# STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH v. LAKSHMI ICE FACTORY & OTHERS

- **Citation:** [1962] Supp. 3 S.C.R. 59
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1959-09-23
- **Bench:** P. B. Gajendragadkar, A. K. Sarkar, K. N. Wanchoo
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/state-of-uttar-pradesh-v-lakshmi-ice-factory-others-2484
- **Pages:** 12

## Headnote

lnclustrial Dispute-Alvard-Pronouncement of in open
cu·urt-Ij im_peral'ive-United Provinces Industrial Disputes Act,·
1947 (U.t'. 28.oj 1947, ss . .J, G-Statutory Orders cl. 9(7).
The Governmenrof U!tar Pradesh under s. 3 of the
U.P. Industrial -Disputes Act, 1947, and the :;tatutory.orders
framed thereunder referred certain disputes between the
respondent Ice liactories .and the respective workmen to an
Industrial Tribunal. The Tribunal heard the matters but failed
to pronounce its award in open Court, as required under the
clause 9 (7J of the Statutory Orders. Instead the Registrar of
the 'l ribunal informed the lee hctories that the a ward of
the Tribunal had been submitted to the Government.
The
award was published in the U.P. Gazette and the Regional·
Conciliation Officer called
upon
the
Ice Factories to
implement the award immediately. The Ice Factories moved
lhe High Court at Allahabad alleging that the award was a
nullity as it had not been pronounced in open _court as required
under the clause 9 (7) of ihe Statutory Orders and asking for
writs to quash it. High Court issued the writs quashing the
Notification publihing the award. 'The qu~stions are whether
the provisions of sub-cl. ( 7) of cl. 9 of the Statutory Orders
a1 e imperative or merely directory and whether that sub-clause
is ultra vires as being in contliCt with the Act under which it
had been framed.
Held, that the clear intention of the legislature is to
make it imperative that judgments should be pronounced
in open court by the 'fribunal and a judgment not so pronounced would therefore be a nullity. The provision in suiJ-cl.( 7) of
cl. 9 of the .Statutory Order is in1perative and not d1r~ctory.
Held, further, that the provisidns as to the pronouncement of the decision in open court contained in cl. ~ ( 7) of the
Statutory Order was clearly within the po,vers contemplated
in s. 3 (g) of the Act and s. 6 of the Act does not prohibit
the making of such provisions. A rule duly framed under the
Act requiring the Tribunal to pronounce its decision in open
court is therefore not in conflict with s. 6 of the Act,
Montreal Street Railway Go. v. Normandin, [1917].A. C.
170, referred to.
1962
Februa1J' 7.
J9ij2
$'/alt of
Utrar l'1a'ft,.'i
, ..
l.a~Jhlfli Ju l"r:c:o~1·
GO
SUPREl\JB COURT HEPOI:TS [1!)62] SUPP.
C1n1. ,\1·rEJ.LA'l'E .JL•msuwTI01\: Civil Appe1ds
No>. :>I and 5:.'/61
Appeals from the 1mlgrncnt ancl decree dated
September :!:3, I \l5U, of the Allahabad Hi"h Court
0
(L11<'lmoll' Bench) at Lucknoll' in C. i\[. Applications
:'llos. l:i (O.J.) and Hi (U .• J.J of HJ,)/ rcspcctiv<'ly.
C. Ii. Auanmfo and C. P. /,n/, fur th<· Appcllanls
(in both tlw a ]l]ll'a Is).
A. V. Viw:l1nat.l1a Snslri'., :;nd /(, /,, Arora, for
Respondent No. I (in both the appeals).
196:!. February 7. The Judgment of the Court
'l°<IS clcliv<·red Ly
SAHKA!t, J.- These two appeals have been
heard together.
Th11 appellants in each case arc
the i:ltate of t:ttar Praclcsh, for sho1 t callcll C. P.
and some of its officers and th~, respondents in one
appeal are Lak.ihmi Ice Factory arnl certain of it.s
workers and in the other the PrakaFh kc Factory
and certain of its workers.
These appeals involv·e
a question of construction of certain provisions of
the C. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 19·17, hereafter
referred to as the Act.
