# SU.PRE~IE COURT REPORTS [11!63] JAGANNATH PRASAD v. THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH

- **Citation:** [1963] 2 S.C.R. 850
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1963
- **Bench:** J. L. Kapur, K. C. Das Gupta, l<AORUBAR DAYAL
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/su-pre-ie-court-reports-11-63-jagannath-prasad-v-the-state-of-uttar-pradesh-2551
- **Pages:** 15

## Headnote

"--.
..
Salt8 Tax-U•inu forget!, clocumenl• before Sa/ea Tax
01/iur-l'roaecution-Jf complaint of sale• Tax Officer >1eces·
aary-SIJ/ea 1'az Offiur, whelher a Court-Liability to pay tax-
·...,--
Notification 1'"-•crihing aingk point for tcu:.ition inel/ectiveEl/ect of Utta1 PradMh Salu Tax Ar,t, 19'8 (U. P. 15 of 1948),
aa. 3, · 3A, U(d)-Cixk of Criminal Piocedure 1898 (Act V of
1898), •. 195.
The appellanlS who carry on the business in vrgctable
ghee purchased vegetable ghee from ouiside U. P. in the
name of four fictitious firms.
In their return of sales tax they
did not include the sale proceeds of the'iC transactions on
the ground that they had purchased from the four firms and
that under a notification made under s. 3A of the U. P.
Sales Tax Act, tax was leviable only at a single-point on the
sale by the outside suppliers to the"' four firms.
In support
of this the appellant No. 1 made a fal<e statement before
the Sales fax Officer and also
filed forged bills
before
him. The return was accepted by the SalC'i Tax Officer with
the result that the sales covered by these transactions were not
taxed. The appellants were tried and convicted for offence
under •· 471 Indian Penal Code for using forged decuments
and under s. 14(dJ of the Act for fraudulently evading payment of tax due under the Act The appellants contended that
the trial for the offence under s. 471 wa• illegal as no complaint had been made by the Sales l"ax Officer as required by
s. I !15 Code of Criminal Procedure and that the offence under
s. 14 (d) of the Act was not made out as no tax was payable
under s. 3A became the notification issued thereunder was
invalid.
Held, that the Sales Tax Officer wa1 not a Court Nithin
the meaning of s. 195 Code of Criminal Procedure and It waa
not neces.ary for him to make a complaint for the prosecution
of the Appellants under s. 471 Indian Penal Code. A Sales
Tu Officer was merely an
instrumentality oi the State
for purposeo of assessment and collection of tax and even if he
was required to perform certain quasi-judicial functions he
was not a part of the judiciary. The nature of the functions,
of a Sales Tax Officer and the manner prescribed for their
.
•
...
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
851
performance showed that he could not be . equated with a
Court. Nor could he be said to be a Revenue Court. Though
the definition of Court in s, 195. of the Code was enlarged by
the substitution of the word «include" for the word "means"
by the amendment of 1923, it did not change the definition of
''Revenue Court.''
Smt. Ujjam Bai v. The St<itt, of U. P. (1963) 1 S.C.R. 778),
Shell Oo. of Australia Ltrl. v. Ferleral Oommissioner of Taxation
[1931] A, C. 275 and Brajnanrlan Sinha
v. Jyoti Narain
[1955] 2 S.C.R. 955, applied.
~
Krishna v. Gocerrlhanaiah, A. I. R. 1954 Mad. 822,
'
I
approved.
In re: Punamchand Manelclttl, (19.14) I. L, R. 38 Born.
642 and Stale v. Nemchanrl Pashvir Patel, (1956) 7 S. T. C.
404 not approved.
In re: R. Nataraja Iyer (1914) I. L. R. 36 Mad. 72
and Shri Virende•· Kumar l'Jatyawa<li v. The Sate of Punjab,
(1955] 2 S. c. R. 1013 referred to.
·
Helrl, further th.at the appe \Ian ts were rightly convicted
under s. 14 (d) of the Act. Sales tax was payable under s.3
of the Act in respect of all sales. But under s.3A it was
leviable only at a single point if the Government issued a
notification
declaring the point at which tax. was payable
and it was so prescribed by the rules. Under the notification
issued by the Government tax was payable only by the
dealer who imported the goods and sold them.
