# STATE OF. UTTAR PRADESH v. BHOOP SINGH VERMA

- **Citation:** [1979] 2 S.C.R. 1126
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1979-01-24
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 252 of 1969
- **Bench:** Jaswant Singh, R. S. Pathak, A. P. Sen
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/state-of-uttar-pradesh-v-bhoop-singh-verma-7472
- **Pages:** 5

## Headnote

Termination of simpUciter-No 1departmental enquiry is necessary under
law in such cases.
The respondent was appointed as a Sub-Inspector of police in a temporary
pool in 1955.
He was discharged from service on July 13, 1957.
A Writ
Petition filed by him in the Allahabad High Court was allowed on August 4,
1959 and consequently he was re-instated in service on December 15, 1959.
Thereafter, on January 21, 1960 his services were .terminated on the ground
that they were no longer required by the State. A suit for declaration that
the said order of termination was null and void was decreed in his favour
by the trial court which was affirmed in. appeal and also by the High Court
in second appeal.
Allowing the State appead. by special leave the Court,
HELD : 1. The considerations which prevailed with tho High Court in
reaching its findings on the application of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution
nnd the bona {ides of the superior authority in making the impugned order of
tern1ination simpliciter are not warranted in law.
[1130D1
2. The order terminating the services wa-; an order of termination simpliciter passed in accordance with the rules applicable to temporary Government
servants.
After the original ,order of ,discharge was quashed by the High
Court, the respondent was reinstated, alJowed increment in
pay
and
one
month's salary in lieu of notice under the 'general rules for termination of
services of temporary government serva-nts was also given.
[1128F-G]
3. It 1'1as open to the superior authority to
terminate the
respondent's
services on the ground on which it did so. And the eyidence disclosed no
personal motive had influenced the order or th&t it was passed by way of
punishment. A departmenta) enquiry is not required under the law. Instead
of· instituting disciplinary proceedings against the government
servant,
the
suitability for retention in service could be decided.
[ll28H, 1129A, El
State vf U.P. v. Ram Chandra Trivedi', [1977] 1 SCR 462; Chan1pakTal Chimanlal SIFJh v. The Union of India, [1964] 5 SCR 190,
Jagdis!z Mitter v.
Union of India, A.l.R. 1964 S.C. 449 and State of Puniab & Anr. v. Shri Sukh
llai Bahadur, [1968] 3 SCR 234; referred to.
Union of India & Ors. v. R. S. Dhaba, (1969] 3 SCC 603, Stme df Bihar
& Ors. v. Shiva Bhikshuk Mishra [1971] 2 SCR 191 and R. S. Sial v.
Th•
State of U.P. and Ors., [1974] 3 SCR 754; applied.
The State of Hihar v. Gopi Kishore Prasad, A.l.R.
1960
SC 689
and
. Madan Gopal v. The State of Punjab, (1963] 3 SCR 716; distinguished.
_J
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U. P. STATE v. BHOOP SINGH (Pathak, J.)
1127