By a Notification issued on February IU, 195G,
the Government of t.:. P. referred o~rtain disput~s
which had cropped up between each of the foe
Factories and its respective workmen, to an Indus.
trial Tribunal for adjudication.
Tho details of
these disputes are not material for these appeals.
Tho Tribunal heard .the matters but failed to pronounce its award in opon court. Instead, on Xovembor 8, 1956, the Registrar of tho Tribunal informed
the Ice }factories that the a.ward of the Tribunal
had boen submitted to the Government. On December, 15, 1956, the a.ward was published in the U. P.
Gazette and it appeared from this publication that
tho a.ward was dated November 8, 195

## Text

'•
s s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPOR'rs
59
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
v.
LAKSHMI ICE FACTORY & OTHERS
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, A. K. SARKAR and K. N.
WANCHOO, JJ.)
lnclustrial Dispute-Alvard-Pronouncement of in open
cu·urt-Ij im_peral'ive-United Provinces Industrial Disputes Act,·
1947 (U.t'. 28.oj 1947, ss . .J, G-Statutory Orders cl. 9(7).
The Governmenrof U!tar Pradesh under s. 3 of the
U.P. Industrial -Disputes Act, 1947, and the :;tatutory.orders
framed thereunder referred certain disputes between the
respondent Ice liactories .and the respective workmen to an
Industrial Tribunal. The Tribunal heard the matters but failed
to pronounce its award in open Court, as required under the
clause 9 (7J of the Statutory Orders. Instead the Registrar of
the 'l ribunal informed the lee hctories that the a ward of
the Tribunal had been submitted to the Government.
The
award was published in the U.P. Gazette and the Regional·
Conciliation Officer called
upon
the
Ice Factories to
implement the award immediately. The Ice Factories moved
lhe High Court at Allahabad alleging that the award was a
nullity as it had not been pronounced in open _court as required
under the clause 9 (7) of ihe Statutory Orders and asking for
writs to quash it. High Court issued the writs quashing the
Notification publihing the award. 'The qu~stions are whether
the provisions of sub-cl. ( 7) of cl. 9 of the Statutory Orders
a1 e imperative or merely directory and whether that sub-clause
is ultra vires as being in contliCt with the Act under which it
had been framed.
Held, that the clear intention of the legislature is to
make it imperative that judgments should be pronounced
in open court by the 'fribunal and a judgment not so pronounced would therefore be a nullity. The provision in suiJ-cl.( 7) of
cl. 9 of the .Statutory Order is in1perative and not d1r~ctory.
Held, further, that the provisidns as to the pronouncement of the decision in open court contained in cl. ~ ( 7) of the
Statutory Order was clearly within the po,vers contemplated
in s. 3 (g) of the Act and s. 6 of the Act does not prohibit
the making of such provisions. A rule duly framed under the
Act requiring the Tribunal to pronounce its decision in open
court is therefore not in conflict with s. 6 of the Act,
Montreal Street Railway Go. v. Normandin, [1917].A. C.
170, referred to.
1962
Februa1J' 7.
J9ij2
$'/alt of
Utrar l'1a'ft,.'i
, ..
l.a~Jhlfli Ju l"r:c:o~1·
GO
SUPREl\JB COURT HEPOI:TS [1!)62] SUPP.
C1n1. ,\1·rEJ.LA'l'E .JL•msuwTI01\: Civil Appe1ds
No>. :>I and 5:.'/61
Appeals from the 1mlgrncnt ancl decree dated
September :!:3, I \l5U, of the Allahabad Hi"h Court
0
(L11<'lmoll' Bench) at Lucknoll' in C. i\[. Applications
:'llos. l:i (O.J.) and Hi (U .• J.J of HJ,)/ rcspcctiv<'ly.
C. Ii. Auanmfo and C. P. /,n/, fur th<· Appcllanls
(in both tlw a ]l]ll'a Is).
A. V. Viw:l1nat.l1a Snslri'., :;nd /(, /,, Arora, for
Respondent No. I (in both the appeals).
196:!. February 7. The Judgment of the Court
'l°<IS clcliv<·red Ly
SAHKA!t, J.- These two appeals have been
heard together.