The appellants having imported the ghee were liable to pay the tax on
the sales of this ghee which 'they fraudulently evaded.
Though the notification was ineffective as no rules were made
under the Act prescribing the ;ingle point, it did not help the
appellants, as the only effect of this was that s. 3A did not
come into play. In ttying to get the benefit of the ineffective
notification under s. 3-A the appellants evaded

## Text

1S5Z
May 3.
850
SU.PRE~IE COURT REPORTS [11!63]
JAGANNATH PRASAD
v.
THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
(J. L. KAPUR, K. C. DAS GUPTA and
l<AORUBAR DAYAL, JJ.)
"--.
..
Salt8 Tax-U•inu forget!, clocumenl• before Sa/ea Tax
01/iur-l'roaecution-Jf complaint of sale• Tax Officer >1eces·
aary-SIJ/ea 1'az Offiur, whelher a Court-Liability to pay tax-
·...,--
Notification 1'"-•crihing aingk point for tcu:.ition inel/ectiveEl/ect of Utta1 PradMh Salu Tax Ar,t, 19'8 (U. P. 15 of 1948),
aa. 3, · 3A, U(d)-Cixk of Criminal Piocedure 1898 (Act V of
1898), •. 195.
The appellanlS who carry on the business in vrgctable
ghee purchased vegetable ghee from ouiside U. P. in the
name of four fictitious firms.
In their return of sales tax they
did not include the sale proceeds of the'iC transactions on
the ground that they had purchased from the four firms and
that under a notification made under s. 3A of the U. P.
Sales Tax Act, tax was leviable only at a single-point on the
sale by the outside suppliers to the"' four firms.
In support
of this the appellant No. 1 made a fal<e statement before
the Sales fax Officer and also
filed forged bills
before
him. The return was accepted by the SalC'i Tax Officer with
the result that the sales covered by these transactions were not
taxed. The appellants were tried and convicted for offence
under •· 471 Indian Penal Code for using forged decuments
and under s. 14(dJ of the Act for fraudulently evading payment of tax due under the Act The appellants contended that
the trial for the offence under s. 471 wa• illegal as no complaint had been made by the Sales l"ax Officer as required by
s. I !15 Code of Criminal Procedure and that the offence under
s. 14 (d) of the Act was not made out as no tax was payable
under s. 3A became the notification issued thereunder was
invalid.
Held, that the Sales Tax Officer wa1 not a Court Nithin
the meaning of s. 195 Code of Criminal Procedure and It waa
not neces.ary for him to make a complaint for the prosecution
of the Appellants under s. 471 Indian Penal Code. A Sales
Tu Officer was merely an
instrumentality oi the State
for purposeo of assessment and collection of tax and even if he
was required to perform certain quasi-judicial functions he
was not a part of the judiciary. The nature of the functions,
of a Sales Tax Officer and the manner prescribed for their
.
•
...
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
851
performance showed that he could not be . equated with a
Court. Nor could he be said to be a Revenue Court. Though
the definition of Court in s, 195. of the Code was enlarged by
the substitution of the word «include" for the word "means"
by the amendment of 1923, it did not change the definition of
''Revenue Court.''
Smt. Ujjam Bai v. The St<itt, of U. P. (1963) 1 S.C.R. 778),
Shell Oo. of Australia Ltrl. v. Ferleral Oommissioner of Taxation
[1931] A, C. 275 and Brajnanrlan Sinha
v. Jyoti Narain
[1955] 2 S.C.R. 955, applied.
~
Krishna v. Gocerrlhanaiah, A. I. R. 1954 Mad. 822,
'
I
approved.
In re: Punamchand Manelclttl, (19.14) I. L, R. 38 Born.
642 and Stale v. Nemchanrl Pashvir Patel, (1956) 7 S. T. C.
404 not approved.
In re: R. Nataraja Iyer (1914) I. L. R. 36 Mad. 72
and Shri Virende•· Kumar l'Jatyawa<li v. The Sate of Punjab,
(1955] 2 S. c. R. 1013 referred to.
