# STATE OF PUNJAB AND ORS v. SANJEET SINGH GREWAL AND ORS

- **Citation:** [2007] 8 S.C.R. 1
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2007-07-03
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal Nos. 5721-5725 of 2001
- **Bench:** B.P. Singh, Al Tamas Kabir
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/state-of-punjab-and-ors-v-sanjeet-singh-grewal-and-ors-23138
- **Pages:** 33

## Headnote

B
Purifab Regional and Town Planning and Development Act, 1995;
Section 56-Setting up of a new town-Acquisition of land thereforScope explained-Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
C
The State of Punjab issued Notifications dated March 13, 2000 under
Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as 'the
Act') for acquisition of about 9354 acres of land in 29 villages of the district
of Ropar. The acquisition was proposed to be made for "a public purpose D
namely for setting up of new town, Anandgarh". Objections were invited against
the proposed acquisition. The aforesaid Notifications were challenged by way
of filing several writ petitions before the High Court alleging that the
Notifications had been issued in derogation of the 'provisions of the Punjab
Regionai and Town Planning and Development Act, 1995 (hereinafter referred
to as 'the Act of 1995'). The High Court Allowed the writ petitions. Hence, E
the appeal
It was contended by the appellant that High Court committed a basic
error in coming to the conclusion that it was only the Board constituted under
Section 3 of the Act of 1995 which could select the site for a new town and
take all necessary action in connection therewith, and further that the F
selection of a site could be challenged by any person not necessarily an owner
of land sought to be acquired. It was contended that the Act of 1995 as a
futuristic legislation providing for modern planning and urban development
with multi level institutions. According to him Section 14 of the Act which
laid down the functions of the Board did not mandate that the site of a new G
town must be selected by the Board. In fact there was no other provision in
the Act of 1995 to this effect .. Sections 56, 57 and 61 of the Act permitted the
Government to decide where the new township should be located and the State
Government was not compelled to confine its choice to locations selected by
H
2
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2007] 8 S.C.R.
A any other authority under the Act. The State Government is not required
mandatorily to entrust the duty of selection of the site of a new town to the
Board. In fact under Section 28 of the Act the State Government or the Board
may entrust any of the authorities to do any work for carrying out the purposes
of the Act The powers that could be entrusted to the PUDA under Section 28
B of the Act by the State Government and the Board could also be entrusted to
the New Town Planning and Development Authority constituted under Section
31 of the Act. Indeed the State Government had constituted the New Town
Planning and Development Authority for Anandgarh under Section 31 of the
Act and therefore it was for the said Town Planning and Development Authority
,"-,
to select the site and to plan and develop the new township. For this purpose
c it could request the State Government to acquire lands as provided in Section
42 of the Act. It was further emphasized that the power of the Board was only
advisory in nature. The State Government could entrust any work to any of
the authorities under the Act. Power of the State was not fettered even in the
matter of selection of site and planning and development of a new township.
D The Town Planning and Development Authority for Anandgarh was actually
entrusted to do all this and there was, therefore, no need for the Board to be
called upon to select the site and take other steps. In fact the New, Town
Planning and Development Authority for Anandgarh was constituted;under
Section 31 of the Act of 1995 on May 20, 1999 which recommended the
acquisition of the lands in question pursuant to which Notifications were
E issued t1nder Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act on March i3, 2000. It
was also submitted that since the functions of PUDA under Section 28 of the
Act could be entrusted to the Special Urban Planning and Development
Authority constituted under Section 29 and the New Town Planning and
Development Authority under Section 31 of the Ac

## Text

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r
STATE OF PUNJAB AND ORS.
A
v.
SANJEET SINGH GREWAL AND ORS.
JULY 3, 2007
[B.P. SINGH AND AL TAMAS KABIR, JJ.]
B
Purifab Regional and Town Planning and Development Act, 1995;
Section 56-Setting up of a new town-Acquisition of land thereforScope explained-Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
C
The State of Punjab issued Notifications dated March 13, 2000 under
Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as 'the
Act') for acquisition of about 9354 acres of land in 29 villages of the district
of Ropar. The acquisition was proposed to be made for "a public purpose D
namely for setting up of new town, Anandgarh". Objections were invited against
the proposed acquisition. The aforesaid Notifications were challenged by way
of filing several writ petitions before the High Court alleging that the
Notifications had been issued in derogation of the 'provisions of the Punjab
Regionai and Town Planning and Development Act, 1995 (hereinafter referred
to as 'the Act of 1995'). The High Court Allowed the writ petitions. Hence, E
the appeal
It was contended by the appellant that High Court committed a basic
error in coming to the conclusion that it was only the Board constituted under
Section 3 of the Act of 1995 which could select the site for a new town and
take all necessary action in connection therewith, and further that the F
selection of a site could be challenged by any person not necessarily an owner
of land sought to be acquired. It was contended that the Act of 1995 as a
futuristic legislation providing for modern planning and urban development
with multi level institutions. According to him Section 14 of the Act which
laid down the functions of the Board did not mandate that the site of a new G
town must be selected by the Board. In fact there was no other provision in
the Act of 1995 to this effect .. Sections 56, 57 and 61 of the Act permitted the
Government to decide where the new township should be located and the State
Government was not compelled to confine its choice to locations selected by
H
2
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2007] 8 S.C.R.
