# State of U. P v. Deomati Upadhyaya

- **Citation:** [1961] 1 S.C.R. 64
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1961
- **Bench:** P. B. Gajendbagadkar, K. N. Wanchoo, M. HIDAYA'rULLAH, K. C. Das Gupta, a.nd J. c. SHAH
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/state-of-u-p-v-deomati-upadhyaya-2205
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

Government Servant-Dismissal-Member of subordinate rank
of police forces-Police officer committing offence-Departmental
enquiry and dismissal-V a!idity-Dismissal from service without
fresh shew cause notice-Legality-Police Act, 186t (V of 186t),
ss. 29, 35-Government of India Act, 1935 (z5 <So :z6 Geo. 5, Ch. 42),
SS. 240(3), 243.
The appellant, who was employed in the Punjab Police, was
found while working as a Police Censor to have detained certain
letters illegally and later to have made use of copies and photographs of them for blackmail.
lie was consequently revqted
to his substantive post of head constable on January 14, 1944·
Thereafter an enquiry was started against him by the Superintendent of Police and eventua!Jy he was dismissed frorn service on
January 25, 1944·
His representations to higher authorities
having failed he instituted a suit challenging the legality of the
order of dismissal on the grounds, inter alia, (1) thats. 240(3) of
the Government of India Act, 1935. had not been complied with,
and (2) that as the appellant was alleged to have committed a
criminal offence the Superintendent of Police could not hold a
departmental enquiry in respect of sucli allegations in view of
ss. 29 and 35 of the Police Act, l!lbr.
Held : (1) thats. 243 of the Government of India Act, i935,
-
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
65
. \v hich was a special provision with regard to the subordinate
ranks of police forces in India, excluded the operation of s. 240(3t
of the Act to the appellant, who was, therefore, governed by the
conditions of service as provided under the Police Regulations,
and that the substance of s. 240(3) which was brought into the
Police Regulations in September 1946 long after the appellant
had been dismissed was not ·applicable to him.
Accordingly, he
was not entitled to the seco.nd notice, under s. 240(3), giving him
a reasonable opportunity of showing cause aga:inst ·_the action
proposed t.o be taken in regard to him.
North-West Frontier Province v. Swaj Narain Anand [1948]
F.C.R. 103 and High Commissioner for India and High Commissioner for Pakistan v. I. M. Lal, [1948] F.C.R. 44, referred .to.
. (2) that. the provisions of the Police Act." 1861, relating to
offences committed by a police officer above the rank of a constable do not bar .a departmental enquiry .in respect of a matter
where it is also possible to prosecute such an officer under that ·
Act.
b1vIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION:
Civil
Appeal
No. 349 of 1957.
Appeal by . special leave from the judgment and
decree dated November 29, 1954, of the"Punjab High
_}
0ourt in Regular Second Appeal No. 891of1951.
Hardayal Hardy and N. N. Keswa"ni, for the appellant.
.
·
N, S. Bindra and D. Gupta, for the respQndent.,
.1960 . .Tuly 21.
The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
_
Ig6o
Bhagat Singh
v.
The.State of
Punjab
WANOHOO J.-This is an: appeal by spedal leave
Wanchoo J.
against the judgment of the Punjab High Court
•
in a service matter. The b~ief f1J,cts necessary for
present purposes a.re that' the lJ.ppellant was appointed
·as a. foot-constable in 1931 in the Punjab Police and.was
dismissed on J anua.ry 25, 1944. Shortly before, he was
11.cting as al) Assistant Sub.Inspector and actually working as a Police Censor. The charge against h.im Was
that whi)e he was· working as Police Censor, he detained certain letters illegally and had copies and photo.
graphs· ma.de of them and later used these copies and
photographs for blackmail. He was .consequently
reverted to his substantive post of head constable on
9
Thf Sta!1 'Jj
~l..l'REME COl1HT REPORTS
[ 1961 J
January 14, 1944. Thereafter on January 21, 1944,
an enquiry wits st artcd against him by the Superintendent of Poliec and he was eventually dismissed.
He went in appeal to t.hc Deputy Inspector General
of Police, which was dismissed.
