# STRA"WBOARD MANUFACTURING CO., LTD v. • GU'rTA MILL \VORKERS' UNION. THE STATE OF U. P.: INTERVENER

- **Citation:** [1953] 1 S.C.R. 439
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1950-02-18
- **Bench:** Mehr Chand Mahajan, Das, BHAGWA'l'I
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/stra-wboard-manufacturing-co-ltd-v-gu-rta-mill-vorkers-union-the-state-of-u-p-32
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

.
U. P. Industrial Dispntes Act, 1947, s. G-U. P. General
Clauses Act, 1904, ss. 14, 21-lndustrial Dispide-ReferencePower to e:ctend time for mxkinJ award-Award made after timeValidity-Subsequent extension of time-Effect.
On February 18, 1950, the Governor of Uttar Pradesh referred an industrial dispute to the Labour Commissioner or a person
nominated by him with the direction that the award shonld be
submitted not later than April 5, 1950. The award, however,
was m.ade on April 13, and on April 26, the Governor issued a
notification' extending the time for making the award up to
April 30:.
Held, (i) in view of the language of s. 6 of the U .· P. Industrial
Disputes Act, 194 7, anc1 in the absence of a provision like that
contained in the proviso tor. 16 of the Governor's rrotification dated
:lfarch 15, 1951, the State Government had no authority whatever to ex tend the time, and the adjudicator became fnnctus
officio on the expiry of the time fixed in the originn,l order of reference and the award was therefore one made without jnrisdiction
and a nullity.
(ii) Section 14 of the U. P. General Clauses Act, 1904, did not
in terms or by necessary implication give any s'uch power of
e~teusion of time to the State Government.
·
(iii) Though the order of April 26 did ex facie purport to modify
the order of Februn,i:y 18, in view of the absence of any distinct
provision in s. 21 of the 'C. P. General Cln,uses Act, 1904, that the
power of amendment and modification conferred on the State
Government may he so exercised as to lrnve retrospective opera·
tion, the order of April 26, viewed merely as an order of amendment'or modification, cannot, by virtue of s. 21, have retrospective
effect.
Baja Har Narain Singh v. Chmu]hrai11 Bhagwant Kuar (L.R.
18 I.A. u5) applied.
Jetha Lal Lakshmi Chand Shah v. Amrita. Lal Ojha (I.L.R.
[1938] 2 Cal. 482), Lord v. Lee (L.R. 3 Q.B. 404), Dentron v. Strong
(hR. !J Q.B.117), Mny v. Harconrt (L.R. 13 Q.B.D, G88) distinguisliocl.
57
195:!
Dec. 17,
440
SUPREME COUR'l' REPORTS
[1953]
195~
CrvIL APPELLATE
JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal
Strawboard .No. 134 of 195 l. Appeal from tbe .Judgment and
Manufacturing Order dated 20tb November, 1950, of tbe JJabour
Co., Ltd.
Appellate Tribunal, Lucknow, in Appeal No. 10 of
v.
1950.
Gutta J.fill
!Vorker1' Union.
Bakshi Tele Chand and Veda Vyasa (S. R. Kapur,.
with them) for tbe appellants.
Sha1tka.t Hussain for the respondent.
Bishen Singh for the intervener.
1952. December 17. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
DAS J.-'fhis appeal has been filed with the special
leave granted by this Court on May 10, 1951.
By
the order granting such leave the appeal has been
restricted to one point only, namely, "whether the
GoYernment of Uttar Pradesh had the power to
extend the time for making the award ex post facto,
i.e., after the time limit originally fixed therefor had
' d ,,
expire .
There is no dispute 'as to the facts. An industrial
dispute having arisen between the appellant company and its employees, by Labour Department
Notification No. 637 (S'r)/XVIII-53 (ST)/50 dated
February ,18; HJ50, the Governor of Uttar Pradesh
was pleased, in exercise of the powers conferred by
section 3 read with section 4 of the U. P. Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 (U. P. Act No. XXVIII of 1947),
to refer the said dispute to the Labour Commissioner,
U. P., or a Conciliation Officer of the State Government nominated by him for adjudication on seven
several issues specified therein and to direct the
adjudicator to conclude the adjudication proceedings
and submit bis award to the Government not later
than April 5, 1950.