·
Helrl, further th.at the appe \Ian ts were rightly convicted
under s. 14 (d) of the Act. Sales tax was payable under s.3
of the Act in respect of all sales. But under s.3A it was
leviable only at a single point if the Government issued a
notification
declaring the point at which tax. was payable
and it was so prescribed by the rules. Under the notification
issued by the Government tax was payable only by the
dealer who imported the goods and sold them.
The appellants having imported the ghee were liable to pay the tax on
the sales of this ghee which 'they fraudulently evaded.
Though the notification was ineffective as no rules were made
under the Act prescribing the ;ingle point, it did not help the
appellants, as the only effect of this was that s. 3A did not
come into play. In ttying to get the benefit of the ineffective
notification under s. 3-A the appellants evaded payment of
tax under s. 3 which they were liable to pay.
CRIMINAL .Al>PELLATE JumsDIOTION: Criminal
.Appeal No. 152/59;
'
~
Appeal by special leave from the judgillent
and Order dated May 12, 1959 of the Allahabad
High Court in Criminal Revision No. 1182of1957.
Nur-ud-din A.lvme.d,
J. B •. Dadachanji, 0. O.
Mathur, and Ravindar Narain for the Appellants.
J96B
Jaiannath Pra1aa
v.
Stale of UUar
Pradesh
J1g•nnath Prasad
v.
S1tile of Ultar
P,adesh
KopurJ.
, .
-.-.·-/·; '_,..---:- .,,,
852
SUPREME COURT REPOR1S [1963]
0. 0. Jfothur aud O.A, Lal for the Respondent.
1962. May 3. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by-
\)'_· KAPUR, J.-The appellants are father and son
earring on business in vegetable ghee at -Aligarh ..
They along with l{omesh, the second son of appellant Jagannath - Prasad -- .-were prosecuted under
s. 14 (d) of the U. P. Sales Tax Act, 1948 (U.P. 15
of 1948) hereinafter called the •Act' and under
s. 471 read with s. 468 _ands. 417 of the Indian
Penal Code. They wer_e all acquitted of the charge
under· s. 468. Jagannath Prasad was convicted
under · ss. 4 71 and 417 of the Indfan Penal Code
and s,-14. (d) of the Act and was.sentenced to two
years' rigorous imprisonment under s. 47 J, to one
years' rigorous imprisonment - and a fine of
·Rs. 1,000/· under s. 417 and to a fine- of Rs. 1,000
under s. 14 (d) of the Act. Bhagwan Das was convicted_ under s.
14 ( d) ·of the Act and sentenced.
- to a fine of Rs. _ 1, 000/-_ • Ramesh ·was acquitted .
. The sentences passed on Jagannath Prasad were
concurrent. . Their appeal to the Sessions Judge
was dismissed and in revision to the High Court
J agannath l'rasad · was acquitted of the offence
(
•
under s. 417 of the Indian Penal Code but tle
other convictions and sentences were upheld. . ·
_ Against this_ judgment and order of the ~Iigh Court . ·
of Allahabad the· appellants have_ come to this
..._
I
court by special leave.
·
The facts leading to' the appeal are these:
~
In 1950-51, the firm ·of the appellants purchased
vegetable -ghee valued at about Rs. 3 lacs from
places• outside the State of U. P. in -the name of
· four fictitious firm. The firm made its return for
· that year to the Sales Tax Offic,.r Aligarh and did
not include the sale proceeds of these transactions
on the ground that they bad purchased them from
+
these four firms who were supposed to be carrying
>- ,,/'
>
' ,
,
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
· 853
on business in Hathras, Aligarh, and other places
in U. P~ By thus not including the proceeds of the
sales of these transactions the firm evaded payment of sales .tax for that year on· thoRe transactions. The return of sales tax made by the firm
was accepted by the 8ales Tax Officer with the
consequence that the sale of goods covered by
those. transactions was not taxed. A complaint
was made against the ~es Tax Officer in regard to
these transactions; an enquiry was held with the
result that the ·appellants and ltomesh were μrosecuted and nonvicted as above stated. In the High
Court there was no controversy about the facts
i. e. the finding of the courts below that the appellants' firm purchased vegetable ghee from outside
U. P. and did not show the sale proceeds of the
sale of those goods on the ground that they had
been purchased from inside· the 8tate of CJ. P.
when in reality they had been purchased from
outside the State, that the.statements made by the
appellant Jagannath Prasad before the 'Sales Tax
Officer were false and that the bills produced by
him before the Sales 'fax Officer were forged. The
conviction was challenged. on grounds of le.w alone.
