# STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH v. JOGENDRA SINGH

- **Citation:** [1964] 2 S.C.R. 197
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1964
- **Case number:** Special Appeal No. 40 of 1959
- **Bench:** P. B. Gajendragadkar, M. Hidayatullah, J. C. Shah
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/state-of-uttar-pradesh-v-jogendra-singh-2837
- **Pages:** 7

## Headnote

Public Servant-Disciplinary
l'roceedings-Proc<iluro-
"M ay" -Construction
of-U. P. Di,ciplinary
Procuiling•
(Administrative Tribunal) Rul.s, 1.947, r. 4 (2).
The respondent was appointed a Naib Tehsildar under
the appellant, in the year 1937. On August 4, 1952, he was
suspended on complaints received against him and his case was
referred for investigation
to the Administrative Tribunal
appointed under the Rules. While the proceedings were
pending, additional complaints were received by the appellant
against his conduct
and they
were
communicated to
the
Tribunal
with
an intimation that the appellant
proposed to send those further charges against the respondent
for enquiry. The Tribunal did not wait for receipt of the said
additional charges and on enquiry exonerated him from the
charges framed against him, in August, l 952. On October
28, 1956, the respondent was again suspended and the charges
framed on the additional complaints were de livered to him.
The respondent submitted his explanation and pleaded that
the enquiry
might
be entrusted
to the
Administrative
Tribunal in accordance with the Rules; but his request was re ..
jected and the case was entrusted to the Commissioner with
directions to take disciplinary proceedings against him. The
High Court allowed the writ petition of the respondent and
the order directing the enquiry to be held by the appointed
authority under r. 55 of the said Civil Services Rules was
quashed.
The question for decision in this Court was, whether like
the word "may" in r. 4 (!) which confers the discretion on the
Governor, the word "may" in sub-r. (2) confers discretion on
him, or does the word "may" in sub-r. (2) really mean "shall"
or "must".
,
Held, that the whole purpose of r. 4 (2) would be frustrated if the word "may" in the said rule receives the same construction as in sub-r. (I).
The plain and unambiguous
object of enacting rule 4 (2) is to provide an option to the
1963
19f3
Sl4l1 •f Uttf:T P1adtJl1
••
Jo&ttuira Sinih
198 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] vot.
Gazetted Government scrvanu to request the Governor that
their cases should be tried by a Tribunal and not otherwise.
'fhus r. 4 (2) irnposes au obligation on thr. Governor to grant a
request n1adc hy the Gazetted ('.,rl)vcrnn1ent Servant and such a
request ~at having ~en granted in the present case, the appeal
must fail.
C1v11, Al'PELLATE J URISDIC'f!ON : Civil Appeal
No. 30 l of l!J61.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated
l\farch 10, 1960, of the
Allahabad High Court
(Lucknow Bench) in Special Appeal No. 40 of
1959.
K. S. Hajela, and C. P. Lal, for the appellant.
K. L. Gosain
and lSaunit
Lal,
for
the
respondent.
Hl63. March 4. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
GAJENDRAGADKAR J .-The short point of law
which arises in this appeal relates to the construction
of Rule 4 (2) of the Uttar Pradesh Disciplinary
Proceedings (Administrative Tribunal) Rules, 1947
(hereinafter called the Rules). That question arises
in this way. The respondent Jogcndra Singh was
appointed a Naib Tchsildar under the appellant, the
State of U. P. in the year l!l37.
O.n August 4, 1952,
he was suspended as complaints had been received
against him and an enquiry into the said complaints
was
contemplated.
Accordingly,
charges
were
framed against him am! his case was referred for
investigation to the Administrative Tribunal appointed under the Rules.
The Tribunal held an enquiry
and exonerated the
respondent from the charges
framed against him, in August 1953.
While the proceedings before the Tribunal were
pending, additional complaints were received by the
2 s.a.R..
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
199
appellant against the respondent's conduct, and they
were communicated by the appellant to the Tribunal
with ~n intimation that the appellant proμosed to
send those further charges against the respondent for
enquiry.
