# STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS v. SUGHAR SINGH

- **Citation:** [1974] 2 S.C.R. 335
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1973-11-22
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 1110 of 1971
- **Bench:** K. K. Mathew, M. H. Beg
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/state-of-uttar-pradesh-ors-v-sughar-singh-6140
- **Pages:** 13

## Headnote

335
Constitution of India-Arts. 311, 14 and 16- Revmlon of trmporary Gov•
ernmtnt strvant from his officlatlna post-When /unlor.r allowed to contlnu1Revmlon If vlolat/v1 of art. 311-Post not abo/ishrd nor all)' admlnl1tratlv1 rt•·
son shown-Whrthrr vlolatlv• of arts. 14 & 16.
The respondent, a permanent Head Constable In tho U.P. Police Force, wu
appointed in 1961 ·aa ()fftciatins Platoon Commander In the combined Cadre of
Sub inlpector, Armed Police and Platoon Commander. In 1966, an advene
entry was made in his character roll and he was reverted to the substantive post
of Head Constable in 1968. At the time of reversion be waa one amona a sroup
of about 200 officers, most of whom were juniOr to him. The High Court
quaabed the order of reversion to the post of Head Constable.
On the question whether the order of reversion was made in violation of Art.
311 of the Constitution or in violation of any right of tho raapondent under Art.
16 of the Constitution.
DlsmiMina tho appeal,
HELD : An order of reversion is in its immediate effect bound always to be a
reduction in rank. Even a reversion from a high~ but temporary or oftlciatina
rank to a lower substantive rank is in a sense a reduction. But, such ordera of
reversion are not always reduction In rank within the meanina of Art. 311. If
the officer is promoted substantively to a higher post or rank, he gets a right to
that particular post or rank an'd if he is afterwards reverted
to the
lower
post
or
rank
which
be held before, it is a "reductlon in
rank'' in the technical sensQ: in which the expression is used in art. 311. Tho
real test in all 1ucb cage1 Is to aacertaln if the officer concerned baa a right to tho
post from whicb be !1 raverted. It cannot be ordered except in compliance with
the provisions of art. 311. If on the other hand, the officer concerned hu no
right to the pos~ he ci.n be reverted without attractinir th• provisions of ll!l. 311.
Hut even in this cue. be cannot be reverted in a manner which .lYill-tbO:W conclu·
sively that the intention waa to punish him; Tho order_.ltae!Oilay expr011!y 1tate
that the officer concerned is being reverted by way bf punishment. In fact the
order may in various oth,er wiys cast a stigma on the officer concerned. In all
such cases, the order is tO: be·taken u a punishment. Sometimes again, the order
of reversion may bring UPoD .the officer c.ertain penal con.111equenccs like forfeiture
of pay. and allowances or loss of seniority in the subordinate rank or the stoppage
or postponement of future· chances of ·promotion : in such cases alao the Govern·
ment servant must be regarded as having been punished and his reversion to the
substantive rank must be treatod as a reduction in rank. In such a case art. 311
Will be atltacted.. [342H; 343A'D]
Jn the instant case the order of reversion is not attended with any stigma.
There is nothing to show that the respondent has lost his seniority in the subst&Dtive rank and there is no evidence to show that there bas been any forfeiture of
his pay or allowances or any loss in the seniority in the sub5tantive rank. The
mere fact that the respondent will be deprived of the post of Platoon Commander
is not a penal oonsequence. Such deprivation is the usual consequence of . an
order of reversion from the officiating post to which an incumbent has no right
to hold. In a case like this what is important to see is ~hethe~- the order • of
reversion entails· any penal consequences and not the motive behind the reversion.
[345A-EJ
r.
Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. The Union of India, [1958] S.C.R. 828, Stat< of
Pun/ab and Anothtr v. Sukh Ra/ Bahadur, [1968] 3 S.C.R. 23, Stat< of Orl3'aNv.
Ram Narayan Das, [1961] I S.C.R. 606, R. C. Lacy v. State of Blhar, C.A.
o.
590 of 1962 decided on 2J.I0-63. Madan Gopal v. State of Pu11jab, [19631 3 S.C.R.
716. lagdlsh Miller v. Union of fndia. A.t.R. 1964 S.C. 449, A. G. Ben/amln v.
336
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1974 J 2 s.c.a.
Un/011 of India, CA. No. 1341 ol 1966 decide

## Text

_Characters 0–39,804 of 40,338. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39804 for what follows._

9
c
D
E
F
G
H
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.
v.
SUGHAR SINGH
November 22, 1973
[K. K. MATHEW AND M. H. BEG, JJ.]
335
Constitution of India-Arts. 311, 14 and 16- Revmlon of trmporary Gov•
ernmtnt strvant from his officlatlna post-When /unlor.r allowed to contlnu1Revmlon If vlolat/v1 of art. 311-Post not abo/ishrd nor all)' admlnl1tratlv1 rt•·
son shown-Whrthrr vlolatlv• of arts. 14 & 16.