Before us five points were raised: (1} that no
sales tax was exigible on these transactions under
s. 3A of the Act in 1950-5 l and liability arose by
the amendment of the Act in 1952. which gave
retroactive operation to the section and became
applicable to sales Di dispute and therefore there
could be no prosecution under an ex poat facto
amendment; (2) the trial of the appellants was
illegal because of want of complaint by the Sales
Tax Officer under s. 195 of the IJ'riminal Procedure
Code; (3) there was no offence under s. 14 ( d) of
the Act; (4) forged invoices were produced by
appellant Jagannath Prasad because they were
called for by the Sales Tax Officer and therefore
it cannot be said that they were used by the appellaDt and (5) tha Sales Tax Officer having accepted
1961
JaganndlJ Piasa d
v.
Staid fl/ Uttar
Prarlesh
Kapur J.
1962
Jag1nnath Prasad
v.
St.t• of Uitar
P,adeah
Kapu.rJ.
S54
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
the invoices as genuine no prosecution could be
entertained in regard to those invoices.
Now the appel)ants · cannot be pr;secutecl .on
the basis of any f'm~ndme,nt subsequent to the
date of the allege"d qffence
committ~d by tbem.
Both parties are, agreed on th.at and therefore we
have t.o see the Act as it stood on. the date whcll
the offence is alleged to have been committe,d.
Accor'ding ,to th~ qharge the offence was C•Jmmitted on or about July ,l~, 1~51, when forged ·invo·
ices produced by' the appellants before the :'ales
Tax Officer. Sp what we have to se(! is the law as
it stood on th.at d,ay. Section 3 of the Act deals
with liability ·to tax under tb.e Act and s. 3A with
single poin~ taxatiqn.
Upder s. 3 every dealer was
reguired to.pay on.his turnover of each assessment
year a tax at \h~ rat!) of three pies a i;.upee.
Thus
the tax was pay{i.ble 'in regard tp all sales but under
s. 3~ ( i) the -~if '}'.as
le.viable only .at a single
point.
~fat section provided,
S. 3A (1) "Noh;ithstanding .anything con·
tained in section 3, the ~tate Government
1b'ay, by' notification in 'tho 'officiafGazo-
- , ·tte, dec!!\'6 that the turnover in respect
of any goods or class of goods shall not
b,e liable ;to tax except at such single
point Jn the seril'lll .of sales by successive
dealers. as may be prescribed".
The Government could declare the ta~ to be
payable at a.sing"Ie point but there were two require·
mei;its; there had to be.'a potifioation in the Official
· Gazette d~elaring the pomt ~t which the tax was
payab)e and in the series 'ob.ales by successive dealers
it had tO pe "as niay be prescribed" i. e. as m~y be
prescribed by rμIes.
Section 3A was. amended in
1952 with retrospec~ive effeyot bu~ retroactiv"e proviV
sion is not applicable to the present proceedings.
Under s. 3A a n9tification No. 1 (3) was issued on
~>_./
·.·• >
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
855
June 8, 1948, declaring that the proceeds of sales
of vegetable ghee imported from outside shall not
be included in the turnover of the dealer other than
the importer himself. The effect of the notification thus was that if a dealer imported vegetable
ghee from outside U. P. and sold it he was requ·
ired to include the sale proceeds in his turnover but
the other dealers who bought vegetable ghee from
the importer. in U. P. and sold it were not so required. The appellants having thus imported the
vegetable ghee :Crom outside U. P. were required
by the notification to include the proceeds in their
turnover and it was to a.void t!iis that they falsely
produoed forged invoices that they had purchased
th 1 vegetable ghee from those fictitious dealers
within the State of U. P. and thus if the notifica·
tion was an effective notification the appellants
successfully evaded the payment of sales tax which
under the law th9y were required to pay. But it
was agreed that the notification was ineffective in
view of the words "as may be prescribed" because
that could only be done by rules and no rules had
been made uudcr s. 3A which ·made everv dealer
liable to sales tax if ho was an importer from outside U. l'. To this extent the contention of the
appellants fa well founded and therefore under s.
