# STATE OF U.P v. PARAS NATH SINGH & ORS

- **Citation:** [1973] 3 S.C.R. 313
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1973-01-15
- **Bench:** A. Alagiriswami, I. D. Dua, C~ A. Vaidialingam
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/state-of-u-p-v-paras-nath-singh-ors-5817
- **Pages:** 15

## Headnote

Crirninal k;Jw-Practice and procedure-Eye witn··esses f.elativeS' of
deceased-No intrinsic infirmity in
their
evidence----.Jf
corroboration.
necessary for sustaining
conviction-Sentence
of
life
imprisonment
instead of death-Circumstances justifying.
The six respondents (accused) were convicted by the
trial Olurt
for offences Ulllder s. 302/149, I.P.C. Four of them were
sentenced
to death and two to Imprisonment for life on the grounds that one
was a 'budding lawyer' and the other was IS years old. The son and
daughter of .the dec,eased were examined as eye witnesses to .the .occurrence. Four penons, who were cited as eye-witnesses by the prosecuUon, were giv~ up, because, the counsel for prosecution
represented
that he had reason to believe that they would not speak the tmth.
They were neither examined by the trial court under s. 540, Cr.P. C.,
nor as defence witnesses. The trial court scrutinised
carefully
and
properly evaluated the evidence of the son and daughter, and as the
son was 12 or 13 years old, applied the correct principles gover.ning
the appreciation of the evidence of a child witness and accepted th.eir
evidence as true.
The Hipt Court on appeal, examined the 4 witnesses
given up by the prosecution, as court witnesses.
It devoted a
major
part of its judgment to the consid,eration of the
additional
evideroce
recorded by it. Feeling whotly unimpres;ed by that evidence, the High
Court endors.ed the view of the plrosecution that these witnesses
were
given up as they were not prepared to speak the truth and even issued
notice und,er s. 479A, Cr. P. C. to one of them to show cause why he
should 1not be prosecuted for perjury. The High Court disagreed with
the main arguments urged on behalf of the accused for
discrediting
the testimony of the son and daughter. Bui, th.e High Court acquitted
the accused on the view that the SOI> and daughter, being closely related
to the deceased and being in a sense, chance witnesses, their evideince
without corroboration did not prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt.
Allowing the appeal to this Court,
HELD: (!) The judgment of the High Court reversing the judgment
of the trial court and acquitting the accused caused grave miscarriage
of justice.
[32SB-C]
Once the two eye witinesses were h.eld to be trustworthy witnesses
there was no cogent reason for not acting upon their evidencle. The
fact that the other persons who were present at the
spot and
had
w?tnesse~ the ~urrence have, without 11ny good reason and, perhaps
with oblique motive, chose.n ~t t? state the truth in court and thereby
obs!ructcd the course of 1ushce, is a sound reason for accepting
the
testimony of the son and daughter. To decline to act upon their testimony merely because of the absence of other witnesses to corroborate
them in court, is to defeat the cause of justice in this case.
It was
wholly unreasonable for the High Court to dub them as chance
wit-
:nesses, as there i! no material on record to support such an observation.
and the observation runs counter to the High Court's own
line
of
314
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1973) 3 S.C.R.
reasoning earlier. There is thus absolutely no justification for the view
that theit testimony leaves any scope for reasonable doubt ebout
the
guilt of the accused. It could not be considered that because of their
relationship to thi: deceased, they would spare the real assailants
"""1
ffilaely implicate the accused, and in the circumstances of the
case,
there is no scope for such a hypothesis.
There is no general
rule
that the .evidence of the relations of the deceased must be corroborated
for securing the conviction of the offender.
Each case is to be considered on its own facts.
[325F-326Cj
bl the present case, there is an instr'insic ring of truth in the evidence of the two eye witnesses.
The straight forward nature of their
deposition and the fact that they were undoubtedly in. a
position
t<>
identify the assailants coupled with the recovery of blood-stained earth
f

## Text

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STATE OF U.P.
v.
PARAS NATH SINGH & ORS.
January 15, 1973
313
[A. ALAGIRISWAMI, I. D. DUA AND C~ A. VAIDIALINGAM, JJ.J
Crirninal k;Jw-Practice and procedure-Eye witn··esses f.elativeS' of
deceased-No intrinsic infirmity in
their
evidence----.Jf
corroboration.
necessary for sustaining
conviction-Sentence
of
life
imprisonment
instead of death-Circumstances justifying.
The six respondents (accused) were convicted by the
trial Olurt
for offences Ulllder s. 302/149, I.P.C. Four of them were
sentenced
to death and two to Imprisonment for life on the grounds that one
was a 'budding lawyer' and the other was IS years old. The son and
daughter of .the dec,eased were examined as eye witnesses to .the .occurrence. Four penons, who were cited as eye-witnesses by the prosecuUon, were giv~ up, because, the counsel for prosecution
represented
that he had reason to believe that they would not speak the tmth.