Th11 appellants in each case arc
the i:ltate of t:ttar Praclcsh, for sho1 t callcll C. P.
and some of its officers and th~, respondents in one
appeal are Lak.ihmi Ice Factory arnl certain of it.s
workers and in the other the PrakaFh kc Factory
and certain of its workers.
These appeals involv·e
a question of construction of certain provisions of
the C. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 19·17, hereafter
referred to as the Act.
By a Notification issued on February IU, 195G,
the Government of t.:. P. referred o~rtain disput~s
which had cropped up between each of the foe
Factories and its respective workmen, to an Indus.
trial Tribunal for adjudication.
Tho details of
these disputes are not material for these appeals.
Tho Tribunal heard .the matters but failed to pronounce its award in opon court. Instead, on Xovembor 8, 1956, the Registrar of tho Tribunal informed
the Ice }factories that the a.ward of the Tribunal
had boen submitted to the Government. On December, 15, 1956, the a.ward was published in the U. P.
Gazette and it appeared from this publication that
tho a.ward was dated November 8, 1956.
On
December 26, 1956, the Regional Conciliation Offi·
cer appointed under tho Aot oallod upon the Ioe
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
61
Factories to implement the award immedhtely.
Thereupon the Ice Factories moved the High Court
at Alh.h1,b<t'1 on J'1nu'try 3, 1957 uuder Art. 226 of
the C'.lnstitution for writs qu!l.shing tll8 award and
prohibiting the Government and the workmen from
taking steps to implement it. They contended that
the award sought to be enforced was a nullity as it
had not been pronounced in open court as required
by certain rules to which reference will presently
be made.
B:v a judgment passed on September 23,
1959, the High Court allowed the petitions of the
Ice Factories and issued writR quashing the Notification publishing the award.
The appeals are against
this judgment of the High Court.
Section. 3 of the Act gives the Government
power in certain circumstances to make provisions
by general, or
special order (1)
for appointing
IndustriP 1 courts, (2) for referring any industrial
dispute for adjudication in the manner provided in
the order and (~)for matters incidental or supplementary to the other provisions of the order. Under
this
power the
Government
had
issued an
Order dated July 14, 1954 and this Order is hereafter called the "Statutory Order." It was under
powers conferred by the Act read with the Statutory
Order that the Government had issued tho N otification of February 10, 1956.
In exercise of powers confrrred by cl. 8 of
the Statutory Order the GoYernment had set up the
· Tribunal. ClauRe 9 of the Statutory Order provides
for the procedure to be followed by the Tribunal.
Sub-clause (7) of this clause is in these terms: "The
decision of the Tribunal shall be in writing and
shall be pronounced in open court :md dated and
·signed by the member or members of the Tribunal,
as the case may be, at the time of pronouncing it."
Clause I 1 of the Statutory Order gives power to
Government to refer any industrial dispute to the
Tribunal.
Sub-clause (9) of cl. 9 of the Statutory Order
State of
Uttar P1adejh
v.
La~shmi lee Factory
Sarkar J.
•
J9G2
8f11!t of
Uttar f',Qdtsh
v.
L'l~lhmi let F.Jctory
Sarkar .J.
•
62
SUPRE~IE COURT REPORTS (1962] SUPP.
gives power to the Tribunal to make Standing Orders
relat.ing to its practice and procedure.
Under this
sub-clause the Tribunal framed certain Standing
Orclcrs.
8tanding Orrlcr N'o. 36 provided.
",Judgment shall be pronounced in open court either
immediately aft1•r the close of the arguments or on
a subsequent date of which previous notice shall be
given to thn parties. It shall then bn signe<l and
dated by the Tribunal."
Acting presumably un<ler Standing Order No.
36, the Tribunal in tho preRent ca~e had fix!>rl a
date on which it would pronounce its judgment in
open court..
This date d&R not. appear on the
recorrl hut on September 2;;, 190ll. the Tribunal
informed the parties that the date for pronouncing
the award had been changed to October· !l, l!l5fl.
On that date, however, the award \\"U~ not pronounced in open court, nor was any intim>ttion of any
other <late for its pronouncement gh·en to the part.iPs.
Th<• Ire Factories first came to know of the making
of the award from th<• IPtter of the Jll'gistrar of the
Tribunal date1l ~ovPmher 8, 1!)56 ea~lier referred
to. The award harl in fact, ne,·er heen prnnounced
in opPn court..