3A merely by no~ification the Government could
not prescribe a single point taxation as was done
by the notification but that does not help the a.pp·
.ellants very muc'l. Under s. 3 everv dealer was
liable to pay sales tax on every transaction and e.
3A 011ly gave relief in rogard to sales at every
point and thus prevented multi-point taxation. If
the notification under s. 3A was ineffective, as
indeed it was, the appellants were required to pay
tax on all their sales and in order to escape multi·
point taxa.~ion ·they took advantage of an ineffect.ive notification anti tried the false plea of the goods
havhg been imported by fictitbus persons and
their having purchased those goods from those
I96Z
Jogumatla Prasa
v.
Sta" nJ Uttar
Prad"h
KopurJ.
1962
Ja1annath P.a1ad
••
S1a1, 01 Uitnr
Pr0dtc1h
Kapu1 J.
850
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1963]
ficti~ioue dealers and in tliis manner the appellants
escape :I payment of sales tax under s. 3. In other
words they tried to take advantage of s. 3A
by producing false documents and thereby evaded
payment of tax under s. 3 which every dealer
was required to pay on hie turnover. In trying
to get the benefit under the ineffective notification
issued under s. 3A the appellants evaded payment of tax under s. 3 which they were in any
case liable to pay. It cannot be said therefore
that no offence was committed under s. U (d) of
the Act which provides:-
Section 14. "Offences end penalties.-Any person
wh0--
(a)
(h) ...............
(c)
••.....•.•••..•
( d) fraudulently evadeR the payment of
any tax due under this Act,
shall, without prejudice to this liability under
any other law for the time being in force. on
conviction by a l'lfaj!istrate of the first class,
he liable to a fine whioh mav extend to one
thousand rupees, and where the breach is a
continuing breach, to a further fine whioh
may extrnd to fifty rupees for every day
after thEl
first during which the breach
continues".
It is no defence to say that the appellants
were asked by the Sales Tax Officer to produce
invoices. The appellants were trying to flet exclusion from their turnover of the sale of goods
... -
...
worth a.bout a la.Ce and had made statements
_.._
before the ~a.Jes Ta.x Officer in regard to it on
July 9, 195), and in order to prove that the goods
)
{
I
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
857
were not required to be included in the turnover
the invoices were produced by appellant Ja~annath
Prasad. When a fact ha~ to be proved before a
court or a tribunal and the court or the tribunal
calls upon the person who is relyin~ upon a fact
to prove it by best evidence it can not be a
defence as to the offence of forl."ery if th at best
evidence which, in this case, was the in:voices turn
out to be forged documents.
A person who
. produced those documents cannot be heard to say
that he was required to prove his case by the
best evidence and because· be was so required be
produced forged documents.
It was then submitted that the Sales Tax
Officer was a court within s. 195 of the Criminal
Pro.cedure Code and in the absence of a complaint
in writing by such an officer no cognizance could
be taken of any offence punishable under s. 471
of the Indian Penal Code.
Thi@, in our opinion,
is an eqmdly erroneous submission.
The Sales
Tax Officers are the instrumentalities of the State
for collect,ion of certain taxes.
Under the Act
and the Rutes ·made thereunder certain officers
are appointed as Sales Tax Officers who · have
certain duties assigned to them for the imposition
and coilect.ion of taxes and in the proceBB they
have to perform many duties which are of a quasi·
judicial nature aud certain . other duties which are
a<lmini8trative duties.
Merely because certain
instrnmentaliti:is of state employed for the purpose
of taxation hav~, in the discharge of their duties,
to perform certain quasi-jndicial functions they are
not converted into courts thereby. In a recent
judgment of this Court in· Shrimati Ujjam Bai v.
The Suite of U.P. (1 ), all the opinions were unanimous on this point that taxing authorities are
not courts eveu though they perform quasi-judicial
functions.
The following observation of Lord
(I) ( 195.1) I S.C.R, 778.
1962
Jag• nn1Jt/r PrafJd
••
St1te aJ Utto1'
Pratlesli
E • .JpurJ.
J •iannath Pto•ad
v.
Stal• of Ut14r
PraJe,h
858
SUPRFME OOURT REPORTS [19113]
flankey L. C. in Skell Oo. of Australia Ltd. v.
