# STATE OF PUNJAB v. DEWAN CHUNI LAL February 16, 19'70

- **Citation:** [1970] 3 S.C.R. 694
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1970
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 2348 of 1966
- **Bench:** J. M. Shelat, G. K. Mitter
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/state-of-punjab-v-dewan-chuni-lal-february-16-19-70-5072
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

Constitution of India, Art. 311-0pportunity to show cause "llflinst
dismiss•·l-Departmental enquiry is vitiated if officer concerned Is not
given reasonob/e opportunizy of conducting his defence.
Punjab Police Ru/es-Officer charged with inefjicie11ey ·within meaning
of R. 16. 25(2)-Adverse reports relating to 1941 and 1942 not relevant
when officer allowed to cross efficiency bar in 1944.
The respondent was a Sub-l!jSpector of Police and had served as such
in various places which are no,,V in Pakistan before being posteq to
Gurgaon in 1948. His confi<lential service reports upto 1940 were satisfactory. In 1941 and 1942 he got bad reports. However he was allowed
to cross the efficiency bar in 1944.
The reports relating to 1945 and
1946 were again adverse.. In 1948 the report charged him with having
taken bribe in a particular case, but the charge was on enquiry found to
be false.
On October 12, 1949 he was served with a charge sheet setting
forth extracts from his confidential character roll imputing inefficiency
and lack of probity while in service from 1941 to 1948. He was asked
to answer to the prima facie chal'ge of inefficiency as envisaged in paragraph 16.25(2) of the Punjab Police Rules. A departmental enquiry was
held and the enquiry officer in 1950 recommended his dismissal. After a
further show cause notice the respondent was dismissed from seryice. He
thereupon filed a suit in which he challenged his dismissal as wrongful on
the gj'ounds inter alia that (i) Reports relating to the years 1941 & 1942
should not have been taken into consideration against him; (ii) that the
enquiry oljicer did not allow hiin to examine in defence the :officers who
- had written adverse reports against him and other witnesses who could
have thrown light on these reports. The trial court decreed the suit and
the High Court also held in the appellant's favour mainly on the ground
that Art. 311 of the Constitution had not been complied with. In appeal
to this Court by the State of Punjab.
HELD: (i) Reports earlier than 1944 should not have been"<:onsidered at all inasmuch as the respondent was allowed to cross the efficiency
bar in that year. It was unthinkable that if the authorities took any
serious view of the charge of dishonesty and inefficiency contained in the
confidential reports .for 1941 and 1942 they could have overlooked the
same and recommended the case of the officer as one fit for crossing the
efficiency bar in 1944.
Moreover there was no specific complaint in
either of the two .years and at best there was only room for suspicion regarding his behaviour. [699 HJ
(ii) On the facts of this case it was impossible to hold that the respondent had been given reasonable opportunity of conducting . his
defence
before the enquiry officer. It was clear that if the enquiry officer had
summoried at least those witnesses who were available and who could
have thrown some light on the reports made ag.ainst the respondent the
report might will have been different.
Refusal of the right to examine
witness~ who had made general remarks against the respondent's.character
and were available for ~xamination. at the ,enq~~ amoun~ to denial
of a reasonable opportunity of showmg cause agamst tlie action proposed.
Although the case was governed by Art. 3tl as it stood prior to its
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PUNJAB v. CHUN! LAL (Mitter, I.)
695
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a!"endment in 1963 the, respondent could not be deprived of an effective
nght to make representation against the aCtion of dismissal [70 I F-O·
703 C-D]
.
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In this view the appeal by the State of Punjab must fail.
Sadananda Mohapatra v. State, A.I.R. 1967 Orissa 49 and State of
lammu & Kashmir v. Bakshi Ghu/am Mohammed [1966] Supp S C.R
B
401, distinguished.
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State o/ Orissa v. ,Sailabehari, A,l.R. 1963< Orissa 73, referred to.
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## Text

694
STATE OF PUNJAB
v.
DEWAN CHUNI LAL
February 16, 19'70
[J. M. SHELAT AND G. K. MITTER, J1.J
Constitution of India, Art. 311-0pportunity to show cause "llflinst
dismiss•·l-Departmental enquiry is vitiated if officer concerned Is not
given reasonob/e opportunizy of conducting his defence.
Punjab Police Ru/es-Officer charged with inefjicie11ey ·within meaning
of R. 16. 25(2)-Adverse reports relating to 1941 and 1942 not relevant
when officer allowed to cross efficiency bar in 1944.