They were neither examined by the trial court under s. 540, Cr.P. C.,
nor as defence witnesses. The trial court scrutinised
carefully
and
properly evaluated the evidence of the son and daughter, and as the
son was 12 or 13 years old, applied the correct principles gover.ning
the appreciation of the evidence of a child witness and accepted th.eir
evidence as true.
The Hipt Court on appeal, examined the 4 witnesses
given up by the prosecution, as court witnesses.
It devoted a
major
part of its judgment to the consid,eration of the
additional
evideroce
recorded by it. Feeling whotly unimpres;ed by that evidence, the High
Court endors.ed the view of the plrosecution that these witnesses
were
given up as they were not prepared to speak the truth and even issued
notice und,er s. 479A, Cr. P. C. to one of them to show cause why he
should 1not be prosecuted for perjury. The High Court disagreed with
the main arguments urged on behalf of the accused for
discrediting
the testimony of the son and daughter. Bui, th.e High Court acquitted
the accused on the view that the SOI> and daughter, being closely related
to the deceased and being in a sense, chance witnesses, their evideince
without corroboration did not prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt.
Allowing the appeal to this Court,
HELD: (!) The judgment of the High Court reversing the judgment
of the trial court and acquitting the accused caused grave miscarriage
of justice.
[32SB-C]
Once the two eye witinesses were h.eld to be trustworthy witnesses
there was no cogent reason for not acting upon their evidencle. The
fact that the other persons who were present at the
spot and
had
w?tnesse~ the ~urrence have, without 11ny good reason and, perhaps
with oblique motive, chose.n ~t t? state the truth in court and thereby
obs!ructcd the course of 1ushce, is a sound reason for accepting
the
testimony of the son and daughter. To decline to act upon their testimony merely because of the absence of other witnesses to corroborate
them in court, is to defeat the cause of justice in this case.
It was
wholly unreasonable for the High Court to dub them as chance
wit-
:nesses, as there i! no material on record to support such an observation.
and the observation runs counter to the High Court's own
line
of
314
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1973) 3 S.C.R.
reasoning earlier. There is thus absolutely no justification for the view
that theit testimony leaves any scope for reasonable doubt ebout
the
guilt of the accused. It could not be considered that because of their
relationship to thi: deceased, they would spare the real assailants
"""1
ffilaely implicate the accused, and in the circumstances of the
case,
there is no scope for such a hypothesis.
There is no general
rule
that the .evidence of the relations of the deceased must be corroborated
for securing the conviction of the offender.
Each case is to be considered on its own facts.
[325F-326Cj
bl the present case, there is an instr'insic ring of truth in the evidence of the two eye witnesses.
The straight forward nature of their
deposition and the fact that they were undoubtedly in. a
position
t<>
identify the assailants coupled with the recovery of blood-stained earth
from the place of occurrence ]eave no reasonable doubt about the guilt
of the accused. [326C-D]
(2) No leniency should have been show.n to the 'budding lawyer',
because, he, as a result of his education and profession should
have
exercised a restraining
inftuenc~ on his associates rather than allowed
himself to be misled by them into being
a
party to
a
gruesome
murder.
However, in view of the facts that: (a)
the
murder
was
committed as far back as 1968; (b) on convictiO\ll by the trial court
in September 1969, the accused were under the shadow of death; (c)
the accused were acquitted by the High Court in
May
1970;
and
( d) it is not .possible to assign with certainty the fatal blows to any
particular accused person, the ends of justice would be served by sen·
tencing all the accused to impris()Jll11ent for life. [3260-H; 327 A-CJ
ORIGINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.
49 of 1971.
Appeal by special leave from die judgment a,nd order May 18,
1970 of the Allahabad High Court at Allahabad in Criminal
Appeal No. 1947 of 1969.
0. P. Rana for die appellant.
Nuruddin Ahmad and U. P. Singh for the respondent,.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DuA, J.-The State of U. P., the appellant in this appeal by
special leave, assails the judgment of the Allahabad High Court
dated May 18, 1970 acquitting on appeal the six respondents in
·this Court who were convicted by the Court of the first Temporary
Civil & Sessions Judge, Pratapgarh on September 1,
1969 of
various offences under the Indian Penal Code. The accused Paras
Nath Singh, Ramendra Pratap Singh, Hari Saran Singh and Lal
Pratap Singh were sentenced to death under s. 302 read with s.
149, I.P.C. The accused Surendra Pratap Singh and Shiva Pratap
Singh were also convicted under the said sections but sentenced to
life imprisorunent. Leniency was shown to them bv l!he trial court
because Surendra Pratap Singh was stated to be a ·budding lawyer
and Shiv Pratap Singh, being of tender age (15 or 16 years old).
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U.P. STATE v. P. N. SINGH (Dua, J.)
315
was considered to have apparently been· misled by his relations.
Excepting Surendra Pratap Singh and Hari Saran Singh, the remaining accμsed were also sentenced to rigorous imprisonmen~ for
one year each under s. 14 7, l.P .C. They were furthe_r convtcted
under s. 148, l.P.C. and sentenced to rigorous imprisomnent for
two years each. Accused !'aras Nath Singh was in addition, sentenced to rigorous imprisomnent for six months under s. 397,
l.P.C.
