# + STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ORS. ETC. ETC v. UNION OF INDIA ETC. ETC

- **Citation:** [1978] 1 S.C.R. 1
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1977-05-06
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/state-of-rajasthan-ors-etc-etc-v-union-of-india-etc-etc-7262
- **Pages:** 124

## Headnote

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STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ORS. ETC. ETC.
v.
UNION OF INDIA ETC. ETC.
May 6, 1977
I
(M. H. BEG, C.J., Y. V.
CHANDRACHUD, P. N. BHAGWATI, P. K.
GoSWAMI, A. C. GUPTA, N. L. UNTWALIA AND
S. MuRTAzA FAzAL ALI, JJ.]
Comtitution of India, 1950, Articles 131, 256, 257-Advice
by
Home
Minister, Union oj India to Chief Minister of State dated 184-1977 to recom..
mend under Art. 163 to the Governor to dissolve Ugislative Assenzbly under
Art. 174(2)(b).-Nature of the advice, whether any relief as prayed for in
the suits and petitioM can be J!ranted.
Doctrine of Rough Mparation of powers-Nature of-Duty of the court
retardint questions involving
policy
matters
and
constitutional inuuConstilution of /Mia, 1950, Article 131.
PreJidenfa satisfaction under Art. 356-Whether such a satisfaction ca~
be based only on Gov~rnor's report-Power of court to question such Ml~
faction-Second part of Art. 355 covers Proclamation .under .Article 356Direction by Unicr; Government under Articles 256, 251 to the State Gover1'-
1nent to recommend to the Governor to dissolve the State Legislature, whether
such a direction is unconstitutional, illegal and ultra vires--Constitution of
India, 1950, Articles 74, 163, 174, 255, 256, 257, 355 and 356(1)(a).
Words and phrase3-"State" whether means "State Governmen('-Consti~
tutzon of India, 1950, Article 367 read with General Clauses Act. 1897.
Constitution of India, 1950, Article 131-Whether powers of the Supreme
Court to grant relief under Art. 131 are restricted to "declaratory judgmentl'.
A
B
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Constitution of India, 1950, Articles 19(1)(/), 31 and 32, 195 and 356Rqhts of Members of A.Jiemblie.r to
draw their salary under Art. 195Nature of-Whethe1· as a consequence of the threatened dl!KJlution of Ugi&-
E
lative Assembly 01 the Proclamation
under Art. 356(1)
dissolvint
States
A..rse,mplies the rights guaranteed to the petitioners/ Legislators are violated.
In;unction-Ptrmanent/temporary iniunctior>-Order XXXIX C.l'.C. reai
with Order XLVII of the Supreme
Court Rules 1966-Whether a
proper
relief iri a suit challenging a proclamation under Art. 356.
Constitution of India, 1950, Articles 95, 131, maintainability of a suit under
Art. 131 and the writ petitions under Article 32--Constitution of India, Art.
356(1) st:ope and ambit of the power of the President.
Under Article 74(1) of the Consti~ution "there shall be a
Council ol
Ministers to aid anct. advise the President in the exercise of his functiona".
Under Article 163 of the Constitution there shall be a Council of Ministe"'
with the Chief Minister at the head to aid and advise the Governor of a State
in the exercise of his functions, except imofar as by or tinder the Constitution
required to exen..ise his functions or any of them in his discretion. Botlt
under Art. 74 and Art. 163 the question whether any, and if so what, advice
was tendered by the Council of Ministel'!' to the President /Governor 1hall
not be inquired into in any court. Under Article 174(2) (b), the Governe><
may from time tv time dissolve the Legislative Assembly. Under
Article
172(1) a Legislative Assembly of "a State, unless sooner dissolved, shall continue for six years from the date appointed for its meetin& and no longer and
the expiration of the said period of six yean shall operate as a dissolution
of the Assembly.
Articles 256 & 257 enjoin that the executive powers of the
Union shall extend to the giving of such directions to a State u may appear
to the Government of India to be necessary for that purpose. Under Art.
355, "it shall be the duty of the Union to ensure that the Government of
evecy State is carried on in accordance with the pro-Visions of tho Conatit.-
tion." Article 356 empowers the President to assume to himself all or any
of the fut:ictions of th~ Government of the State and all or any of the powers
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vested in or exerciaablc by the Governor or any body or any authority in the
State other than (he Legislature o

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STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ORS. ETC. ETC.
v.
UNION OF INDIA ETC. ETC.
May 6, 1977
I
(M. H. BEG, C.J., Y. V.
CHANDRACHUD, P. N. BHAGWATI, P. K.
GoSWAMI, A. C. GUPTA, N. L. UNTWALIA AND
S. MuRTAzA FAzAL ALI, JJ.]
Comtitution of India, 1950, Articles 131, 256, 257-Advice
by
Home
Minister, Union oj India to Chief Minister of State dated 184-1977 to recom..
mend under Art. 163 to the Governor to dissolve Ugislative Assenzbly under
Art. 174(2)(b).-Nature of the advice, whether any relief as prayed for in
the suits and petitioM can be J!ranted.