The respondent was a Sub-l!jSpector of Police and had served as such
in various places which are no,,V in Pakistan before being posteq to
Gurgaon in 1948. His confi<lential service reports upto 1940 were satisfactory. In 1941 and 1942 he got bad reports. However he was allowed
to cross the efficiency bar in 1944.
The reports relating to 1945 and
1946 were again adverse.. In 1948 the report charged him with having
taken bribe in a particular case, but the charge was on enquiry found to
be false.
On October 12, 1949 he was served with a charge sheet setting
forth extracts from his confidential character roll imputing inefficiency
and lack of probity while in service from 1941 to 1948. He was asked
to answer to the prima facie chal'ge of inefficiency as envisaged in paragraph 16.25(2) of the Punjab Police Rules. A departmental enquiry was
held and the enquiry officer in 1950 recommended his dismissal. After a
further show cause notice the respondent was dismissed from seryice. He
thereupon filed a suit in which he challenged his dismissal as wrongful on
the gj'ounds inter alia that (i) Reports relating to the years 1941 & 1942
should not have been taken into consideration against him; (ii) that the
enquiry oljicer did not allow hiin to examine in defence the :officers who
- had written adverse reports against him and other witnesses who could
have thrown light on these reports. The trial court decreed the suit and
the High Court also held in the appellant's favour mainly on the ground
that Art. 311 of the Constitution had not been complied with. In appeal
to this Court by the State of Punjab.
HELD: (i) Reports earlier than 1944 should not have been"<:onsidered at all inasmuch as the respondent was allowed to cross the efficiency
bar in that year. It was unthinkable that if the authorities took any
serious view of the charge of dishonesty and inefficiency contained in the
confidential reports .for 1941 and 1942 they could have overlooked the
same and recommended the case of the officer as one fit for crossing the
efficiency bar in 1944.
Moreover there was no specific complaint in
either of the two .years and at best there was only room for suspicion regarding his behaviour. [699 HJ
(ii) On the facts of this case it was impossible to hold that the respondent had been given reasonable opportunity of conducting . his
defence
before the enquiry officer. It was clear that if the enquiry officer had
summoried at least those witnesses who were available and who could
have thrown some light on the reports made ag.ainst the respondent the
report might will have been different.
Refusal of the right to examine
witness~ who had made general remarks against the respondent's.character
and were available for ~xamination. at the ,enq~~ amoun~ to denial
of a reasonable opportunity of showmg cause agamst tlie action proposed.
Although the case was governed by Art. 3tl as it stood prior to its
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PUNJAB v. CHUN! LAL (Mitter, I.)
695
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a!"endment in 1963 the, respondent could not be deprived of an effective
nght to make representation against the aCtion of dismissal [70 I F-O·
703 C-D]
.
'
In this view the appeal by the State of Punjab must fail.
Sadananda Mohapatra v. State, A.I.R. 1967 Orissa 49 and State of
lammu & Kashmir v. Bakshi Ghu/am Mohammed [1966] Supp S C.R
B
401, distinguished.
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State o/ Orissa v. ,Sailabehari, A,l.R. 1963< Orissa 73, referred to.
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CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2348 of
1966.
Appeal from the judgment and decree dated September 6, 1962,
of the Poojab High Court in Regular First Appeal No. 53 of 1956.
V. C. Maha;an, for the appellant.
N. S. Bindra and B. Datta, for the respondent.
The Judgment of_ the Court was delivered by
Mitter, J.
By this ~ppeal the State of Punjab challenges the
judgment and order of the Punjab High Court upholding the
decree of the Subordinate Judge, Gurgaon declaring that the
dismissal of the respondent from service was illegal and inoperative.
The respondent, a Sub Inspector of Police was . called
upon to answer a charge framed on October 12, 1949 setting
forth extracts from his confidential character roll showing his
inefficiency and lack of probity while in service from 1941 to
1948 and to submit his answer to the prima facie charge .of inefficiency as envisaged in paragraph 16.25(2) of the Punjab
Police Rules.
The respondent had joined the police service and had served
as a Sub Inspector in various places which are now in Pakistan
before he was posted to Gurgaon in the year 1948. It appears
that the view taken of his conduct and reputation by his supetior
officers, over the years was not consistent. In some years he got
, what is known as a 'B' certificate and in others an 'A' certificate.