He t.hon went in
rev is ion r.o the l nspector General of Police, w hieh also
failed.
Finally he made several representations ancl
memorials to the Punjab Govc>rnrnent b

## Text

State of U. P.
v.
Deomati
Upadhyaya
llidayatullah j.
July I.
64
SUPREME COGRT REPORTS
[1961]
of Criminal Procedure in so fa.r a.a " tha.t section
relates to s. 27 of the Indian Evidence Act" a.re
intra vires a.nd do not offend Art. 14 of the Oon~titu
tion.
Tho order of the High Court acquitting the
respondent is a.lso set a.side a.nd the order of the CourL
of Sessions convicting the 11ccused (respondent) under
s. 302 of the India.n Pena.I Codo and sentencing him
to <lea.th is restored.
Appeal allowed.
BHAGAT SIKGH
v.
THE STATE OF PUNJAB
(P. B. GAJENDBAGADKAR, K. N. WANCHOO,
M. HIDAYA'rULLAH, K. C. DAS GUPTA, a.nd
J. c. SHAH, JJ.)
Government Servant-Dismissal-Member of subordinate rank
of police forces-Police officer committing offence-Departmental
enquiry and dismissal-V a!idity-Dismissal from service without
fresh shew cause notice-Legality-Police Act, 186t (V of 186t),
ss. 29, 35-Government of India Act, 1935 (z5 <So :z6 Geo. 5, Ch. 42),
SS. 240(3), 243.
The appellant, who was employed in the Punjab Police, was
found while working as a Police Censor to have detained certain
letters illegally and later to have made use of copies and photographs of them for blackmail.
lie was consequently revqted
to his substantive post of head constable on January 14, 1944·
Thereafter an enquiry was started against him by the Superintendent of Police and eventua!Jy he was dismissed frorn service on
January 25, 1944·
His representations to higher authorities
having failed he instituted a suit challenging the legality of the
order of dismissal on the grounds, inter alia, (1) thats. 240(3) of
the Government of India Act, 1935. had not been complied with,
and (2) that as the appellant was alleged to have committed a
criminal offence the Superintendent of Police could not hold a
departmental enquiry in respect of sucli allegations in view of
ss. 29 and 35 of the Police Act, l!lbr.
Held : (1) thats. 243 of the Government of India Act, i935,
-
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
65
. \v hich was a special provision with regard to the subordinate
ranks of police forces in India, excluded the operation of s. 240(3t
of the Act to the appellant, who was, therefore, governed by the
conditions of service as provided under the Police Regulations,
and that the substance of s. 240(3) which was brought into the
Police Regulations in September 1946 long after the appellant
had been dismissed was not ·applicable to him.
Accordingly, he
was not entitled to the seco.nd notice, under s. 240(3), giving him
a reasonable opportunity of showing cause aga:inst ·_the action
proposed t.o be taken in regard to him.
North-West Frontier Province v. Swaj Narain Anand [1948]
F.C.R. 103 and High Commissioner for India and High Commissioner for Pakistan v. I. M. Lal, [1948] F.C.R. 44, referred .to.
. (2) that. the provisions of the Police Act." 1861, relating to
offences committed by a police officer above the rank of a constable do not bar .a departmental enquiry .in respect of a matter
where it is also possible to prosecute such an officer under that ·
Act.
b1vIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION:
Civil
Appeal
No. 349 of 1957.
Appeal by . special leave from the judgment and
decree dated November 29, 1954, of the"Punjab High
_}
0ourt in Regular Second Appeal No. 891of1951.
Hardayal Hardy and N. N. Keswa"ni, for the appellant.
.
·
N, S. Bindra and D. Gupta, for the respQndent.,
.1960 . .Tuly 21.
The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
_
Ig6o
Bhagat Singh
v.