A any other authority under the Act. The State Government is not required
mandatorily to entrust the duty of selection of the site of a new town to the
Board. In fact under Section 28 of the Act the State Government or the Board
may entrust any of the authorities to do any work for carrying out the purposes
of the Act The powers that could be entrusted to the PUDA under Section 28
B of the Act by the State Government and the Board could also be entrusted to
the New Town Planning and Development Authority constituted under Section
31 of the Act. Indeed the State Government had constituted the New Town
Planning and Development Authority for Anandgarh under Section 31 of the
Act and therefore it was for the said Town Planning and Development Authority
,"-,
to select the site and to plan and develop the new township. For this purpose
c it could request the State Government to acquire lands as provided in Section
42 of the Act. It was further emphasized that the power of the Board was only
advisory in nature. The State Government could entrust any work to any of
the authorities under the Act. Power of the State was not fettered even in the
matter of selection of site and planning and development of a new township.
D The Town Planning and Development Authority for Anandgarh was actually
entrusted to do all this and there was, therefore, no need for the Board to be
called upon to select the site and take other steps. In fact the New, Town
Planning and Development Authority for Anandgarh was constituted;under
Section 31 of the Act of 1995 on May 20, 1999 which recommended the
acquisition of the lands in question pursuant to which Notifications were
E issued t1nder Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act on March i3, 2000. It
was also submitted that since the functions of PUDA under Section 28 of the
Act could be entrusted to the Special Urban Planning and Development
Authority constituted under Section 29 and the New Town Planning and
Development Authority under Section 31 of the Act of 1995, the Board
F constituted under Section 3 of the Act did not come into the picture at all. He
also emphasized the fact that the challenge was to the Notifications issued
......
under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act asking not for a writ of mandamus
but for quashing the Notifications on the ground that there existed no valid
and legal public purpose for which the acquisition was purported to be made.
According to him the scheme of the Act left no room for doubt that the powers
G of the State Government were wide enough to include selection of the site for
a new town. Indeed the Board had no mechanism for selecting an appropriate
site for a new town and, therefore, the State Government followed the route of
Sections 28, 38 and 42 of the Act of 1995 i.e. by conferring on the New Town '
Planning and Development Authority constituted under Section 31 of the Act
H
the powers and functions of PUDA under section 28 of the Act, and then
STATEOFPUNJABv. SANJEETSINGHGREWAL
3
..
-'.'
acquiring the land on the recommendation of the New Town Planning and A·
Development Authority under Section 42 of the Act of 1995. He further
submitted that if the High Court was right in its opinion the State would be
compelled to first move the Board for the purpose of selection of site. This
was wholly unnecessary because in all cases the sanctioning authority being
the State, its powers and authority must be interpreted in that larger B
perspective. He also submitted that there was no requirement in law that a
•
detailed plan complete in all respects must precede the acquisition under the
)
Land Acquisition Act. He also emphasized the provisions ofSectiqn 10 of the
Perphiery Act and submitted that the State was not inhibited from acquiring
lands which came within the controlled area under the Periphery Act, and
this was made explicit by Section 10 of the Periphery Act It was also contended c
that High Court adjourned the matter sine die awaiting the judgment of this
Court in view of the fact that it found certain common questions arising in
the Writ Petition. However, he also made his submission on merit since the
principles laid down in this batch of appeals may apply to the matter pending
before the High Court. According to him the acquisition is sought to be made D
under the Land Acquisition Act. Section 56 does not at all contemplate
,
compulsory acquisition. The High Court proceeded on the erroneous basis
that the scheme should first be formulated and only thereafter the acquisition
of land could be made. This completely ignored the State's power of eminent
domain. 'fhe State is not denuded of its power to acquire land merely because
under the scheme of some other Act a Board is constituted to select the site E
for setting up a new town. He referred to the Scheme of Chapter XI of the Act
of 1995 and submitted that the State may be compelled to acquire land under
Section 84 of the Act. In this connection he also referred to Section 71(3)(f)
of the Act of 1995 which provides that the Draft Comprehensive Master Plan
...
may esignate land subject to acquisition for any public purpose. He, therefore, F
submitted that the power of eminent domain under the Land Acquisition Act
cannot be curtailed by the Act of 1995 or any other Act. According to him
after the selection of site for a new town under Section 56 of the Act of 1995
there is no provision for compulsory acquisition of land. The site may be
selected by the State as well as by the Board constituted under Section 3 of
the Act of 1995. Where the compulsory acquisition route is followed the only G
procedure for acquisition is the one under the Land Acquisition.