The respondent, a permanent Head Constable In tho U.P. Police Force, wu
appointed in 1961 ·aa ()fftciatins Platoon Commander In the combined Cadre of
Sub inlpector, Armed Police and Platoon Commander. In 1966, an advene
entry was made in his character roll and he was reverted to the substantive post
of Head Constable in 1968. At the time of reversion be waa one amona a sroup
of about 200 officers, most of whom were juniOr to him. The High Court
quaabed the order of reversion to the post of Head Constable.
On the question whether the order of reversion was made in violation of Art.
311 of the Constitution or in violation of any right of tho raapondent under Art.
16 of the Constitution.
DlsmiMina tho appeal,
HELD : An order of reversion is in its immediate effect bound always to be a
reduction in rank. Even a reversion from a high~ but temporary or oftlciatina
rank to a lower substantive rank is in a sense a reduction. But, such ordera of
reversion are not always reduction In rank within the meanina of Art. 311. If
the officer is promoted substantively to a higher post or rank, he gets a right to
that particular post or rank an'd if he is afterwards reverted
to the
lower
post
or
rank
which
be held before, it is a "reductlon in
rank'' in the technical sensQ: in which the expression is used in art. 311. Tho
real test in all 1ucb cage1 Is to aacertaln if the officer concerned baa a right to tho
post from whicb be !1 raverted. It cannot be ordered except in compliance with
the provisions of art. 311. If on the other hand, the officer concerned hu no
right to the pos~ he ci.n be reverted without attractinir th• provisions of ll!l. 311.
Hut even in this cue. be cannot be reverted in a manner which .lYill-tbO:W conclu·
sively that the intention waa to punish him; Tho order_.ltae!Oilay expr011!y 1tate
that the officer concerned is being reverted by way bf punishment. In fact the
order may in various oth,er wiys cast a stigma on the officer concerned. In all
such cases, the order is tO: be·taken u a punishment. Sometimes again, the order
of reversion may bring UPoD .the officer c.ertain penal con.111equenccs like forfeiture
of pay. and allowances or loss of seniority in the subordinate rank or the stoppage
or postponement of future· chances of ·promotion : in such cases alao the Govern·
ment servant must be regarded as having been punished and his reversion to the
substantive rank must be treatod as a reduction in rank. In such a case art. 311
Will be atltacted.. [342H; 343A'D]
Jn the instant case the order of reversion is not attended with any stigma.
There is nothing to show that the respondent has lost his seniority in the subst&Dtive rank and there is no evidence to show that there bas been any forfeiture of
his pay or allowances or any loss in the seniority in the sub5tantive rank. The
mere fact that the respondent will be deprived of the post of Platoon Commander
is not a penal oonsequence. Such deprivation is the usual consequence of . an
order of reversion from the officiating post to which an incumbent has no right
to hold. In a case like this what is important to see is ~hethe~- the order • of
reversion entails· any penal consequences and not the motive behind the reversion.
[345A-EJ
r.
Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. The Union of India, [1958] S.C.R. 828, Stat< of
Pun/ab and Anothtr v. Sukh Ra/ Bahadur, [1968] 3 S.C.R. 23, Stat< of Orl3'aNv.
Ram Narayan Das, [1961] I S.C.R. 606, R. C. Lacy v. State of Blhar, C.A.
o.
590 of 1962 decided on 2J.I0-63. Madan Gopal v. State of Pu11jab, [19631 3 S.C.R.
716. lagdlsh Miller v. Union of fndia. A.t.R. 1964 S.C. 449, A. G. Ben/amln v.
336
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1974 J 2 s.c.a.
Un/011 of India, CA. No. 1341 ol 1966 decided on 13-12-1966 and Ram Gopa/
A
Chaturvtdl v. Sta" of Madhya Prade.rh, [1970) l S.C.R. 472, referred to.
Union of T11dla
v.
Gafendra Singh [19721 5 S.C.R. 660,
Dlvl•lonal Ptr·
•onntl Of!ictr v. &ghavt11dracl1arl [1966] 3 S.C.R. 106, Union of India v. /11w•n
Ram, A.l.R. 1958 S.C. 905, Mad 1av v. Statt of My•ort, A.I.R. 1962 S.C, 811
and Star. of Bombay v. A. braham, A.l.R. 1962 S.C. 794, followed.
But, the order was liable to be qua1bed on the iround ol contravention of
b
articleo 14 and 16 of tho Constitution. The comploJnt that 200 head coiutableo who
had taken troJnlna u Cadet Sub·lnapecton ot Armed Police alter tho rapondent
and who were junior to him bavo otlll been allowed to retain their ponent 1tatu1
ns Sub·lnapector and have not been reverted to their 1ub1tantive poat ot Head
Coiutable muat be sustained. No poulble explanation tor this extreme form ol di•·
crimination bu been shown. It ii also Clear that there wu no admlni!tradvo
reuon for this revenion. Thero wu no 1une1tion that the post bad been abo·
llshed or that the respondent was, for administrative reasons, required to ao back
to bis own post of Head Constable. [347C·E]
C
Stale of Mysore v. P. R. K11fkar11i, A.J.R. 1972 S.C. 2170, and The State of
Bihar and Others v. Shiva Bhlks/111k Mishra, [1971] 2 S.C.R. 191, followed.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1110 of 1971.