The.State of
Punjab
WANOHOO J.-This is an: appeal by spedal leave
Wanchoo J.
against the judgment of the Punjab High Court
•
in a service matter. The b~ief f1J,cts necessary for
present purposes a.re that' the lJ.ppellant was appointed
·as a. foot-constable in 1931 in the Punjab Police and.was
dismissed on J anua.ry 25, 1944. Shortly before, he was
11.cting as al) Assistant Sub.Inspector and actually working as a Police Censor. The charge against h.im Was
that whi)e he was· working as Police Censor, he detained certain letters illegally and had copies and photo.
graphs· ma.de of them and later used these copies and
photographs for blackmail. He was .consequently
reverted to his substantive post of head constable on
9
Thf Sta!1 'Jj
~l..l'REME COl1HT REPORTS
[ 1961 J
January 14, 1944. Thereafter on January 21, 1944,
an enquiry wits st artcd against him by the Superintendent of Poliec and he was eventually dismissed.
He went in appeal to t.hc Deputy Inspector General
of Police, which was dismissed.
He t.hon went in
rev is ion r.o the l nspector General of Police, w hieh also
failed.
Finally he made several representations ancl
memorials to the Punjab Govc>rnrnent but without
avail. Consequ!'ntly the prcs!'nt suit was tiled by the
appellant in FPbrua.ry 1949.
The plaint as originally
filed, iifter wirmting the facts relating tu the appellant's servic<>, merely stated that the charge uf
misconduct was brought against the appellant. on
account of enmity and that the departmental enquiry
made hy the l:'uperintcndont of Police was arbitrary
and not according to law, rules and regulations prescrihccl for tho same.
Besides this vague general
allc>gation, the only specific grievance made out by
the appellant in the pl>Lint was that the Superintendent of Police had dismissed him w~thout recording
his defenco evidence and without giving him an
opportunity to produce thti same.
Tho appellant
amended the plaint later and added one more grievance, namely, that he had heen appointed by the
Doputy Inspector General of Police and could only
have hccn dismiHscd by him and not by the Superintendent of Police.
As to the Departmental enquiry,
certain further defects therein were pointed out
besides the allegation already made that his defenco
had not been taken and that he had not been given
an opportunity to produce it. Thoso further defects
were (i) that he was not permitted to engage counsel,
(ii) that he was not allowed full opportunity to croas.-
examine the prosecution witnesses, and (iii) that he
was not asked by the enquiry officer to state what he
had to say in answer to the charge against him and
was not permitted to file a written.statement explaining the alleged incriminating circumstances against
him.
The suit was opposed on behalf of the Punjab
Government and among otht>rs their main defence
was that the enquiry we.a in accordance with the •
)
- 1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
67
Regulations and was not arbitrary. It was also denied
that no opportunity had beeri given to the appellant
to lead defence evidence or to cross-examine prosectition witnesses or to make his own statement in answer
to the charge. It was admitted that permission was .
. refused to engage a counsel; but it was finally averred
_ that taking the enquiry a:s a whole there was no such
defect in its _conduct as to invalidate it or call for
interference by the courts.
Three issues, all of a general nature, were framed
· by the trial court, namely,_
1.
Whether. the plaintiff's dismissal is void,
illegal, inoperative and wrongful and what is its
effect?
2.
Whether the Civil Courts have jurisdiction to
entertain the suit or to go into the <1uestion of the
validity of the departmental enquiry ?
3.
Whether the suit for a declaration lies and is
competent and why ?
It is unfortunate that the specific points raised by
the appellant whatever they were were not made the
·subject-matter of specific ;ssues. However, tlie trial
court came to the conclusion that the case of the
appellant was governed by s. 240(3) of the Government India Act, 1935; and it was reinforced in this
conclusion by the Police· Regulations which, according to it, provided for the same safeguards as were
contained in s. 240(3).
-
-
It .therefore held that as s. 240(3) had not been
com plied with, t,he dismissal was yoid and iUegal. As
to the other two issues relating to the· jurisdiction of
- civil courts they were-depided in favour of the
appellant.
-
_ -
. _There was an appeal to the District Jndge by the
Ptfnja.b Government. The District Judge' agreed with
the conC!usions of the trial court on the applicability
of s, 240(3) to the case of the appellant and further -
referred to an amendment in the ·Police Regulations
which- required that before an order of dismissal or
reduction 'in rank is made, the officer to__ be punished
shall be proquced before the _officer empowered to
punish him and shall_ be informed of the _charges
'
Bhagat Singh
v.