'l'he Labour Commissioner by
his letter No. I.M.R. 14-A nominated Shri M. P.
Vidyarthi. Regional Conciliation Officer, U. P., as
the adjudicator in the above dispute with a direction
that he shonld submit his award by March 25, 1950,
11nd that if the proceedings were not likely to be
j
----
-
S.C.R.
SUPREM~ COURT RE1POR1S
441
completed within that time he should move the
I952
Gov

## Text

-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
439
STRA"WBOARD MANUFACTURING CO., LTD.
v.
•
GU'rTA MILL \VORKERS' UNION.
THE STATE OF U. P.: INTERVENER.
[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, DAS and BHAGWA'l'I JJ.]
.
U. P. Industrial Dispntes Act, 1947, s. G-U. P. General
Clauses Act, 1904, ss. 14, 21-lndustrial Dispide-ReferencePower to e:ctend time for mxkinJ award-Award made after timeValidity-Subsequent extension of time-Effect.
On February 18, 1950, the Governor of Uttar Pradesh referred an industrial dispute to the Labour Commissioner or a person
nominated by him with the direction that the award shonld be
submitted not later than April 5, 1950. The award, however,
was m.ade on April 13, and on April 26, the Governor issued a
notification' extending the time for making the award up to
April 30:.
Held, (i) in view of the language of s. 6 of the U .· P. Industrial
Disputes Act, 194 7, anc1 in the absence of a provision like that
contained in the proviso tor. 16 of the Governor's rrotification dated
:lfarch 15, 1951, the State Government had no authority whatever to ex tend the time, and the adjudicator became fnnctus
officio on the expiry of the time fixed in the originn,l order of reference and the award was therefore one made without jnrisdiction
and a nullity.
(ii) Section 14 of the U. P. General Clauses Act, 1904, did not
in terms or by necessary implication give any s'uch power of
e~teusion of time to the State Government.
·
(iii) Though the order of April 26 did ex facie purport to modify
the order of Februn,i:y 18, in view of the absence of any distinct
provision in s. 21 of the 'C. P. General Cln,uses Act, 1904, that the
power of amendment and modification conferred on the State
Government may he so exercised as to lrnve retrospective opera·
tion, the order of April 26, viewed merely as an order of amendment'or modification, cannot, by virtue of s. 21, have retrospective
effect.
Baja Har Narain Singh v. Chmu]hrai11 Bhagwant Kuar (L.R.
18 I.A. u5) applied.
Jetha Lal Lakshmi Chand Shah v. Amrita. Lal Ojha (I.L.R.
[1938] 2 Cal. 482), Lord v. Lee (L.R. 3 Q.B. 404), Dentron v. Strong
(hR. !J Q.B.117), Mny v. Harconrt (L.R. 13 Q.B.D, G88) distinguisliocl.
57
195:!
Dec. 17,
440
SUPREME COUR'l' REPORTS
[1953]
195~
CrvIL APPELLATE
JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal
Strawboard .No. 134 of 195 l. Appeal from tbe .Judgment and
Manufacturing Order dated 20tb November, 1950, of tbe JJabour
Co., Ltd.
Appellate Tribunal, Lucknow, in Appeal No. 10 of
v.
1950.
Gutta J.fill
!Vorker1' Union.
Bakshi Tele Chand and Veda Vyasa (S. R. Kapur,.
with them) for tbe appellants.
Sha1tka.t Hussain for the respondent.
Bishen Singh for the intervener.
1952. December 17. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
DAS J.-'fhis appeal has been filed with the special
leave granted by this Court on May 10, 1951.
By
the order granting such leave the appeal has been
restricted to one point only, namely, "whether the
GoYernment of Uttar Pradesh had the power to
extend the time for making the award ex post facto,
i.e., after the time limit originally fixed therefor had
' d ,,
expire .