Doctrine of Rough Mparation of powers-Nature of-Duty of the court
retardint questions involving
policy
matters
and
constitutional inuuConstilution of /Mia, 1950, Article 131.
PreJidenfa satisfaction under Art. 356-Whether such a satisfaction ca~
be based only on Gov~rnor's report-Power of court to question such Ml~
faction-Second part of Art. 355 covers Proclamation .under .Article 356Direction by Unicr; Government under Articles 256, 251 to the State Gover1'-
1nent to recommend to the Governor to dissolve the State Legislature, whether
such a direction is unconstitutional, illegal and ultra vires--Constitution of
India, 1950, Articles 74, 163, 174, 255, 256, 257, 355 and 356(1)(a).
Words and phrase3-"State" whether means "State Governmen('-Consti~
tutzon of India, 1950, Article 367 read with General Clauses Act. 1897.
Constitution of India, 1950, Article 131-Whether powers of the Supreme
Court to grant relief under Art. 131 are restricted to "declaratory judgmentl'.
A
B
c
D
Constitution of India, 1950, Articles 19(1)(/), 31 and 32, 195 and 356Rqhts of Members of A.Jiemblie.r to
draw their salary under Art. 195Nature of-Whethe1· as a consequence of the threatened dl!KJlution of Ugi&-
E
lative Assembly 01 the Proclamation
under Art. 356(1)
dissolvint
States
A..rse,mplies the rights guaranteed to the petitioners/ Legislators are violated.
In;unction-Ptrmanent/temporary iniunctior>-Order XXXIX C.l'.C. reai
with Order XLVII of the Supreme
Court Rules 1966-Whether a
proper
relief iri a suit challenging a proclamation under Art. 356.
Constitution of India, 1950, Articles 95, 131, maintainability of a suit under
Art. 131 and the writ petitions under Article 32--Constitution of India, Art.
356(1) st:ope and ambit of the power of the President.
Under Article 74(1) of the Consti~ution "there shall be a
Council ol
Ministers to aid anct. advise the President in the exercise of his functiona".
Under Article 163 of the Constitution there shall be a Council of Ministe"'
with the Chief Minister at the head to aid and advise the Governor of a State
in the exercise of his functions, except imofar as by or tinder the Constitution
required to exen..ise his functions or any of them in his discretion. Botlt
under Art. 74 and Art. 163 the question whether any, and if so what, advice
was tendered by the Council of Ministel'!' to the President /Governor 1hall
not be inquired into in any court. Under Article 174(2) (b), the Governe><
may from time tv time dissolve the Legislative Assembly. Under
Article
172(1) a Legislative Assembly of "a State, unless sooner dissolved, shall continue for six years from the date appointed for its meetin& and no longer and
the expiration of the said period of six yean shall operate as a dissolution
of the Assembly.
Articles 256 & 257 enjoin that the executive powers of the
Union shall extend to the giving of such directions to a State u may appear
to the Government of India to be necessary for that purpose. Under Art.
355, "it shall be the duty of the Union to ensure that the Government of
evecy State is carried on in accordance with the pro-Visions of tho Conatit.-
tion." Article 356 empowers the President to assume to himself all or any
of the fut:ictions of th~ Government of the State and all or any of the powers
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vested in or exerciaablc by the Governor or any body or any authority in the
State other than (he Legislature of the State, if on receipt of a report from
the Governor of a State or otherwise, is satisfied that a situation has arisen m
which the Government of the State cannot be carried on in accordance with
the provibions of the Constitution. Under sub-section (5) of Art. 356 "notwithstanding anything in the Constitution, the satisfaction of the President in
clause (I ) shall be final and conclusive and shall not be questioned in any
court on any ground.
The Lok Sabha in which tho Congress (R) had an overwhelming majority
was dissolved on January 8, 1977 though under the Constitution (Forty Second
Amendment Act) iL had another year to run out its extended term. In tho
fresh elections held in March 1977 the ruling party lost its majority and went
out of power which it had exercised since independence. On March 24, 1977,
the Janata Party which had. secured an overwhelming -majority' of vores oil
the electorate, formed the new Government at the Centre.
On tho date thal
the Janata Government too~ office, the Congress (R) Was in power in various
States including Bihar, Haryana, Himacbal Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Oriss>,
Punjab, Rojasthan, Ultar Pradesh and West Bengal.
On April 18, 1977, the Union Home Minister addressed a letter to the
Chief Ministers of these States "earnestly commending" for their considerati.QD.
that they may advise the Governors of their respective States "to dissolve the
State Assemblies in exercise of the powers under Art. 174(2)(b) and seek a
fresh mandate from the electorate. This alone according to the Home Minis_·
ter's letter would be "consistent with constitutional precedents and democratic
practices."