According to rule 13.17 of the Punjab Police Rules, Superintendents of Police had to ,prepare personally and submit annually to
the Deputy Inspector-General of Police confidential reports in the
form prescribed on the working of all Assistant Sub Inspectors
and Sub Inspectors serving under them. The reports were to be
of two kinds 'A' and 'B' and to be marked as such.
An 'A'
report was for recommending tl!at incremental promotions should
not be withhe_ld while a 'B' report was to contain a recommendati~n, for reasons to be fully stated, that incremental promotions
should be withhel,d. The rule further shows that the purport of
all 'B' reports was to be formally communicated to the officer
696
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1970] 3 S.C.R.
concerned and his written acknowledgment to be taken. It also
prescribed tbat the submission of two successive 'B' reports regarding an officer would result, automatically in the institution of
departmental proceedings against him witb a view to stoppage of
increment.
The punishments which could be awarded d~par.tmen~ally are
set out in rule 16.1 and under rule 16.2 ( 1) dismtssal 1s to be
awarded only for the gravest acts of miscond11ct or as the cumulative effect of continued misconduct proving in;:orrigibility and
complete unfitness for police service.
Rule J 6.24 sets out the
procedure to be followed in departmental enquiries.
The sum
and substance of rule 16.24 is that in case the police officer did
not admit the misconduct
"the officer conducting the enquiry shall pro~eed to
record such evidence, oral and documentary, in proof
of the accusation as is available and necessary, to support
the charge.
Whenever possible, witnesses shall be
examined direct, and in the presence of the accused,
who shall be given opportunity to take notes of their
statements and cross-examine them.
The officer conducting the enquiry is empowered, however, 'to bring
on to the record the statement of any witness whose
presence cannot, in the opinion of such officer, be procured without undue delay and expense or inconvenience, if he considers such statement necessary, and
provided that it has been recorded and attested by a
police officer superior in rank to the accused officer or
by a tnagistrate, and is signed by the person making
it."
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Further the accused officer was required to state the defence witF
nesses whom he wish~ to call together with a. summary of the
facts as to which they would testify. The enquiring officer was
empowered to refuse to hear any witnesses whose evidence he
considered would be irrelevant or unnecessary in regard to the
specific charge framed.
Under rule 16.25 ( 1) a police officer called upon to answer
::1 ch~rg: of misconduct must be given every opportunity of provmg his mnocenc~. Under sub-rule (2) of this_!!!le, charges need
n~t be framed m relation only to a specific incident or act of
niis~o~duct and :when reports r~eived against an officer or a
prehmtnary enqmry show that his general behaviour has been
such as to be unfitting his position or that he has failed to reach
or maintain a reasonable standard of efficiency he may and
should be charged accordingly, and a finding of guilty on such a
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PUNJAB v. CHUN! LAL (Mitter, J.)
697
charge would be valid ground for the jnfilction .of any al!th~
departmental punishment which might be considered suitable m
the circumstances of the case.
The confidential reports extracts whereof were contained. in
the charge sheet make it clear that the respondent was bemg
accused of laziness and ineffectiveness and as having a doubtfμl
reputation as to hi~_honesty. Excepting for the year 1948 wherein
a specific instance of corruption was charged against him the other
reports only contained generally adverse remarks.
For instance
the remarks against him for the year 1941 were to the effect that
he was "lazy and ineffective and that he had been warned for
dishonesty, laziness and lack of control." In fl!e year 1942 wnen
he was posted at Dera Gazi Khan his annual confidential report
showed that although there were no definite complaints he had
not shown any outstanding ability or energy.' The Superintendent
of Police was not certain about his honesty but had no special
complaints against him.
The respondent was not allowed to
cross the efficiency bar in that year in view of his past reports.
It is the common case of the parties that the respondent was
allowed to cross the efficiency bar in 1944. In 1945 he was
transferred to Montgomary and got a 'B' report and his honesty
was characterised as doubtful. He get another warning in that
year.
In 1946 the Superintendent of Police remarked that he
was a failure as a Station House Officer and was slow to carry
out orders and had no grip on his staff. T)le Deputy Inspector
General of Police, Multan Range, summed up his 16 years'
service with the note :
"From all accounts he is one of the worst Sub
Inspectors in the Range and the department will be
well rid of him, if action under r. 16.25 (2) can be
successfully taken against him. Action under r. 16.25
cannot succeed at present but his past record is such
that any further complaint should warrant his dismissal."
In the. confidential reports of the year 1946, the Superintendent
of Police, Muzaffargarh, stated that he was not honest and was
very poor on parade.