The State of
J>unja~
Wanchoo ].
11;60
lJh·1;:at
S1n1;h
v.
The St~itc cf
J)U11}U!1
W'co1clioo J.
68
SCPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
proved against him and called upon to show cause
whv an order of dismissal or reduction in rank should
nut" be passed. The District J udgo was conscious that
this amendment in the Regulations was made in
September 1946 long after the dismissal of the appellant and therefore would not apply to the appellant's
case; but he overruled this contention on the ground
that the rule was merely dodaratory of the law and
only removed the ambiguity that might have arisen
because of s. 243 of the Government of India Act. He
therefore dismissNI the appeal.
Then followed a second appeal by the Punjab
Government to the High Court.. The High Court
held that s. 240(3) did not apply to the case of the
appellant and that s. 243 was the governing section.
In consequence tho High Court further held that the
appellant was not Pntitled to the protection of s. 240(3)
and as the amendment to tho Police Regulations
which brought in the substance of s. 240(3) therein
was made after the dismissal of the· appellant, he
could not take advantago of it.
As to tho enquiry,
the High Court held that though there might ha.vo
been minor procedural defects in tho enquiry it was on
the whole substantially in accordance with tho Regulations and principle" of natural justice . and could
not therefore be held to be invalid.
The High Court
pointed out tha.t there was no serious contravention of the Regulations and the witnesses who had
appeared wem cross-examined by tho appellant who
was also ca.lied upon to produce his defence within 48
hours. He however did not choose to do so a.nd wanted
a postponement which was refused and thereafter the
Superintend<nt of Police proceeded to dismiss him.
Learned counsel for the appellant challenges the correctness of the view taken by thii High Court and
three points have been urged on his behalf before us,
namely, (I) s. 240(3) of the Government of India Act
applied t.o police officers of subordinate rank and there
was nothing in A. 243 which took away from such
officers the protection of s. 240(3); (2) Even if the Police
Regulations a.lone applied, thero was such violation of
the relevant regulations as to vitiate the enquiry
•
'
1 s:nR .. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
69
proceedings ; and (3) The Superintendent of Police
could not hold a departmental enquiry as a criminal
offence had been committed; and reliance in this connection was placed on ~s. 29 and 35 of the Police .Act,
No. V of 1861.
Re. (1).
Section 243 of· the Government of India Act appears in Chapter II of Part X dealing with 'Civil
Services'. That Chapter begins with s. 240 and subs. (3) thereof provides that no member ofa civil service
or holding any civilpost in India shall .be dismissed
or reduced in rank until he has been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause again~t the action
proposed to be taken in regard to him. Section 243
·however is in these terms :-
" Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions of this chapter, the conditions of service of the
subordinate ranks of the various police forces in India
shall be sμch as may be determined by or under the
Act relating to those forces respectively."
Obviously s. 24.3 was a special provision ..yith regard
to subordinate ranks of police forces in India and it is
not in dispute that the appell;i.nt belonged to the subordinate rank_s .. Therefore according to s. 243, the
conditions of service of the subordfoate ranks are
governed by or-under the Acts relating to police forces
and s. 240(3) can have no application to them. The
non obstante clause of s. 243 makes it clear that so far
as the subordinate. rnnks of police forces in India ·are
concerned, s. 243 will apply and not the earlier provisions including s. 240(3). We are therefore of opinion
that in view of the special provisions in s. 243 relating
to the subordinate .ranks of police forces in India (to
which the appell~nt undoubtedly belonged), s.'240(3)
would have no application._ We may in this connec;
tion refer· to the judgment of the Privy Council in
North-West Frontier Province v. Suraj Narain Anand (1); where it was held that ·the non obstante clause
in s. 243 excluded the operation of s. 240(2) in the case·
of subordinate ranks of poli_!Je forces ·in India and thllot
conditions of service included the tight of dismissal.
• (1) [1948] F.C.R. 103.
Bhagat Singh
v,
The State of
Punjab
JVanchoo ].