Fe.deral Oommiaaioner of Taxatian (')was quoted
with approval :-
"The authorities are clE>ar to show that there
are tribunal& with many of the trappings of a
court which, nevertheleBB are not oourts in
the striot sense of exercising judicial power''.
Lord Sankey also enumerated some negative
propositions as to when a tribunal is not a court.
At p. 297 his lordship said :-
"In that oonneotion it may be useful to
enumerate 1ome negative propositions on this
eubjeot : I. A tribunal is not neoessarily
a Court in this strict sense b~oa.use it gives
a final decision. 2. Nor beoii.use it hears
witneBSes on oath. 3. Nor because two or
more contending parties appeRr before it
between whom it has to decide. 4.
Nor
because it gives d~oieions which affect the
rights of subj11cts. 5. Nor because there is
an appeal to a Court. 6. Nor beca.use it
is a body to whiob a matter is referred
by another body.
See Rex v. Electricity
Oommissionera (1924) 1K.B.171".
Hidayatullah J, in Shrimati Ujjam Bhai(') oase
described Sales tax authorities thus :-
"The taxing authorities
are instrumentalities of the State. They are not
a part of the legislature, nor are they
a part of the judiciary. Their functions are
the assessment and oollection of taxes aud
in tho. process of aesessing taxes, they follow
a pa.ti ern of action whioh is considered
Judioiat They are not thereby converted
into Courte of Civil judioatore. They still
(I) (1911) A.C. l1~. 283.
(?) (1961) IS.CR. 778.
l
•
' • •
2 S.C;R.
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
859
remain the instrumentalities of the State and
are
within the definition of "State" in
Art. 12''.
No doubt the Sales Tax Officers have certain
powers which are similar to the powers exercised
by courts but still they are no! courts as under·
stood in s. 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
In sub-secti~n 2 ofs. 195 it is provided :-
S. 195(2) "In clauses (b) and (c) of sub-section (1)
the term "Court" includes a ·Civil,
Revenue or Criminal Court, but does
not include a
Registrar
or
Sub-·
· Registrar under the Indian Registration
Aot, 1877".
•
· · ·
.
.,
It cannot be said that a Sales Tax Officer is a
Revenue Court.
UndJr s. 2(a) of the Aot an
assessing authority is defined to mean any person
authol"ised by· the ~tate Government to make
assessment under the Act and under R. · 2(h) a
Sales Tax Officer means :-
"Sales Tax Officer" means a Sales Tax Office~
of a circle appointed by the !:)tate Gov!lrnment
to perform the duties and exercise the powers
of an assessing authority in ~uch circle"
.
Thus under the Act a Sales Tax Officer is only an
assessing authority. Under s. 7 of the Act, if the
~· Sa.Jes Tax Officer, after, making such enquiries as
~
he thinks necessary, is satisfied th&t a return made
is correct and complete, he shall assess the tax
on the basis thereof and if no return is submitted
he can make such enquiries as he considers
necessary and then. determine the turnover of a
dealer. ·Thus his determination depends upon
-.
enquiries he may make and which he may consider
; ~ necessary. Sections 9, 10 and 11 of the Act deal
with Appeals, Revisions and Statement of the CBSe
to the High Court. Under s. 13 power is given
1961
J agarMOIA Pr<Uod
••
. •lal1 of U/tor
P1atleih
1981
J-""""'Prasad
••
StaJ.,j U llar
Pr&U16
Katur J,
860
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS (1963}
to a Sales Tax Officer to require the production
of all accounts, documentR and other information
relating to business and a1Jcounts and registers
shall be open to inspection of the Sales Tax
Officer at all reasonable times. He has the power
to enter any office, shop, godown, vehicle or any
other place in which business is done which is a
power destructive of the Sales Tax Officer being
a Court which is a place where justice is ad·
ministered as between thti parties whether the
parties are private persons or one of the parties
is the State.
V nder s. 23
certain secrecy is
attached to documents filed before the Sales Tax
Officer and information received by him. Similarly under &. 43 certain p.lwer is given to the.
Sales T.ax Officer to calculate turnover when goods
are sold for consideration other than money and
this is after such enquiry as he considers nece1111&ry.
