# STATE OF U.P v. SMT. SARJOO DEVI & ORS

- **Citation:** [1978] 1 S.C.R. 181
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1977-07-27
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 2334 of 1968
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/state-of-u-p-v-smt-sarjoo-devi-ors-7259
- **Pages:** 7

## Headnote

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181
STATE OF U.P.
v.
SMT. SARJOO DEVI & ORS.
July 27, 1977
[P. K. GOSWAMI AND JASWANT SINGH, JJJ
U.P. Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Act, 1950-ss. 3(14), 212 and
212A-Scope of-Land settled on the respondent with hereditary tenancy rights
-Sabhapati of Gaon claimed the land to be co1nmon pasture. [and-No evidence
to show the land to be pasture land-Sub Divisional Officer ordered ejectn1ent
of the 1enant-Lega/ity of the order.
Words and phraSes-"Held" meaning of.
Under section 3 of the U.P. Land Utilisation Act, the Collector served a
notice on two intermediaries under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land
Reforms Act, 1950, calling upon them either to cultivate the land belonging
to them or to let it out to other persons- for cultivation. Thereupon in 1950
the land was settled on respondent No. 1 with hereditary tenancy -rights. In
1954, a notification was issued under the Indian Forest Act, 1927 declaring that
certain lands, including the land in dispute, would be constituted as reserve
forest.
Respondent No. 1 preferred her claim before the Forest Settlement
Officer. In the meantime respondent No. 5, Sabhapati of the Gaon Samaj, filed
an application before the Sub-Divisional Officer claiming that the land was
customary pasture land and that respondent No. 1, who had encroachrd upon
the land, should be ejected. That application having been granted, respondent
No. 1 filed a suit against the appellant and others for a declaration that the
Sub-D.ivisional Officer's order was null and void and was not binding on her
because she was the Sirdar in possession of the land.
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The trial Court held that the suit land was never recorded in the revenue
papers as customary pasture land but as 'Parti' land fit for cultivation and deeE
lared the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer to be null and void. The District
Court and the Hi_gh Court upheld the order of the trial Court.
In appeal before this Court, it was contended that (i) the trial court was
wrong in holding that the Sub-Divisional Officer's order was null and void;
(ii) the impugned order was final and (iii) the Jand not having been ever
occupied for the purpose connected with agriculture respondent No. 1 could
not be said to be a hereditary tenant.
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Dismissing the appeal,
HELD : (l)(a) The Courts below were right in holding that the land in
question was not customary common pasture land nor it ever been used as
customary pasture land or pasture land in any year. ·The Sub-Divisional Officer
acted without jurisdiction and the impugned order was wholly illegal, ineffective,
null and void and not binding on respondent No. 1.
[186 B]
(Ii) A conjoint reading of the provisions of ss. 212-A and 212 of the 1950
Act would show that the Chairman, member or society of a committee referred
to in s. 121 can make an application to the Collector for ejectment of a person
only if the land of \vhich he is in possession is of the description specified in s.
212, that is, (i) if it was recorded as customary pasture land or (ii) if it was
a customary common pasture land. The evidence adduced in the case does not
at all show that the suit land was recorded as customary pasture land nor does
it show that it was in fact customary common pasture land.
On the contrary
the relevant revenue records showed that they land in question was "Parti fit for
cultivation." [185 HJ
(2) The Sub-Divisional Officer's order cannot be held to be final and the
suit of respondent No. 1 to establish her right was clearly maintainable.
The
impurned order passed under s. 212-A is not final and it is open tb the party
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[1978] 1 S.C.R.
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against whom the order of ejectment was passed to institute a suit to establish
the rig~t claimed by it. It is only when the suit instituted by the person sought
to be eJected fails that the ord;:r of the ejectmenJ becomes cop.elusive.
[186 G]
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(3) (a) This Court'in Bud/zan Singh & Anr. v. Nabi Bux & Anr. [19701 2
S.C.R. 10, in

## Text

~.1
j)
181
STATE OF U.P.
v.
SMT. SARJOO DEVI & ORS.