I
On the other hand, the respondent contended that Under the Act of 1995
the Board is a high power Board presided over by the Chief Minister of the
State. He submitted that the planning area as well as the planning agency has
to be declared and designated by the Board. The Board has a 'e~' ''ital role to H
4
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(2007) 8 S.C.R.
A play since it is the apex authority under the Act. He submitted that if any land
is to be acquired under the Act of 1995, that must be done in accordance with
the procedure laid down for that purpose in the Act. He, therefore., submitted
that when any land is acquired for the purpose of any authority under the Act
of 1995, the State Government may at the request of the authority concerned
proceed to acquire land under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. On
B payment by the authority of compensation awarded under the Land Acquisition
Act and of any other charges incurred in acquiring the land, the land shall
vest in the authority. It was emphasised the O\'erriding effect of the Act of 1995
and referred to Section 179 thereof. He contended that for setting up a new
township provisions are made only in the Act of 1995 and, therefore, the
C provisions of the special Act must be scrupulously followed. He did not dispute
the State's power of eminent domain and submitted that in appropriate cases
the State may acquire lands for public purposes. However, ifthe land has to be
acquired under Section 42 of the Act of 1995 it must be acquired for the
purpose of the authority under the Act. If the land is to be acquired to set up
a new town as stated in the impugned notifications the site must be selected
D in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 1995. He id not dispute that if
the Government proposes to acquire any land under the Land Acquisition Act
for any purpose not covered by the Act of 1995, the provisions thereof will not
be attracted. In the instant case, he submitted that the site was in fact selected
by the New Town Planning Development Authority constituted und~r Section
E 31 of the Act and not by the Board. This was clearly contrary to the provisions
of Section 56 which in terms provided that it was the Board which was
authorized to declare its intention by issuance of Notification in the Official
Gazette to specify any area in the State to be a regional planning area, a local
planning area or the site for a new town. Thereafter it was again the Board
which could designate the planning agency for that area for the purpose of
F performance of the functions assigned to it. Thus, so far as the selection of
site for a new town is concerned, the site has to be entified by the Board and
after hearing objections the Board could declare the site for a new town. He
further drew a distinction between the selection ofa site for a new town, and
preparation of plans for development of the selected site. The planning may be
G entrusted by the Board to any of the authorities under the Act who may be
called upon by the State Government or the Board to take up the work in
connection with the preparation and implementation of regional plans, master
plans, new township plans, schemes etc. According to him before any of the ·
\
authorities could be called upon to do so, in the case of setting up of a new
town, the existence of a selected site was a pre-condition because no
H development could take place unless the site was first selected. He, therefore,
STATE OF PUNJAB v. SANJEET SINGH GREW AL
5
.......
fully supported the findings of the High Court and submitted that in the A
absence of a validly selected site for a new township by the Board, no planning
and development work could be entrusted to any of the authorities under the
Act. The selection of site which amounted to declaratio~ ofa planning area
was entrusted to the Board under Section 56 of the Act and the authority
constituted under Section 31 for the development of the township could not be B
entrusted with the task of selecting the site and declaring a planning area.
Dismissing the appeals, the Court
HELD 1.1. The Board constituted under Section 3 of the Punjab Regional
and Town Planning and Development Act, 1995 is a high-powered authority c
with the Chief Minister at its head. It may be called upon by the State
Government to do certain things as are enumerated in sub-section (2) of
Section 14, but it is equally true that even without the directions of the State
Government the Board may itself perform those functions. Section 14 does
say that the functions of the Board shall be to advise the State Government
and to guide and direct the planning agencies and to perform such other D
:r
functions as the State Government, from time to time, assign to it. This,
however, should not lead to the conclusion that the Board, a statutory authority,
can be ignored by the State Government altogether. It may be that the advice
tendered by the Board may not be acceptable to the State Government, but
that is quite different from suggesting that having regard to the overriding E
powers of the State Government the Board may not be consulted at all even
with regard to the matters and functions which it is required to perform under
the Act. (Para 19) (19-H; 20-A-BI
1.2. The Board, in exercise of power conferred under Section 56 and
~
57 of the Act only can, by Notification in the Official Gazette, specify an area F
as a regional planning area, a local planning area or a site for a new town
clearly defining the limits of the area. After considering the objections and
suggestions that may be received by it the Board may with or without
· modifications declare the area to be a planning area by Notification in the
Official Gazette, and thereafter appoint a planning agency for performance
of the functions related thereto. Not only individuals but e\·en representatives G
of the departments of the State Government or the Central Government or a
local authority or any other institution may submit its objections or
/
suggestions relating to anything contained in the Notification. There is
nothing in Sections 56 and 57 to hold that the planning agency itself may
select the site for a new to·wn. (Para 21 ( (22-E-G; H; 23-AI
H
6
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(2007) 8 S.C.R.
