# STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ORS v. MODI INDUSTRIES LIMITED ·

- **Citation:** [1977] 2 S.C.R. 548
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1977-01-04
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 1694 of 1971
- **Bench:** V. R. Krishna Iyer, P. N. Shinghal
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/state-of-uttar-pradesh-and-ors-v-modi-industries-limited-7069
- **Pages:** 7

## Headnote

U. P. Sales Tax Act, 1948-S. 31-Scope of.
The respondent filed its sales tax returns for the assessment years 1948-49
and 1949.50 on the basis of its turnover of two previous years. In respect of
certain commodities, the rate of sales tax was enhanced with effect from certain
C
dates falling . within the assessment years.
D
E
F
G
H
The High Court on reference took the view that the dealer who had chosen
to be assessed on the basis of its tuinover of the previous year of assessment:
\Vas liable to be assessed at the rule prevailing On the first day of the rel~vant
assessment year and tJ,J.at any change in. the rate during the assessment year could
not be applied to that assessment.
The assessee, who had paid tax at the enhanced rate, applied for refund of
the excess tax together With interest thereon under s. 11 (6) of the U.P. Sales Tax
Act, 1948. The Additional Judge (Revisions), however, rejected the application
holding that refund was not permissible in view of s. 31 introduced by the Amending Act (U.P. Act 3 of 1963). That section provided that where a dealer opted
to be assessed to tax: on the basis of his turiiover of the previous year, he shall
be assessed to tax at such .ta.tes as are prevalent during the year for which the
assessment is being made, and if the rates of tax are altered during such assess·
ment year, the dealer, in respect of the turnover of such goods. shall be liable
to pay tax at the altered rates, as if the altered rates were in force during the
previous year also proportionately for the number of days involved as they were
in force during the assessment year. According to sub-section (2) of that sec-·
tion the assessments made at the enhanced rates in accordance with the notifica·
tion dated April 9, 1948 were to be deemed to be gocxI and valid as if they had
been duly made and as if the amendment made by the inserfion of s. 31 had
been in force on aU material dates. It was expressly provided by the suO-section
that that was to be so notwithstanding any judgment, decn:e-or order of any
court.
The High Court quashed the order of assessment on the £round that the
Revisin~ Authority was not free to take a different view from the one expressed
by it (High Court) on anv ground whatsoever, including the grollnd of any
subsequent amendment of the law. .
Allowing the Appeal to this Court,
HEt.D : There is nothing wrong with the vieW' taken bv the R~vising Authority.
Wbe"n S. 31 of the Act is va1id, and is retroactive .and the Legi<;fatnre has shown
the intention of restorin~ the assessments and orde"n; made before the a"lend·
ment a<il l!Clod and valid in law a<il if thev had bPPTI dulv made- that wac; enou~h
to set the controversy at rest.
The amendment made by S. :11 wac; rPtrn::ic:tive
and anpJied to assessments vendinP or c1oc:M a.c; if the Amending Act had been
in force at aU ma.terial times. [554CD; S52C] ,
Comml,.,:•iion~'r of Sales Tax, U.P. v. Bijli Cotton Mills, Hathras, f19641 7
S.C.R. 383 referred to.
(a) Section 31 was sou2ht to be annlied to the facts of the case wh"'n the
Ailditfr,nal Tnd.2e (Revisinnci) wac; in <:E"i•d'n of the c:tcie fnr ,the .nnmn•P .r.f .nao::ciin~
the necessary orders. to dispose it of finally in conformity with, the judgment of
.
u. P. v. MODI lNDl'.STRIES (Shinghal, !.)
549
the High Court. If he had passed an order under s. 11 (6) of the Act as directed
by the High Court, that would have been of no consequence and would have
been inoperative because of s. 31 (2).
[553B-C & F]
A

## Text

A
B
548
-STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ORS.
v.
MODI INDUSTRIES LIMITED
·January 4, 1977
(V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND P. N. SHINGHAL, JJ.]
U. P. Sales Tax Act, 1948-S. 31-Scope of.
The respondent filed its sales tax returns for the assessment years 1948-49
and 1949.50 on the basis of its turnover of two previous years. In respect of
certain commodities, the rate of sales tax was enhanced with effect from certain
C
dates falling . within the assessment years.
D
E
F
G
H
The High Court on reference took the view that the dealer who had chosen
to be assessed on the basis of its tuinover of the previous year of assessment:
\Vas liable to be assessed at the rule prevailing On the first day of the rel~vant
assessment year and tJ,J.at any change in. the rate during the assessment year could
not be applied to that assessment.