The relevant facts necessary for our purpose may now be
stated. The six respondents (hereinafter called the accused) were
charged with the murder of Suresh Singh on July 9, 1968 and with
the theft of his gun and cartridges along with t!!e container. · The
deceased and the accused are all Thakurs by caste residing in
village Isanpur. Accused Surendra Pratap Singh and Ramendra
Pratap Singh are brathers residing in a house adjoining that of the
deceased, being thus his next door neighl::!Ours. Shiva Pratap Singh
and Lal Pratap Singh are cousins and the other accused persons
are said to be their associates. There was long standing enmity
between the deceased on the
one h_and and Ramendra Pratap
Singh and. his family members on the other. About six or seven
months prior to the present occurrence, Ramendra Pratap
is said to have tried to fire at the deceased on Dewali • day
and a case under s. 307, I.P.C. arising out of the said incident was
pending at the time of '!lie murder Of the deceased. . About five
or six days prior to the murder Ramendra Pratap Singh, Surendra
. Pratap Singh and one Vijai Bahadur Singh are stated to have
beaten the deceased inside his house giving ri~e to another case
under s. 107)117, Cr. P. C. which was also pending at _the time
of the murder in question. This enmity is stated to be the motive ·
for the murder of the deceased. Now turning to tht; occurrence
in question on July 9, 1968, Suresh Singh deceased had gone to
Pratapgarh on cycle for some work carrying with him his gm~ and
cartridges. On his way back from Pratapgarh the same evening
at about sunset when he reached Rakhaha Bazar and was on the
Rakhaha Bazar-Kandhai kachha road, all the . accused persons
emerged from the nearby Nala.
They surrounded their victim
Snresh Singh, shouting th:rt he should be killed because he posed
to be a great leader. The accused who were armed with lathis,
spears and farslza, assaulted the deceased with their respective
weapons. Smt. Sheela Devi, P. W. 1, daughter of the deceased and
Sachendra Pratap Singh, (P.W. 2) son of the deceased also happened Jo be .returning to their village from Rakhaha Bazar where
they had gone to purchase parwal (a vegetable) for their mother
who .was not well. On hearing the alarm they went towards the
nala where they saw the accused assaulting their father with lathis,
spears and farsha.
Several other persons, including Shiva. Pratap
5-L796Sup.C. I./73
316
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1973] 3 S.C.R.
Singh, Mahabir Singh, Ranmast Singh and Jagdish Bahadur Singh
were also attracted by the alarm to the place of occurrence. The
deceased fell down on receipt of injuries and the accused ran away
carrying with them the gun and container of cartridges along with
its contents belonging to the deceased.
The cycle and a jhola
belonging to the deceased and lying on the spot was sent home by
Sheela Devi (P.W. 1) through one Mahabir. Sheela Devi also
sent for her mother ( Smt. Sundari Devi) through the same man.
The mother arrived soon thereafter and Suresh Singh was taken
on an ekka io Diwan Mau from where he was taken in a taxi to
the District Hospital, Pratapgarh. Suresh Singh appears to have
expired on hls way to the hospital near village Pipari. The doctor
on examining Suresh Singh informed Sheela Devi that her father
had already died and advised her to lodge a report at the Police
Station, Kotwali. She wrote out a report of t!!~ occurrence (Ex.
Ka-1) at the hospital and along\ with the dead biody, went to
Kotwali police station where she handed over the written report
the same night at about 11.30 p.m. on the basis of which Ka-18.
the formal F.I.R. was prepared. A case under ss. 302/147 /148/
149, I.P.C. was thereupon registered and all the relevant papers
sent to the police station Kandhai. As a result of the investigation,
it was considered necessary also to frame a charge against the
accused persons under s. 379 read with s. 149. I.P.C. for the theft
of the gun and the cartridges along with their containers belonging
to the deceased. The foregoing is the prosecution version.
At the trial the only eye-witnesses deposing to the actual occurrence were Smt. Sheela Devi, (P.W. 1) the daughter and Sachendra
Pratap Singh (P.W. 2), the son of the deceased. P.W. 1 was about
19 years old when she gave evidence at the trial in July, 1969 and
P.W. 2 about 13 or 14 years old. The other persons mentioned
in the F.I.R. by P.W. 1 were not produced as witne~ses on the
ground that they were not prepared to depose in favour of the prosecution at the trial. P.W. 1 and P.W. 2 have unfolded the pr0 secution case deposing to the incident as witnessed by them. According to P.W. 1, she and her younger brother who had gone to
Rakhaha Bazar in the afternoon for buying Parwal. while returning to their home, heard the alarm as thev reached the kachcha
road. They went towards the side from which the noise came and
saw that their father was being beaten biv Lalii. Chotey Lal. Sadhy
and Nankoo with lathis, Hari Saran Singh with ballam and Munna
who is also called Sheo Prat•p Singh. with
farsha.