A
1.3. Clause (I) ofsub-section (2) of Section 28 provides that the State
-rGovernment or the Board may require the authority (PUDA) to take up the
works in connection with the preparation and implementation of Regional
Plans, Master Plans and New Township Plans, and town improvement
schemes. It does not empower PUDA to declare the site for a new town as a
B planning area though it is authorized to prepare and implement new township
plans. Therefore, it can be safely concluded that after a site for a new town is
selected by the Board and declared as a planning area in exercise of its powers
under Section 56 of the Act, the authority designated as the planning agency
for that area, can take up the works in connection with the preparation and
implement~tion of new township plans. (Para 231124-B-CI
c
1.4. Neither the PUDA nor the authority constituted under Section 17
nor the New Town Planning and Development Authority constituted under
Section 31 is vested with the power to declare a planning area such as a site
of a new town. The fact that it is entrusted with the task of proper planning
and development of a site of a new town itself pre-supposes the existence of a
D selected site. I Para 27and 371126-B-C; 31-CI
1.5. The Notification issued under sub-section (I) of Section S6 declaring
the intention of the Board to specify an area as the site for a new town must
define the limits of the area to which it relates meaning thereby that the Board
must while declaring its intention to specify an area as a planning area give
E all the necessary particulars as required under sub-section (I) of Section 56
and consider the objections thereto.
(Para 27and 351126-E-FI
1.6. The provisions of the Act of 1995 are clearly attracted to the
F acquisition in question, since the acquisition was for planning and development
, ...
ofa planning area i.e. new town, under the Act of 1955.
tpara 281127-B-q
1.7. The submission that no acquisition of land is at all contemplated in
connection with schemes declared under Section 56 of the Act is not justified
G and very wide as depending on the nature of scheme framed for
implementation, the planning authority may require land for its purposes and
may, therefore, request the Government to in\·oke Section 42 of the Act which
provides for acquisition of land for the purposes of the authority under the
\
Act applying the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The Scheme
H
concerned, in the instant case, did involve acquisition of land and the
..
'•
ST A TE OF PUNJAB v. SANJEET SINGH GREWAL
1
. ..._
Government did in fact issue the impugned Notifications for acquisition of A
land for the purposes of the aforesaid New Town Scheme. IPara 291127-E-GI
1.8. The submission that the State in exercise of its power of eminent
·-
domain may acquire lands under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act and it
is not denuded of its power to acquire land merely because under the Scheme
of some other Act a certain procedure had been prescribed for acquisition of B
land, is not acceptable, in the facts of the instant case, the lands were sought
to be acquired for the purpose of implementation of a New Town Scheme and,
therefore, the procedure laid down in the Act of 1995 had to be followed.
I Para 311128-B-CI
Gandhi Groh Nirman Sahkari Samiti Ltd. & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan c
and Ors., 1199312 SCC 662; Pratap and Another Etc. Etc v. State of Rajasthan
and Ors. Etc. Etc., (199613 SCC I and Jaipur Development Aurhorityv. Sita
Ram and Ors., I 19971 3 SCC 522, referred to.
1.9. In specifying and declaring the site for new town for which the land
D
was sought to be acquired i.e. in specifying and declaring the planning area,
r·
namely the site for a new town, the various provisions of the Act were not
complied with. I Para 341 IJO..fl
1.10. The Legislature having enacted a statute and expressly provided
a procedure for declaration of a planning area, which involved consideration E
of objections and suggestions from the public and publication of the declaration
in the Official Gazette, the State could not have adopted a different procedure
in breach of express provisions, completely ignoring the existence of the
Board, the apex authority under the Act, and obliterating the provision for
public participation in the matter of declaring a planning area as that would
be in the teeth of the mandatory provisions of Section 56 of the Act and it F
cannot be countenanced that the Gonrnment being the final authority was
not bound to consult the Board. !Para 391 (31-F-Gl
2.1. No doubt once a public purpose has been specified by the Government,
•
the Notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act is not vitiated
~
on account of the fact that planned development was not specified with G
particularization of the land in question needed for the public purpose. In the
,)
instant case there did not exist any \'a lid public purpose in the absence of a
validly declared planning area, namely a site for a new town, by the competent
authority by Notification in the Official Gazette under Section 56 of the Act
of 1995. (Para 33 and 401130-C; 32-A-CJ
H
8
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(2007) 8 S.C.R.