The Deputy Inspector General Multan
R•nge gave him a third warning. The Superintendent ~f Police,
Muzaffargarh, ho:vever remarked that although his previous
r:cord was unsatisfactory he appeared to be trying to-mend
himself. In the year l 948 he-get=a 'C' report aud the Superintendent of Police described him as "thoroughly corrupt". The S.P.
further remarked that
"Thi~ o~cer fell to unh~d of depths of moral
degradal!On m corrupt .practices while posted to City
698
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1970] 3 s.c.R.
· Rewari inasmuch as he changed the opium recovered
by him earlier with Rasaunt for Rs. 1,000/- bribe and
then made over the opium for sale in the black market.
He was known to have mixed up with bad characters,
gamblers and Ris!lawatdalals."
According to the charge sheet the attested copies of these reports
were to be used as evidence against him,
In regard to the year 1948 and the charge above mentioned
it is enough to say that an enquiry was held against him and he
was held entitled to an honourable acquittal.
The respondent pleaded not guilty to the charge and filed a
list of 63 witnesses whom he sought to examine in his defence.
He also gave a summary of the facts about which each of the
witnesses was to depose.
The enquiry officer allowed him to
examine 21 witnesses in defence.
No witness was examined on
behalf of the department. On 25th May 1950 Bishambar Das,
Superintendent of Police made a report that the char_ge had been
fully brought home to the respondent and it was suggested that
he should be dismissed.
The Deputy Inspector General asked
him to show cause why he should not be dismissed from service.
After receipt of a written representation made by the respondent
and recording his statement the Deputy lnsp~ctor General passed
an order dismissing the respondent from service.
The respondent then filed his suit in the court of the Subordinate Judge, Gurgaon, wherein his main complaint was that
the enquiring officer did not record any evidence in support of
the charge nor were the persons making the reports examined
direct and in his presence with opportunity m him to ~ross
examine the persons who had made those reports : he also
averred that good reports earned by him during his long period
of service had not been taken into account. He also pleaded that
he had been allowed to cross the efficiency bar in December 1944
and had been given a selection grade in 1945.
It was urged before us that the crossing of the efficiency bar
must be regarded as giving him a clean bill up to that date and
in view of this the reports of 1941 and 1942 should not have been
taken into consideration against him.
As regards the reports for tji.e years 1945 and 1946 the respondent's complaint was· that the Superintendent of P01ice,
Montgomary, was for certain communal reasons biased against
him.
As regards the reports for the period May 27, I 946 to
30th June 1946 and the rest of the year the same had been made
by Shamsheer Singh and Sadat Ali, Superintendents of Police of
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PUNJAB v. CHUN! LAL (Mitter, J.)
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Muzaffargarh. Shamsheer Singh had given him no adverse remark.
and had left the column of honesty ip the report "blank". Sadat.
Ali who was biased against the respondent got the word "no'"
typed opposite the column of hon_esty.
The report for the year
1948 was based mainly on the opium case and as he hnd been
cleared of the charge in respect of that case, there was no foundation for. the report for that year. Further the order of dismissal
was in violation of r. 16.2 as this punishment was to be awarded.
for the gravest acts of misconduct or as the cumulative effect of
continued misconduct proving incorrigibility and complete unfitness for police service which facts did not exist in his 'ase. A
further complaint was made that the enquiry officer did not care
to sUlllmon A. L. Chopra, the Rehabilitation Inspector and Captain
Chuni Lal, Ex-military man although they had been allowed t0>
be
examined previously.
The deposition of Ram Chander,
Assistant Surgeon, a defence witness was not typed out and made
a part of the record although his deposition was noted by the
steno-typist in the note book. The order of dismissal was passed
by the Deputy Inspector General without considering this evidence. Besides the above, the evidence of well placed officers like
Deputy Commissioners, Superintendents of Police, Sub Divisional
Magistrates and others who had testified to the respondent's efficiency, honesty and reliability were totally ignored.
The Subordinate Judge held that the charge framed against
the respondent was vague and indefinite and the enquiry was.
unfair and inadequate because some of the authors of the reports
adverse to the respondent, though available, were not produced
to enable the rHpondent to cross-examine them. that oral and.
documentary evidence sought by the respondent was withheld and.
as such no reasonable opportunity of defence was afforded to him.
In the result he held that the requirements of Art. 311 of the
Constitution had been violated and the order of dismissal was
inoperative.