They took
her father down into the Nala shouti~g. "1<;11 the sala. he was olaying the oart of Nefaf!iri vef'V much".
After the accused h•~ run
awav. p. w. 1 went near her father who. thon!!h badlv iniured,
was still in a position to speak. He tnld her and the other oer<ons
who had assembled there that the accused t1ersons had been hiding
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U.P. STATE v. P. N. SINGH (Dua, J.)
317
inside the Nala and that they had forcibly taken him away from
the road into the Na/a and beaten him.
She sent her father's
eycle and jhola home through Mahabir Singh also requesting him
to send her mother to the place of occurrenc;:. Her mother came
there and after arranging for an ekka, Suresh Singh was taken to
Diwan Mau from where Suresh Singh was taken to the hospital
in a taxi. On the way Suresh Singh expired near Pipari. After
the doctor had certified death of Suresh Singh, P.W. 1 was advised.
by the doctor to make a report in the Sadar Police Station. She
wrote out a report in the hospital and along with the dead body of
the deceased, she went to the police station and lodged the report
in the Kotwali. Paras Nath, accused, according to P.W. 1, had
taken away with him the gun and the cartridge belt belonging to
the deceased. She had herself to go to the Kotwali to lodge the
report because there was no other adult male member left in their
house. According to her, Sarvashri Ram Pratap Singh, Krishnapal. Singh, Ran1esh Prasad Singh and Ruddar Pratap Singh, Vakils,
live in the neighbourhood of her village.
These persons being
under the influence of the lawyers, she could not say if they would
be willing to give evidence in support of the prosecution. She was
cross-examined at great length by four different lawyers defending
the accused persons.
Sachendra Pratap Singh, (P.W. 2), a boy
who did not appear to the court to be more than 12 or 13 years
of age, was first questioned by the trial court by asking him unexpected but intelligent questions to which he gave rational and
sensible answers which impressed the court and the court came to
the conclusion that the boy understood the importance of justice
and of taking oath and was fully conscious of the desirability of
speaking the truth when on oath.
P.W. 2 fully corroborated
P.W. 1 on all material points.
He too was cross-examined at
great length by all the defence counsel.
It appears that after the examination of P.W. 1 and 2 the prosecuting counsel applied to the trial court stating that Mahabir
Singh, Shiva Pratap Singh, Ranmast Singh and Jagdish Bahadur
Singh were present in court but as the prosecuting counsel had
reason to believe that they would not speak the truth, they were
not bieing produced as witnesses by the prosecution. It was suggested !hat they could be examined by the court under s. 540,
Cr. P.C. if considered proper or the accused persons could examine
them in their defence, if they so liked. On this application the
counsel for the accused oersons recorded a note opposing the
suggestion and describin~ the allegation against the witnesses as
baseless. Section 540, Cr. P.C., according to the defence counsel
was inapplicable and he also decFned to examine these witnesses
in defence.
The said witnesses were in these circumstances discharged by the trial court on July 9, 1969.
,r
318
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1973] 3 S.C:.R.
The ffial court i11 a very detailed and exhaustive judgment
dealing with every aspect in a very lucjd manner, came to the conclusion that P.W. 1 and P.W. 2 were both truthful witnesses and
their sincerity and h,.onesty in speaking the truth could not be
doubted.
After stating the principle governing the evidentjary
value of ihe testimony of a child witness, the trial court made the
followin;: observations about the quality and value of the evidence
:i.f P.W. 2:
"He has been cross-examined at a very great length
:.nd that too by four sets of defence lawyers repute.
It i, amazing to find that despite their lengthy and cumbersome cross-examination the witness has not been impaired. Had he not been an eye-witness of the occurrence and had he been examined after tutoring he could
not have remained firm even for a single moment. The
said witness was tried to be beguiled, tempted and also
brow-beaten but to my utter surprise he maintained his
mental composure throughout and did not yield anywhere during tbe cross-examination. Even on the most
minute details the witness did not confuse and gave convincing replies to them.
From the beginning to the end
of the incident he has successfully acquitted himself and
not a single thing could be pointed out in his statement
which could be used as a weapon against him. The
manner and the method which the P.Ws. have exhibited in
the witness box have left an everlasting impression in
my mind about their sincerity and truthfulness.
As a
Judge of fact I am definitely of the opinion that unless
trnthful and honest the P.Ws. 1 and 2 would have collapsed under the weight of this trying and tiring crossexamination".
The testimony of P.W. 2 according to the triatcourt was fully supported and corroborated by his sister, P.W. 1, who has unfolded
the prosectrtion version about the occurrence in question. The
trial court also upheld the jurisdiction for not producing the other
witnesses in court.
This is what the trial court has said in this
connection :-
·
"The nature and number of injuries found on the
person of the deceased and that too in a broad day light
goes to show that the deceased was beaten mercilessly.
The site of the scene of the occurrence and the injured
must have been awe striking and appalling.
To all
those who might have seen the occurrence it must have
left an indelible impression that the accused meant business and there was nothing which could deter them from
accomplishing their tariet. This psychoanalysis of the
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U.P. STATE "· P. N. SINGH (Dua, J.)