The Tribunal did not wait for receipt of
the said additional charges because it was asked by
the government to proceed with the charge already
with it a

## Text

-
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
197
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
v.
JOGENDRA SINGH
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, M. HIDAYATULLAH and
J. C. SHAH JJ.)
Public Servant-Disciplinary
l'roceedings-Proc<iluro-
"M ay" -Construction
of-U. P. Di,ciplinary
Procuiling•
(Administrative Tribunal) Rul.s, 1.947, r. 4 (2).
The respondent was appointed a Naib Tehsildar under
the appellant, in the year 1937. On August 4, 1952, he was
suspended on complaints received against him and his case was
referred for investigation
to the Administrative Tribunal
appointed under the Rules. While the proceedings were
pending, additional complaints were received by the appellant
against his conduct
and they
were
communicated to
the
Tribunal
with
an intimation that the appellant
proposed to send those further charges against the respondent
for enquiry. The Tribunal did not wait for receipt of the said
additional charges and on enquiry exonerated him from the
charges framed against him, in August, l 952. On October
28, 1956, the respondent was again suspended and the charges
framed on the additional complaints were de livered to him.
The respondent submitted his explanation and pleaded that
the enquiry
might
be entrusted
to the
Administrative
Tribunal in accordance with the Rules; but his request was re ..
jected and the case was entrusted to the Commissioner with
directions to take disciplinary proceedings against him. The
High Court allowed the writ petition of the respondent and
the order directing the enquiry to be held by the appointed
authority under r. 55 of the said Civil Services Rules was
quashed.
The question for decision in this Court was, whether like
the word "may" in r. 4 (!) which confers the discretion on the
Governor, the word "may" in sub-r. (2) confers discretion on
him, or does the word "may" in sub-r. (2) really mean "shall"
or "must".
,
Held, that the whole purpose of r. 4 (2) would be frustrated if the word "may" in the said rule receives the same construction as in sub-r. (I).
The plain and unambiguous
object of enacting rule 4 (2) is to provide an option to the
1963
19f3
Sl4l1 •f Uttf:T P1adtJl1
••
Jo&ttuira Sinih
198 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] vot.
Gazetted Government scrvanu to request the Governor that
their cases should be tried by a Tribunal and not otherwise.
'fhus r. 4 (2) irnposes au obligation on thr. Governor to grant a
request n1adc hy the Gazetted ('.,rl)vcrnn1ent Servant and such a
request ~at having ~en granted in the present case, the appeal
must fail.
C1v11, Al'PELLATE J URISDIC'f!ON : Civil Appeal
No. 30 l of l!J61.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated
l\farch 10, 1960, of the
Allahabad High Court
(Lucknow Bench) in Special Appeal No. 40 of
1959.
K. S. Hajela, and C. P. Lal, for the appellant.
K. L. Gosain
and lSaunit
Lal,
for
the
respondent.
Hl63. March 4. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
GAJENDRAGADKAR J .-The short point of law
which arises in this appeal relates to the construction
of Rule 4 (2) of the Uttar Pradesh Disciplinary
Proceedings (Administrative Tribunal) Rules, 1947
(hereinafter called the Rules). That question arises
in this way. The respondent Jogcndra Singh was
appointed a Naib Tchsildar under the appellant, the
State of U. P. in the year l!l37.
O.n August 4, 1952,
he was suspended as complaints had been received
against him and an enquiry into the said complaints
was
contemplated.
Accordingly,
charges
were
framed against him am! his case was referred for
investigation to the Administrative Tribunal appointed under the Rules.
The Tribunal held an enquiry
and exonerated the
respondent from the charges
framed against him, in August 1953.
While the proceedings before the Tribunal were
pending, additional complaints were received by the
2 s.a.R..
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
199
appellant against the respondent's conduct, and they
were communicated by the appellant to the Tribunal
with ~n intimation that the appellant proμosed to
send those further charges against the respondent for
enquiry.
