in Automobile Transport (Rajasrhan) Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan.(')
"Restrictions obstruct the freedom, whereas regulations promote it. Police regulations, though they may
superficially appear to restrict the freedom of movement, in
fact provide the necessary conditions for the free movement. Regulations such as provision for lighting, speed,
good conditions of vehicles, timings, rule of the road and
similar others, really facilitate' the freedom of movement
rather than retard it. So too, licensing system with compensatory fees would not be restrictions but regulatory provisions: for without it, the necessary lines of communications,
such as roads, water-ways and air -ways c&.mot effectively
be maintained and the freedom declared may in practice
turn out to be an empty one. So too, regulations providing for necessary services to enable the free movement
of traffic, whether charged or not cannot also be described
as restrictions impeding the freedom."
\
It was asserted in the affidavit filed on behalf of the State in
rep\y to the petition that the restriction imposed by the rules on the
freiaom of citizens to transport timber, fire-wood, charcoal and
bamboos is a reasonable restriction and in the public interest, i.e.
to prevent unauthorised felling of trees and bamboos and smuggling
them from the State forests. It was said that checking transport
of the forest produce during nights would require enormous increase
in the number of checking staff of the Forest Department, that such
staff will have to work in two or three shifts every day if they have to
check transport of forest produce during nights also, further that
such staff will have to be equipped with lanterns and.warm clothings
if they have to work during nights, that persons who indulge in
smuggling of timber find nights more convenient to avoid detection,
and that smuggling of forest produce is a serious menace to preservation of forests in the State and safeguarding of the property
of the State. Whether or not these are good grounds for imposing
·restrictions on transport of forest produce is not a matter with which
we are concerned in dealing with the power of the State by rules tL
restrict the right to transport forest produce. The power conferred
upon the State Government is merely "to regulate the transit" of
forest produce and not to restrict it. If the provisos are in truth
restrictive of the right to transport the forest produce, however, good
the grounds apparently may be for restricting the transport of forest
(I) [1963] l S.C.R. 491, 549.
366
SUPREME COURT lll!PORTS
[1967] 2 S.C.R.
produce, they cannot on that account transform the power conferred
by the provisos into a power merely regulatory. The High Court was,
therefore, in our view, right· in holding that the two provisos
to r. 2 are not regulatory in character, but are restrictive.
The alternative ground on which the High Court has decided
against the State Government must also be sustained. Article
301 provides:
"Subject to the other provisions of this Part, trade,
commerce and intercourse throughout the territory of
India shall be free."
The provisos are undoubtedly restrictive of trade and commerce
and on that account would prima facie be void, as derogating from
the freedom declared by Art. 301. It has been held by this Court in
Automobile Transport (Rajasthan) Ltd.'s case(') that regulatory
measures, which do not hamper trade, commerce and intercourse,
but facilitates them, are not hit by Art. 301 of the Constitution. But it cannot be said of the two provisos, that they are in
any sense regulatory. The plea that Art. 301 does not come to the
aid of the respondent because of the reservation made in Art. 305
has, in our judgment, no substance. Article 305, insofar, as it is
material, provides :
I
"Nothing in articles 301 and 303 shall affect the provisions- of any existing law except in so far as the PresideQt..
may by order otherwise direct;"
'
·
The expression "existing law" is defined in Art. 366(10) as meaning
any Jaw, Ordinance, order, bye-law, rule or regulation i;.sssed or
made before the commencement of the Constitution by any Legislature, authority or person having power to make such a law, Ordinance, order, bye-law, rule or regulation.
Undoubtedly the Forest
Act was passed before the Constitution and it was brought into
force before that date.
Rule 2 (as it stood originally) was promulgalcd after the Constitution, but that, as already observed, was
regulatory of the right to transport forest produce. Sec•ion 37 which
conferred power to make rules was undoubtedly "existing law"
within the meaning of that expression used in Art. 305, but the
rules made in exercise of that power after the Constitution cannot be
<leemed to be "existing law". The mere fact that there wan authority in the State under a pre-Constitution Act to make rules which
may impose restrictions on trade, commerce and intercourse, but
which was not exercised, will not make the rule made in exercise of
the authority after the Constitution "existing law" within the
meaning of the Constitution. This Court in Kalvani Stores
v. 11re State of Orlssa (2) held that a notification issued after the Con-
(I) (1963] I S.C R. 491, 549.
(2) A.I R. 1966 S.C. 1686.
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stitution imposing additional duty under the power reserved under s.
90 read with s. 27 of the Bihar & Orissa Act, 1915, was not existing
Jaw within the meaning of Art. 305 of the Constitution read with Art.
366(10) and the notification was invalid unless it cornplied with
the requirements of Arts. 302, 303 or 304 of the Constitution. It was
held by a majority of the Court that "existing law within the meaning
was therefore the provision contained ln s. 27 of the Bihar & Orissa
Act 2of1915 authorising the State Government to issue a notification
imposing a duty at the rate fixed thereby,
and the
notification issued pursuant thereto before the Constitution." The
decision of the Orissa High Court in Kasi Prasad v. StateofOrissa(I)
in which it was held that rules framed in 1958 after the coming into
force of the Constitution in exercise of the power conferred by s.
41 of the Orissa Forest Act, 1927, were existing law," and on that
account not open to challenge because of Art. 305 of the Constitution,
even though they violated the guarantee under Art. 301, cannot
be regarded as correct.
Article 304 which is an exception to Art. 301 has no application
to this case, because that Article saves certain laws from the operation of Art. 301 if the law is passed by the Legislature of a State.
The provisos to r. 2 are not made by the Legislature of the State;
'they are made by the executive Government in exercise of
delegated
authority.
The rules have the force of law, but
when made did not become part of the Act : (see s. 77 of the
Mys~e Forest Act). Again Art. 304(b) exempts from the operation of Art. 301 reasonable restrictions on the freedom of trade,
commerce and intercourse with or within the State as may be required in the public interest. There is no evidence of an enquiry
made by the State before the provisos were framed, and no case is
made out that they are reasonable restrictions on the freedom of
trade, commerce and intercourse imposed in the public interest.
Article 301 in terms prohibits the imposition of any restriction on
trade, commerce and intercourse throughout the territory of India,
and by the enactment of the two provisos clearly a restriction is
imposed upon the freedom of trade. The provisos to the rule
enacted by the State Government must thereft>re be deemed to be
invalid as infringing the guarantee under Art. 301 on the freedom
of trade, commerce and intercourse.
The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
G.C.
Appeal dismissed.
(I) A.I.R. 1963 Orissa, 24.