From the judgment and decree dated the 8th September, 1970 of
the Allahabad High Court in Special Appeal No. 826 of 1969.
D
G. N. Dikshit and 0. P. Rana, for the appellants.
R. K. Gsrg, S. C. Agarwala and V. l. Francis, for the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered byMATHEW, J. This appeal, by certificate, is directed against the
judgment and decree dated September 8, 1970 of the Allahabad High
Court. The short facts of the case are as follows. · The respondent
Sughar Singh was a permanent bead constable in the U.P. Police Force
between 1950 and 1960. Some time in 1960, he was deputed for training as a cadet sub-inspector at the Armed Police Training Centre at
Sitapur. On March 16, 1961, Sughar Singh was appointed an official·
ing Platoon Commander. He worked in that post till August, 1968.
While working as a Platoon Commander, on July 22, 1966, the respondent was served with a notice by the Senior Superintendent of Police,
Kanpur, in wliich he was asked to show cause within 10 days' of the
recdpt of that notice as to why the following adverse entry should not
be entered in his character roll :
"1966-Is suspected to have got entries of date of birth
and educational qualifications altered on the authority of a
nctitious certificate which had to be corrected later on.
Severly 'varncd."
The respondent submitted an explanation in accordance with the
terms of this notice on July 30, 1966. The explanation was not, however, founc! acceptable and an adverse entry was· actually made in his
character roll in 1966. On August 12, 1968, the Deputy Inspector
General of Police, Kanpur Range, U.P. passed an order to the following
effect :
E
F
G
Il
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
u. p, STATE ·V, SUGHAR SINGH (Mathew, J.)
337
"Order No. 1207/P.H.Q.-No, T 13 B 68
Order-On his reversion from the post of Officiating Sublnspcctor, Armed Police, Shri Sughar Singh is taken back on
his substantive post of Head Constable".
Tho order is in Hindi but we have set out an English translation'
of the order which we found included in the records.
The respondent challenged this order of reversion by a writ petition
filed in the High Court of Judicature at Allahabaq. His petition was
at first dismissed by a learned Single Judge of the High Court on
May 12, 1969. He filed a special appeal befote a Division Bench. One
of the Judges of this Division Bench allowed the appeal and quashed
the order of reversion. The other learned Judge, however, was of '·
different view and held that the respondent's appeal was liable to be·
dismissed. The matter, thereafter, was referred to a third learned Judge
who found in favour of the respondent and quashed the order of
reversion. In view of the opinion of the third learned Judge, the special
appeal filed by the respondent was allowed by a judgment of September
8, 1970 •l!d the order reve~ting the present respondent to his post of
head constable was quashed. The appellants have now come on appeal'
before this Court against the order of the Allahabad High Court.
The short question that ari&es for determination is as fo whether
lhe order of August 12, 1968, was made in violation of article 311 of
the Constitution of India or in violation of any right of the respondent·
under article 16 of the Constitution.
For answering this question the first essential is to determine what
v.:as exactly the nature of the appointment of Sughar Singh when he
was posted as a Platoon Commander. Both parties accept the proposition that the rank of Platoon Commander is the same as that of a
Sub-Inspector of Police. The appellants contend that Sughar Singh was'
never appointed substantively to the post of Sub-Inspector of Police
and that he was merely officiating as a Platoon Commander in August
1968 when he was reverted to his substantive post of Head Constable.
The respondent on the other hand, contends that before he
was
appointed as a Platoon Commander, he had been appointed as a SubInspector of Police and that even if his appointment to the post of a
Platoon Commander was in an officiating capacity, his substantive
rank was that' of a Sub-Inspector of Police. In support of this contention, reliance was placed on the framing of the order dated March 21
1961 which was in the following terms:
"Order-On completion of the practical
training
on
March 16, 1961, the following S.I.A.P. Cadres are allotted
to P.A.C. for posting as offg. Platoon Commanders : ·
Name
Distt{Unit of lien
xx
xx
Suahar Singh
A~ra
xx
xx
Sd, M.u, Ahmald I.P.S.
Residence
xx
Etawah
xx
Dy. Inspr. Gen. of Police, Headquarter, U.P.
1
'
338
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1974] 2 s.c.a.
The order was made in respect of 15 head constables and reads as if
.all the officers mentioned therein who were posted as officiatit1g Platoon
Commanders already belonged on the relevant date to the S.I.A.P.
Cadr~ i.e., they were sul>-inspectors in the Armed Police. The respondent's counsel argued that the order specifically described
. the respondent as a Sul>-Inspector belonging io the Armed Police
Cadre and the obvious intent of that order was to allot him to the
Provincial Armed Constabulary in the post of Officiating Platoon Commander.