In an interview on April 22, 1977, in the "Spot Llght Programme" of All
lndid Radio, Shri Shanti Bhushan, Minister of Law, Justice and
Company
Affairs said that "a clear case had been made out for the dissolution of the
Assemblies in the nine congress-ruled states and holding of fresh elections"
since "a serious doubt has been cast on their enjoying the people's confidence,
their party havin~ been rejected in the recent Lok Sabha electioos." A report
of the said interview appeared in various newspapers including the "Statesman."
of the 23rd April.
The correctoess of the repOrt is not disputed.
The si>. plaintiff-States, namely, the State of Rajasthan, Madhya Prade<h,
Punjab, Bihar, Himachal Pradesh and Orissa filed suits in this court praying
for a declaration that the letter of the Home Minister was illegal, and ultra
vires of the Constitution and not binding on the plaintiffs and prayed for
an interlm injunction restraining the Central Government from resorting to
Art. 356 of the Constitution.
A permanent injunction was also sought for by
the plaintiffs in order to restrain the Cenn-al Government permanently from
taking any step to digsolve the Assemblies until the fixed period of six yean
was over.
Some of the Members of the Legislative Assembly of Punjab
had also filed a writ petition complaining of violation of their fundamental!
rights and prayed for similar injunctions.
The principal common submissions on behalf of tho plaintiffs as well as
\,..
the petitionenr Wer'C! :-
Firstly, that the letter dated 18th April 1977 discloses the sole ground
of an impending proclamation under Article 356 of the Constitution to be
followed by a dissolution of Legislative Assembly of the State concerned and
that such a proclamation, resulting necessarily in the dismissal of the Minis ..
tries· in the six States and the dissolution of their Legislative Assemblies \lPOll
the grounds given in the letter, ~ prima faci~ outside the purview of At1. 356
of the Constitution and would be destructive of the federal structure.
Secondly, that, in any case, the condition precedent to the diMolution of
the State Asoembly is a ratification by both Houses of Parliament of tho
Presidential action under Art. 3 56 so that no dissolution at any rate of a
Legisla:ive Assemblv can tske place without ascertaining the wishee of both
tho Houses of Parliament.
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RAJ AST HAN V. UNION
3
;.
Thirdly, that the grounds given, being outside the constitutionally auU1orised
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purposes and objectives, the proposed action on the face of it is mala fide
and unconstitutional. Tho respondents' reply in defence are :-
Firstly, that on allegations made in tho plaints no suit could fall within
the purview of Art. 131 · of
the Constitution which is meant for grievance•
of States as such, against the Union Government and not those relating to
mere composition of State Governments and Legislatures without involving
constitutional or other legal rights of States as such.
B
Secondly, the questions
which arise for guaging
the
existence of
a
"situation", calling for action under Article 356 are, by their very nature,
non-)usticiable and they are also made non-justiciable expressly by A.it. "356(5)
of the Constitution so that, even if a S~te could, -as such, be said to be legally
and properly interested in the dispute between its Government and the Union
Government, about the d~irabilitv or need for any action by the Union Govern·
ment under Article 356 of the Constitution, such a dispute is outside the sphere
C
of justiciable matters. If the final action. or its grounds are non-justiciable, ·
they could not be indirectly assailed by challenging a process which may or
may not actually produce the apprehended result or action.
Thirdly, the letter of the Union Home Min;ster and the speech of the
Union Law Minister do not indicate that anything falling outside the wido
ipectrum of Article 356 of the Constitution is bein2 or will be taken into
account for taking action under Art. 356. Hence, on matters stated there,
no cause of action could be said to have arisen.
D
Fourthly, mere intimation of some facts, fully within the purview
of
.Art. 356 of the ConstituMon, does not justify a prohibition to act i'f1 future
when the situation may be serious enough on the strength of facts indicated
and possibly others facts also, for act•on under Art. 356 of the Constitution.
The freedom of constitutionally authorised executive action of the higheat ..
oxecutive organs of the Union should not be impeded by judicial intrrfercnce
excet't on grounds of clearest and
gravest possible
character. There
was
E
nothing beyond
bare possibilities
before the court so that no anticipatory
injunction or otder could be granted.
Dismissing the suits. as well as the petitions the Court.
HELD:
Per Beg, C.J.
(1) The choice between a dissolution and re-election or a retention of
the same membership of the Legislature or the Government for a certain
period could be matters of political expediency and strategy under a democratic syst.em.
Under our system, quest for political power through forma·
tion of several political powers with different socio-economic policies and
ptotJrammes and ideologies is legal. Hence, a mere attempt to
get more
political power for a party as a means of pursuing the programme of that
party. as opposed to that of other parties is not constitutionally prohibited
or per se illegal. (24 F-G]
(2) Ono purpose of our Constitution and laws is .certainly to give electors
a periodic opportunity of choosing their State's legislature and,_ thereby,. of
determining the character of their State Gove:rnments .a~o. It 1S the obJ!!Ct
oi. every democratic constitution to give such opportun1t.1es.