July 27, 1977
[P. K. GOSWAMI AND JASWANT SINGH, JJJ
U.P. Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Act, 1950-ss. 3(14), 212 and
212A-Scope of-Land settled on the respondent with hereditary tenancy rights
-Sabhapati of Gaon claimed the land to be co1nmon pasture. [and-No evidence
to show the land to be pasture land-Sub Divisional Officer ordered ejectn1ent
of the 1enant-Lega/ity of the order.
Words and phraSes-"Held" meaning of.
Under section 3 of the U.P. Land Utilisation Act, the Collector served a
notice on two intermediaries under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land
Reforms Act, 1950, calling upon them either to cultivate the land belonging
to them or to let it out to other persons- for cultivation. Thereupon in 1950
the land was settled on respondent No. 1 with hereditary tenancy -rights. In
1954, a notification was issued under the Indian Forest Act, 1927 declaring that
certain lands, including the land in dispute, would be constituted as reserve
forest.
Respondent No. 1 preferred her claim before the Forest Settlement
Officer. In the meantime respondent No. 5, Sabhapati of the Gaon Samaj, filed
an application before the Sub-Divisional Officer claiming that the land was
customary pasture land and that respondent No. 1, who had encroachrd upon
the land, should be ejected. That application having been granted, respondent
No. 1 filed a suit against the appellant and others for a declaration that the
Sub-D.ivisional Officer's order was null and void and was not binding on her
because she was the Sirdar in possession of the land.
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The trial Court held that the suit land was never recorded in the revenue
papers as customary pasture land but as 'Parti' land fit for cultivation and deeE
lared the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer to be null and void. The District
Court and the Hi_gh Court upheld the order of the trial Court.
In appeal before this Court, it was contended that (i) the trial court was
wrong in holding that the Sub-Divisional Officer's order was null and void;
(ii) the impugned order was final and (iii) the Jand not having been ever
occupied for the purpose connected with agriculture respondent No. 1 could
not be said to be a hereditary tenant.
'
Dismissing the appeal,
HELD : (l)(a) The Courts below were right in holding that the land in
question was not customary common pasture land nor it ever been used as
customary pasture land or pasture land in any year. ·The Sub-Divisional Officer
acted without jurisdiction and the impugned order was wholly illegal, ineffective,
null and void and not binding on respondent No. 1.
[186 B]
(Ii) A conjoint reading of the provisions of ss. 212-A and 212 of the 1950
Act would show that the Chairman, member or society of a committee referred
to in s. 121 can make an application to the Collector for ejectment of a person
only if the land of \vhich he is in possession is of the description specified in s.
212, that is, (i) if it was recorded as customary pasture land or (ii) if it was
a customary common pasture land. The evidence adduced in the case does not
at all show that the suit land was recorded as customary pasture land nor does
it show that it was in fact customary common pasture land.
On the contrary
the relevant revenue records showed that they land in question was "Parti fit for
cultivation." [185 HJ
(2) The Sub-Divisional Officer's order cannot be held to be final and the
suit of respondent No. 1 to establish her right was clearly maintainable.
The
impurned order passed under s. 212-A is not final and it is open tb the party
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[1978] 1 S.C.R.
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against whom the order of ejectment was passed to institute a suit to establish
the rig~t claimed by it. It is only when the suit instituted by the person sought
to be eJected fails that the ord;:r of the ejectmenJ becomes cop.elusive.
[186 G]
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(3) (a) This Court'in Bud/zan Singh & Anr. v. Nabi Bux & Anr. [19701 2
S.C.R. 10, interpreted the word "held" ins. 9 of the 1950 Act as meaning possession by ·Jegal title".
[187 E]
(b) A perusal of the definition of the word 'land' in the Act would show
that it is not necessary for the land to fall within the purview of this definition,
that it must b~ actually under cultivation or be occupied for purposes connected
with agriculture. The requirement of the definition is amply satisfied if the land
is euncr lleid or occupied for purposes connected with agriculture. The word
"held" in the definition is of wide import.