The first question is whether the provisions
in suh cl. (i) of d. !l nrc imperat.i"<"c.
The High
Court. held that. they wi:-re and thereupon ciuashe<l
the ~otific'ltion publi~l1ing the awn.rd.
The appcl-
!Ants contend that the High Court was in error arid
that the proYisions arc only directory and that tho
failure of· th<' TrilJ11nal to pronounce thf' award in
open Cnurt. did n·it result in thr a\rnrd l1ceoming
\•oid.
The Jee Fantories conl("nd for the rontrnry
view.
Mr. Aggarwala for tho nppellnnts rP.ferred us
to the rulP of cnn~truction •tat.er] in llfa:rn ell rn
Interpretation of Statutes, 10th ed. at: p. 381, which
iR as followA: "Whcne the prf'~<·ript.ionA of a statutcr!'late to the performance of a public. duty ond
•
·•
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
63
where the invalidation of acts done fo neglect of
them would work B()rious general inconvenience or
injustice to persons who have no control over those
entrusted with thP, duty without promoting the
essential aims of the Legishture, such prescriptions
seem to be generally understood as mere instrur~
tions for the guidance and government of those on
whom the duty is imposed, or, in other words as
directory only''. Ho said that sub cl. (7) of cl. 9 of
the Statutory Order imposed a public duty on the
Tribunal and as none of the contesting partiP.S to
the proceedings before the Tribune,] had any control over it, the provision in the Statutory Order as
to how the Tribunal is to discharge its duty must be
regarded as merely directory and therefore a disre.>-
gard of that provision by the Tribunal would not
render the thing done by it a nullity.
It seems to us that the rule read from Maxwell
is· not applicable to this case. It applies only when to
]lold the prescriptions in a statute as to the performance of a public duty to be imperative would work
injustice and hardship without serving the object of
the _statute. None of these _conditions are· present in
the statute now before us. The mle may be illustrated
by reference to the case of JJfontreal Street Railway Go.
v. Normandin(') 'which is cited in MaxwPl!'s book.
That was a case in ;vhich certain st11t11tury provi:
sions as to how the jnry list was to b" revised had not
been followed and the question arose whether the
verdict of a jury empannellcd out of a list revised in
_ disregard of the provision was a nullity. It was held
that the verdict was not a nu!lit.y as the provision
regarding tbe revision of the jury list was merely
directory. It was further held that the object of
the provision was to distribute the burden of jury
equally between all liable to it, to secure effective
jurorn likely to attend a.nd lastly to prevent packing
of the jury. It Wits said that "It docs far less harm
to allow cases tried hy a jury former! as this one was
(ll
[1917] A. C.
170.
1962
State of
Uttar Pradesh
v.
Lakshmi Ice Facfory
S-.irkar J.
1!162
Stal,. of
l...:ttn, Prad;~h
Y.
Laksl,mi la FarfOI)'
Sarkar .J,
64 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [I!H12J SUPP.
with the opportunities there would ho ohject to
any unq1mlified man called into tho hox, t~ stnnd
irood, than to hold the proceedings nnll and voi<l.
So to bold would not, of course, prevent the court.s
Q'ritnt.in!! now trials in casoR where there was rP.a•on
to think that a fair trial had not bePn had":
(P. l 7!l).
The case in bantl is whollv difforont. Th"
prooeodinQ'B that were had hef'orP the Trihunnl .wonlrl
not becomA null and void if we hold cl. 917) of tho
Statut.-0rv Or<ler to he imperativP.
A view that. the
nrovi•ion was imperative woul<l can~" no sPrions
hardRhip to anv one.
The Government. can alwavs
require the Tribunal t.o prononncp it.s drrision in
open court, Pxtending, if nec<>ssarv for I.he pnrpORf' ..
tho time fixed for gh·ing its ilPcision. Eithrr part.v
to t.hc proMP<l ing can also ask the Gnvernment. to
call upon the Tribunal to nronmmce it.s awnrd in
open conrt. There is no doubt that tho Gm·Prn·
ment will so ca.ll npon the Tribunal when t.he <l"f1wt.
is brought to its notice for tho Govornmrnt itsl']f
referred the matter to the Tribunal for its <lecision.