Hence a pohcy
devised to serve that end could not be contrary to the basic structure or scheme
of the Constitution. (24 BJ
(3) Article 356(1) of the Constitution calls for an
aasessme.n~ of "a
•ituation". In so far as Article 3 56 (I) may embrance matters of poht1cal and
e~ocutiYe policy and expediency, Courts caunot interfere with these unless 8lld
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until it is sho\'\>n what constitutional provision the President is going to contravene or has contravened on attempted grounds of action under Art. 356(1)
for, while Art. 74(2)~ disables Courts from inquiring into the very existence
or nature or contents of ministerial advice to the President, Article 356(5)
makes h impossible for Courts to question the President's satisfaction 'on any
ground'. Hence Courts can only determine the validity or the action on
whatever remains for them or what is admitted on· behalf of the Pre'5ident
to be the grounds of President's satisfaction.
[25 D, 26 E-F]
( 4} If the Union Government' thinks that the circumstances of the situation
demand that the State G::ivernments must seek a fresh mandate to justify their
n1oral rights in the eyes of the people to continue to exercise power in the
interests of their electors, or else the discontent of the masses may have it8
repercussion not only on the law and order situation, but will also affect legal
responsibilities or duties which the U•aion Government has towards a particular State or towards Indian citizens in general, all of whom live in some
State or other, it cannot be said that resort to Art. 356 of the Constitution
is not called for.
[25 E-F]
(5) Questions of political wisdom or executive policy only could not be
subjected to judicial control. No doubt executive policy mmt also be subordinated to constitutionally
sanctioned
purposes. It bas
its sphere
and
limitations. But, so long as it operates with:n that sphere, its operations are
immune from judicial interference. This is also a part of the doctrine of a
rough separation of power under the supremacy of the Constitutioo.
· [27 A-Bl
(6) The provisions dealing with the ProcJamation of emergency under
Art. 352, which have to be grave and imminent seem to be covered by the
first pRrt of the duty of the Union towards a State mentioned in Article 355
but the second part of that duty mentioned in Art. 355, seems to b: of somewhat different and broader character.
The second
part
seems
to
cover
all
step~ which are enough "to ensure" that the Government of every
State is carried, "in accordance with the provisions of the
Constitution'~.
Its sweep seems
qui~e
wide.
It is this part of the dutv of
the
Ull.ion
towards each State which is sought to be covered by a Proclamation under Art. 356. That Proclamation is not of a grave emergency.
In fact,
1he \Vord "emergency~' is not used there. It is a Proclamation intended either
to safeguard against the failure of the constitutional machinery in a State or
to. repair the defects of a breakdown.
It may be either a preventive or a
curative action. It is enough if the President which. in view of the amended
Art. 73(1) realty means the Union Council of Ministers, conclude~ that "the
Government of the State cannot h::'! carried out in accordance with the pro--
visions of the Constitution".
On the other hand, action under Art. 352 is,
more properly, only defensive and protective action to be taken to avert or
meet a grave and immant danger.
[30 C-F]
(7) The language of Art. 356 is so wide and loose that to
crib
and
confine it within a straight jacket will not be just interpreting or construing
it but will be constitution making legislation. which does not lie in the domain
of the Supreme Court.
[31 C-D]
H. H. Kesavananda Bharati SripadaRalavaru v. State of
Kerala. [1973]
Supp. S.C.R. p. 1 @ 89, Smt. Indira ,Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain
[1976]
2 S.C.R. 347 @ 539; Har Sharan Varma, v. Chandra Bhan Gupta and Or3.,
A.IR. 1962 All. 301 @ 307 referred to.
(8) A conspectus of the provisions of our Constitution will indicate that,
whatever appearance of a federal structure our Constitution may have,
it!
operdtions are certainly, judged both by the content~ of power which a number
of it~ provisions carry with them and the use that has been made of them,
more unitary than federal.
[33 F]
Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab, [1975] 1 S.C.R. p. 814 referred to.
(9) In a sense, the Indian Union is federal. But the extent of federalism
in it is lariely watered-down by the needs of progres~ and development of a
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RAJASTHAN V. UNION
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country which has to be nationally integrated, politically and
economically
co-ordinated and socially,,
intellectually and spiritually
uplifted.
In such ai
system, the States cannot stand in the way of leg,timate and comprehensively
plann;:U development of the country in the manner directed by the Central
Government.
The question of legitimacy of particular· actions of the Central
Government taking us in particular directions can often be tested and deter·
mined only by the verdicts of the people at appropriate times rather than
by decisiom of Courts.
For th1s reason, they become,
properly
speak.in&
matters for political debates rather than for legal discussion. If the special
needs of our country to have political coherence, national integration, and planned economic development of all parts of the country, so as to build a. welfare
Sllate where "Justice.Social, economic and political" are to prevail and rapid
strides are to be taken towards fulfilling the other noble aspirations set out in
the Preamble strong Central directions seem inevitable. [24 C-E]
(10) Article 256 of the Constitution covers cases where the President may
want to give directions in exercise of the executive power of the Union to
a State Government in relation to a matter covered by an existing law mado
by Parliament which applies to that State.