The High Court did not agree that the charge was vague but
focussed its attention mainly on the question as to whether tliere·
had been a substantial compliance with the requirements of Art.
311 and whether the enquiry conformed to the principles of
fairplay and natural justice. Considering the Service Rules already
mentioned the High Court observed that there was no dispute
that reports till J 940 were generally favourable to the plaintiff.
In our view reports earlier than 1944 should not have been
considered at all inasmuch as he was allowed to cross the efficiency bar in that year.
It is unthinkable that if the authorities
took any serious view of the charge of dishonesty and inefficiency
contained in the confidential reports of 1941 and 1942 they could
700
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1970] 3 S.C.R.
have overlooked the same and recommended the case of the officer as one fit for crossing the efficiency bar in 1944. I! will be
noted that there was no specific complaint in either of the two
years and at best there was only room for suspicion regarding his
j:>ehaviour.
It further appears from the judgment of the High Court ba.sed
mainly on the lengthy finding of the Superintendent of Polle~,
Bishambar Das dated 25th May 1950 that from 1942 to Apnl
1945 the respondent got 'A' class r7ports. though ~~ .super!or offi-
.·cers were not certain as regards his honesty.
His mtegnty was
considered to be doubtful in the succeeding reports up to 3 lSt
December 1946. As regards the first half of 194 7 the Superintendent of Police had noted that he was not in a position to make
any remark about his honesty as he ltad not seen the respondent's
work at any police station. The Deputy Commissioner however
remarked that his work was quite sati!factory and he was honest.
For the remaining part of 1947 he received an 'A' report from
the District Superintendent of Police who also stated that the
respondent seemed to be honest and competent
There can be no doubt that the 19-48 report was a very damai:-
ing one and if the allegations contained therein had any substratum of truth the respondent could be dismissed from service
on the strength of the charges based on those allegations alone.
But, as already noted, the respondent was cleared of this charge.
The High Court opined that the enquiry officer, Bishambar
Das, should not have neglected to summon five officers who made
reports about the respondent and were available for examination
at the enquiry. They were Chunilal Malhotra, Choudhry Roshan
Lal, Deputy Commissioner, Shri Ismail. Shri. Holiday and
Shri Sant Prakash Singh•
According to the High Court the
defence of the respondent in the enquiry being that the reports
against him were based upon no sufficient data and/ or were made
partly because of the poisoning of the mind of the District Superintendent of Police by the Deputy Superintendent of Police on
communal considerations the only way the respondent could 'have
substantiated his defence version would be by putting questions
to the reporting officers if made available during the enquiry. One
of the above officers Shamsher Singh was actually examined as
the respondent's witness in the sui\ and his evidence showed that
he had left the column for honesty in the report for 1946• blank
as be had not seen the respondent at his work.
This evidence
wen. to show that if lie had been examined by the enquiry officer
a portion of the report taken in consideration against the respondent would have been found to be without substance.
Another
ufficer. Chunilal Malhotra though not examined before the enquiry
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PUNJil v. CHUNI LAL (Mitter, /,)
701
A Olicer was· called in defence in the suit. All that he could say
was that he bad received complamts .against ~
l'IS~t but
he did not remember whether they were .oral or m wnting. 'I1le
High Court justifiably col1UDC]lted th.at there was no suffici~t
reason for the ehquiry officer refusmg to summon Chunilal
Malhotra.
On an overall consideration of the facts, the High
a
Court took the view that :
"The approach of the enquiry officer was such that
whatever be the testimony of other witnesses, it could
not undo the efh>cg of the reports-made by the superior
officers about the . plaintiff."
c In other words the enquiry officer shut his mind to the testimony
afforded by a large number of witnesses including a Deputy Commissioner, Under Secretary, two Superinteudents of Police, a few
Magistrates and some Deputy Superintendents of Police who had
given evidence about the respondent's reputation and work.
·
Further the High ~ourt took the view that thc:i remarks of the
· D Deputy lnspector Ge11-eral of Police against the res.pendent in the
~
1948 that he was not worth being retained m service had
influenced the entire· approach of the ·enquiry officer who was a
subordinate to the Deputy Inspector General of Police. The
Deputy Superintendent of Police Lekhraj examined. at the hearing
of the suit by the respondent and te whom another enquiry against
I
the respondent had been entrusted earlier by Bishambar Das, the
inquiry officer, told the court that when he (Lekhraj) exonerated
the respondent in the other enquiry, Bishambar Das had sent for
him and told him that the hi~er authorities wanted to take serious
action to the extent of dismissal of the respondent.