The argument, in other words, was that independently of
and prior to the appointment of the respondent to. the post of a Platoon
Commander, he had been enjoying the status of a Sub-Inspector; It
was further contended that since the respondent's status as a SubInspector of Police is not qualified as either officiating or temporary,
it is impossible to resist the conclusion that on completion of his train·
ing he had already been appointed as a Sub-Inspector substantively.
The order of March 21, 1961 was merely an' order of posting and
not an order indicating the appointment of the respondent to a parti·
cular cadre. We are unable to accept this argument of the respondent's
counsel. To understand the position clearly, one has to refer to certain
provisions of the Police Regulations under which the respondent bad
been selected for promotiol) from the post of Head Constable to the
rank of Sub-Inspector in the Armed Police :
"406( b) Armed Police-Permanent promotions to the
rank . of ·sub-inspector in the armed police are made by
Deputy Inspectors General from the list of those who have
qualified at the course prescribed under paragraph 448.
Superintendents may promqte in pfficiating or temporary
vacancies.
'447. Recruitment to the rank of sub·inspector Armed
Police/Platoon' Commander will be made in the following
manner:-
"(a) 80 per cent of the posts both temporary and.permanent in the combined cadre of sub-inspector, Armed Police/
Platoon Commander will be filled in by selection of men from
the ranks.
"(b) The remaining 20 per cent of the posts both temporary and permanent in the combined cadre of Sub-Inspector,
Armed Police/Platoon Commander will be filled in by direct
recruitment.
"For category (a) the Range Deputy Inspectors General
of Police, Deputy Inspector General,
Provincial
Armed
Constabulary and the Deputy Inspector General of Police
Headquarters in the cases of the Railway Police, will 11ominate from time to time as required by the Inspector General
such number of head constables of the Armed Police as may
be specified.
"For category (b) selection of the required number of
candidates will be made by a committee consisting of the
A
n
c
D
F
G
H
A
B
c
))
E
F
G
H
u. p, STATE v. SUGHAR SINGH (Mathew, ].)
3 39'
Inspector General, the Deputy Inspector General Provincial
Armed Constabulary and one more Deputy Inspector General nominated by Inspector General.
"448(i) Candidates nominated or selected under paragraph 44 7, will undergo a course of training of 7 months'
duration at the armed training centre Sitapur including one
month's practical traiaing in the Provincial Armed Constabulary Units.
(ii) Before taking training under the above sub-para,
candidates selected under para 44 7 (b) shall undergo a successful preliminary training for a period of two months at the
Armed Training Centre, Sitapur.
"448-A. Relative seniority will be governed by the date
of passing the Sub-Inspector Armed Police Course and for
men passing the same course by the position obtained in
the final examination of sub-inspector Armed Police Course
between two men obtaining equal marks in the same final
examination
(i) promoted man will take seniority over .
directly recruited candidate (ii) if both men
are directly
recruited the age will be the determining factor and in the
case of the ranker cadets it will be the length of service".
Certain things are clear from the above regulations.
There is a
combined cadre of Sub-Inspectors of Armed Police and Platoon Commanders. That means there. is no difference in rank between a SubJnspector of Armed Police and a Platoon Commander.
Eighty per
cent of the posts of this cadre are filled up by promotion from the
ranks and twenty per cent by direct recruitment.
These appointments
whether by promotion or . by direct recruitment are made to posts
which may be temporary or permanent. When appointments are
made by promotion, the promotees are nominated from among the
head constables of the Armed Police. As soon as the selection of
nominees is made, they have to undergo first a preliminary training
for a period of two months and, if successful in that training, a
further training of 7 months at the Armed Police Training Centre,
Sitapur. There are certain rules for determining the relative seniority
of the promotees inter se and also vis-a-vis the direct recruits. We are
not concerned with those rules in this appeal.
In the light of these regulations and from the facts set out in the
different affidavits on record, it is clear that the respondent was
selected for training as a cadet Sub-Inspector under Regulation 447
of the Police Regulations and on his successful completion of the
training he was promoted to the combined cadre of 'Sub-Inspector,
Armed Police/Platoon Commander". The order of March 21, 1961
was the order posting the respondent and his other colleagues who
were successful in the training to certain vacant posts in that com--
bined cadre of Sub-Inspector and Platoon Commander for the lint
time.
The order is not happily worded. The order seems to make
340
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1974] 2 s.c.R.
I JI kind of distinction between the rank· of Sub-Inspector of the Armed
.Police Cadre and the rank of a Platoon Commander, though, in fact,
there was no such distinction.
Regulation 447 (a) makes that position indubitably clear.
The respondent's contention that be was first
appointed Sub-Inspector and then posted as a Officiating Platoon Commander, is based on this obvious erroneous drafting of the order of
March 21, 1961.