But, Art. 257(1) imposes a wider
obligation upon a State to exercise its powers in such a way as not to impede
the exercise of executive power -of the Union which, as would appear from
Art. 73 of the Constitution, read with Art. 248 may cover even a subject on
which there is no existing law, but on which some legislation by Parliament
is possible. It could therefore, be argued that, although, the Constitution itself
does not Jay down specifically when the power of dissolution should be exercised by the Government on the advice of a Council of Ministers in
the
State, yet, if a direction on that matter w~ properly given by the
Unio•
Government to a State Government, there i.! a duty to carry it out. Tho
tin1e for the dissolution of a State Assembly is not covered by any specific:
provision of the Constitution or any law made on the subject.
It is possible,
however, for the Union Government, in exercise of its residuary executive
power to consider it a fit subject for the i~sue of an appropriate direction when
it considers that the political situation in the country is such that a fresh
e1ection is necessary in
the interest of political stability or to establish th9
confidence of the people in the Government of a State.
[36 B·E]
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(11) Undoubtedly, the subject is one on which appropriate and healthy
conventions should develop so that the power under Art 356( 1) is neither
exercised capriciously or arbitrarily nor fails to be exercised when a political
'
situation really calls for it. If the views of the Union Government and the
State Government differ on the subject, there is no reason why the Union
Government should not aid the development of what it considers to be a
healthy practice or convention by appropriate advice or direction, and, even.
to exercise its powers under Art. 356(1) for this purpose when it considers tho
observance of such a directive to be so essential that the constitutional
F
machinery cannot function as it was meant ·to do nnless it interferes. Tue
Supreme Court cannot, at any rate, interdict such use of powers_ under Art.
356(1) unless and until resort to the provision, in a particular situation, is
shown to be so grossly perverse and unreasonable as to constitute )1atent misuse
of this provision or an excess of power on admitted facts. It is not for
courts to formulate, and, much less, to enforce a convention, however nece~
Sar} or just and proper a convention to regulate the exercise of such an ex&-
cntive power may be. That is a matt.er entirely within the executive field of
G
operations. [36 E-H]
( 12) All that the Supreme· Court cari do i8 to consider whether an actio•
proposed on such a matter on certain grounds, would fall Under Art. 356(1)
of the Constitution if the Union Government and the State Governments differ
on the question whether, in a particular situation, the dissolution of the State
Assembly should take place or not. The most that one could say is that a
dissolution against the wishes of the majoritv in a State Assembly i.! a IITTlT•
and serious matter.
Perhaps it could be observed that it should be resorted
to under Art. 356(1) of the Constitution only when "a critical situation" has
arisen.
It i.! not always necessary that the mere defeat of a State Govern·
mt:nt in a State Assembly must necessarily create a situation in which a disso--
lution of the State Assembly is obligatory. If an alternate Government is
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[1978] 1 S,C.R.
capable of being 'formed: which commands ihe majority in the State· Assembly
ii may be unnecessary. The position may, however, be very different, when a
State 1.Jovernment has a majority in the State Assembly behind it, but the question is whether the party in the majority in the State Assembly forming the
State Government for the time being having been totally and emphatically
rejected by the people, a "critical situa.tion" has arisen or is bound to arise
unless the "political sovereign" is given an opportunity of giving a fresh verdict.
A. decision ou such a question undoubtedly lies in the
Executive realm. It
involves a correct estimate of a "situation''. [41 B-E]
\13) Article 174(2)(b) of the Constitution expressly vests the power of
re&olving the legislative Assembly in the Government even if that had to be
on
the
advice
of the
Council
of Ministers
in
the
State,
but tho
power to give such advice would automatically be taken over by
the
Union
Government, for the purposes of dissolution of State Assembly, when the Presi ..
dent assumes Governmental powers by a Proclamation under Art. 356(1). A
dissolution by the President after the Proclamation would be as good as a dis ..
11olution by the Government of a State whose powers are taken over.
[37 C-EJ
(14) Indeed, the usual practice is that the President acts under Art. 3S6(1)
of the Constitution only on the Governor's report.
But, the use of the words
••or otherwise" (In Article 356) show that Presidential satisfaction could be
based on other materials as w~ll. This feature of our Constitution indicate•
most strikingly the extent to which inroads have been made by it on the federal
principles of Government.
[38 A-CJ
Shamsher Singh v. Stat< of Punjab, [191S] I S.C.R. p. 87S referred to.
U
(IS) As the question of the proper time for a
dis90lution of a
Stato
Assembly is not a matter extraneous to Art. 3S6(1) of the Constitution, the
most that can be said is that questions raised do not go beyond
sufficiency
of grounds for resorting to Art. 3S6(1) of the Constitution.