The assessee, who had paid tax at the enhanced rate, applied for refund of
the excess tax together With interest thereon under s. 11 (6) of the U.P. Sales Tax
Act, 1948. The Additional Judge (Revisions), however, rejected the application
holding that refund was not permissible in view of s. 31 introduced by the Amending Act (U.P. Act 3 of 1963). That section provided that where a dealer opted
to be assessed to tax: on the basis of his turiiover of the previous year, he shall
be assessed to tax at such .ta.tes as are prevalent during the year for which the
assessment is being made, and if the rates of tax are altered during such assess·
ment year, the dealer, in respect of the turnover of such goods. shall be liable
to pay tax at the altered rates, as if the altered rates were in force during the
previous year also proportionately for the number of days involved as they were
in force during the assessment year. According to sub-section (2) of that sec-·
tion the assessments made at the enhanced rates in accordance with the notifica·
tion dated April 9, 1948 were to be deemed to be gocxI and valid as if they had
been duly made and as if the amendment made by the inserfion of s. 31 had
been in force on aU material dates. It was expressly provided by the suO-section
that that was to be so notwithstanding any judgment, decn:e-or order of any
court.
The High Court quashed the order of assessment on the £round that the
Revisin~ Authority was not free to take a different view from the one expressed
by it (High Court) on anv ground whatsoever, including the grollnd of any
subsequent amendment of the law. .
Allowing the Appeal to this Court,
HEt.D : There is nothing wrong with the vieW' taken bv the R~vising Authority.
Wbe"n S. 31 of the Act is va1id, and is retroactive .and the Legi<;fatnre has shown
the intention of restorin~ the assessments and orde"n; made before the a"lend·
ment a<il l!Clod and valid in law a<il if thev had bPPTI dulv made- that wac; enou~h
to set the controversy at rest.
The amendment made by S. :11 wac; rPtrn::ic:tive
and anpJied to assessments vendinP or c1oc:M a.c; if the Amending Act had been
in force at aU ma.terial times. [554CD; S52C] ,
Comml,.,:•iion~'r of Sales Tax, U.P. v. Bijli Cotton Mills, Hathras, f19641 7
S.C.R. 383 referred to.
(a) Section 31 was sou2ht to be annlied to the facts of the case wh"'n the
Ailditfr,nal Tnd.2e (Revisinnci) wac; in <:E"i•d'n of the c:tcie fnr ,the .nnmn•P .r.f .nao::ciin~
the necessary orders. to dispose it of finally in conformity with, the judgment of
.
u. P. v. MODI lNDl'.STRIES (Shinghal, !.)
549
the High Court. If he had passed an order under s. 11 (6) of the Act as directed
by the High Court, that would have been of no consequence and would have
been inoperative because of s. 31 (2).
[553B-C & F]
A
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1694 of 1971.
(From the Judgment and Decree dt. 11-2-70 of the Allahabad
High Court in Civil Misc. Writ No. 973 of 69).
S. C. Manchanda and 0. P. R.ana for the Appellants.
A. K. Sen, J. P. Goyal and Shreepal Singh, for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SHINGHAL, J. This appeal by the State of Uttar Pradesh and
three sales tax officers is directed against the judgment of the Allahabad High Court dated February U, 1970. The High Court has
granted a certificate of fitness under clause ( c) of article 13 3 ( 1) of
the Constitution.
Respondent Mod~ Industries Limited. hereinafter referred to
as
the dealer, was known earlier as the Modi Sugar Mills Ltd. It manufactured various. articles likei sugar,
oil, vanaspati and soap. It
exercised the option under section 7 (as it stood prior to its amendment by section 7 of U.P. Act XIX of 1956) of the U.P. Sales Tax
Act, 1948, hereinafter referred to as the Act, to submit its returns of
sales-tax on the basis of its turnover of the previous years and filed
the returns accordingly.
The assessment years for which the returns
were filed were 1948-49 and 1949-50, and the corresponding previous
years were November 1, 1946 to October 31, 1947, and November
l, 1947 to October 31, 1948 respectively. The rate of sales tax for
certain commodities was enhanced during the assessment year 194849, with effect from June 9, 1948, and for some other commodities
with effect from July 1, 1948. The dealer contended that sales tax
on its entire turnover of the two previous years should be assessed at
the old rate of 3 pies per rupee and not at the enhanced rate of
6 pies per mpee because the enhancement was made after both the previous years had expired.