Had the respondent been appointed in the first instance to the post of a Sub-Inspector and then posted as a Platoon Commander, it would have been possible for him to produce the first order by
which be claims to have been promoted to the cadre of sub-inspector.
He produced no such order. In fact. there can be little doubt that
there was no such order. The order of March 21, 1961 was an
order passed immediately after the completion of the practical training on March 21, 1961.
That is clear from the order itself.
There
is no rOOJll for any order intervening the completion of the practical
training and the passing of the posting order on March 21. 1961.
Having regard to these considerations, it is impossible for us to accept
the respondent's contention that he had been appointed substantively
to the rank of Sub-Inspector of Police.
In our opinion, his first
appointment was as an officiating Platoon Commander and he was
never given a substantive rank in the combined cadre of Sub-Inspectors,
Armed Police and Platoon Commanders.
We now turn ·to the question whether the order of reversion of
the respondent was either a reduction in rank in contravention of
article 311 of the Constitution or a contravention of the respondent's
fundamental right under article 16 of the Constitution.
Though the
law in this matter has been laid down in a large number of decisions
of this Court, considerable difficulty arises in applying the various
principles enunciated b ythose decisions to the facts of any particular case.
The first decision which has now become a locus clo;;sicus on the
subject is the decision in Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. The Union of
India(!).
The principles that were laid down in that case are as
follows :
(1) Article 311 of the Constitution of India makes no
distinction ,between permanent and temporary posts anti
extends its protection equally to all government servants
holding permanent or temporary posts or officiating in any
of them.
(2) The protection of article 311 is available only
where dismissal, removal or reduction in rank is sought to
be inflicted by way of punishment and not otherwise.
( 3) If the terrnlnation of servcie or reduction in rank is
not by way of punishment, article 311 (2) is not attracted.
To determine whether the terrnlnation or the reduction is by
way of punishment one has to consider whether the servant
has the right to hold the post from which he has been either
(I) [1958] S.C.R. 828.
'
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
A
.B
'C
D
E
F
G
H
u. P. STATE v. SUGHAR SINGH (Mathew, l.)
341
removed or reduced. In the ca~ of a probationary or officiating appointment to a permanent or temporary post there
is no such right.
This does not mean, however, that the
termination of service or reduction in rank of a servant who
has no right to the post can never be dismissal or removal
or reduction by way of punishment. If gov.,rnment express·
ly chooses to penalise the servant for mis-conduct, negligence, inefficiencY. or the like by infli~ti'!,g on him ~e punishment of dismissal, removal or reduct10n, the requirements of
article 311 must be complied with.
( 4) A reduction in rank must be a punishment if it
carries penal consequences with it and the two tests to be
applied are :
(i) Whether the servant has a right to the post or the rank;
and
(ii) whether evil consequences s11ch as forfeiture of .pay
and allowances, loss of seniority in his substantive
rank, stoppage or postponement of future chances of
promotion follow as a result of the order ?
Where either of these tests apply, the reduction in rank
must be one within the meaning of article 311 ( 2) of the
Constitution and will attract its protection.
The principles formulated in Parshotam Lal Dhmgrds case have
furnished the principal gllidelines in all future cases relating to .dis·
missal, removal or reduction in rank of government servants. As we
have already said, however, the matter is not altogether free of difl\·
culty even after the formulation of these princ1ples.
Depending on
the nature and circumstances of each individual case it has often been
necessary to clarify and modify these principles in certain respects.
In this process, sometimes new but analogous principles have been
evolved and sometimes the old principles have been themselves elaborated, analysed and re-formulated in a difl'erentlanguage.
It is necessary at this stage to refer to one special difficulty which
has been created by the process of elaboration and reformulation wl)ich
we have mentioned just now.
Sometimes in applying the principles
of Parshotam Lal Dhingrd s case to the facts of a particular case; one
aspect had to be emphasised in view of the .peculiar circumstances of
that case and in doing so this Cpurt gave a special formulation which
covered the facts of that case. That principle was later found either
inadequate or inapplicable in another case where the facts and circumstances have been slightly different and which called for emphasis on a
different aspect of the rules.. In this way, this Court has found it
necessary to mould the principles to suit the needs of the varying circumstances of different cases.
The original principles were not intend·
ed to be abandoned but re,shapirig of the principles became necessary
and even unavoidable to fit them accurately and appropriately to ·new
set of circumstances. This has often led to formulation of principles
with varying contours which superficially at least seem to suggest that
some of them are anomalous and even contradictory. If, however,
342
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
( 1974] 2 S.C.R.
the prniciples are construed with reference to the facts of any parti·
cular case for which they have been evolved, it will, we believe, be
found that there is no fundamental discrepancy or contradiction in the
principles.
Confusion has arisen particularly in respect of cases where this
Court has had to deal with orders of government. from the aspect of
the motive underlying those orders.
What is the weight to be given
to motive in deciding whether a particular order is penal ill character
and therefore falling within the mischief of article 311 of the Consti·
tution or whether it has been passed for departmental considerations
and in exigencies of public service? It is well recognised that very
often the motive of a particular order of government and the language
and terms of the order itself are not in harmony.