A
Ajay Krishan Shinghal and Ors, v. Union of India & Ors. ( 19961 JO SCC
721, referred to.
3.1. It may be that the State Government in its anxiety to set up the new
town of Anandgarh acted with haste and in the process lost sight of some of
the mandatory provisions of the Act of 1995. That, however, does not justify
B the conclusion that the State had acted ma/a fide. Observations made by the
High Court in this regard set aside. (Para 44( (32-G-H; 33-A(
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 5721-5725 of
2001.·
C
From the final Order/Judgment dated 28.3.2001 of the High Court of
Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in C.W.P. Nos. 7291: 8708, 9047, 9143 and
16738/2000.
WITH
D
C.A. Nos. 5727-5731 of2001 and S.L.P. No. 7946 of2002.
R.S. Cheema, A.G. for Punjab, Sanjeev Sharma. A.A.G., Vikas Singh,
A.S.G., A.G. Choudhary, Ranjit Kumar, Sr. Advs., Rachna Joshi lssar, Sanjay
Jain, June Choudhary, Rishi Malhotra, Prem Malhotra, G.C. Garg Dhuriwala,
M.P. Jha, Ram Ekbal Roy, Harshvardhan Jha, Gaurav Garg Dhuriwala, Anil K.
E Chopra, Sudhir Walia, Priank, Mahinder Singh Dahiya, Yash Pal Dhingra,
Balbir Singh Gupta, Seeraj Bagga, Sureshta Bagga, Yakesh Anand, Amit Sethi,
Nishant Kumar, Sanjeev Anand, Keshav Kaushik, Dr. Kailash Chand, R.C.
Kohli, A.P. Mohanty, Arun K. Sinha, Vipin Gogia, G.P. Singh, K.K. Gogna.
Jaspreet Gogia and Madan Gopal Gupta for the Appellants.
F
J.S. Garewal, K. Amareswari, Sr. Adv., H.S. Garewal, Dhiraj, P.N. Puri.
Anjani Aiyagari, B. Ramana Murthy, S.N. Terdal, Kamini Jaiswal, Shomila
Bakshi, Rani Mishra, Atul Nanda, Rameeza Hakeem and Atishi Dipankar for
the Respond.ents.
G
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
8.P. SINGH, J. I. In this batch of Civil Appeals by Special Leave the
common judgment and order of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at
\
Chandigarh dated March 28, 2001 in Civil Writ Petition Nos. 7291, 8708, 9047,
9143 and 16738 of2000 has been impugned. Civil Appeal Nos.5721-5725 of
H 2001 have been preferred by the State of Punjab while Civil Appeal Nos.5727J
STA TE OF PUNJAB"· SANJEET SINGH GREWAL [B.P. SINGH. J.]
9
-~
"""'
5731 of 2001 have been preferred by the New Town Planning and Development A
Authority for Anandgarh. Special Leave Petition No. 7946 of 2000 has been
preferred against the order of the High Court dated September I 0, 200 I in Civil
Writ Petition No. 7050 of 200 I adjourning the writ petition sine die awaiting
the judgment of this Court in the aforesaid Civil Appeals. By this common
judgment and order we proceed to dispose of all the appeals before us as also B
the Special Leave Petition.
2. The facts of the case are not in dispute. The State of Punjab issued
Notifications Exhibits P-1 to P-29 dated March 13. 2000 under Section 4 of the
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') for acquisition
of about 9354 acres of land in 29 villages of the district of Ropar. The c
acquisition was proposed to be made for "a public purpose namely for setting
up of new town, Anandgarh". Objections were invited against the proposed
acquisition. Several writ petitions were filed before the High Court challenging
the aforesaid Notifications alleging that the Notifications had been issued in
derogation of the provisions of the Punjab Regional and Town Planning and
Development Act 1995 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act of 1995'). It was D
stated that to set up a new town, the site had first to be selected by the Board
constituted under the Act of 1995. The Board was thereafter required to
designate a planning agency. This was not done. The provisions of Sections
56, 57, 58 and 59 of the Act of 1995 were completely ignored. Though the New
Town Planning and Development Authority for Anandgarh was constituted E
by the Government on May 20, 1999 under Section 31 of the Act of 1995, in
the absence of a decision of the Board under Sections 56 and 57 of the Act
of 1995, the aforesaid Special Town Planning Authority for Anandgarh could
not take up the planning and development of the new township. It was
alleged that a large number of influential persons including senior bureaucrats
_,
had bought land in the area with a view to earn profit since the Government F
had announced compensation at an exorbitant rate. It was also submitted that
the provisions of the Punjab New Capital (Periphery) Control Act, 1952
(hereinafter referred to as 'the Periphery Act') and the rules framed thereunder
have been violated. Apart from these legal submissions it was also urged that
the site was not suitable for a new town.