[187 A]
In the instant case, it has been concurrently found by the Courts below on
the basis of evidence adduced in the case that the land in question \Vas let out
to respondent No. I by the intermediaries in May 1950 for growing crops; that
she brought a substantial portion thereof under cultivation, paid rent to the
intermediaries, had been regularly paying revenue to the State and that she had
all along lawtully continued to hold the land. for purposes connected with agriculture.
From the appellant's own revenue record it is clear that respondent
No. 1 was holding the land as ·a hereditary tenant on the date in1mediatery
preceding the date of vesting.
She has, therefore, fulfilled all the
requisite
conditions and become a sirdar of the land on the date of vesting under s. 19
of the Act. [187 E-FJ
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2334 of 1968.
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated
5-2-1968 of the Allahabad High Court in Second Appeal No. 3257 of
1960.
G. N. Dikshit, and 0. P. Rana for the Appellant.
Faujdar Rao, Jagdish Misra and U.
B. Prasad for Respondent
No. 1.
The Judgment of the Court was dellvered by
JASWANT SINGH, J. This appeal by sp,ecial feave which is directed
against the judgment and decree dated February 5, 1968 of the. Htgh
Court of Judicature at Allahabad affirming the decisions of the District
Judge and the Civil Judge, Basti, dated May 20, 1960 and July 27,
l 959 respectively decreeing the suit instituted by respondent No. l
herein under sub-section (7) of section 212A of the U.P. 'Zamindan
Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (U.P. Act No. 1 of 1951)
(hereinafter referred to as 'the U.P. Z.A: and L.R. Act'), which came
into force on January 26, 1951, arises in the following circumstances:-
The land in dispute measuring 142 bighas, 1 biswa and 18 dhurs
situate in village Baudhara, Tappa Menhdawal, Pargana Maghar East,
Tehsil Khalilabad, District Basti, belonged in 1950 AD. to Girdhar Das
and· Purshottam Das, Zamindars of Gorakhpur City, who became intermediaries under the U .P. Z.A. and L. R. Act. Finding that the said
land was lying uncultivated, the Collector, Gorakhpur, served the
aforesaid Zamindars with a notice under section 3 of the U.P. Land
Utilisation Act calling upon them either to cultivate the land themselves or to let out the same to other persons for cultivation. The
said Zamindars thereupon settled the land in May 1950 (1357 Fasli)
with respondent No. 1 by executing 'pattas' in her favour for growing
cr9ps i.e. for cultivation and conferred hereditary tenancy rights on
her. On May 1, 1954, a notification under section 4 of the Indian
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Forest Act, 1927 was published in the U.P. Gazette in respect ot 342
acres of land of village Baudhara including the land in question declaring that it bad been decided to constitute the said land as a reserved
forest. This was followed in June, 1954 by a proclamation as required
by section 6 of the Forest Act. Respondent No. 1 thereupon preferre::I
her claim in respect of her rights to the land in question before the
Forest Settlement Officer. On January 22, 1955, when the said claim
preferred by respondent No. 1 was still pending, Ram Naresh Tewari,
father of respendent No. 5, describing himself as Sabhapati of Gaon
Samaj, Baraipur, filed an application purporting to be under section
212A,
(1) of the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act before the Suh Divisional
Officer, Khalilabad (who was empowered by the State Government to
discharge the functions of a Collector) for ejectment from the land in
·question of respondent No. 1 on the ground that it was a customary
common pasture land and as such had vested in the Gaon Sainaj and
that the said respondent had encroached upon the same. By his order
<laled August 16, 1955, the Sub Divisional Officer, Khalilabad, allowe_d
the aforesaid application of Ram Naresh Tewari and ordered the ejectment of respondent No. 1. After unsuccessfully trying by means of a
review petition to have the aforesaid order of her ejectment quashed,
respondent No. 1 filed the aforesaid suit, being suit No. 7 of 1956, on
February 15, 1960 under sub-section (7) of section 212-A of the U.P.
Z.A. and L.R. Act against the State of U.P., the appellant herein, and
four others including Ram Naresh Tewari, the father of respondent No.
5, for declaration that the aforesaid order passed by the Sub Divisional
Officer, Khalilabad, was illegal, ineffective, null and void and was not
binding on her and that she was a sirdar in possession of the land in
question.