In many· cases
though government take action under the terms of a contract of em·
·p1ormcnt or under the specific service rules for the purpose of termi·
nallng the service or reducing the rank of an officer, the real motive
or inducing factor which inlluences the government to take action is
different and is ~onnected with some disqualification or ineiflciency
of the officer.
In other words. government while pretending to act
in terms of the contract of service or service rules, in reality wants to
get rid of the officer concerned or to reduce him to a lower rank by
way of punishment for his misconduct or inefficiency or disqualification.
In such a case, the action taken by government is in an innocuous
form but .the real intent of it is penal.
Such a situation was cont~m
plated by Das, C.J. in Parshotam Lal Dhlngra's case.
He observ·
ed:
"It is true that the misconduct, negligence inefficiency
or other disqualification may be the motive or the inducing
factor which inlluences ·the government to take action under
the terms of contract of employment ()r the specific service
rule, nevertheless, if a right exists, under the contract or
the rules,· to terminate the service, the motive operating in
the min\! of the government is, as Chagla, C.J. has said
in Shrinivas Ganesh v. Union of India (A.I.R. 1956 Bom.
455) wholly irrelevant.
In short, if the termination of ser·
vice is founded on the right llowing from contract or the
service rules, then, prlma facie the termination is not a
punishment and carries with it no evil consequences and so
article 311 is not attracted."
Following this enunciation of the principle this Conn has in many
later cases refused to· give any weight to the motive operating in the
mind of the authority which passes an order terminating the service
of a temporary servai:;t or reducing the servant in rank so long as
the particular action taken was "founded on the right flowing from
contract or the service rules."
Since we are concerned in this case with a case of reversion, we
propose to confine our attention to the different circumstances in which
an order of reversion may be. made.
An order of reversion is in its
immediate effect bound always to be a reduction in rank.
Even a
reversion from a higher but temporary or officiating rank to a lower
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
/.
A
D
c
D
u. P. STATE v, SUGHAR SINGH (Mathew, /.)
343
substantive rank is in a sense a reduction. But such orders ol reversion are not always reduction in rank within the meaning of article 311.
If the officer is promoted substantively to a higher post or rank, he
gets a right to that particular post or rank and if he is afterwards
reverted to the lower post or rank which he held before, it is a "re·
duction in rank" in the technical sense in which the expression is
used in article '311. The real test in all such cases is to ascertain
if the officer concerned has a right to the post from . which he is
reverted. If he has a right to the ~ost then a reversion is a punishment
and cannot be ordered except in compliance with the provisions of
article 311. If, on the other hand, the officer concerned has no right
to the post, he can be reverted without attracting the provisions of
article 311.
Btit even iri this case, he cannot be reverted in a manner
which will show conclusively that the intention was to punish him. The
order itself may expressly state that the officer concerned is being revert·
ed by way of punishmen\ In fact the order may in various otqer ways
cast a stigma on the officer concerned. 'In all such cases, the order is to
be taken as a punishment. Sometimes again. the order of reversion
may bring up0n the officer certain penal consequences like forfeiture
of pay a.nd allowances or loss of seniority in the subordinate rank or
the stoppage or postponement of future chances of promotion : in
such cases also the government servant must be regarded as havini
been punished and his reversion to the substantive rank must be
treated as a reduction in rank. In such a case article 311 will be
attracted.
In State of Punjab and Another v, Sukh Raj Bahadur( 1), Mitter,
E . J., after analysing the decisions of this Court in Parshotam Lal Dhinrra
v. Union of lndia('), State of Orissa v. Ram Narayan Da~(') R. C.
Lacy v. State of Bihar('), Madan GopaJ v. State of Punjab('), ~ag
dish Mitter v. Union of Tndia(') and A. G. Benjamin v. Union of
India('), has formulated the following propositions :
F
G
H
I. The services of a temporary servant or a probationer
can be terminated 1mder the rules of his employment and
such termination without anything more would not attract
the operation of article 311 ·of the Constitution.
2. The circumstances preceding or attendant on the order
of termination of service have to be examined in each case,
the motive behind it being. immaterial.
3. If the order visits tb.e public servant with any evil
consequences or casts an aspersion against his charac!er or
integrity, it must be con<idered to Ge one bv way nf punishment, rio matter whether he was a mere probationer or a
temporary servant,
·
(1) [196Rl 3 S.C.R. 2).4.
(2) [19581 S.r:.R. R28.
(3) [19511 t S.C.R. 611.
(4) C.A. "10. 590 of 1962 dcc:c',d on 13-t0-6l.
(5) [1963] 3 S.C.R. 716.
(6) A.l.P. 1964 S.C. 449.
(1) C.A.. No. 134t of 1966 decided. on.Jl-12-196f.
IO-I:.522SCI/74
344
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1974) 2 S.C.R·
4. An order of termination of service in unexceptionable
form preceded by an enquiry launched by the superior authorities only to ascertain whether the public servant should be
retained in service, does not attract the operation of article
311 of the Constitution.