As soon as the Trihnnn 1 pronounces its award in
open court, the proceedings ,dll °beMrne ·fully effcc·
ti\•p,
It is also an accepted rule of construction that
1ma.otmentR regulating the nroce<lure in courtf! ar1>
usnallv imperative : Maxwell on Interpretation of
Statutes, I 0th ed. p. 379. It further appears to us
1hat tho object of th" legislaturf'\ won Id bo defeated
hy rl':.iling cl. 9(7\ of the Statut.orv Order as Mnt.riining a provision which is merelv directory. W" now
procecrl to ascertain that ohject. from tho other
provisions in the Statutory Oriler, the Act anrl
connected legislation.
SMtion fl of tho U. P. Act proviiles as
follows:-
(I) When an authority to which
An
industrial disput-0 has been referred for
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT . REPORTS
65
adjudication has completed its enquiry,
it shall, within such time as may be
specified, submit its award to the State
Government.
(2) The State Governlll!:nt may ..... .
enforce for such period as it:"fuay specify
all or any of the decisions in the award.
It was under this section th&t the Tribunal submitted
its award to the Government and the Government
issued the Notification in the Gazette dated December 15, 1956 earlier mentioned and directed that the
award be enforced for 3! period of one year from the
date of the publication.
Since the award has to be submitted to the
Government by the Tribunal under s. 6 of the Act,
the award has to be in writing, for a verbal award
cannot obviously be submitted to the Government.
It would therefore appear that the provision in subcl. (7) of cl. 9 of the Statutory Order that the decision of the Tribunal shall be in writing is imperative,
~his would be an indication that the other provisions in the same sub-clause connected with it were
intended to be equally imperative.
Then we find that cl. 18 of the Statutory Order
is in these terms : "The Tribunal or the adjudicator shall hear the dispute and give its or his decision
within 180 days (excluding holidays but not annual
vacations observed by courts subordinate to the
High Courtj from the date of reference made to it or
him by the State Government and shall thereafter
as soon as possible, supply a copy of the same to
the parties to the dispute ............... Provided that
the State Government may extend the said period
from time to time." It seems to us that the provision in this clause in clearlymandatory. The Tribunal
: has no power to make an award after the time men-
, tioned in it; if it had, the proviso to cl. 18 would be
wholly unnecessary. The result therefore is that it is
196:!
State of
Uttor Ptaliesh
v.
Laksluni Ice Factory
Sarkar J.
1962
State of
Uttor Pradesh
v.
La/t;J/imi Jc, Factory
Sarkar J.
66 SUPREME cou1iT REP01i'rs [1962) stJ.t>t>.
obligatory on the Tribunal to give its decision
within 180 days from the date of the reference. A
decision given, that is an award made, boyoud
this period would Le . a nullity.
Now when cl. 18
talks of giving a decision, it can only mean· giving
it iri the manner indicated in sub-cl. (7) of cl. !J uf
the Statutory Order, that is, by pronouncing it in
open court, for that" is the only manner of giving
a decision which that
order contemplates.
It
would follow that the terms of cl. 9(7) were imperative, for otherwise no one would know whether
the terms of cl. 18 of the Statutory Order had bc<'n
complied with, that is to say, no one would know
whether the award was void or not. The provisio1:s
of cl. 18 m&y thus be rendered nugatory by hc,l<ling cl. 9(7) to ho only directory. It would follow
that unless the provision as to the pronouncement
of the award in open court was mcndatory, the
int-0ntion of the framers of the Statutory Ordc;
would be defeated.
Sub-clause (2) of cl.
24
of the Statutory
Or<ler also leads to the same conclusion.
That
sub-clause is in thPse terms : "Clerical or arith·
metical mistakes in decisions or awards, or errors
arising therein from any accidental slip or omission may, within one month of giving the decision
or award be corrected by the Tribunal or the
adjudicator, either of ita or his mm motion or on
the application of any of the partie5.''
Under this
rule therefore clerical or arithmetical errors or
slip~ may be
correct~d within one month of the
giving of the decision and the part.ies have the
right to apply for such corrections within that t.ime.