RhtJ;at .S111gh
v.
The .1·ifafc of
Pu11;a1,
H'anchoo J.
70
SCPREME COCRT REPORTS
[1961]
That case dealt with s. 240(2) but the sa.mo reasoning
would in our opinion apply to s. 240(3). As has already
been pointed out by the learned District Judge, tho
-Substance of s. 240(3) was brought into the Police
Regulations in September 1946 long after the appellant had been dismissed and would therefore not apply
to the appellant.
He would therefore not bo entitled
to the second notice under s. 240(3) as explained in
[. M. Lall's case by the Privy Council: (See High
Commissioner for India &: High Commissioner for
Pakistan v. ]. M. Lall(')). Kor was such notice necessary under the Police Rogulations·as they existed at
the time of the appellant's dismissal. The view taken
by the High Court under the circumstances is correct.
Re. (2).
So far as violation of tho material provisions of
r. 16.24 of the Police Regulation" is concerned, we find
that only threo specific allegations material for the
μnrposc wero sot out by the apμl'llant, namely, (i) that
he was not given the cha.nee to defend himself, (ii) that
he was not allowed to cross-exa.mino the prosecution
witnesses, and (iii) that he was not allowed to explain
the circurnst.ancos appearing against him and was. not
allowed to file a written statement. lt is enough in
this connection to say that he was certainly given a
chance to produce defence but did not himself avail of
it. It also appears as found by the High Court that
the witneRses wero cross-examined by tho appellant at
length and on the whole there is nothing to show that
he was not allowed to explain the circumstances
appearing against him.
Wo therefore agree with the
High Court that there is no such serious contravention
of the l{egulations as to call for interference by the
Courts.
Re. (3).
Reliance in this connection is placed on ss. 29 and 35
of tho Police Act. Section 29 prov ides for penalties
for neglect of duty etc. by police officers and lays down
the extent of punishment on conviction by a ma.gistrat~. Section 35 defines what magistrate can try a
(1) [1948] F.C.R. H·
' •
•
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
71 .
charge against a police officer above the rank of a constable under the Police Act and such a magistrate has
to 'be a )!'irst Class Magistrate. These sections nowhere. exclude departmental enquiry. All that they lay
down is that where. an offence punishable under the
Police Act is committed by a police officer above the
ra,nk of a constable and is to be tried by a court oflaw
it has to go before a :First Class Magistrate. That,
however, does not mean that no departmentalenqu\iry
can be held with respect to a matter where it is afiio
possible· to prosecute a police officer under the Police
. Act. There is no force in this contention also and it i~
hereby rejected.
·
;:
The appeal therefore fails and is hereby dismissed)
but in the circumstances of this case we pass no ordef'
as to costs.
'
·
Appeal dismissed.
M/s. GUDUTHUR BROS.
v.
THE INCOME-TAX OFFICER, SPECIAL
. CIRCLE, BANGALORE.
/
(S. K. DAS, M. HIDAYATULLAH and J. c. SHAH, JJ.)
Income-tax-Assessment-Penalty-Imposition, 'by Income-tax
Officer without reason.al!le opportunity given to assessee of being
heard-Order set -aside on appeal and refund directed-No express
. order of remand-Continuance of proceedings by the Income-tax
Officer-Legality-Indian 1ncome-tax Act, z922 (II of .z922), ss. 28
(r)(a) and 28(3).
The, appellants failed to file their return within the prescri-
. bed time and on a notiCe issued under s. 28(r)(a)' of 'the Indian
. Income-tax Act, 1922, to show cause why penalty should not be
imposed on them, they filed a written reply. Without affording .
them an opportunity of being heard as required by s. 28(3) of the
Act the Incoi:ne'tax Officer· imposed a penalty on them. On
. appeal the Appellate Assistant Commissiotier set aside the order
. and direded refund of the penalty. Thereafter the Income-tax
Officer issued a further notice giving an opportunity to the appel~
!ants of being heard. The appellants objected to this notice and
' -'
Bhagat Singh
v.
The State of
Punjab
H1anchoo J.
r960
July 2i
•