There is no dispute 'as to the facts. An industrial
dispute having arisen between the appellant company and its employees, by Labour Department
Notification No. 637 (S'r)/XVIII-53 (ST)/50 dated
February ,18; HJ50, the Governor of Uttar Pradesh
was pleased, in exercise of the powers conferred by
section 3 read with section 4 of the U. P. Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 (U. P. Act No. XXVIII of 1947),
to refer the said dispute to the Labour Commissioner,
U. P., or a Conciliation Officer of the State Government nominated by him for adjudication on seven
several issues specified therein and to direct the
adjudicator to conclude the adjudication proceedings
and submit bis award to the Government not later
than April 5, 1950.
'l'he Labour Commissioner by
his letter No. I.M.R. 14-A nominated Shri M. P.
Vidyarthi. Regional Conciliation Officer, U. P., as
the adjudicator in the above dispute with a direction
that he shonld submit his award by March 25, 1950,
11nd that if the proceedings were not likely to be
j
----
-
S.C.R.
SUPREM~ COURT RE1POR1S
441
completed within that time he should move the
I952
Government for extension of time at lea'lt a week beStrawboard
fore the specified date.
By Notification No. 897 Manuf.icturing
(ST)/XVIII-53 (S'r)/50 dated March 2·0, 1950, th"e
co., Ltd.
Governor was pleased to order that the adjudicator
v.
should also adjudicate on an additional issue formulGutta, M"iU
ated therein.
By a further Notification No. 950 Workers Unio,..
(ST)/XVIII-53 (ST)/50 dated March 24, 1950, the
Das J.
Governor was pleased to refer another additional
issue for the decision of the adjudicator.
The adjudicator did not make his award on or before April
5, 1950, as directed by the first order of reference
but made his award on April 13, 1950, that is to say,
8 days after the expiry ·of the time originally fixed
for the making of the award.
About thirteen days
after the delivery of the award Labour Department
Notification No. 1247 (ST)/XVIII-53 (ST)/50 was
issued on April 26, 1950, whereby the Governor was
pleased, in exercise of powers conferred by section ~
read with section 4 of the Act. to allow the adjudicator in the said dispute to submit his award by
April 30, 1950.
Thereafter by Notification No. 1447
(ST)/XVIH-53(ST)/50 dated August 1, 1950, the
Governor was pleased, in exercise of powers conferred by section 6 (2) read with sections 3 and 4
of the Act, to order that the award be enforced for a
period of six months from the date of that order in
the first ins.tance and thereafter for such further
period as might be prescribed.
On August 17, 1950, the appellant company preferred an appeal against the award to the Labour
Appellate
Tribunal
c.ontending,
inter alia,
as
follows:-
"That the award dated April 13, 1950, is vitiated,
having been given after the expiry of the time limit.
(a) In its order dated Februa,ry 18, 1950, para.
(5), Government directed the adjndicator to conclude
the proceediugs and submit his a.ward not later than
the 5th April, 1950. The award is dated 13th April,
l950.
The Government, however, tried to remedy
442
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
fl953j
1952
this defect by the issue of G.0. No. 1247 (ST)
Stra,,·board
XVIH-53 .(S.1')/50 dated.April 26, 1950,. but under
,1rannfaotur'ing the law this IS of no avail.
To be a valid ex.tension
co., Ltd.
ol' date granted to the adjudicator, Government
v.
order should have been issued before the 5th April,
Gutt~ u,zz
1950, to keep the authority of the adjudicator alive.
Work~,., Un.an. On the da.te the adjudicator made the award, i.e., 13th
Das-;.
April, 1950, be bad no power to make a.n award."
The App&llate Tribunal by its decision given on
November 20, 1950, dismissed the a pp ea! with the
following observations on
the
point mentioned
above.
·
·
"With regard to the last point our view is that as
the Government had the authority under section 6 of
the Act to fix time limit for submitting an award it
bad also the necessary and incidental power to extend
. the time limit originally fixed, if it considered it
necessary.
The first proviso to section 3 empowers
the Provincial Government to add more matters for
adjudication.
It is obvious that additions to the
matters already referred to would or may take more
time than what had been originally estimated, and so
it may lead to an impossible position if the Government bad no power to extend the time originally fixed
by it, and it makes no difference, in our opinion,
whether the time is extended before or after the
expiry of the time originally limited."