## Text

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1126
STATE OF. UTTAR PRADESH
v.
BHOOP SINGH VERMA
January 24, 1979
[JASWANT SINGH, R. S. PATHAK AND A. P. SEN, JJ.]
Termination of simpUciter-No 1departmental enquiry is necessary under
law in such cases.
The respondent was appointed as a Sub-Inspector of police in a temporary
pool in 1955.
He was discharged from service on July 13, 1957.
A Writ
Petition filed by him in the Allahabad High Court was allowed on August 4,
1959 and consequently he was re-instated in service on December 15, 1959.
Thereafter, on January 21, 1960 his services were .terminated on the ground
that they were no longer required by the State. A suit for declaration that
the said order of termination was null and void was decreed in his favour
by the trial court which was affirmed in. appeal and also by the High Court
in second appeal.
Allowing the State appead. by special leave the Court,
HELD : 1. The considerations which prevailed with tho High Court in
reaching its findings on the application of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution
nnd the bona {ides of the superior authority in making the impugned order of
tern1ination simpliciter are not warranted in law.
[1130D1
2. The order terminating the services wa-; an order of termination simpliciter passed in accordance with the rules applicable to temporary Government
servants.
After the original ,order of ,discharge was quashed by the High
Court, the respondent was reinstated, alJowed increment in
pay
and
one
month's salary in lieu of notice under the 'general rules for termination of
services of temporary government serva-nts was also given.
[1128F-G]
3. It 1'1as open to the superior authority to
terminate the
respondent's
services on the ground on which it did so. And the eyidence disclosed no
personal motive had influenced the order or th&t it was passed by way of
punishment. A departmenta) enquiry is not required under the law. Instead
of· instituting disciplinary proceedings against the government
servant,
the
suitability for retention in service could be decided.
[ll28H, 1129A, El
State vf U.P. v. Ram Chandra Trivedi', [1977] 1 SCR 462; Chan1pakTal Chimanlal SIFJh v. The Union of India, [1964] 5 SCR 190,
Jagdis!z Mitter v.
Union of India, A.l.R. 1964 S.C. 449 and State of Puniab & Anr. v. Shri Sukh
llai Bahadur, [1968] 3 SCR 234; referred to.
Union of India & Ors. v. R. S. Dhaba, (1969] 3 SCC 603, Stme df Bihar
& Ors. v. Shiva Bhikshuk Mishra [1971] 2 SCR 191 and R. S. Sial v.
Th•
State of U.P. and Ors., [1974] 3 SCR 754; applied.
The State of Hihar v. Gopi Kishore Prasad, A.l.R.
1960
SC 689
and
. Madan Gopal v. The State of Punjab, (1963] 3 SCR 716; distinguished.
_J
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U. P. STATE v. BHOOP SINGH (Pathak, J.)
1127
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 252 of 1969.
A
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order
dated
19-8-68 of the Allahabad High Court in Civil Appeal No. 254/65.
G. N. Dikshit and M. V. Goswami for the Appellant.
S. C. Manchanda, S. C. Patel and Trilok Singh Arora for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was deliver,ed by
PATHAK, J.-This appeal by special leave is directed against the
judgment and order of the Allahabad High Court dated August 19,
1968 dismissing a second appeal arising out of a suit for declaration.
The respondent was appointed as a Sub-Inspector of Police in a
temporary post in 1955. He was discharged from service on July 13,
1957. A writ petition filed by him in the Allahabad High Court was
allowed on August 4, 1959, a'nd accordingly on December 15, 1959
he was reinstated in service.
Thereafter, on January 21, 1960 his
services were terminated by the Deputy lnspector General o[ Police,
Agra Ran~, Agra.
On March 13, 1963 the respondent instituted· a suit for a declaration that the order dated January 21, 1960 was illegal and void and
that he continued as Sub-Inspector of Police in the Uttar Pradesh
Polio.e Service. It was alle~d that on a false complaint made against
him in respect of the custody and detention of one Smt. Phoolmati,
an enquiry bad been made in cohsequence of which the appellant
had been arbitrarily and illegally discharged from service on July 13,
1957. It was pleaded that although he was reinstated .on the success
.of his writ petition in the High Court, his services were tenninated
a mere five weeks later although no ground had arisen since for doing
so. It was asserted that the order of January 21, 1960 was passed
as a simple order of termination in order to avoid a departmental
enquiry under section 7 of th~ Police
Act, which enquiry if held
would l)ave enabled him to expose
the falsity of the
alleg:ations
levelled against him.
The suit was contested by the appellant, who
maintaill".,,d that the termination of the respondent's services was not
by way of punishment nor motivated by · malice, and that it was a
simple termination of the services of a temporary government servant
on the ground that they were no longer required by the State. The
.suit was decreed by the learned Munsif, Etah and the decree was
affirmed in appeal and &xond appeal.
The High Court, in second
appeal, took the view that whern ah enquiry was
instituted by a
superior authority into a
misconduct alleged against
a govemn1ent
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1128
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1979] 2 S.C.R.
A
servant, the resulting termination of servioe was by way of punishment because it attached a stigma or amoun~ed to a reflection on the
competence of the government servant and affected his future career.
The High Court held that the fi'ndings recorded during the enquiry on
the original complaint against the respondent were n~sponsible for the
order terminating the respondent's services, and it affirmed ·that the
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order was vitiated by mala fides.
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Attacking the findings of th;, High Court, learned counsel for the
appellant contends that i:n the first place the order terminating the respondent's services had not been made by way of punishment, bu~ wa,;
an order of termination simplicit•er passed in accordance with the rules
applicable to temporary government servants.
In the second place,
it is said, if the order is attributed to the complai'nt against the respondent concerning his. conduct relating to Smt. Phoolmati it was open
· to the Deputy Inspector General of Police to take the circumstances of
the case into account for the purpose of considering the suitability of