G
3. The appellants (respondents in the writ petitions) contested the writ
/
petitions and submitted that the State Government having taken a decision
to set up a new township Anandgarh, and having appointed a Special Planning
Authority under Section 31 of the Act, the Board had no role to play in the
matter and it was not necessary that the Board should have first selected a H
10
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(2007) 8 S.C.R.
A site and designated a plan,ning agency before the Special Planning Authority
could take any action for planning 'and development of the new township. It
was also submitted that the Periphery Act did not inhibit the State of Punjab
from acquiring land in the controlled area under the Periphery Act for the
purpose of setting up a township.
B
c
4. Having regard to the ~ubmissions urged before it the High Court
formulated the following questions which fell for its consideration:-
"(i) Are the provisions of the Punjab Regional and Town Planning and
Development Act, 1995 applicable to and attracted in the facts and
circumstances of the present case?
(ii) If yes, have the provisions of the 1995 Act been followed in the
present case? Does the selection of the site for setting up the city of
Anandgarh conform to the requirements of the statute?
(iii) Have the respondents acted in violation of the provisions of the
D
Punjab New Capital (Periphery) Control Act. 1952 and the Rules framed
thereunder?
(iv) Is the action of the respondents based on extraneous considerations
and vitiated by malajides?
E
(v) Have the petit;oners made out a case for interference by this court
under article 226 of the Constitution of India?
5. The High Court rejected the submission urged on behalf of the State
that the Act of 1995, particularly Section 56 thereof, was not applicable when
acquisition was made under the Land Acquisition Act, since the two acts
F operated in two distinct and separate fields. and that the provisions of the
Act of 1995 were applicable only when the Master Plan was sought to be
implemented without acquisition of land. The High Court held that admittedly
the Board under Section 56 of the Act had not selected the site for the new
township after considering the objections and suggestionsas provided therein,
nor did the Government ever consult the Board in the matter. It rejected the
G argument of the State that the Act of 1995 was applicable only when
compensation was not payable. It further held that the Government itself.
proceeded on the basis that the Act of 1995 was applicable inasmuch as it
proceeded to implement its scheme through The New Town Planning and
· Development Authority for Anandgarh constituted under Section 31 of the
H Act of I Q95 and it was on the recommendation of the aforesaid authority that
--\.
STATEOFPUNJABv. SANJEETSINGHGREWAL [B.P. SINGH,J.]
ll
fand was sought to be acquired under Section 42 of the Act of 1995. It A
therefore held that the Act of 1995 was applicable.
6. Considering the question whether the provisions of the 1995 Act
were followed, it noticed the concession made by the State that the matter
with regard to the selection of site for the new township was never referred
to the Board. The New Town Planning and Development Authority for B
Anandgarh constituted under Section 3 I of the Act had considered three
sites and forwarded its recommendation to the Chief Town Planner who after
examination of the matter selected the site in question. The matter was placed
before the State Cabinet for its approval which was granted on January 12,
2000. On February 24, 2000 the aforesaid de_velopment authority requested the C
State Government to acquire the lands in question and accordingly the
impugned Notifications were issued on March 13, 2000 under Section 4 of the
Land Acquisition Act. The High Court after considering the Scheme of the
Act upheld the contention urged on behalf of the writ petitioners that only
the Board constituted under Section 3 of the Act of 1995 could, in exercise
of its authority under Sections 14 and 56 of the Act read with Rule 22, take D
a decision regarding the selection of the site for a new town. Only thereafter
further action could be taken by the State for constituting a Special Agency
for the planning and development of the new town under Section 31 of the
Act and which Agency could take further action for the said purpose as was
considered necessary. The High Court recorded its findings as under:-
E
"On a cumulative consideration of the provisions of the Act, it appears
clear to us that the act entrusts the task of selecting the site for a new
town to the Board. Thereafter, a Master Plan has to be prepared in
accordance with the prescribed procedure. After the Master Plan is
ready, the government is competent to constitute a special agency for F
the planning and development of the new town. At the asking of this
authority, the government can proceed to acquire ·the land. Thus
despite the provision for the constitution of a Special Authority, the
Board cannot be by-passed. The selection of site is the job assigned
to the Board. This is so obviously because it has and can associate
experts. It can get assistance from others".