The Tribunal did not wait for receipt of
the said additional charges because it was asked by
the government to proceed with the charge already
with it and concluded its enquiry. That is why on
October 28, 1955, the respondent was again suspended and charges framed on the additional complaints received against him were delivered to him
on October 29, 1956. On November 12, 1956,
the respondent submitted his explanation and pleaded
that in case the appellant wanted to pursue the
enquiry against him, it might be entrusted to the
Administrative
Tribunal in accordance with the
Rules.
On June 28, 1958, the Deputy Secretary
Board of Revenue, U. P., informed the respondent
that in accordance
with the orders passed by the
appellant his case had been entrusted to the Commissioner, Gorakhpur Division, with directions to take
disciplinary proceedings against him, and his request
that the charges against him, should be entrusted for
investigation to the Administrative Tribunal had be('n
rejected.
Thereupon, the respondent filed a writ petition
in the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad on
July 14, 1958, aFJ.d prayed that a writ, or a direction
or an appropriate order should be passed against the
appellant quashing the proceedings intended to be
taken against him before the enquiring officer appointed by . the appellant under Rule 5fi of the
Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal)
Rules.
The learned sini:-le Judge who heard the
writ petition held that the respondent being a
gazetted officer, the appellant was bound to grant
his request that the enquiry against him should be
1963
State of U1ttJr Pr11tlesh
v.
Jngendra Singh
Gajendragadkor J.
1963
St•tt •f Utt•r Pr•dtJh
••
Jo101dra Sinth
G1jrndroz .. dk8r J.
200
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [lll64] VOL.
held by the Administrative Tribunal appoin!cd under
the Rules. That is why the writ petition
was
allowed and the _order directing the enquiry to be
held by the appointed authority under l{ule [ifi of
the said Civil Ser\'iccs Rules was quashed.
This order was challenged by the appellant by
an appeal under the Lcltcrs Patent before a Division
Bench of the said High Court.
The Division Bench
agreed with the view taken by the learned single
Judge and dismissed the
appeal. The appellant
then applied for and obtained a certificate from the
said High Court
and it is with the said certificate
that it has come to this Court.
Mr. Hajcla for the appellant contends that the
conclusion reached
by the Courts' below is not
supported on a fair and reasonable construction of
Rule 4 (2) of the Rules.
The appellant's ca~c is that
in the State of U. P. it is competent to the G0vcrnor
to direct that disciplinary proceedings against the
officers specified in Ruic ·.I of the Rules should be
tried before an Administrative Officer,
but there
is no obligation on the Governor in that behalf.
The Governor may, if he so decides direct that the
said enquiry ma)•
be held uuder Rule fi5 of the
Civil Services Rules and conducted by an appropriate
authority appointed in that
behalf.
Whether the
enquiry
should be held by the Administrative
Tribunal, or by an appropriate authority, is a matter
entirely within the discretion of the Go,·ernor .
..
On the other hand, the High Court has held
that so far as cases of gazetted government servants
arc concerned, they are covered by Rule 4 (2) of the
Rules and on a fair construction of the said Ruic, it is
clear that if a gazetted government servant requests
that the enquiry against him should be held by the
Administrative Tribunal, the Governor is bound .to
grant his request. So, the narrow point which arises
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
201
for our decision is which of the two views can be said
to represent correctly the effect of Rule 4 (2) of the
Rules. Rule 4 reads as follows:-
1963
State of Uttar Pradesh
. Y,
.T ogendra Singh
"4.
(1)
The Governor may refer to the
Gajendragadkar /.
tribunal cases relating to an individual
-
government servant or class of governl!lent
servants or
government servants m a
particular area only in respect of matters
involving :-
(a} corruption;
(b) failure to discharge duties properly;
(c) irremediable general inefficiency in
a public servant of more than ten
years' standing; and
(d) personal immorality.
( 2)
The Governor may, in respect
of a gazetted government servant on his
own request, refer his case to the Tribunal in respect of matters referred to in
sub-rule (1)."