the respondent for continuing in service.
Learned counsel for the respondent points out that an enquiry had been originally instituted
against the respondent which had resulted in an order terminating
his services and, he urges, after the order of the High Court quashing
his discharge on the ground of violation of Article 311 (2) of the
Constitution it was obligatory on the superior authority, in case it prcr
posed to terminate the respondent's services, to institute a proper
and comple~e departmental enquiry, providing an opportunity to the
respondent to lead evidence and be heard in his defence, and only
thereafter could it make an order against the respond•ent.
We are of the opinion that the appellant is right on both counts.
Considered &s an order made without reference to the earlier proceeding
against the respondent, the impugned order cannot be regarded as one
of punishment.
After the original order of discharge was quashed by
the High Court, the respondent was reinstated in service.
He was
even allowed an increment to his salary.
The Deputy Inspector General of Police made the impugned order subseqnently terminating
his
services on the gronnd that they were no longer required.
The services
were terminated on payment of one month's salary in lieu of notice under
the "general rules for termination of service of temporary government
servants".
The Deputy Inspector General of ·Police was examined as
a witness in the suit, and throughout he maintained that he terminated
the respondent's services because they were not required any more and
that in making the order he did not intend to punish the respondent. The
evidence also discloses that no personal motive had
influenced the
order. It was open to the superior authority to terminate the respondent's services on the ground on which it did so.
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U. P. STATE v. BHOOP SINGH (Pathak, J.)
1129
Assuming, howe.ver, that the impugned order was made in the background of the allegations against the respondent concerning his behaviour
with Smt. Phoolmati, we see no reason in law why a departmental enquiry should be necessary before the respondent's services could be terminated.
It appears from the material before. us that it was merely a
preliminary enquiry which was made by the Superintendent of Police
into the allegations made against the respondent's conduct concerning
the woman.
No departmental enquiry by way of disciplinary proceedings was instituted, no charge was framed, and the formal
procedure
charactedsing a disciplinary proceeding was never adopted.
The Deputy Inspector General of Police passed the original order
dated July 13, 1957 discharging the respondent from the police force on
the ground that he had behaved in a reprehensible manner, was not likely
to make a useful police officer and was nnfit for further retention in
a
disciplined force.
The original order plainly attached a stigma to the
respondent's record of service, and it is because of the specific grounds
set forth in the termination order that the High Court consiqered the respondent entitled to the benefit of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution, and
quashed the order.
Now the order having been quashed, the position
reverts to what it was when the Deputy Inspector General of Police received the report of the Superintendent of Police on the preliminary enquiry made by him.
There was nothing to pre.vent the Deputy Inspector General from deciding that instead of instituting disciplinary proceedings against the government servant he should consider whether the
government servant was suitable for retention in service.
The case law
on the point has been considered elaborately by one of us (\Jaswant Singh,
J.) in State of U. P. v. Ram Chandra Trivedi(') and reference has been
made in this behalf IQ Champaklal Chimanlal Shah v. The Union of
India('), Jagdish Mitter v. Union of India(') and State of Punjab &
Anr. v. Shri Sukh Raj Bahadur('). It is apparent from the facts of
this case that if the impugned order be considered as made in the light
of foe allegations against the respondent concerning the ·woman, the
conduct of the respondent constituted a motive merely for making the
order and was not the foundation of that order.
In this connection what
has been stated by this Court in Union of India & Ors. v. R. S. Dhaba.(')
State o,I Bihar & Ors. v. Shive Bhikshuk Mishra(") and R. S. Sial v. The
S.We of V.P. & Ors. ( 7) appears relevant.
That it was not intended
(l) [1977] 1 S.C.R. 462.
(2) .[1964] 5 S.C.R. 190.
(3) A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 449.
(4) [1968] 3 S.C.R. 234.
(5) [1969[ 3 s.c.c. 603.
(6) 11971] 2 S.C.R. 191.
(7) [l.9'14) 3 S.C.R. 754.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1979] 2 S.C.R.
to take punitive action against the respondent for his misbehaviour with
Smt. Phoolmati is evident from the circumstance that thereafter the rc·spondent was allowed an increment to his salary and was regarded as in
service for all purposes.
The High Court, it seems to us, did not have
regard to all the facts and circumstances of the case, and appears to have
a·ssumed that the respondent's services were terminated as a measure of
punishment.
The High Court relied on The State of Bihar v. Gopi
Kishor'e Prasad(') and Madan Gopal v. The State of Punjab('). Both
cases are distinguishable.
In theformer, the govermnent servant was
discharged from service because he was found to be corrupt and the order terminating his services branded him a dishonest and incompetent
officer.
In the latter, the government ·servant had been served with a
charge-sheet that he had demanded and received illegal gratification and
the Court found that the proceeding, consequent to which the termination
order was made, was intended for the purpose of taking punitive action.
We are satisfied that the considerations which prevailed with the
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High Court in reaching its findings on the application of Article 311 (2)
of the Constitution and the bona fides of the superior authority in making
the impugned order. are not warranted in law and on the material before
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us.
Accordingly, the appeal is allowed, the judgment and decree of the
High Court dated August 19, 1968 are set aside and the respondent's
suit is dismissed, but in the circumstances without any order as to costs .
S. R.
(!)A:l.R.. 1960 s.c. C-39.
(2) (1963]3 S.C R. 71 •
• 4 ppeal allowed.
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