G
7. Accordingly, the High Court held that the State action did not confonn
to the requirements of the Act of 1995 and thus could not be sustained.
6. The High Court held that the provisions of the Periphery Act, 1952
had ·also been violated. It concluded that though Section l 0 did not affect the H
12
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2007} 8 S.C.R.
A power of the Government or any other authority to acquire land in the
controlled area under any other law for the time being in force, yet the bar
contained in Section 5 prohibited the erection or buildings or making of roads
even under the garb of establishing a new town without permission of the
competent authority under the Periphery Act. No such permission had been
B taken by the Government and yet the land was sought to be acquired for the
purpose of setting up a new town. On the question of ma/a fide the High
Court did not record a categoric finding and gave to the State the benefit of
doubt.
9. Lastly, the High Court held that in the facts and circumstances of the
C case the writ petitioners were entitled to relief under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India.
D
E
F
G
IO. In the end the High Court recorded its conclusions in the following
words:-"
(i) Nature is beautiful. But it demands obedience to its ordinance.s.
When violated, the earth erupts and we have earthquakes. Man cannot
continue to 'pick nature's pocket'. He cannot raise multi-storeyed
monsters of steel and cement at every place. All places cannot be
suitable for a new city.
(ii) Recognising the need for a multi-disciplinary consideration, the
legislature had enacted the "Punjab Regional and Town Planning and
Development Act, 1995" and provided for the constitution of the
Board and other Authorities. The Board consists of persons who
have knowledge or experience in the fields of engineering, housing,
town planning and urban development. It can associate others for the
efficient performance of its onerous functions.
(iii) While embarking upon the project of the new town-' Anandgarh',
the State has not shown even a scant regard for the salutary provisions
of the statute. It has acted against the express letter and spirit of the
·Act. It has not allowed the Board to perform its functions. In particular,
it has not let the Board 'select the site' for the new city. It has acted
in contravention of the statute.
(iv) In the process, the government has deprived the citizen of the
opportunity to put forth the objections/suggestions and denied itself
the benefit of good advice.
H
(v) The mere fact that the government finds the procedure prescribed
l'
STA TE OF PUNJAB v. SANJEET SINGH GREWAL [B.P. SINGH, J.)
13
by the Act and the Rules to be lengthy or cumbersome and such as A
--
can result in delay cannot be a ground to avoid obedience to the
provisions of law. The courts cannot allow 'time' taken in complying
with the provisions to become the graveyard of good laws or peoples'
rights.
L~"
(vi) The State government has also failed to consider the objections B
raised and the relevant suggestions made by the Union Ministries of
Defence and Urban Development. Its action is likely to finish the
farms and farmers who live in the periphery of Chandigarh.
(vii) The State government has proceeded to acquire land without
obtaining permission from the competent authority under the c
provisions of the Punjab New Capital (Periphery) Control Ac·~. 1952
and the Rules. Thus, it has proceeded to acquire land without being
entitled to raise any construction or even lay any roads. The entire
proceedings can prove to be an exercise in futility.
(viii) The courts do not count heads. The mere fact that the petitioners D
are few in number or that their holdings are small is no ground to deny
r -
them the relief as prayed for in these petitions. Even the poor are the
God's children.
(ix) There is a suspicion surrounding the action of the State Government
E
in acquiring the land. There is a smell. But not a stink. Suspicion is
not enough to uphold the plea of ma/a fides. Thus, the respondents
are entitled to a benefit of doubt when the entire acquisition is
challenged on the ground of extraneous considerations.
(x) The State is undoubtedly trying to keep its head up and the F
expenses down. However, its ability to gather the resources to pay for
the land and to develop it, is extremely suspect and it's wisdom
doubtful".
11. The High Court therefore struck down the impugned Notifications
issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act and allowed the writ G
petitions.
12. The learned Advocate General for the State of Punjab assailing the
impugned judgment and order of the High Court submitted that the High
/
Court committed a basic error in coming to the conclusion that it was only
the Board constituted under Section 3 of the Act of 1995 which could select H
-1
14
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(2007) 8 S.C.R.