[41 H, 42 A]
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K. K. Aboo v. Union of lndia, A.I.R. 196S
Kera!a 229; Rao Birender
Singh v. The Union of India A.LR. 1968 Punjab 441; In re. A. Sreeramulu,
A.I.R. _ 1974 A.P. 106, Bijenananda Patnaik and Ors. v. President
of India
and Ors .. A.LR. 1974 Orissa S2 referred to.
(16) Attempts to secure political victories by appeals to the electorate, are
parts of the recognised rules of a democratic system of Government permittina
contests between rival parties so as to achieve ~ertain other objectives.
If such
a contest with the desire for achieving a political victory in order to enforce
certain programmes, believed by the m~mbers of a party to be beneficial for the
people in a State, as a method of achieving the objects set out in the Preamble,
ar.: not only legal and permissible under the Constitution, but, obviously constitute the only possible and legal means of attaining the power to enforce policies
believed to be correct by various part;es, according to their own lights, it could
not possibly be asserted- that procuring the dissolution of a State Legislative
Assembly with the object of gaining a political victory is, in itself, an extraneous
object which could not fall at all under Art. 3S6 of the Constitution. [ 42 E-F]
Attorney General v. Dr. Keys.qr's Royal Hotel, 1920 AC 508; Liversidge v.
Anderron 1942 AC 206; Addi. Dist. Magistrate, Jabalpur v. Shivakant Shukla,
1976 Supp. SCR 173, Bhagat Singh & Ors. v. The Kin.• Emperor, 50 I.A. 169
King Emperor v. Benorilal Sharma 72 I.A. 51, Padfield and Ors. v. Minisf'~
of ARric1'lture, Fisheries and Food and Ors., 1968 A.C. 997 @ 1006 (not
applicable).
·
(17) Jn all the grounds of action- taken under Art. 356(1) are disclosed to
the pubL:c by the Union Government and its_ own disclosure of grounds reveah
that a constitutionally or legally prohibited or extraneous or a ~Uateral pur~
pose is sought to be achieved by an impending or actual proclamat1on under Art.
356 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court will not shirk its duty to acti in tl!e
manner i'Il which the law may then oblige it to act.
But, when allegation made in
the plains and in the petitions before the court relate, in substance, only to the
&Ufficiency of the grounds of action under Art. 356 ( 1) of the Constitution and
go no further, the Court cannot p~a;ceed further with the consideratioo.of _tho
plaints under Art. 131 or the petitions under Art. 32 of the Constttutton.
[46 E-GJ
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RAJ AS THAN V. UNION
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(18) Proclamations under Article 356(1) are bound to be placed under
A
Art. 356(3) of the Constitution before each House of Parliament. However,
there is not only nothing in Art. 356 to make a consideration by either Houae
.of Parliament a condition precedent to the exercise of the power of dissolution
o( a State Legislative Assembly by the President under Art. 356 (I), but, on
the other hand, Article 356(3) makes it clear that the only effect of even a
failure or refusal by either House of Parliament to approve the Proclamation
is th.at it ceases to operate after two months. Obviously, this means that it
operates for at least two months.
Hence, whatever is done in these two months
cannot be held to be illegal for that reason alone.
[47 A-BJ
B
(19) It is
true that the exercise of power under Art. 356 of
the Ccnstitution is subject to Parliamentary control. This means that it i3 subject to such control as the two Houses out of which the Council of Stales really
represents the State Assembly may be able to exercise during the period for
which the Proclamation lasts. But, the existence of such Parliamentary control,
as a safeguard cannot possibly nullify the legality of what is done in the period
during which the Proclamation lasts.
(4 7 C-DJ
C
(20) Although Arl 356(1)(a) of the Constitution impases a bar against
·the assumption by the President of the legislative powers of the State Legislature, which could only be transferred to Parliament, its provisions, read with
Art. 357 of the Constitution, do no• operate as an absolute bar on any expenditure which could be legally incurred by the President or under the Presidential
~nthority in accordance with pre-existing State laws authorising expenditure by
-0ther authorities or bodies whose powers can be taken by the President under
D
Art. 356(1)(a). In any case, the provisions of Art. 357 could not J)OS&ibly
be used as a bar against a dissolution of th~ State Assembly by a Presidential
Proclamation. Nor can they be used to introduce as a condition precedent to
the Presidential Proclamation under Art. 356(1)(a), involving, a> it usually
·does, the dissolution of the State Assembly, an approval of both Or either of the
two. Houses of Parliament. [49 A.CJ
(21) Even if there be some grounds for making a distinction between a
State's interest and rights and those of its Government or its members, the
J::
Court need not take too restrictive oi;. stringent a view of the States' right to
-me for any rights, actual or fancied, which the State Government chooses to
take up on behalf of the State concerned in a suit under Art. 131.
[50 F-G]
State of Bihar v. Union of lndia and Anr., (1970] 2 S.C.R. 522; explained.
United Provinces v. The Governor General in Council, 1939 FCR 124;
referred to.
Per Chandrachud J.