'l'be present appeal is against that ·decision of
the Appella.te Tribunal but limited to the question
hereinbefore mentioned.
Dr. Tek Chand appearing in support of this appeal
urges that the adjudicator derived his authority under
the order made by No.tification No. 637, dated
February 18, 1950.
Section 6 (1) provides that the
adjudicator "shall, within such time as may be
specified, submit its award to the State Government."
The time specified by the order was" not later than
April 5, 1950."
On the expiry of that time the
adjudicator became functus officio an.a had no power
9r authority to make the award. It 1s tr!fe that two
-
_.... -
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-
S.O.R.
StJPR:8ME COURT R:EiPOR'rs
443
more issues were, by the two subsequent orders, added
19611
to the list of issues to be determined by the adjudiStrawboa,rd
cator but those issues, Dr. Tek Chand submits, did Manufactu,.inrJ
not involve any detailed investigation ii:i.to fatts
Co., Ltd.
necessitating any further time for making the award.
v.
lJearned counsel contends that the U. P. Act under
Gutta Mill
considerati9n has no provision empowering the State Woricer!_Un·ioii.
Government to enlarge the time for the making of
Das J.
the award by the adjudicator.
In the circumstances,
if the State Government took the view that the
addition of those two issues would render the time
specified in the original order inadequate for the purpose it should have cancelled the previous notification and issued a fresh notification referring all the
issues to the adjudicator and specifying a fresh period
of time within which he was to make his award.
The State Government did not adopt that course. ·
What it purported to do was to extend the time for
making the award not only after the time originally
fixed had expired but also after the award had
actually been submitted.
'l'he argument is that even
assuming but not admitting that the. State Government had the power to extend the time before the
time had expired it certainly had no power to do so
after the award had been made, for it was meaningless, urges Dr. Tek Chand, to extend the time to do an
act which had already been done. He refers us to the
decision of the Judicial Committee in RnjnHar Narain
Singh v. Ohaudhmin Bhagwant Ku.nr(1) where it was
held that under the Code of Civil Procedure of 1882
the Court had no power to extend the time for making
the award after the award had been filed. Section 514
of that Code enabled the Court to g11ant a further. time
and from time to.time to enlarge the period for the
deli very of the award but section 521 provided that
no award shall be valid unless made within the period
allowed by the Court.-
Their Lordships of the Privy
Council took the view that it would not have been
competent for the Court to extend the time after the
award had been made, for once the award was made
\I) L.R. 18 !.A. 55; 13 All.JOO
444
SUPREME COUR'I' REPORTS
[1953]
1952
and delivered the power of the Court under section
Strawboa,·d
514 was spent and that although the Court had the
Manufacturing fullest power to enlarge the time under that section as
Co., Ltd.
lottg as th'e awa:'rd was not completed it no longer posv.
sessed any such power when once the award was made.
Gutla Mill
In order to give full effect to section 521 the Judicial
Work<>>::'._Uni0>» Committee had to confine the exercise of.the power
Das J.
to extend the time given to the Court by section 514
to a point of time before the awar'd had been made.
'l'his decision was relied upon by Mr. Justice Harrington sitting singly on the Original Side of the Calcutta
High Court in Shib Krishna Dawn & ·co. v. SrLtish
Chander Dutt(') which was a case governed by the
Code of 1908. The learned Judge overlooked the
fact that paragraph 8 of the Second Schedule to the
Code of 1908 which corresponded to section 514 of
the Code of 1882 expressly conferred power on the
Court to allow further time and from time to time,
.either before or after the expiration of the period fixed for the making of the award, to enlarge such period
and 'that paragraph 15 which corresponded to section
521 of the Code of 1882 contained no provision
that an award made out of time was ipso facto invalid
and that consequently the reasoning underlying the
decision of the Judicial Committee iu the case of Raja
Har Narain Singh v. Chaudhrain Bhagwant Kitar (")
had no application to the case before him, which was
governed by the Code of UJ08.