Sh0 also prayed for a perpetual injunction restraining the
defendants from interfering with her possession and enjoyment or the
'land.
The case as set up by respondent No. 1 was that in 1357 Fasli
(1950 A.O.), the zamindars viz. Girdhar Das and Purshottam Das
who were in possession of the land in question duly executed pattas
conferring hereditary tenancy rights in the land in her favour; that the
i;aid tenancy rights were confirmed by virtue of the decrees passed by
the competent revenue courts in suits brought by her under sections 5'J
and 61 of the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939 (U.P. Act No. XVII of 1Y3Y)
(hereinafter referred to as 'the U.P. T. Act); that on the notified date
viz. July 1, 1952, she became a sirdar of the land in question under
·section 19 of the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act; that since 1357 Fasli (1Y5U
A.D.) she had been in actual possession of the land and using it for
-agricultural purposes or for purposes connected with agriculture and
had been appropriating its produce and regularly paying rent to the
aforesaid zamindars and since July 1, 1952, she had been continuously
paying revenue to the State Government; that as the land in question
could not and did not vest in the Gaon Samaj, neither the Gaon Sama]
nor Ram Naresh Tewari had any right to make an application under
sect!on 212-A (1) of the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act and that the
land
not having been a common pasture land or a customary
common
pasture land before or after August 8, 1946, cbut having .been in exclusive possession and ownership of the aforesaid zamindars till the
execution by them of the aforesaid pattas and after their execution in
her exclusive possession, it was not land of the nature which could
fogitimately be said to fall within the purview of section 212 of the
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1978] l S.C.R.
U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act and that the proceedings taken by the Sul>
Divisional Officer, Khalilabad, under section 212-A of the U.P. Z.A.
and L.R. Act were illegal, null and void. The appellant herein aione
contested the suit. The rest of the defendants'having cboscn to remain
absent despite service of summons, the case proceeded ex-parte against
them.
The appellant pleaded inter alia that as the land had never
been in the actual possession of the aforesaid zamindars before or after
the enforcement of the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act, it vested in the State
Government; that the land had always remained a cnstomary pasture·
land of public utility in which no tenancy or other right could be conferred by the zamindars in favour of respondent No. 1; that the transaction of lease relied upon by respondent No. 1 was invalid and unenforceable; that the suit land legally vested in the Gaon Samaj and
that the impugned ejectment order dated August 16, 1955 passed by
the Sub Divisional Officer, Khalilabad was binding on respoildent
No. 1 and the suit brought by her was not maintainable.
On a consideration of the oral and documentary evidence, the trial
court came to the conclusion that the suit land was never recorded in
the revenue paper~ as customary pasture land but was recori!ed in the
Khatoni relating to 1357 Fasli (1950 A.D.) as "Parti land fit for
cultivation"; that there was also no evidence to support the contention
of the appellant that the suit land was used in any year as common
pastures land or as pasture land; that even the appellant had to concede that some 10 or 12 bigha of the suit land had been brought under
cultivation by respondent No. 1; that the suit land had been let out to
respondent No. 1 in May 1950 when she became a hereditary tenant
of the same; that the suit land not being a customary pasture land, the
order dated August 16, 1955 passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer,
Khalilabad was illegal, null and void and was not binding on the
plaintiff. The trial court further held that the oral and documentary
evidence adduced by respondent No. 1 established that she had been
recorded in the revenue papers as hereditary tenant of the land; that
respondent No. 1 had also been held by the competent revenue courts
in suits Nos. 1178 of 1950, 780 of 1950 and 285 of 1952 filed by her
under sections 59 and 61 of the U.P. T. Act as hereditary tenant and
that she had become sirdar of the suit land on the date of vesting. Witlt
these findings, the Civil Judge, Basti decreed the suit with costs in
favo.m of respondent No. 1 by his judgment and decree dated July 27,
1959. Aggrieved by this Judgment and decree, the State of U.P. went
up in appeal to the District Judge, Basti, who by his judgment and
decree dated May 20, 1960 affirmed the aforesaid judgment and decree
of the trial court holding inter alia that the suit land had been let out
to respondent No. 1 for the purpose of growing crops; tbat in revenue
papers (Exhibits 1, 7 and 8) which relate to the years 1358, 1359 and·
1362 Faslis, she had been recorded as hereditary tenant of the suit
land and she became sirdar thereof on the date of vesting viz. July 1,
1952. On further appeal, the High Court by its judgment dated
February S, 1968, upheld the aforesaid judgments and decrees of the
trial court and the District Judge, Basti. It is against this iudgment
and decree that the State of U .P. had come up in appeal to this Court.