(1) 'The use of the phrase "Government of India" in Article !31(a) and
(b) does not mean that one party to the dispute has to be the Government of
the day at the Centre. "Government of India" means "Union of India" The
true construction of Article t31(a) true in substance and true pragmatically
is that a dispute must ari~e between the Union of India and a State. [53 E-G]
F
(2) 'The dispute between the Union of fodia and the State cannot but be a
G
dispute which arises out of the difference between the Government in offtce
at the Centre and the Government in office in the State. But, there is a
further pre-requisite which narrows down the ambit of the class of disputes
which fall within Article 131. That requirement is that
the dispute mnst
in\"Olve a question whether of law or fact, on which the existence or extent of
a legal right depends. It is this qualification which contains the true guide
for determining whether a particular dispute is comprehended within Art. 131.
Mere wrangles between Governments have no olace in the scheme of that
H
.Arti ... Ie.
The purpose of Art. 131 is to afford a forum for the resolution of
di!pntes which depend for their decision on the existence or exte'1t of a legal
1ight It is only when a legal, not a mere Political, issue arises touching Uf\OI.
the exiatence or extent or a legal right that Article 131 is altracted. [54 A-CJ
A
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(3) When the l'laintif!-States by. their suits directly or specifically question
the consututional nght and authority of the Union Government to issue a
directive to the; State Governments commending that the Chief Ministers should
tender a certain advice to their Governors and also question the constitutional
right of the Union Government to dissolve the State Assemblies on the grounds
mentioned in the Home Minister's letter to the Chief Ministers,. a legal not a
po_litical, issue ari~ing out of the existence and extent of a legal right sQuarely
arises and the suits cannot be thrown out as falling outside the purview of
Art. 131. [54 D-EJ
( 4) It is not neces.sary for attracting the provisions of Art. 131 that tho
plaintiff must assert a legal right in itself.
Art. 131 contains no such restriction and it is sufficieni in order that its provisions may apply that the plaintiff
qliestions the legal or constitutional right asserted by the defendant, be it the.
Government of India or any other State.
Such a challenge brings the suit
within the terms of Article 131 for, the question for the decision of the Court
ii not whether this or that particular Leg:slative Assembly is entitled to continue
in office, but whether the Government of India, which asserts the constitutional
right to dissolve the Assembly on the grounds alleged poosesses any sucil right.
[54 F-G]
( 5) The States, have the locus and the interest to contest and seek an
adjudication of the claim set up by the Unin Government. The bond of
consututional obligation between the -Government of India and the
Statea
1111Stains that locus.
[54 H-55A]
( 6) The expression "legal
right" which occurs in Art.
131 has to
be
understood in its pro-per perspective. The legal right of the States consists in
their immunity, in the sense of freedom from the power of the Union Government.
They are entitled under Art. 131, to assert that right either by contending
in the absolute that· the Centre has no power to dissolve the Legislative Assemblies or with the qualification that such a Power cannot be exercised on the
grounds •lated. [55 A-DJ
State of Bihar v. Union of India, [1970] 2 SCR 522; held inapplicable.
(7) By the Proclamation under Art. 356(1) the Legislative Assemblies
of nine States were dissolved and the President's rule was imposed on those
States.
As a result the writ petitioners ceased to be Members of the Legislative
Assemblies and as a result of their ceasing to be such members the right to
salary which they could only draw if they were
m~mbers of the Assemblies
came to an end. Though the petitioners could not be denied relief on the
iround that it was not intended by issuing the Proclamation to deprive them
of their salary, the writ petitions were liable to be dismissed on the ground
that the injury to the alleged Fundamental Rights of the peti!ioners was too
indirect and remote.
[56 G-H]
(8) Whether or no~ the Proclamation issued under Art 356 of the Constitution is approved as enjoined in Art. 356(3), it has an assured life for a
period of two months and its Validity during that period cannot be whittled
down by reading into Art. 356 a condition precedent in the nature of parliamentary approval which, plainly, is not to be found therein.
[57 DJ
[His Lordship considered it unnecessary to consider
the implicationa
of clause (5) of Art. 356,
introduced by the 38th amendment
and
applied "Non-liquet" agreeing with the decision in
Stephen
Kalang:
Ningkan v. Government of Malaysia, L.R. (1970) A.C. 379, 392]
Per Bliagwati I. (On b<half of Gupta I. & himself)
( 1) The satisfaction of the President is a subjective one and cannot be
deciG.ed by reference to objective tests. It is deliberately and advisedly subjective because lhe matter in respect to which he is to be satisfied is of such
a nature that its decision must necessarily be left to the executive branch of
Government. It cannot by its very nature be a fit subject-matter of judicial
determination and hence it is left to the subj~ctive satisfaction of the Central
Go\oernment which is best in a position to decide it. The Court cannot. in
the circumstances, go into tho ques~on of correctness or adequacy of the facts
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RAJASTHAN V. UNION
9
and circumstances on which tho satisfaction of tho Central Government is
A
buea. That would be a dangerous exercise for the court, both because it
is not a fit instrument for determining a question of this kind and
also
jx!cause the court would thereby usurp the function of a Central Government
and in doing so enter the "Political thicket" which it must avoid if it is to
retain its legitimacy with the people.