The Sales Tax Officers rejected that contention and assessed the sales tax at the enhanced rates.
The appellate authority however upheld the dealer's contention and the matter
went uv in revision to the Judge (Revisions). He upheld the order
of the Sales Tax Officer.
The dealer applied for a reference under
section 11 ( 1) and the following two questions of law were referred
to the High Court,-
"( 1) Whether the enhanced rate under notifications dated
8th June, 1948 and 30th June. 1948 issued
under
section 3-A of the U.P. Sales Tax Act.
1948 are
appiicable to the sales
of goods
mentioned
in
paragraph 2 above which took place
before
8th
June 1948 and 30th June, 1948.
(2) Whether sub-section (ii) of section
3-A of the
U.P. Sales Tax Act,
1948, empowers
Provincial
Government to fix the rate of sales tax in respect
of an assessment year or in respect of certain
specified sales only ?"
8
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A
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c
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E
550
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1977] 2 S.C.R.
By its judgment dated July 24, 1961, the High Court answered question No. 1 in favour of the dealer, but declined to answer the other
question.
The High Court took the view that the dealer
who had
chosen to be assessed on the basis of its turnover of the previous year
was liable to assessment, on the entire turnover of the previous year,
at the rate prevailing on the finst day of the relevant assessment year
and that any change in the rate of the sales tax during the course ol
the assessment year could not be applied to that assessment.
The
dealer filed an app:ication under section 11 (8) of the
Act for a
direction for the payment of interest on the amount which had become
refundable as a result of the judgment of the High Court. The High
Court held in its order dated February 22, 1966 that the dealer was
entitled to interest at the rate of two per cent on the refundable
amount.
The dealer accordingly made an application to the Revising
Authority on October 11, 1968 to pass an order under sub-section
(6) of section 11 for a refund of Rs. 3,48,420/13 with interest at
two percent per annum.
The Additional Judge
(Revisions)
Sales
Tax however dismissed the application byi his order dated December 28, 1968, as he took the view that that was not permissible
because of the insertion of section 31' in the Act by the Uttar Pradesh
Bikri Kar (Sanshodhan) Adhiniyam, 1962 (U.P. Act III of 1963)
hereinafter referred to as
the
Amending
Act.
The
dealer
felt
aggrieved and filed a writ petition under article 226 of the Constitution.
It is that petition which has been allowed by the impugned
judgment of the High Court dated February 11, 1970 by which the
order of the Additional Judge (Revisions) Sales Tax Meerut, dated
December 28, 1968, has been quashed and a direction hais been
given to him to pass an appropriate order under section 11 (6) of the
Act in accordance with the law and in the light of the observaHons
made by the High Court. This is why the State of Uttar Pradesh
and others have come up to this Court in appeal.
We have made a mention of the facts bearing on the controversy,
and we may as well refer to th~ relevant provisions of the law.
The Act came into force on April 1, 1948. It provided for payF
ment of the sales tax on several commodities at a uniform rate of
3 pies in the rupee.
Section 3-A was inserted by Act XXV of 1948
conferring certain powers on the Proviosial Government.
The · provincial Government issued a notification under that section declaring.
inter alia, that with effect from June 9, 1948. the rate of sales tax in
[respect of the turnover of the goods specified in the notification
shall be as stated in the schedule to the notification.
The rate of tax ·-
G
was thus enhanced to 6 pies per rupee. The enhancement of the
tax was challenged on the grouil_d that it was not permissible in thi
case of an assessee who had taken the option to submit his return on
the basis of the turnover of the sales in the previous year as he was
liable to pay the tax according to tbe rates prevailing during the
assessment year. That case came up to this Court at the instance of
the present respondent, which was then known as the Modi Sugar
H
Mills Limited, and it was helrl in Commissioner of Sales Tax. Uttar
Pradesh v. The Modi Sugar Mills Ltd. (') that the assessee who had
(I) (1961] 2 S.C.R. 189.
-~
U. P. v. MODI INDUSTRIES (Shinghal, /.)
551
elected to submit his return on the turnover of the previous year wa&
A
liable to be assessed to sales tax at the rate in force on the first day of
the year of assessment because the liability arose on that date, and
any subsequent enhancement of the rate by the notificali.on under
section 3-A did not alter the liability.