319
situation too has ~o be kept in mind before g1vmg a
finding about the respective versions of the parties.
Several documents have been filed in the case by the prosecution to show that cases under sections 307, 323 /
452, l.P.C. and under sections 107/117, Cr. P.C.were
pending :tt the time of occurrence between the deceased
on the one hand and the accused Ramendra and his
family on the other. In these circumstances there was
nothing surprising if even on-lookers did not dare to
come forward. Further I am constrained to observe tjiat
had the accused been on bail even the offsprings of the
deceased i.e., P.Ws 1 and 2 could not have come in the
witness box to depose about facts relating lo the murder
ot their father and in 'that case the fact of even the death
of !he deceased would have been enveloped in darknes5.
Whatever reason may be there to it there is no denying the fact that witnesses in 1he case have kept back
and have avoided coming forward.
l n this connection
I may recall the statements of P.Ws 1, 2 and 4. Out of
so many public witnesses
named in :the
charge-sheet
only P.Ws 1 and 2 could figure as eye-witnesses of the
occurrence. Had they not been the family members of
the deceased even they would not have come. P.W.
lnder Singh has stated that the witnesses have been pres·
surised not to come. I am very much impressed by the
statements of P .Ws 1, 2 and 4 on this score.
Thus in
the case of the present nature no one coulg Like to invite
trouble for him by coming in the witness box. There
is not the least doubt that either because of fear or because of other influences witnesses have not liked to
involve themselves in !he matter. Thus considering the
evidence and the circumstances of the case I feel that the
explanation offered by ·the prosecution regarding the
absence of other P.Ws in the witness box has got to be
accepted.
Exhibits Ka-14 and Ka-16 also lend asiurance to this finding".
Exhibit Ka-14, it may be pointed out, is the F.I.R. dated
Xovember 1, 1967 made by Suresh Singh (deceased)
against
Ramendra Pratap Singh and others lodged at 10.30 p.m. with
respect to the attempted assault on him and firing of shots the
same day ~t about 6 p.m.
Exhibit Ka-16 is an application by
Suresh Singh, deceased, dated November 6, 1967 made to the
Superintendent of Police, Pratapgarh, in which, after referring to
the incident of November 1, 1967 when Ramendra Pralap Singh
was alleged to have fired from the upper portion of his house
about 8 or 10 shots at Suresh Singh from a double barrel!ed gun
320
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1973] 3· s.c.R.
of his grandfather, Raghav Pratap Singh, it was complained that
there was a constant danger to Suresh Singh and the members of
his family at th~ hangs of Ramendra Pratap Singh, Krishna Pr<(tap
Singh and others mentioned therein.
At this stage we consider
it proper to reproduce the nature and number of injuries inflicted
on the deceased because according to !@ tdal court all
those
persons ~vho might have witnessed this occurrence must have been
impressed by 1he fact that the accuse(! meant business ~d nothing
could deter them from accomplishing their objeotive. The following ante-mortem injuries were found on the person of the deceased:-
1. Lacerated wound 2" x !" bone deep on the fore-head
1 t" above the right eye-brow.
2. Lacerated wound l" x t" x scalp, deep just behind
injury no. 1.
3. Abrasion t" x t" on the forehead 2" above the left eyebrow.
+. Incised wound 2!" x !" b(Jne deep 1" behind the left
ear directed downwards and outwards.
5. Incised wound 3" x t" muscle deep on the leit side of
the face directed downwards and outw:irds.
6. Incised wound 1" x t" muscle deep just below the left
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eye directed dowpwards and outwards.
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7. Punctured wound !" x !" x lt" over the bridge of the
nose directed upwards and inwards.
8. Incised wound 1 t" x t" x muscle deep on the lower part
of the face below the chin.
9. Contusion 1" x 1" on the top of the right shoulder.
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I 0. Contusion 3" x 1 t" on the medical surface of the right
arm upper 1/3.
11. Contusion 3" x 2" on the back of the right arm lower
1.13.
i 2. Contusion 3" x 1" on the back of the right forearm
middle 1/3.
J 3. Contusion l" x l" on the back of the right wrist.
l.J. Contusion 3" x 2" on the back of the right hand.
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15. Lacerated wound l" x t" skin deep on the web between
the right thumb and index finger.
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16. Contusion 3" x 2" on the front of the chest near the
root of the neck.
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u.P. STATE v. P. N. SINGH (Dua,/.)
321
17. Contusion 2" x t" on the front of the right 'thigh middle 1/3.
18. Contusion 2t" x :\-'' on the front of the right thigh -!-"
below injury no. 17.
19. Contusion 3" x t" on the right thigh just below injury
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no. 18.
20. Contui;ion 3" x t" on the right .thigh l" below injury
no. 19.
21. Contusion 3'' x t" on the front of the right thigh just
ablove the knee joint.
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22. Contusion 2" x I" on the top of the left shoulder.