All these provisions show that the Sales Tax
Officer cannot be equated with a Court. In our
opinion therefore the Sales Tax Officer is not a
Court. In Krishna v. Goverdhansiah{'), it was held
that the Income Tax Officer is not a court within the meaning of s. 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code and this view was accepted by this court
in Shrimati Ujjam Bai's(') case. In Brajoondan
Sinha v. Jyoti Narain('), a Commissioner appointed
under the Public Enquiries Act 1950 was held not
to be a court. Shell Co. of Australia v, Federal
Commiasioner of Taxation (') was referred to in tbat •
case.
At p. 967 the following passa.ge from
Halsbury's Laws of England, Hailsham Edition,
Vol. 8, p. 526 was approved:-
"Many bodies are not courts, although they
have to decide questions, and in so doing
f
have to aot i"udioially, in the sense that the
· I,,.__
proceedings must be conducted with fairnll88
,r
(I) A.I.R. (1954) Mad. 822.
(2) (1963) I S.C.R. 778.
csi (19") 2 s.c.a. 95,.
(4) (1991) A.C. 27,, 213.
'
2 s.c.:a.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
861
A i
and
impartiality,
suoh
as
assessment
committees, guardian committees, the Court
of
referee
constituted under
tht'
Un· .
employment Insurance Acts to decide claims
made on the Insurance funds, the benchers
of the Inns of Courts when considering tht1
conduct of one of their members, the General
Medical Council when considering questions
affecting the position of a medical man".
)
That passage is now contained in Vol. 9 of the
3rd Edition at p. 343.
But it was submitted that the Sales Tax Qffi.
cer while acting as an assessing authority is a court
within the meaning of s. 195. (2) of the Criminal
Procedure Code because by the amendment of 1923
t.he definition of the word "court" was enlarged by
substituting the word "includes'' in place of the ·
word "means" and the section now reads as has
been set out above.
Undoubtedly by this change
the legislature did mean to make the definition of
the word "court" wider but that does not enlarge
the definition of the words "Revenue Court". The
track of decision which was pressed on our attention
is based primarily on a full bench judgment of the
Bombay High Court in In re Punemchand Maneklal(I).
In that case an Income-tax Collector was held to
be a Revenue Court within thl,l meaning of the word
as used ins. 195. The learned Chief Justice who
• gave the judgment of the court. proceeded on the
basis that inquiries conducted according to the Forms
of judicial procedure under Chapter IV of the Incometax Act were proceedings in a Revenue Court. This
was on the ground that under the law as it then
stood revenue questions were generally removed
from the cognizance of civil courts and the officers
charged with the duty of deciding disputed question
relating to revenue between an individual and the
{\) (191l) 1.L.R. 38, Bom. 642.
1962
J agannoth P rosad
v.
Slate of Uttar
Prad.eJh
Kapur J,
J az•n.at1' "Pra1aJ
Y;
StaU~oJ Utlar
Prcd.1h
862
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1963J
Government would be invested with the functions
of & "Revenue Court".
This view w&e followed by
the Bombay High Court in State v. N emolw.n<l Pashvir
Pate! (1). After referring to the va.rious powers which
were given to the Sa.Jes Tax Officers urider the
Bombay Salee Tax Aot that Court proceeded to sa.y
that the Salee Tax Officers under the Bombay Sale11
Tax Act were Revenue Courts
because they hlld
juriediotion to decide questions relating to revenue,
are exclusively empowered with the powers which
are normally attributes of a court or & tribunal land
&re authorised to adjudicate upon a disputed quee·
tion of law or fa.ot relating to the rights of the citizens. The Madras High Court in In re R. Nat.araja
Iyer held that a Divisional Officer hearing appeals
under the Income tax Act was & oourt within the
meaning of e. 4 76 of the Criminal Procedure Code
but a Tehsildar who was the original &Reessing &U·
thority was not because there was no lis before him.
There is one passa.ge in the judgment of Sundara
Ayyar J., whioh is of significance. It was said :-
"I may observe that I am prepared tO
agree with Dr. Swaminathan that more author·
ity to receive evidence would not make the
officer recording it a Court"
At page 84, it was said that the determination
of the aseesement in the first instance may not be
of a court although the asseseing officer may have
the power to reoord statements. But an appeal •
against the aseeBBment is dealt with by the Collector
in the manner in which an appeal i1 disposed of by
a Civil Court. In this connection referenoe may be
made to the statement of the law contained in the
judgment of Venkatarama Ayyar J., in Shri Virinder
Kumar Sa!yawadi v. The Swt,e of Punjab('). There
(I) (19'6)7 s.c.R. 40f.