Having regard to
the difference in the language of the relevant provisions of the two Codes, the correctness 0f the decision of Harrington J. was doubted by Mr. Justice
Chitty also sitting singly on the Original Side of the
Calcutta High Court in Sri Lal v. Arjitn Das(').
Eventually the decision of Mr. Justice Harrington
was dissented from by a Division Bencq of the same
High Court sitting in appeal from the Original Side
in Jetha Lal Laxmi Chand Shah v. Amrita Lal Ojha('),
which held that the Court had power to enlarge the
time for making t'he award even after the award had
(r} I.L.R. 38Cal.522.
\2) 18 I.A. 55.
f3) 18C.\V.N. 1325.
141 l.L R. [1938] 2 Cai. ,s,; 42 r.w.x. ss3•
> -
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S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPOR'rS
445
ac.itually been made.
The learned Judges in the last
mentioned case referred to and relied on the case of
1952
Strawboard
Lord v. Lee(1).' Reference has also been made by Manufacturing
learned· counsel for the respondents to Dentron• v.
co., Ltd.
Strong( 2) and to May v. Harcourt( 3 ). It will be noticed
v.
that all those English cases were decided under section
Gutta Milt
15 of the Common Law Procedure Act. 1854 (17 & 18 Workers' Uilion.
Vic, c. 125). It is true that in that English statute
DaaJ.
there was no provision similar to section 521 of our
Code of 1882 which was noticed by the Privy Council
in the case cited by Dr. Tek Chand; nevertheless
section 15 of the English statute like section 514 of
the Code of Civil Procedure of 1882 corresponding
to paragraph 8 of the Second Schedule to the Civil
Procedure Code of 1908 and like section 9 of the
English Arbitration Act, 1889, corresponding to section 12 of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1899, empowered the Court, from time to time, to enlarge the time
for making the award. There is a similar provision
for enlargement of time· in section 148 of our
Civil Procedure Code of 1908. There is, however,
no similar provision in the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Section 6(1) of that Act peremptorily requires the adjudicator to submit his
award to the State Government "within such time as
may be specified" and not "within such time as may
from time to time be specified." It is significant that
the only occasion when the State Government
can, under the U. P. Act, specify a fresh period
\ of time is when it remits the award for reconsideration
under sub-section (2) of section 6, for under subsection· (3) the adjudicator is enjoined to submit his
award, after reconsideration, within such period as
may be specified by the State Government. Even in
this case, under section 6(2) and (3) the State Government may in the order remitting the award specify
a time within which the award, after reconsideration,
must be filed.
'rhis gives power to the State Government to fix a fresh period pf time to do a fresh
(r) (r868) L.R. 3 Q.B. 404.
(2) (1874) L.R. 9 Q.B. rr7.
(3) L.R. 13 Q. B,D, 688.
446
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1953]
,1902
act, namely, to reconsider and file the reconsidered
Strawboard
award.
It does not give .the State G?v.ernment any
Manufacturing power to enlarge the time fixed ongma.lly, for the
Co., Ltd.
m1tial makmg of the award. Therefore, except where
v.
the State Government under section 6 (2) remits the
Gutta Mill
award for reconsideration it has no power even to
TVork"~"'
0"· specify a fresh period of time and much less a power
Das J.
to extend the time for the initial making of the
award under section 6 (1). In exercise of the powers
conferred by clauses (b),.(c), (d) aud (g) of section 3
and section 8
of the U. P. Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947, the Governor was pleased to make an
order embodied in Notification No. 615 (L T")/X V III-7
(J"L)-1951, dated March 15, 1951.
The proviso to
rule 16 of that order authorised the State Government to extend from time to time the period within
which the Tribunal or the adjudicator was to pronounce the decision. 'l'hese rules were, however, not
in force at the time material to the case before us.
Learned counsel appearing for the respondent and
for the State of Uttar Prauesh have not referred us
to any similar rule which was in force in 1950. In
view of the laugua,ge of section 6 of the U. P.
Act
and in the absence of a rule like the proviso to rule 16 referred to ab.ove it must follow that
the State Government had no authority whatever to
extend the time and the adjudicator became fimctus
officio on the expiry of the time specified iu the original order of reference and, therefore, thenward which
had not been made within that time must be helil to
be without jurisdiction and a nullity as contended by
Dr. Tek Chand.