23. Contusion '2!' x t" on the lateral surface of the left arm
upper 1/3.
24. Contusion 3" x 1" on the back Of the lefit foreann
upper 1/3.
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25. Contusion 3" x H" on the right forearm lower 1/3.
26. Contusion H" x t" on the back of the left wrist.
27. Contusion 1" x t" on the back of the left hand.
28. Contusion 3" x 1" on the front of the left thigh middle
1/3.
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29. Contusion 3!" x 1" on the front of the left thigh lower
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. 30. Abrasion 1" x -!-" on the front of the left knee.
31. Multiple abrasion in an area of 2" x H" on the front
of the le fit leg upper 1I3.
32. Abrasion 1" x t" on the front of the left leg upper
l /3 x 1" below injury no. 31.
33. Abrasion l'' x t" on the front of the left leg lower 1/3.
34. Contusion 6" x 1" on the right side of the back upper
1/3.
35. Contusion 1" x t'' on the right side of the back middle
1/3.
36. Punctured wound t" x !" on the left side of the back
middle 1/3 close to the mid line of the back directed
downwards and outwards.
3 7. Punctured wound t" x t" on the left side of the black
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lower 1 /3 directed downwards and outwards.
Relying on the evidence of P.Ws l, 2 and 4, the tiial court convfoted the accused persons, as already noticed.
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SUPREME COURT. REPORTS
i · >73 j 3 S.C.R.
\.
An appeal was preferred to the High Courl qy the si' nc.?•1scd
persons against their conviction and sentenc.e
x-.·~- in tne n1\,.iUO·
randum of appeal the only grounds taken w•n . (1) that the
conviction was bad in law; (2) that the c0n 1i<:tion was against
the weight of evidence; and (3) that the senten· e was too severe.
Death sentence on four of them was also !-efoce that court for
confirmation.
The High Court after noticing the circumstances in which the
four witnesses mentioned earlier bad been discharged by the trial
court, considered it necessary to examine them itself as court Witnesses .. They were examined in the Higit Court in May, 1970.
All of them denied having been present at il.~ place of the occurrence. When cross-examined, they seem to us to have cut a very
sorry figure and we consider it impossible to place any reliance on
their testimony. Indeed, even the High Court, after a close scrutiny of their evidence, came to the conclusion that the four witnesses did not want to speak the truth and that they had not been
withheld by the prosecution for any oblique motive as suggested
on behalf of the accused persons.
The High Court accepted the evidence of P.Ws 1 and 2 with
respect to the place where Suresh Singh had been Jllurdered but
according to it (to quote its own words) : "The question that
. remains to be decided is whether the testimony ot P.W. 1 Smt. ·
Sheela Devi and P.W. 2, .Sachendra Pratap Singh, who are the
daughter and son of Suresh Singh, can bie believed". After hold•
ing the four witnesses examin~d by pie High Court on appeal to
be untruthful, the High Court proceed'd to scrutinise the evidence
of P.Ws l and 2. After a thorough and detailed consideration of
the criticism levelled against their testimony by the counsel for
the accused persons, the High Court obs_erved :
"We have therefore come to the
conclusion that
- -·there is nothing inherently improbable in the ~tatements
of P.W. 1 Smt. Shil\i Devi,
and P.W. 2,
S~chendra
Pratap-Singh. We cannot, .however, ignore the fact that
· they are after all the daughter and the son respectively
of the deceased Suresh Singh and are in a sense chance
.witnesses. It is true that under the law there is nothing
which prevents us from acting upon the testimony of
these two eye-witneses and. unholding the conviction
of the appellants, but rules of prudence and safety have
to be taken into consideration. Therefore, having given
the_rμatter our ·anxious thought even though-we hold that
we find nothing improbable in _the statements of tbese
two eye-witnesses, we think it proper not. to act on the
uncorroborated testimony of these witnesses. w: .. thereA
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fore, by the way of abundant caution give the appellants
the benefit of the doubt",
With these concluding observations the High Co.urt allowed the
appeal of the accused persons and set aside their conviction. The
High Court, however, also considered it proper to issue notice
under s. 497A, Cr. P.C. to Sheo Pratap Singh son of Birju Singh
who had been examined by the High Court on May 11, 1970,
calling upon him to show cause why he should not be prosecuted
for perjury for having falsely stated that he did not live in village
Isanpur and that he did not know the accused persons.
On appeal in this Court Mr. Rana appearing on behalf Otf the
Sta'te of Uttar Pradesh has submitted that the High Court has gone
seriously wrong in acquitting the accused persons merely on the
grormd of absence of corroboration of the evidence of P.Ws 1
and 2 when it had itself held that there was nothing improbable
in the statements of these witnesses. The High Court has, according 10 the appellant's submission, seriously erred in ignoring its
own earlier conclusion that the other witnesses 1ropped b!Y the
prosecution who were expected to corroborate P.Ws I and 2, were
not prepared to speak 'the ·truth.
This was a sufficiently cogent
reason for not producing them and for placing complete ce!iance
on the sole testimony of P.Ws I and 2.