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In our view the High Court arrived at the correct conclusion
and on the facts of this case it is impossible to hold that the respondent ·had been given reasonable opportunity of conducting hi!
defence before the enquiry officer.
From what we have stated
it is clear that if the e11<J!liry officer had sunimoned at least those
witnesses who were available and who could have thrown some
light on the reports made against the flllpondent the report might
well have been d.ilferent. We cannot also IOle sight of the fact
that charges based on the reportl-·fOr the yea.rs 1941 and 1942
should not have been levelled apinst the re8pondent.
Learned counsel for the appellant relied on two decisions of
the Ori&sa High Court in support of his cootention that it was not
necessary to examine the authors of the confidential reports against
the respondent. In Sadananda Mohapatra v. Stat~( 1 ) tk court
considered the question as to whether reasonable ~ty
had
(!) A.1.R. 1967 Oriua 49.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1970) 3 S.C.ll.
an fact been given to the petitioner before the punishing authority
.had made use of the adverse remarks in the confidential character
Toll. According to the High Court the petitioner in his examina-
·tion to the second show cause notice had referred to the good
·services that he had rendered to the department. The High Court
'Observed that the fact that the petitioner had done good wodt
led the punishing authority to impose a lesser punishment and
thus the confidential roll h_ad h~lped the petitioner. It also appears
•from the judgment that the punishing authority in that case had
-during the personal hearing discussed the confidential character
with the petitioner and accordingly the High Court was of opinion
that even though the adverse remarks in the petitioner's confiden-
·tial character roll were not included in the second show cause
notice inasmuch as the same had been discussed at the persoruil
hearing it could not be said that no reasonable opportunity had
been given to the petitioner.
In our view the facts in this case are entirely different. The
·respondent before us wanted an opportunity by examining the
-witnesses mentioned by him to explain away the circumstanees
which had led to the making of the adver_se remarks and he was
given no such chance.
The second authority relied on for the appellant was State of
iOrissa v. Sailabehari('). In this case the entry in the diary of a
Deputy Collector went to show that the Special Assistant Agent,
i.e., the respondent, had no reputation for honesty. The diary
mentioned the source of information on which the remarks were
·based and although none of the informants figured as· wit!lesses
in th11 departmental enquiry the touring officer was examined as
a witness and his tour diary proved at the inquiry and the res-
-pondent had been iriven an opportunity to cross-examine him.
On those facts the High Court of Orissa, after discussin1t this
-position, took the view that although insufficient for the establishment of a criminal charge the position was different in 'the case
of departmental enquiries where punishment could be based
merely on general reputation for corrupt conduct.
In our view there was no flaw in the enquiry which the Orissa
High Court was called upon to examine in that case and the
above dictum of the High Court was not really called for.
Learned counsel also wanted to rely on a decision of this
Court in State of Jammu and Kci;hmir v. Bakshi Ghu/am
Mohammed(') where the Court was dealing with the proceedings
-0f a Commission of Inquiry under the Commission of Inquiry Act.
0) A.J.R. 1963 Orissa 73.
(2) (1966] SUJJp. S.C.R. 401.
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PUNJAB 11. CHUN! LAL (Mitter, 1.)
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Section 10 of that Act gave the delinquent a right to be heard but
only a .restricted right of cross-examina.tion, i.e .. it was confined
only to the witnesses called to depose against the person demanding tile right. It was further observed that as "the Act did not
contemplate a right of hearing to include a right to cross-examine"
"it will be natural to think that the statute did not intend that in
B other c1!5es a party appearing before he Commission should have
any~ further right of cross-examination". On the facts befoie it
the Court came to the conclusion that no case had been made by
Bafshi Ghulam Mohammad tl>at rules of natural justice required
that he should have a right to cross-examine all the persons who
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had sworn affidavits supporting the allegations made against him.
In our opinion the above observation regarding the limit of
the right to cross-examine dissociated from the context in which
it was made cannot help the appellant.
Although the case _ is
governed by Art. 311 as it stood prioi to its amendment in 1963
the respondent could not be deprived of an effective right to make
representation against t~- action of dismissal.
In our opinion,
refusal of the right to examine witnesses who had made general
remarks against his character and were available for examination
at the inquiry amounted to denial of a reasonable opoprtunity of
showing cause against the action.
In the result we hold that the High Court came to the correct
conclusion and the appeal should be dismissed with costs.
G.C.
Appeal dismissed.