It would be noticed that Rule 4 (1) confers discretion on the Governor to refer to the Tribunal cases
falling under clauses (a) to (d) in respect of servants
specified by the first part of sub-rule (1 ). In regard
to these cases, the government servant concerned
cannot claim that the enquiry against him should
not be held by a Tribunal and the matter falls to be
decided solely in the discretion of the Governor.
It is also clear that amongst the classes of servants
•
to whom sub-rule (1) applies, gazetted government
servants are included, so that if Rule 4 (1) had
stood by itself, even gazetted government servants
would have no right to claim that the enquiry
against them should not be h~ld by a Tribunal.
202 . SUPRENIE COURT REPOR ts [1964] VOL.
1963
I(is in the light of this provision that rule 4 (2) has
si.1,.f Utw P•aluh to be considered.
y,
Ja1,.ir• SV.,h
Rule 4 (2) deals with the cia» uf gazetted
govemmcnt servants and gives them the right to
make a request to the Govemor that their cases
should be referred to the Tribunal in rt'Spect of
matters specified in clauses (a) to (d) ofsubrule (1).
The question
for our decision is whether like the
word "may" in rule 4 (I) which confers the discretion on the Governor, the word "may" in subrule (2) confers discretion on him, or docs the word
"may" in sub-rule (2) really mean "shall" or "must"'?
There is no doubt that the word "may" generally
does not mean "must" or "shall". But it is wellsettled that the word "may" is capable of meaning
"must" or "shall" in the light of the context. It
is also clear that where a discretion is conferred
upon a public authority coupled with an obligation,
the word "may" which denotes discretion should be
construed to mean a command. Sometimes,
the
legislature uses the word "may" out of deference to
the high status of the authority on whom the power
and the obligation are intended to be conferred an<l
imposed. In the present case, it is
the context
which is decisive. The whole purpose of rule 4 (2)
would be frustrated if the word "may" in the said
rule receives the same construction as in sub-rule (1).
· It is because in regard to gazetted
government
servants the
discretion had already been given to
the Governor to refer their cases to the Tribunal
that the rule-making authority wanted to make a
special provision in respect of them as distinguished
from other government servants falling
under
rule 4 (1) and rule 4 (2) has been prescribed, otherwise rule 4 (2) would be wholly redundant.
In
other words, the plain and unambiguous object of
enacting rule 4 (2) is to provide an option to the
gazetted government servants to request the Governor
that their cases should be tried by a Tribunal and
'
i
•
2 s.c.:R.
stri>:REM:E COURT REPORTS
203
1963
not otherwise. The rule-making authority pre- .
sumably
thought that
having regard to the StateofUttarPraaah
status of the gazetted government servants, it would
Jogend~~ Singh
be legitimate to give such an opinion to them.
Therefore,
we feel no difficulty in accepting the
Gajendragadkar J,
view taken by the High Court that rule 4(2) imposes
an obligation on the Governor to grant a request made
by the gazetted government servant that his case
should ho referred to the Tribunal under the Rules.
Such a request was admittedly made by the respon·
dent and has not been granted. Therefore, we are
satisfied that the High Court was right in quashing
the proceedings proposed to be · taken by the appe·
Hant against the respondent otherwise than by
referring his case to the Tribunal under the Rules.
The appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed
with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
HARi NARAIN
v.
BADRI DAS
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, M. HIDAYATULLAH,
and J. C. SHAH JJ.)
Supreme Oourt Practice-Revocation of Special Leave
granted earlier by Supreme Oaurt-Effect of inaccurate, untrue
and misleading statements in petition for Special Leave.
The respondent filed a suit for the ejectment of the
appellant. That suit was dismissed by the trial Court. The .
respondent filed an appeal in the Court of the Additional
Sessionsjudge,Jaipur City. The appeal was accepted and
the claim of respondent for ejectment
was allowed. The
appellant filed an appeal in the Rajasthan High Court but
that was dismissed. The High Court also refused to gr~nt a
certificate.°~ fitness to ~ppeal to this Court. The appellant
filed a petitmn for Special Leave to appeal to this Court and
the same was allowed.
1963
March .