The Legislature however
passed the Amending Act and inserted the following as section 31,--
"31 ( 1) Where any dealer has, in accordance with the
provisions of Section 7, as it stood prior to its amendment
by Section 7 of U.P. Act XIX of 1956, opted to be assessed
to tax on the ballis of his turnover of the previous year, he
shall be assessed to tax at such rates as are prevalent during
the year for which the assessment is being made, and if the
rates of tax on any goods or class of goods
are altered
during such assessment year, the dealer, in respect of the
turnover of such goods, shall be liable to pay tax at the
altered rates, as if the altered rates were in force during the
previous year also proportionately for the same number of
days as they are in force during the assessment year.
(2) Notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of
any court, all assessments or orders made, actions or proceedings taken, directions issued, jurisdictions exercised or
tax levied or collected by any officer or authority purporting
to act under the provisions of sub-section ( 1 ) of Section 7,
as it stood prior to its amendment by Section 7 of U.P. Act
XIX of 1956, shall be deemed to be good and valid in law
as if such assessments, orders, actions, proceedings, directions, jurisdictions and tax have been duly made,
taken,
issued, exercised, levied or collected, as the case may be,
under or in accordance with the said provisions of this Act
as amended by the Uttar Pradesh Bikri Kar (Sanshodhan)
Adhiniyam, 1962 and as if the amendment so made had
been in force on all material dates.
Explanation-For the purposes of this
section
the
expre5sion
"previous year" shall have the meaning assigned to it in
sub-clause
(ii) of clause (j) of Section 2 of this Act, as it stood prior to its
amendment by Section 2 of the U.P. Act XIX of 1956."
The validity of the aforesaid section 31 of the Act came up for
consideration in this Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax,
U.P.
v
Bi;li Cot.ton Mills Hathras(') and Wall upheld.
It was held that as
the Legislature had amended the Act and declared that notwithstanding the option exercised by the assessee the tax would have to be
computed in the light of the rates prevailing in 1948-49 as if they
were projected upon the turnover of the previous; year, the Legislature
had expressly stated that that rule would prevail as if it were in force
during the assessment year and all assessments would be made in the
light of the amended provision.
It was observed that in taking that
view this Court was seeking to apply a legislative provision which
was, by express enactment, in force at the time when the liability
(1) (1964]7 S.C.R. 363.
8
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552
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
.[1977] 2 S.C.R.
A
arose, for section 31 incorporated by the Amending Act was
to be
deemed to have been in operation at all material times in
supersession of the previous rule declared by this Court. It was held fw·-
ther that this would be the position even if the laws were amended
with retr.oactive operation during the pendency of a reference to the
High Court. It was accordingly held that "if the law which the ·
Tribunal seeks to apply to the dispute is amended, so as to make the
B
law applicable to the transaction in dispute, it would be bound
to
decide the question in the light of the law so amended."
The validity
and the retroactive operation of section 31 have therefore been placed
beyond challenge by the aforesaid decision in Bijli Cotton Mills' case
and have in fact not been challenged by counsel for the dealer..
It
may be mentioned that in its judgment in Bijli Cotton Mills'
case
this Court took notice of its earlier decision in the Modi Sugar Mills'
C
case (supra) so that it is well settled that the amendment made by
section 31 is retroactive and applies to assessments pending or closed
as if the Amending Act had been in force at material times.
D
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The qnestion is whether the judgment of the High Court dated
July 24, 1961 answering question No. 1 of the aforesaid
reference
by stating that the sales tax had to be charged from the dealer for the
assessment year 1948-49 at the rate applicable to the various commodities on April 1, 1948, and for the assessment year 1949-50 at
the rate applicable on April 1, 1949, was binding on the Additional
Judge (Revisions) in spite of the amendment made by the Amending
Act by insertion of section 31 in the Act? The High Court has
taken the view in its impugned judgment dated February 11,
19/0
that the Revising Authority was not free to take a different view from
the one expressed by it (High Court) on "any ground whatsoever",
including the yound of any subsequent amendment in the law.
and
that it was bound to decide the case in conformity with the judgment
of the High Court.
The High Court has expressed
its view
as
follows,-
"The judgment of the High Court may be said to have
become erroneous as a result of the amendment but so
long as 'the judgment stands, it is binding upon the parties
and the revising authority has no option except to give effect
to it in its order passed under section 11 ( 6)."
The High Court further made the following observation,-
"We however, express no opinion as
to
the
course
which the depa1iment should adopt in a situation like this,
but we have no doubt in our mind that the amendment
brought about by section 31 of the Act does not make the
judgment of the High Court a nullity and the Judge
(Revisions) was not free to ignore it for any reason whatsoever.''