The obserntion of the
High Court that P.Ws 1 and 2 were "'in a sense chance witnesses".
was wholly unjustified and is indeed contrary to the High Court's
own earlier view accepting the testimony of P.Ws I and 2.
On
the circumstances of this case, according to the appellant's counsd
the evidence of P.\Vs 1 and 2 had been rightly accepted by the
trial court and the high Court erroneously required further corn'-
boration for acting upon their evidence. The decision of the High
Court, it has been emphasised, erroneous as it is. has resulted in
gross failure of justice
In reply, Mr. Nuruddin Ahmad has with his usuc1l pasuasiw
eloquence criticised the evidence of the two eye-witnesses, P.Ws
1 and 2. While paying to these witnesses a high tribute for their
intelligence, and presence 0£ mind and also while endorsing !he
impression of the trial court that even on the matter of minute
details P.W. 2 did not get conf11sed by his cross-examination but
gave convincing replies to the questions. the learned counsel has
argued that the high order of intelligence of these two witnesses
only serves to explain their cleverness in putting forth a
prima
facie plausible story which is far from true.
According to the
learned counsel these two witnesses have maue up a story about
the manner in which their father met with his death with the sole
object of falsely implicating !he accused persons who are their
enemies. The submission proceeds that neither was the deceased
killed at the time stated bry these witnesses nor were they present
324
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1973] 3 s.c.R.
at the spot to witness their father's murder.
The decea~ed, it is
suggested, had also several other enemies and his murder was ill
all probability committed by some other person or persons who
had their own scores to settle with him. The children of the deJ
ceased who are extremely intelligent, h.ave very shrewdly thought
of utilising this opportunity for getting their enemies _hanged. In
this connection, the absence of any mention about the presence of
parwal at the place of occurrence or with P.Ws 1 and/or P.W. 2;
in the F.J.R. or in the statements of either of the two eye-witnesses
has been very ~trongly emphasised by the counsel in support of
his suggestion that the whole story about the visit of these two
children of the deceased to Rakhaha Bazar on the evening of the
day of occurrence for buying parwal is false and so.must, therefore, be the story of their presence at the time and the place of
the murder. The counsel has also laid stress ori the fact that there
was no point in their going so far away from their village to buy
parwal when the same could easily have been secured from closer
quarters. It has also been suggested that a young girl was normally. not expected to hie sent for purchasing parwal late in the
evening.
A passing observation was also made to the fact that
parwal were not a medicine which could urgently be required and
that the story of the witnesses' visit to Rakhaha Bazar for this
purpose should be discarded as concocted and unconvincing. The
other criticism very strongly pressed relates to the F.I.R.
This
report which is detailed has been drafted in a form which, according to the counsel, suggests that its author has at least some knowledge. of legal phraseology and of some sections of the Indian
Penal Code as also of the Criminal Procedure Code. From this
it is sought to be inferred that P.W. 1 who claims to be its author,
must have secured the assistance of someone conversant with the
drafting of such report and she must, therefore, be assumed to
have both time and opportunity of concocting a story for false!y
implicating the accused persons who were the
enemies of the:!
family. A suggestion was put to P.W. 2, the son of the deceased,
and to Head Constable Tripathi, P.W. 10, that the report had beerl
lodged b.Y P. W. 1 after consulting Bhagwati Prasad but this suggestion was denied by q1em.
Still another point has been forcefully urged by the counsel that according to P.Ws 1 !1._nd 2 a large
number of people had gone for shopping to the Rakhaha Bazar
on that day and, therefore. many people would have noticed the
occurrence, ir it had actually taken place as deposed by P .Ws 1
and 2. The fact that no other independent witness is forthcoming
is, according to the counsel, proof positive that the occurrence did
not take place at the time and the spot and in the manner deposed
by these witnesses.
Almost all these arguments were urged in the trial court and
repelled for cogent reasons with which we are in full agreement
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U.P. STATE v. P. N. SINGH (Dua, J.)
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and it is, therefore, not necessary to repeat them. It is note-worthy
that the High Court also did not take a different view on the credibility of P.Ws l and 2.
The absence of other witnesses from
the witness box is satisfaotorily explained by the prosecution and
after recording the evidence of these witnesses as court witnesses,
the High Court also endorsed the opinion of the prosecuting
counsel that these other witnesses were not willing to speak the
truth.
In our view, the High Court has gravely erred in acquitting
the accused persons and indeed its judgment has resulted in grave
failure of justice. The trial court had taken great pains in fully
scrutinising and properly evaluating the evidenc~ of P, Ws l and 2
and after applying the correct principles governing !he appreciation of the evidence of a child witness it has accepted the ,evidence
of these two witnesses as true. All the arguments urged on behalf
of the accused were duly conside~ed and repelled. The High Court
on appeal devoted a major part of its judgment to t)!e consideration of the additional evidence recorded by it. · Feeling wholly
unimpressed by this evidence, it endorsed the view of the prosecuting agency that these witnesses were not produced in court bte·
cause they were not prepared to speak the truth and indeed felt
constrained to issue notice under section 479A, Cr. P. C. to one
of them to show cause as to why he sho11ld not be prosecuted for
perjury. It disagreed with all the main arguments urged on kehalf
of the accused persons for discrediting the testimony of P.Ws l_and
2. but curiously enough, acquitted the accused per:mns on the
view-which we must confess is not easy to appreciate-that
P.Ws I and 2 being closely related to the' dec~ased and being in a
sense chance witnesses, their evidence without corroboratiQII did
not proYe the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. We
are not able •to endorse this view which seems to us to be both
unreasonable and not supportabjle <)n the material- on
record.