\
u. P. STATE v. SARJOO DEVI (Jaswant Singh, J.)
185
Appearing on behalf of the appellant, Mr. Dixit has urged that the
material on the record did not warrant the findings of the courts below
that the suit land not being of the nature contemplated by section 212
of the U.P. Z.A .. and L.R. Act, the aforesaid order passed by the Sub
Divisional Officer, Khalilabad, was
null and void.
He has further
contended that the impugned order was final and conclusive and the
suit out of which the present appeal has arisen was not maintainable.
He has lastly submitted that it is the definition of "land" as contained
in section 3(14) of the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act am! not the one contained in section 3(1) of the U.P. T. Act which is relevant for
the
purpose of the instant case and that the land not having been ever
occupied for the purpose connected with agriculture, respond!)nt No. 1
could not be said to be a hereditary tenant thereof and the courts below
have erred in declaring her as sirdar thereof. We shall consider these
points seriatim.
Point No.· 1 :-For a proper determination of this point, it is
necessary to refer to section 212-A(l) of the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act
under which the aforesaid application by Ram Naresh Tewari, father
of Shea Ram Tewari, respondent No. 5 herein purported to be made
as also to sectioJ1 212 of the same Act which is alluded to in section
212-A( 0 :
"212-A(l). Without prejudice to the provisions of section
212, the Chairman, member or society of a committee referred to in section 121, may, make an application to the Collector for ejectment from the land of a person in possession
of a land referred to in section 212.
(7) Where an order for ejectment has been passed under
this section, the party against whom the order has been
passed, may institute a suit to establish the right claimed by
it, but subject to the results of such suit the order passed
under sub-section (4) or (6) shall be conclusive."
"212. Ejectment of persons from lancl of public utility.
Any person who, on or after the eighth day of August 1946
has been admitted as a tenure or grcwe holder of, or being
an intermediary has brought under his own cultivation or has
planted a grove upon, land which was recorded as or was
customary common pasture land, cremation or burial ground,
tank pond path way or Khalian, shall be liable notwithstanding anything contained in section 199, on the suit of the
Gaon Sabha to ejectment from the land, on payment of such
compensation as may be prescribed."
· A conjoint reading of the provisions of these two sections would
show that the Chairman, memher or societv of a committee referred to
in section 121 can make an application to the Collector for ejectmcnt
of a person only if the land of which he is in possession is of the description specified in section 212 i.e. (1) if it was recorded as customary
pasture land or (2) if it was a customary common pasture land. The
evidence adduced in the case does not at all show that the suit land was
recorded as customary pasture land nor does it show that it was in fact
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1978] 1 S.C.R.
customary common pasture land.
On the contrary, the appellant's
own record clearly negatives its case.
In Exhibits 2 and 45
which
are copies of settlement Khatoni of 1323 Fasli, the land in quest10n
is clearly recorded as 'Parti' with long thatching grass.
Again
in
Khatoni of 1357 Fasli (1950 A.D.), the land is recorded as '"Parti tit
for cultivation".
The courts below were, therefore, perfectly right In
holding that there is no evidence to support the appellant's contentwn
that the land in question was either recorded as customary common
pasture land or had ever been used as customary pasture land or pasture land in any year. Manifestly therefore, the Sub Divisional Otticer,
Khalilabad acted without jurisdiction and the impugned order passed
by him directing the ejectment of the respondent No. 1 was wholly
illegal, ineffective, null and void and not at all binding on respondent
No. 1.