5. If there be a full-scale departmental enquiry envisaged
by article 311 i.e. an Enquiry Officer is appointed, a charge
sheet submitted, explanation called for and considered, any
order of termination of service made thereafter will attract
the operation of the said article."
In Ram Gopal Chaturvedi v. State of Madhy« Pradesh{'), this
Court refused to interfere with an order terminating the services of
an officer who had been temporarily appointed to the Judicial Ser·
vice of Madhya Pradesh under rule 12 of the Madhya Pradesh Government Servants (Temporary and Quasi-Permanent Service) Rules,
1960, without passing any stigma on the officer concerned and merely
stating that his services were terminated from a specified date. Even
though the order· of termination had been preceded in that case by an
informal enquiry into the conduct of the officer with a view to ascertain
if he should be retained in service, this Court followed the decision
in State of Punjab v. Suklz Raj Bahadur (supra) and observed :
"On the face of it the order did not cast any stigma on
the appellant's character or integrity nor did it visit him with
any evil consequences. It was not passed by way of punishment and the provisions of article 3il were not attracted."
In the Union of India v. Gajendra Singh(2 ), this Court sustained
an order passed by the Union of India reverting an officiating Naib
Tehsildar to his permanent post of Kanungo on the ground that he
could not pass the departmental examination.
This Court
clearly
held in that case that "appointment to a post on officiating basis is,
from the nature of employment, itself of a transitory character and in
the absence of any contract or specific rule regulating the conditions
of service to the contrary, the implied term of such an appointment
is that it is terminable at any time.
The Government servant so ap·
pointed acquires no rights to the post.
But if the orper entails or
provides for forfetiure of his pay or allowances or the loss of bis
seniority in the substantive rank or the stoppage or postponement of
his future chances of promotion then that circumstance may indicate
that thou.!!h, in fonn, the government had purported to exercise its
undoubted right to terminate the employment. in truth and reality,
'the termination was by \vay of penalty".
Let us_ now consider whether in the light of· the various cases
decided bv this Court the order of reversion amounted to a reduction
in rank \Vithin the meaning cf article 311 (2) of the Constitution.
We will apply all the different tests laid down by this Court one by one.
First. tl1e order is not attended with any stigma. The order merely states
tl1at Sughar Singh is reverted and that he is reverted to his substantive
----·
(!) ft970] 1 S.C.R. 472.
(2) [1972] 3 S.C.R. 660.
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
II
. u. P. STATE v. SUGHAR SINGH (Mathew, ],)
345
post of head constable. By no stretch of imagination can this language
be construed as casting a ~tigma on. the respondent. Secondly, there is
nothing to show that Sughar Singh has lost his seniority in the substantive rank. It is true that some of his colleagues who were also holding the substantive post of head constable and who had also been
appointed in an officiating capacity to the post of Platoon Commanders
were not reverted on the day when the respondent was reverted. But
that cannot be regarded as a penal consequence by way of Joss of
seniority in. the substantive rank. In Divisional Personnel Officer v.
Raghavendrachar( 1), this Court has clearly held that
where
a
number of employees are placed on a senior list on a provisional basis
they do not get any indefeasible right to retain their seniority on that
provisional basis so that the reversion of a person who was in the list
does not constitute a reduction in rank merely on the grc1Und that
persons lo\ver in the rank have not been reverted. Thirdly, there, is no
evidence to sho\v and, in fact, it \Vas not contended on behalf of the
rcspGndcnt that there has been any forfeiture of his pay or allo\vances or
any loss in the seniority in the substantive rank wkich is, one must
rcmomber, the rank of Head Constables.
On a careful scrutiny of tlie
.order of reversion we do not find any indication that it affects the seniority of Sughar Singh in his substantive rank or that it affects his
chances of his future promotion from that rank.
It is true that Sughar
Singh will be deprived by the order of reversion of the post of Platoon
Con1mander but that is riot considered a penal consequence.
Such
deprivation is the usual consequence of any order of reversion from
the officiating post which an incumbent has no right tc1 hold. Such
deprivation bas been held by this Court not to be an order attended
with penal consequences _(see Union of India v. Jeewan Ram(').
It has been suggested that the motive behind the reversion was
really the infliction of punishment. There was a formal proceeding held
against the respondent and the explanation that be had submitted in
reply to the charge~ made out against him had not been accepted by
his superior officers. The order of reversion which came soon after
this must, it was suggested, be connected with the disciplinary proceedings and the order of reversion must be taken as motivated by the
desire to punish him. The reply to this suggestion is two-fold. The
proceedings had been drawn up two years before the order of reversion. The proceedings were limited in nature. The onlv punishment
proposed in•the proceedings was the making of certain adverse entries
in the character roll. That penalty had already been imposed on the
respondent. There is nothing tcj show that after two years the authorities proposed to rake up that matter ·and inflict a heavier punishment
on the respondent than they had previously proposed and also inflicted.