Once P. W s I and 2 are held to be trustworthy witnesses then there
does not seem to be any cogent reason for not actin~ upon their
evidence. The fact that the other persons who were present at
the spot and had witnessed the occurrence have, without any good
reason and, perhaps with oblique motive, chosen not to state the
truth in court and thereby to obstruct the course of justice would,
in our opinion, provide a sound reason for accepting the testimony
of P.Ws 1 and 2 for sustaining the conviction of the accused persons.
To decline to act upon the testimony of these witnesses
merely because of the absence of other witnesses to corroborate
them in court, is to defeat the cause of justice in •this case. It iii
wholly unreasonable for the High Court to dub P.Ws l .and 2 as
chance witnesses : we find no cogent material on the record to
support this observation. Indeed this observation ignores and to
326
SUPRDIE COl.'RT REPORTS
[1973] 3 S C.R.
an extent runs counter to the High Court's own earlier line of rea.
soning. There is, we think, absolutely no justification for the view
that their testimony leave< any scope for reasonable doubt about
the complicity of the accused persons. Because of their· relationship with the deceased they cannot be considered to be inclined to
spare the real assailants for falsely involving the accused ·persons
and indeed in the circu1m1ances of this case there is hardly any
scope for such a hypothesi•. To us there appears an intrinsic ring
of truth in the statements !"" •he two eye-witnesses which disclose
no infirmity.
There is no ~1
rule that 'the evidence of the
relations of the deceased musl. be· corroborated for securing th"
conviction of the offender.
Each case depends on its own facts
and circumstances. In the present c.a_!e the straightforward nature
of the deposition o,f these two witnesses and the fact that they were
undoubtedly in a position to identify the assailants of their father
coupled with the recovery of blood-stained earth from the place
of occurrence leave no reasonable doubt about the guilt of the
accused persons. The High Court has clearly taken an unreasonable and erroneous view which is not warranted bv the material
on the record and has reversed the judgment of the-trial court on
grounds which are manifestly fallacious and untenable. Relying
on P.Ws 1 and 2 and the attending circumstances of the case we
are constrained to allow the appeal and setting aside the judgment
of ·the High Court, convict the six respondents in this Court for
the offences rthey were charged with and convicted by the trial
·COurt.
The next question which arises relates to that of sentence. This
is a matter which requires the exercise of sound judicial discretion.
After the amendment of sec. 367, Cr. P.C. in 1955, it is no longer
necessary to assign reasons for awarding the lesser penalty in the
case of conviction for the offence of murder. The Comt is now
free in its discretion to award any one of the two sentences prescribed by s. 302, J.P.C. The trial court had. of course imposed
capital sentence on four accused persons and life imprisonment
on two. Of these two, one was shown leniency because he was a
budding lawyer and the ather because a.I' being young. We consider it proper to record our inability to appreciate the leniency
shown in the case of a budding lawyer who, because of his education and profession was, in our opinion, expected to exercise restraining influence on his associates rather than allow himself to be
misled into b'eing a party to such gruesome murder. Those who
live by the law are expected to abide by the law and not violate it
by volmrtarily participating in violent crimes like murder motivated by personal animosity. His participation in the present crime
should, in our opinion, have been considered as an
ag~ravating
rather than an extenuating circumstance. It is indeed
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gruous to contend that success in legal profession by itself mitigates the culpability of the guilty lawyer.
However, since now
this Court h~ts to determine the proper sentence to be imposed after
converting the acquittal int.o conviction, in our opinion, in view
of the facts that ( i) the murder was committed as far back as
1968; (ii) on conviction by the trial c_ourt on ~ptember 1, 1969,
the accused were sentenced to death with the result that till !heir
ucquittal by the High Coart the shadow of. death because of the
capital sentence must have haun!ed them; (Hi) they were acquitted
(though wrongly) by the High Court as far back as May, 1970;
i'nd (iv) it is not possible to assign with certainty the fatal blows
on the vulnerable parts. of the body of the deceased to any particular accused person or persons, it would meet the ends of justice
if we sentence them all to imprisonment for life.
We are not
unmindful of the facts that the murder was really gruesome and
cowardly and the accused being highly influential persons, had also
apIJ<lrent!y successfully influenced and dissuaded a number of eyewitnesses from stating the truth in court, but keeping in view all
the considerations already mentioned, we feel that the more appropriate sentence in this case would be that.of life imprisonment on
all the six respondents.