The Tribunal has no right to correct an error beyond that time. Nor has a party a right to move
tho Tribunal for making any such corrections after
the time has expired.
In order that the intention of cl. 24 (2) may be
given effect to, it is necessary that the date of the
3 S.C.R.
SUPRiJiME CODRT REPoR'tS
~I,.
67
giving of the decision should be known. It cannot
promptly be known to the parties unless the award
is pronounced in open court. If any other manner
of the giving of the decision was permissible as
would be the result if it was not obligatory to pronounce the decision in open court, then a party
may be deprived of its right under cl. 24 to move
the Tribunal for correction of errors. It· is for
this reason that cl. 9(7) provides that the decision
shall be dated and signed at the time of pronouncing it in open court. This signing and dating
of the award after its pronouncement in open
court makes it possible to see whether the terms of
els. 18 a.nd 24 (2) have been complieg with in any
case.
The third thing which to our mind indicates
that pronouncement in open court is essential is
cl. 31 of the Statutory Order. That clause is in
these terms : "Except as provided in this Order and
in the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act,
1950, every order made or direction issued under
the provisions of this Order shall be final and conclusive and shall not be questioned by any party
thereto in any proceedings." The Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950 provides for
appeals from decisions of certain Industrial Tribunals to the Appellate Tribunal established under it.
Clause 31 therefore makes a decision of the Tribunal on a reference to it final subject to an appeal
if any allowed under the Industrial Disputes (A ppellate Tribunal) Act, 1950. Under s. 7 of the Act
of 1950, an appeal shall lie to the Appellate Tribunal from any award or decision of an Industrial
Tribunal concerning certain specified matters. Now
an Industrial Tribunal mentioned in s. 7 includes
a Tribunal set up under a State law which law does
not provide for an appeal : see s. 2(c)(iii) of the Act
of 1!150.
The U. P. Act does not provide for any
appeal expressly but cl. 31 of the :Statutory Order
makes a decision of the Tribunal final subject to
196.I
State ~J
Uttar Pradesh
v.
Lokshrr.i le~ Factory
~ tfrkor J.
,
1961
Btall of
Uflar Pradt:1h
v,
Lak.shmi Jee Fatf01y
Sarkar J.
68 SUPREME COURT REPORTR [1962] SUPJ'.
the provisions of the Act of 1!)50. It would therefore appear that an appeal would lie under the
Act of 1950 tu the Appcllat~ Tribunal constittlted
unclcr it from a docision of a Tribunal set up under
the Statutory Order.
No"' u11dcr s. I 0 of the Act
of l!JiiO, an ~p1wal is <·oinpetcnt if preferred within
thirty days from th<· date of the publication of the
award where such pub Ii cat ion is provided for by the
law under which the award is made, or from the date
of the maki11g of the award where thf:'re is no provision for such publication. Now the C'.P. Act or the
Statutory Order does not provide for any publication of an award. Therefnrn an appPal from the
Tribunal ort. up under the St1itutory Order has
to be filed within thirty clays from the making of
the award.
Hence again it is essential that the
date of the making of the award shall be known to
the ·parties to !'Bable them tu avail themselves of
the right of appeal. This cannot be known unless
tho judgment i~ pronouncer! in open court for the date
of award is the date of its pronouncement. Henco
again pronouncement of the judgment in open
court is ess<"ntial.
[fit were not so, the provisions
for appeal might be n·n<lcrcd i11efl'ective.
For all these reasons it seems to us that the
clear intention uf the legislature iH to make it
imperative that judgmPnts should be
pronounC<~d
in open court by the Tribmial and judgments not
so pronounced woulcl therefore be a nullity.
In the view that we have taken it is unneces·
Hary tu deal separately with Standing Order No. 36.
The provisions of that Sttl.nding Order and cl. 9( 7)
of the Statutory Order are substantially the same.
They should therefore be interpreted in the same
way. In any case since we have held the cl. 9(7)
of the Statutory Order to be imperative, it would
not matter whatever view iH taken of the Standing
Order for the latter cannot affect the former.
• I
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
69
Mr. Aggarwala then argued that cl. 9(7} of the
Statutory Order and Standing Order No.