(2) (1955) 2 S.C.R. 1015, IOIS.
'
I
)
S.C.R.
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
863
the distinction between a quasi-judicial tribunal and
a court was given as follows :-
"It may bestated broadly that what distinguished a Court from a quasi-judicial tribunal is tliat it is charged with a duty to decide
disputes in a judicial manner and declare the
rights of parties in a definitive judgment.
To decide in a judicial manner involves that
the parties are entitled as a matter of right
to be heard in support of their claim and to
adduce evidence in proof of it. And it also
· imports an obligation .on the part of the
authority to decide the matter on a consideration of the evidence adduced and in accordance
with 1!1-WWhen a question therefore arises
as to whether an authority created by an Act
is a Court as distinguished from a quasi-judi·
cial tribunal, what has to be decided is w hether having regard to th3 provisions of the
Act it possesses all the attributes of a Court".
Dealing with quasi-judicial tribunals it was
observed in Gidwpelli Ne,ge,swara Rao v. The State of
Andhra Pradesh(l) : -
'•The concept of a quasi-judicial act implies that the act is not wholly judicial, it describes only a duty cast on the executive body or
authority to conform to the norms of judicial
procedure in performing some act in the exercise of its executive power".
·
I
.
It is not necessary to refer to other cases
because they were decidtd on their own facts and
related to different tribunals. In our opinion a
Sales Tax Officer is not a Court within the meaning
of s. l95 of the Criminal Procedure Code and therefore it was not necessary for a dales Tax Officer to.
. (1) {1959) Supp. I s.c.R. 319, 353-4.
1951
J agannalh Pr<Jsa d
'·
Stai. •! Ult/Ir
Prat11sli
KaputJ.
1962
J agonnal~ l'rasu
••
St.ate•! UU.r
Pr•deJlr
KaJ>vr J,
1961
Miff J.
864
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
ma.ke a complaint and the proceedings without such
a. compl•iint a.re not without jurisdiotion.
In our opinion the appellants were rightly
convicted and we therefore dismiss this a.ppea.).
The appellant J a.ganna.th Prasad must surrender to
his bail bonds.
Appeal di&misstJJ.
JIA LAL
v.
THE DELHI ADMINISTRATION
(B. P.
SINHA, c. J.,
P. B.
GAJENDRAGADKA.R,
K. N. WAXCHOO, N. RAJAGOPA.L.A
AYYANGAR
and T. L. VENKATARAMA AIYAR, JJ.)
Criminal Trial-Po . .,,.8'ion of ·unliunwl arm8 SanGlionProvision requiring Randionfor prosecution. in certain area& and
nnt in other af'ell-If discriminatory-Whether offending portion
of provision can. be removed anrl rrmaining portion allotted to
sta.nd-lf im·alidity of p?ovision regarding •anction affectll
substantive proLisio"" a/so-Indian Arm. Act, 1878 (XI of
1878), 88. 19(1)(/), 29-Canstitution of India, Art. U.
Section 29 of the Indian Arms Act, 1878, provided that
for prosecution for an offence under s. 19(f) of the Act com•
mittcd in the territories north of the Jumna and Ganga no
sanction was required but sanction \\'as required for the prosecution if the offence v.ras committrd in other areas. J was
found in po5scssion of an unlicensed firtarm in Delhi, and
though sanction under s. 29 was necessary, he was tried and
convicted \vithout ohtaining s·u·h sanction.
B was found in
possc!=o;ion of an unJicensed fire::irm in Saharanpur and as no
sanction under s. 29 was necessary for his prosecution he was
tried and convicted without obtaining any sanction.
The
respondents contended that s. 29 nffcnded Art. 14 of the
Constitution and was unconstitutional. J contended that even
ifs. ?9 wa~ invalid in it5 operation a~- r('gards tt'rritories to the
North of the .Jurnna and Ganga it was not invalid in its
. .j