The question is whether this view of the High Court is correct ?
The answer to the question depends on the answer to the further
queBtion whether the proceedings for the assessment of the sales tax
had become final after the High Court's judgment dated July . 24,
,
u. P. v. MODI INDUSTRIES (Shinghal, J.)
.55.3
1961 or whether, after that judgment, something remained to be do~
by the Additional Judge (Revisions) ?
·
Sub-section ( 6) of section 11 of the Act provides that the High,
Court, upon hearing the reference, shall decide the questiom; of . law
and shall deliver its judgment thereon and shall send its copy to the
Revising Authority and the Commissioner of Sales Tax, "and the
Revising Authority shall thereupon pass such orders ·as are necessary
to dispose of the case in conformity with such judgment."
So while
the Additional Judge (Revisions) was in seisin of the case for the
limited purpose for passing such orders as were necessary to dispose
it of in conformity with the judgment of the High Court, it cannot
be gain said that he was in such seisin and was required, in the facts
and circumstances of this case, to make an order which would make
the assessment order final and binding in all respects. It was at that
stage that section 31, which was inserted by section 7 of the Amending Act, was sought to be appiied to the controversy.
According to
sub-section (2) of that section, the assessments made at the enhanced
rates, in accordance with the notification dated April 9, 1948, were
to be deemed to be good and valid as if they had been duly made,
and as if the amendment made by the insertion of section 31
had
been in force on all material dates. It was expressly provided by the
sub-section that that was to be so notwithstanding any judgment,
decree or order of any court.
The order of the Additional Judge
(Revisions) dated December 28, 1968 had therefore the effect of
recognising the restoration of the orders of assessment which
were
made by the Sales Tax Officer at the enhanced rates,and sub-section
(2) of section 31 had the effect of making them "good and valid in
law".
It cannot be said that the Additional Judge (Revisions) erred
in taking that view, and in not passing an order for giving effect to
the judgment of the High Court dated July 24,
1961
which
had
become unenforceable by the aforesaid section 31.
It has to be
appreciated that even if the Additional Judge (Revisions) had passed
an order under sub-section (6) of section 11 of the Act as directed
by the High Court, that would have been of no consequence and
would have been inoperative because of the specific provisions of subsection (2) of section 31, so that the position would !i<1ve beeii the
same as if no such order had been passed at all.
The High Court has expressed the view that if its
judgment
(dated July 24, 1961) was considered by the department to be erro--
neous, it could have filed an appeal against it to this
Court under
article 136 of the Constitution to have it set set aside or modified.
It is not clear to us how that would have been possible when the
Amending Act had not been passed till then, and was enacted some
1 t years thereafter.
The. other suggestion of the High Court that it
may have been open to the department to ask for a fresh reference
to it against the order of the Revising Authority under section 11 (6)
on the ground that by the amendment a fresh question of Jaw had
arisen, is also untenable -because that order (dated December 28,
1968) was in favour of the department.
In fact any suggestion or
observation of the High Court fer seeking any other mode of redress
is beside the point for the State felt aggrieved against the impugned
A
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1977i 2 s.c.R.
A judgment o! the High Court dated February 11, 1970 and has come
up in appeal against it.
And now that this Court is in seisin of the
case, it would be a work of supererogation ta require the parties, or.
any of them, to go back to the Additional Judge (Revisions) or the
High Court for an order.
B
It has next been argued that the amendment made in the Act by
imertion of section 31 can not possibly be implemented as no machinery has been provided to give effect to it and that it should therefore
have been ignored altogether. This argument has been made wilh
reference to this Court's decision in Modi Sugar Mills' case (supra),
but it is futile because no question regarding any such
machinery
could possibly be said to arise for the purpooe of giving effect to
section 31 of the Act in the facts and circumstances of this case.
C
So when section 31 of the Act is clearly valid and is retoractive,
and the Legislature has shown the intention of restoring the assessments and orders made under the provisions of sub-section (1)
of
section 7 ·(as it stood prior to its amendment by section 7 of U.P.
Act XIX of 1956) as good and valid assessments in law, as if they
had been duly made, that was enough to set the controversy at rest
and there is nothing wrqng with the view which has been taken by the
D
Additional Judge (Revisions) in his order dated December 28, 1968.
The appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment of the High
Court dated February 11, 1970, is set aside.
In the circumstances
of the case, the parties shall pay and bear their own costs.
P.B.R.
Appeal allowed.
1546 SCI/76- GIPF.