Besides, it is well-known that in a matter like this we are concerned
oaly with the question whether the order of reversion entails anv
penal consequence. We are not concerned with the motive behind the
'version (see Madhav v. State of Mrsore(') and State of Bombav
v. Abraham(').
·
(1) [1966] 3 S.C.R. 106..
(2) A.l.R. 1008 S.C. c,o;.
(3) A.1.R. 1961. S.C.R. 8, lt.
(4) A.l.R. 1· 62 S.C. 79J.
346
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1974] 2 S.C.R.
The respondent's counsel then challenged the order of reversion on
another ground. He pointed out that at least 200 head constables who
had taken training as Cadet Sub-Inspectors of Armed Police at Sitapur
after the respondent and who were junior to the respondent have still
been allowed to retain their present status as Sub·lnspector and have
not ,been reverted to their substantive post of Head Constable. Unless
this can be justified as a measure of punishment, the reversion of the
respondent would amount to discrimination in contravention of the
provisions of articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The facts on which
this contention is based are found in paragraphs 7 and 20 of the
petition. The contention itself is to be found in ground No. 3 of the
writ petition. The complaint, we must say, is one which has to be
sustained. No possible explanation in this extreme form of discrimina·
tion has been shown to us. Indeed, it appears from the judgment of
the third learned Judge who heard the petition in the High Court that
in answer to a question put by him, the standing· counsel appearing
for the State clearly stated that the order of reversion was a result of
the adverse entry made in the appellant's confidential character roll.
If this statement of the learned standing counsel has to be accepted, it
is impossible to resist the suggestion that the respondent's order of
reversion was really an order of punishment in disguise in which event
the order must be struck down for non-compliance with the require·
ments of article 311 of the Constitution. The appellant in fact faces a
dilemma. If it was not a case of punishment, 1t becomes difficult to
explain why this discrimination was made against the respondent visa-vis at least 200 other officers who were junior to him in the sul>-
stantive cadre. That would make the order liable to be struck down as
violative of article 16 of the Constitution. Reference may be made to
State of Mysore v. P. R. Kulkarni(!), where an order of reversion
was struck down by this Court on the. ground of "unjustifiable discrimi·
nation" which brought the order within the mischief of articles 14 and
16 of the Constitution. If, on the other hand, the order has to be Justified with reference to the adverse entry in the character roll, it .beoomcs
not merely a case of double punishment, but als6 a case ol infringement
of article 311 of the Constitution. It is true that the order ex-facie
does not show anything which can suggest the contravention of article
311 of the Constitution. We have already analysed the order and dis·
cussed that aspect of the matter. But the compelling logic of the
totality of circumstances attending the order of reversion indicates that
if the order is not discriminatory and has to be justified with reference
to the proceedings against the respondent and the earlier order regarding his character roll, it is impossible to avoid the ariticism that it was
really a punishment in the garb of an order of reversion. In the State
of Bihar and Others v.
Shiva Bhikshuk Mishra('), this Court was
called upon to consider the effect of an order of reversion passed on
a member of the Bihar Police Force who, while holding the substan·
tive post of Sergeant, was promoted to officiate temporarily as Subedar
Major in 1948 bu( was subsequently in 1950 reverted to his substantive
post. The High Court of Patna found that the reversion was not in the
- usual course or for administrative reasons but . it was after the finding
(l) A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 2170.
(2) [1971] 2 S.C.R. 191,
A
B
c
D
F
H
8
c
E
p
U, P. STATE V. SUGllAR SINGH (Mathew, /.)
34 7
on an enquiry about some complaint against the plaintiff and by way
of punishment to him. The matter having come on appeal to this Court,
this Court held that the form of the order is not conclusive of its true
nature and might often be a cloak or camoufiage for an, order founded
on misconduct. This Court further obseried :
"It may be that an order which is innocucus on the face
and does not contain any imputation of misconduct is a circum·
stance or a piece of evidence for finding '\\'.hether it was made
by way of punishment or administrative routine. But the
entirety of circumstances preceding or attendant on the
impugned order must be examined and the over-riding test
will always be whether the misconduct is a mere motive or
is the very foundation of the order."
In the instant case we have no doubt in our mind that the peculiar
circumstance that from out of a group of about 200 officers most of
whom are junior to the respondent, the respondent alone has been
reverted to the substantive post of Head Constable makes it absolutely
clear that there was no administrative reason for this reversion; Jn fact
there was no. suggestion at any time made on behalf of the apd~~:nt
that the post has been abolished o.r· that respondent was, for a
· istrative rell80lll, required to go back to his own post of Head Constable.
Thi1 circumstance only corroborates what the learned standing counsel
for the State admitte4 l)efore tho High Court that the foundation of
the order of reversion is the adverse entry made in his character roll.
In this view of tho matter, we havo 110 doubt thaf tho order was passed
by way of punishment, thou&h all clutward lndicia show the order to be
a mere order of reversion.