36 were
ultra vires as being in conflict with the Act under
which they had been framed. His contention was
this :
Under s. 6 of the Act all that the Tribunal
has to do is to submit its award to the Government
after the conclusion of the enquiry before it. The
section does not require the Tribunal to pronounce
its decision in open court. The provisions in the
St.'ltutory Order and the Standing Order both of
which were made under powers contained in the
Act, were therefore in conflic1;
with s. 6 and of
no effect.
Hence he contended that the question
whether the provisions of cl. 9(7} of the Statutory
Order or of the Standing Order No. 36 were imperative did not really arise.
It seems to us that this contention of Mr.
Aggarwala is without any foundation.
Section 6
when it requires that the Tribunal shall submit its
award to the Government necessarily contemplates
the making of the award. Neither s. 6 nor any other
provision in the Act provides how the award is to
be made.
Under s. 3(g) however the Government has
power by general or special order to provide for
incidental or supplementary matters necessary for
the decision of an industrial dispute referred for
adjudication under any order made under s. 3. The
provision as to the pronouncement of the decision
in open court in cl. 9(7) of the Statutory Order
clearly is within the powers contemplated ins. 3(gl.
Section 6 does not prohibit the making of such a
provision. Its main purpose is to direct that the
Tribunal shall submit the award to the Government
so that it may be enforced. It has nothing to do
with the mam1er i~ which tho Trib111111! js to ma~e
1962
State of
U tear Pradesh
v.
Lakshmi lee F tJClory
Sarkar J.
..
1962
Shtenf
Utlar l'radtth
v.
La~sf.mi !cl F•clory
Sark•r J,
I9Ct
Feirlmr;• i'.
70 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
its award.
A rule duly framed
under the Act
requiring the Tribunal to pronounce its decision in
open court is therefore not in conflict with s. H.
The result is that these appeals fail and are
dismissed with costs.
Appeals di.smis.~ed.
RA:IIA KRISHNA RAMANA'J'H
v.
THE .JANPAD SABHA, GONDIA
(B. P. 81'.l'HA, C .. T., K. Sr:BBA R..i.o, ~. RA.JAGOPAT.A
An'ANGAP., .J. R. Mr:DHOLKAR and T. L.
VENKATARAMA AYYAR, J.J.)
!Jegi~lative /)nu·er-'1
1errninal Tax-[n1pru1ition by Dist.rirt
Counr.il under Proi:i11cirzl Strif?t!r:-Con.'ltitution .4ct Placing ta:r
in
}'etl".ral
Legis{afit'e
List-i'Jciring 7)rrn:ision-Po1l'er of
l)ro1·;ncin.l
legislatur~ to continue ta:r-C.l'. and lferar local
Self Uot'unw:nt Act, 1920 (C. P. 4 of 1920)-C.P. aud llerar
J.oco! IJ01,ernm.ent Act, 1948 (C.P . .18 of l.?48). s. /!12-C.l'.
and Bmn· f,oca.l G'o;·mzment (Amendmwr) Act, 1.?49 (':.P. 32
nf /!149)--G'overnment of India Act, 104J (.1G <Im. 5 CJ" 2. ),
8. J.13 (2).
Cnder the C. P. and Berar Local Self Government Act
1920, the District Council of Bhandara. in 1925, imposed a
te<minal tax on the export of bidis and birli lea\-cs by rail
out of Rhandara district. By the Govrrnrnent of India Act,
1q35, ter1ninal tax '"'as included in the Federal Legislati\•e
List but s. 143 (2) of the Act prO\·idecl that such a tax which
was being la\vfully levied under a la\\' in force on January I,
1935, n1ay continue to he levied
until
provision to the
c0ntrary was macic hy the Federal l.c~gi~lature.. 1~he District
Council continued to leavy and collect thr: tax. In 1948 the
C P. an<l Berar Local Government Act, 1948, can1e into force
which repealed the 1920 Act.
It replaced
the District
Council, Bhandara, with three Janapada Sabhas. Clause (c}
of the proviso ti> the saving section s. 192 provided that aH
rates, taxes an<l cessr.s due to the District Council
sh~II be
de~u1ed lo be due to the Sabha to whose ar<a they pert'ltl\Cq.