Learned counsel for the respondents refers us to
the provisions of section 14 of the U. P. General
Clauses Act, 1904, which provides that where by
any Uttar ·Pradesh Act auy power is conferred on
the State Government then that power may be exercised from time to time as occasion requires. Sections
3 and 4 of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act,
1947, certainly confer power on the State Government to refer disputes to an adjudicator for decision
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T
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# -
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
447
and section 6 (1) may be read as empowering the
1952
State Government to specify the time within which
Strawboard
the adjudicator to whom an industrial dispute is Manufacturing
referred for adjudication is to submit his award.
Co., Ltd,
The combined effect of section 14 of the U. P.
v.
General Clauses Act and section 6(1) of the U. P.
Gutt~Mil~
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, it is contended, is Workers Union.
that the adjudicator is enjoined to submit his
Das J.
report "within such time as may from time to time be
specified" and that this being the position, the principles laid down in the English decisions referred to
above must be held to be applicable to the present
case. We are unable to accept this line of reasoning. Under section 14 of the U. P. General Clauses
Act the State
Government may exercise
the
power conferred on it by sections 3, 4 and 6, that. is
to say, it can from time to time make orders referring
disputes to an adjudicator and, whenever such an
order of reference is made, to specify the time within
which the award is to be made. This power to specify
the time does not and indeed cannot include a power
to extend the time already specified in an earlier
order. The legislative practice, as evidenced by the
provisions of the different statutes referred to above,
is to expressly confer the power of extension of time,
if and when the legislature thinks fit to do so.
There
is no question of any inherent power of the Court
and much less of the Executive Government in this
behalf.
Section 14 of the U. P. General Clauses
Act does not in terms, or by necessary implication, give any such power of extension of time to
the State Government and, therefore, the respondents
can derive no support from that section.
Learned advocate for the Intervener, the State of
Uttar Pradesh, draws our attention to section 21 of
the U. P. General Clauses Act, J 904, and contends
that the order of April 26, 1950, should be taken
as an amendment or modification, within the meaning of that section, of the first order of February 18, 1950. It is true that the order of April 26,
i950, does ex faoie purpor~ ~Q modify ~he order qf ·
~8
.
.
.
448
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1953]
19°2
February 18, 1950, but, in view of the absence of any
b
d
distinct provision in section 21 that the power of
Straw oar
d
d
d'fi
· I
Ma ufacturing amen ment an mo 1 catwn conferred on the State
~o., Ltd. · Gtvernment may be so exercised as to have retrospecv.
tive operation the order of April 26, 1950, viewed
Gutta .~fill
merely as an order of ainendment or modification,
Workers' Union. cannot" by virtue of section 21, h:i.ve that effect.
If,
-
therefore, the amending order operates prospectively,
Das J,
d
h
1952
Dec. 22.
i.e., only as from the ate oft e order, it cannot validate the award whic.h had been made after the expiry
of the time specified in the original order and before
the date of the amending order, during which period
the adjudicator was functus officio and had no jurisdiction to act at all.
\Ve do not think the respondents
can derive any support from section 21 of the U. P.
General Clauses Act.
0
The result, therefore, is that this appeal must be
allowed and the award must be declared to be null
and void and we order accordingly. In the circumstances of this case we make no order as to costs.
Appeal allowed.
Agent for the appellant : Ganpat Rai.
Agent for the respondent: S. D. Sekhari.
Agent for the intervener: 0. P. Lal.
ANGLO-FRENCH TEXTIT~E CO., LTD.
v.
COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, MADRAS.
[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, DAS, VIVIAN BOSE and
BHAGWATI JJ.]
India>! Income·tax Act (XI of 19e2), ss. 24 ( 2), 84-Return
shoiving loss-lVhether loss can be recorded and carried forwardProceedings fo1· re-assessment-Whether whole a.ssess·ment can be reopened .
. .\n assessee submitted a return showing the income as l<nil"
~nd this return was accepted by the Income-tax Officer. In the
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