~A the site for a new town and take all necessary action in coMection therewith,
I
and further that the selection of a site could be challenged by any person not _
--
necessarily an owner of land sought to be acquired. He took us to the scheme
of the Act of 1995 as also some provisions onhe Periphery Act. He described
the Act of 1995 as a futuristic legislation providing for modem planning and
B
urban development with multi level institutions. According to him Section 14
·-~
of the Act which laid down the functions of the Board did not mandate that
the site of a new town must be selected by the Board. In fact there was no
other provision in the Act of 1995 to this effect. Sections 56, 57 and 61 of
the Act permitted the Government to decide where the new township should
be located and the State Government was not compelled to confine its choice
,,.(_
c to locations selected by any other authority under the Act. The State
Government is not required mandatorily to entrust the duty of -selection of the
site of a new town to the Board. In fact under Section 28 of the Act the State
Government or the Board may entrust any of the authorities to do any work
for carrying out the purposes of the Act. The powers that could be entrusted
D
to the PUDA under Section 28 of the Act by the State Government and the
Board could also be entrusted to the New Town Planning and DevelQpment
Authority constituted under Section 31 of the Act. Indeed the State Government
had constituted the New Town Planning and Development Authority for
Anandgarh under Section 31 of the Act and therefore it was for the said Town
Planning and Development Authority to select the site and to plan and
E develop the new township. For this purpose it could request the State
Government to acquire lands as provided in Section 42 of the Act. He further
emphasized that the power of the Board was only advisory in nature. The
State Government could entrust any work to any of the authorities under the
Act. Power of the State was not fettered even in the matter of selection of
F
site and planning and devel~pment of a new township. The Town Planning
and Development Authority for Anandgarh was actually entrusted to do all
this and there was, therefore, no need for the Board to be called upon to
select the site and take other steps. In fact the New Town Planning and
Development Authority for Anandgarh was constituted under Section 31 of
the Act of 1995 on May 20, 1999 which recommended the acquisition of the
G lands in question pursuant to which Notifications were issued under Section
4 of the Land Acquisition Act on March 13, 2000.
13. Shri Sanjiv Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General, in his
supplementing arguments submitted that since the functions of PUDA under
\
Section 28 of the Act could be entrusted to the Special Urban Planning and
"
H Development Authority constituted under Section 29 and the New Town
r
STATEOFPUNJABv. SANJEETSINGHGREWAL [B.P. SINGH,J.]
15
Planning and Development Authority under Section 31 of the Act of 1995, the A
Board constituted under Section 3 of the Act did not come into the picture
at all. He also emphasized the fact that the challenge was to the Notifications
issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act asking not for a writ of
mandamus but for quashing the Notifications on the ground that there existed
no valid and legal public purpose for which the acquisition was purported to B
be made. According to him the scheme of the Act left no room for doubt that
the powers of the State Government were wide enough to include selection
of the site for a new town. Indeed the Board had no mechanism for selecting
an appropriate site for a new town and, therefore, the State Government
followed the route of Sections 28, 38 and 42 of the Act of 1995 i.e. by
conferring on the New Town Planning and Development Authority constituted C
under Section 31 of the Act the powers and functions of PUDA under section
28 of the Act, and then acquiring the land on the recommendation of the New
Town Planning and Development Authority under Section 42 of the Act of
1995. He further submitted that ifthe High Court was right in its opinion the
State would be compelled to first move the Board for the purpose of selection ·
of site. This was wholly unnecessary because in all cases the sanctioning D
authority beiac the Stale, its powers and authority must be interpreted in that
larger paspcctive. He also submitted that there was no requirement in law
that a detailed plan complete in all respects must precede the acquisition
under the Land A~isition Act. He also emphasized the provisions of Section
10 of the Petplt,icry Act and submitted that the State was not inhibited from E
acquiring lands which came within the controlled area under the Periphery
Act, and this was made explicit by Section I 0 of the Periphery Act.
14. Mr. Vikas Singh, learned Additional Solicitor General, appearing for
PUDA in SLP) No. 7946 of2002 submitted that the High Court adjourned the
matter sine die awaiting the judgment of this Court in view of the fact that F
it found certain common questions arising in the Writ Petition. However, he
also made his submission on merit since the principles laid down in this batch
of appeals may apply to the matter pending before the High Court. According
to him the acquisition is sought to be made under the Land Acquisition Act.
Section 56 does not at all contemplate compulsory acquisition. The High G
Court proceeded on the erroneous basis that the scheme should first be
formulated and only thereafter the acquisition of land could be made. This
completely ignored the State's power of eminent domain. The State is not
denuded of its power to acquire land merely because under the scheme of
some other Act a Board is constituted to select the site for setting up a new
town. He referred to the Scheme of Chapter XI of the Act of 1995 and H
16
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2007] 8 S.C.R.
A submitted that the State may be compelled to acquire land under Section 84
of the Act.