But, if the satisfaction is mala fide or
hi based on wholly extraneous and irrelevant grounds, the court would have
jurisdiction to examine it, because in that case there would be no satisfaction
Of tne President in regard to tile matter on which he is required to be satisfied.
B
The satisfaction of the ·President is a condition precedent to the exercise of
power undtr Art. 356(1) and if it can be shown that there is no satisfaction
of the President at all, the exercise of the power would be constitutionally
invalid.
Of course, by reason of clause 5 of Art. 356 the satisfaction of the
Pre31dent ii final and conclusive and cannot be assailed on any ground, but
this immunity from attack cannot apply where the challenge is Dot that the
satisfaction is improper or unjustified, but that there is no satisfaction at all.
In !tuch a case, it is not the satisfaction arrived at by the President which is
challenged, but the existence of satisfaction itself. In most cases it would be
C
dilh.cult, if not impossible, to challenge the exercise of power under Art. 356
clause ( 1), even on this limited ground, because the facts and circumstances
on which the sat~;faction is based would not be known, but where it is possible,
to know them from declarations made the existence of satisfaction can always
be challenged on the ground that it is mala fide or based on wholly extraneous
or irrelevant ground.
[ 81 G, H, 82 A-H, 83 A-BJ
Ningkan v. Govt. of Malaysia, 1970 A.C. 379, King Emperor v. Benoarz'laJ
Sarma, 72 I.A. 57 referred to.
(2) The defeat of the ruling party at the Lok Sabha election cannot by
itself without anything more ilUpport the inference that the Government of the
State cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of th~ Cottstitu~
tion. To d.isrolve the Legislative Assembly solely on such ground would be
an indirect exercise of the right of recall of all the members by the President
without there being any provision in the Constitution for recall even by the
dectorate. Where there has been a total rout of candidates belonging to the
D
ruling party and in some of the plaintiff-States, the ruling party has not been
able to secure even a single seat. it is proof of complete alienation between
E
the Government and the people. It is axiomatic
that
no
Government
can function efficiently and effectively in accordance with the Constitution in
a democratic set up unless it enjoys the goodwill and support of the people.
Where there is a wall of estrangement which divides the Government from the
people and there is resentment and
antipathy in the
hearts of the
people
against the Government, it is not a~ all unlikely that it may lead to instability
and even the administration may be paralysed. The consent of the people ii
the basis of democratic form of Government and when that is withdrawn so
entirely and un~quivocally as to leave no room for doubt about the intensity
F
Of public feeling against the ruling party, the moral authority of the Govern ..
ment would be seriously undermined and a situation may arise where the
people may cease to give respect and obedience to Governmental authority
and even conflict ttnd confrontation may develop between the
Government
and the pCople leading to collapse of administration. These are all consequences which cannot be said to be unlikely to arise from such an unusual
stote of affairs and they may make it impossible for the Government of the
State to be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.
G
Whether the situation is fraught with such consequences or npt is entirely a
matter of political judgment for the executive branch of Government. But,
it cannot be said that such consequences can never ensue and that th'!. ground
that on acccunt of total and massive defeat of the ruling party in the Lok Sabha
elections, the Legislative Assembly of the State has ceased to reflect the will
of the people and there is complete alienation between the Legislative Assem~
bly and the people is wholly extraneous or irrelevant to the purpose of Art.
356. Clause (I).
On lhe facts and circumstances of the present case this ground is clearly
H
a relevant ground having reasonable nexus with the matter in regard to which
the President is required to be satisfied before taking action under Article 356.
Clause (l). [85 A-HJ
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( 3) There are two limitations in regard to the nature of the suit which
CJD .be entertained by ~e Supreme Court und~r Art. 131. One is in regard to
parties and the other ts 1n regard to the sub1ect matter. It does not contem~
plate any. private party being arrayed as a disputant on one side or the other.
A dispute in which such a private party is involved must be brought before
a court, other f;han the Supreme Court, having jurisdiction over the matter.
Moreoy~r, the d1spute most be one relating to a legal right and not a dispute
on ~ohtical plane not based on legal right. A legal right which is the subject
of dispute need not arise in the context of the Constitution and the federalism
it sets up.
So also the power of the Supreme Court to grant relief in a suit
under Article 131 is not restricted
only to
'"declaratory
Judgment". The
Supreme Court would have power to give whatever reliefs are necessary for
enforcement of the legal right claimed in the suit, if such legal right is established.
[64 E-H, 6' A-D, 66 CJ
Stat< of Bihar v. Union of India & Anr., (1970) 2 S.C.R. '22, Explained
A doubted:
Shamsher Singh v. State of Puniab, (197'] 1 S.C.R. 814 referred to.
(4) Unconstitutional exercise of power by the President under Article 3'6
clause ( 1) may injuriously affect rights of several persom.