Point No. 2 :-The second point urged by Mr. Dixit is also devoic\
of substance. Even a cursory
gl~nce at sub-section
(7) of section
212-A of the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act reproduced above is enough to
show that the order passed by the Sub Divisional Officer, Khalilabad,
under section 212-A is not final and it is open to the party against
whom the order of ejectment is passed to institute a suit to establish the
right claimed by it. It is only when the suit instituted by the person
sought to be ejected fails that the order of eiectment becomes conclusive. The aforesaid order passed by the Sub Divisional Otlicer,
Khalilabad cannot, therefore, be held to be final and the suit brought
by respondent No. 1 to establish her right was clearly maintainable.
Point No. 3 :-For a decision of this point, it is essential to refer
to sections 3(14) and 19 of the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act, which read
as follows :-
"3 (14). Land (except in sections 109, 143 and 144 and
Chapter VII means land held or occupied for purposes connected with agriculture, horticulture or animal
husbandry
which includes pisciculture and poultry farming."
"19. All land held or deemed to have been held on the
data immediately preceding the ·date of vesting by any person
as :
(i)
(ii)
(ili)
(iv) A hereditary tenant
(v)
(vi)
(vii)
(viii)
(ix)
shall, have in cases provided for in clause ( d) of sub-section
(1) of section 18, be deemed to be settled by the State Government with such person who shall, subject to the provisions
of this Act, .be entitled except as provided in sub-section ,(2)
of section 18, to take or retain possession as a sirdar thereof."
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u. P. STATE v. SARJOO DEVI (Jaswant Singh, l.)
187
A bare perusal of the definition of the wor<l "land as contained in
section 3(14) of the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act which is reproduced
above would show that it is not necessary for the land to fall within
the purview of this definition that it must be actually under cultivation
or occupied for purposes connected with agriculture. The requirement
of the definition is, in our opinion, amply satisfied if the land is either
held or occupied for purposes connected with agriculture.
The world
"held" occurring in the above definition, which is a pa. pple. of the word
"hold" is of wide import. iii-the Unabridged Edition of "The Random
House Dictionary of the English Language'', the word "hold" has been
inter alia stated to mean "to have the ownership or use of; keep as one's
own."
In 'The Dictionary of English Law' by Earl Jowitt
(1959
Edition), the word "hold" has been interpreted as meaning "to have as
tenant".
In Stroud's Judicial Dictionary (Fourth Edition),
the distinction
between holding and occupation is sought to be brought out by quoting the following observations by Littledale, J. in R. v. Ditcheat(I).
"There is a material difference between a holding and an
occupation. A person may hold, though he does not occupy.
A tenant is a person who holds of another; he does not
necessarily occupy.
In Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary (Second Edition),
it is stated that in legal parlance, the word "held" means to possess by
'legal titled'. Relying upon this connotation, this Court in Budhan
Sinl{h & Anr. v. Nabi. Bux & Anr.('), interpreted the word "held" in
section 9 of the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act as meaning possession by legal
titfo.
In the instant case, it has been concurrently found by the courts
below on the basis of evidence adduced in the case that the land in
question was let out to respondent No. 1 by the aforesaid intermediaries
in May, 1950 (1357 Fasli) for growing crops; that she brought a substantial portion thereof under cultivation, paid rent to Girdhar Das and
Purshottam Das in 1951 and 1952 against proper receipts; that she has
been regularly paying revenue to the appellant and that she has all
along lawfully continued to hold the .\and for purposes connected with
agrieulture. It is also established from the appellant's own revenue record that respondent No. 1 was holding the land as a hereditary tenant
on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting. There is, therefore, no manner of doubt that she fulfilled all the requisite conditions
and became a sirdar of the !and on the date of vesting under section
19 of the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act.
All the contentions raised by counsel for the appellant, therefore,
fail.
For the foregoing reasons, we find no force in this appeal which is
·dismissed. The appellant shall pay costs of respondent No. 1 as directe8 in court's order dated November 12, 1968.
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Appeal dismissed.
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(I) 9 B & C 108.
(2)[1970] 2 S.C.R. 10.