# Su11tfer Singh v. Thi Stale of Punjab GAJENDRAGADKAR, J. The three

- **Citation:** [1962] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 654
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1961-02-24
- **Bench:** P. B. Gajendragadkar, K. C. Das Gupta, Raghubar Dayal
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/su11tfer-singh-v-thi-stale-of-punjab-gajendragadkar-j-the-three-2334
- **Pages:** 21

## Headnote

Criminal
'I'rial~Acquittal of one
acc1ued-No appeal
against acquittal--Appeal to High Oaurt by other convicted
accu~ed-Power of High Court-Whether can con8ider correctness
of th' acquittal-Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 (Act jj of
1898), s. 423.
Four. persons S, G, L and R were tried for offences
under s. ?.02 read with 34 ln.dian P<;_nal Code. The Sessions
Judge gave the benefit of doubt to I) and acquitted him but
·he convicted the other three of the' offences charged and
sentence them to death.
No appeal was
preferred against·
the acquittal o( R. but the three convicted persons appealed
ro the High Court .. •The High Court was of the view,that the
se~sions Judge was wr0ng in giving the benefit of doub.t, to R,
th::it R was present at the scene of offence and all the four
accused had the common intention alleged by the prosecution,
Relying upon the evidence of the eye witness it dismissed the
appeal, but reduced the sentence of G.to life imprisonr:ient.
The appellants conten~ed that the High Court ha.d .. 110 Jurisdiction or authority to embark upoh an enquiry Into 'the
propriety or validity of the acquittal of Rand that its.finding
that R had
ta.ken part in
t~e offen~e .as . allege~\ b¥ the
prosecution had introduced a serious 1nf!rm1ty in the Jμdgment
of the High Court.
1
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
65.i
field, that it was open to the High Court, when considering the whole of the evidence in resprct of the accused persons, to consider it so far as it related to the acquitted accused
also. One of the grounds on which the appellants had attacked
the prosecution evidence was that it had not been accepted
by the Trial Court against R.
In dealing with this question
the High Court had necessarily to deal with the case against
R and there was no legal bar ag,1inst it doing so.
Besides,
the Trial Court had not held that the evidence against R was
false ; it had merely found that the case against his was not
free from reasonable doubt.
The King v. Plumber (1902) 2 K. B. D. 339; Pritam
Singh v. State of Punjab, A. I. R. 1956 S. C. 415 and
Bimbadhar Pradhan v. The State of Ori8sa, ( 1956) S. C.R. 206
referred to.
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JuRISDICTIO"'° : Criminal
Appeal No. 100 of 196l.
Appeal by special leave. from the Judgment
and Order dated February 24, 1961, of the Punjab
High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 11 of 1961 and
Murder Reference No. 9 of 196l.
Jai Gopal Seth1:, C.. L. Sareen and R. L. Kohli,
for the appellants.
A. S. R. Chari, Gopal Singh and P. D .. Menon,
for the respondent.
1962. January 19.-The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
1962
Su11tfer Singh
v.
Thi Stale of Punjab
GAJENDRAGADKAR, J. The three appellants,
o,/md,.gadka• J.
Sunder Singh and his sons Lal Singh and Gurmukh
Singh along with one Rachhpal Singh were tried
before the learned Additional
Ses~ions Judge,
Karna! with having committed the offence of
murdering Malook Singh, Anup Singh and Darbara
~ingh on January 13, 1960, at about 11 A.M.
in the Abadi of village Hahri. The prosecution
case, was that these three murders were committed
by the four accused persons in furtherance of their
common intention; at the time when the offence
was committed, Sunder Singh and Gurmukh Singh
were armed with •Lathis' and Lal Singh and
1962
SutUkr Sf,,g!r
v.
Tiu Stalt of />un.jnl1
Gaitndragadlutr .J.
656 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
Rachhpal Singh wero armed with guns. According
to tho charge farmed against tho accused persons,
LR! Singh firoo upon Malook Singh and Darbara
Sinizh and thereby killed them, while Raohhpal
Singh fired upon Anup Singh and killed him. This
firing took plaoe in pursuance of the <'ommon
intRntion of All tho accusl"d per8ons. That is how
Lal Singh and Rachhpal Sinizh were charged under
s. 302 rPad with s. 34 of the Indian Penal Code.
The l!'a rnPd trial Judge took the view that the
rvidence adducPd against Rachhpal Singh left room
for doubt and so,
giving Rachhpal Singh the
benefit of doubt, he acquitted him. The remaining
three accnsed pers

## Text

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1962
Pa/akdha-ri Sint.h
v,
The State of
Uttar Pradesh
Kapur J.
1902
. Ji.nuo')' lfl.
Q54 SUPREME COUR't·REPORTS [1!56~) SUPP.
revision does not, unless specifically ordered, arrest
the operation cif the order of passing of the sentence of conviction.
In the present case the limitation started from the date of conviction by the
Panchavati Adalat and not from 'the date of dismissa1 of i{evision by the High Court.
We.ther~fore allow this appeal, s·et aside the
order ·of the High Court aJJ,d restore that of the
learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate dated February
u, 1958.
Appeal Allowed.
ONDER SINGH AND OTHERS
v.
THE STATE OF PUNJAB
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. C. DAS GUPTA and
RAGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ.)
Criminal
'I'rial~Acquittal of one
acc1ued-No appeal
against acquittal--Appeal to High Oaurt by other convicted
accu~ed-Power of High Court-Whether can con8ider correctness
of th' acquittal-Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 (Act jj of
1898), s. 423.
Four. persons S, G, L and R were tried for offences
under s. ?.02 read with 34 ln.dian P<;_nal Code. The Sessions
Judge gave the benefit of doubt to I) and acquitted him but
·he convicted the other three of the' offences charged and
sentence them to death.
No appeal was
preferred against·
the acquittal o( R. but the three convicted persons appealed
ro the High Court .. •The High Court was of the view,that the
se~sions Judge was wr0ng in giving the benefit of doub.t, to R,
th::it R was present at the scene of offence and all the four
accused had the common intention alleged by the prosecution,
Relying upon the evidence of the eye witness it dismissed the
appeal, but reduced the sentence of G.to life imprisonr:ient.
The appellants conten~ed that the High Court ha.d .. 110 Jurisdiction or authority to embark upoh an enquiry Into 'the
propriety or validity of the acquittal of Rand that its.finding
that R had
ta.ken part in
t~e offen~e .as . allege~\ b¥ the
prosecution had introduced a serious 1nf!rm1ty in the Jμdgment
of the High Court.
1
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
65.i
field, that it was open to the High Court, when considering the whole of the evidence in resprct of the accused persons, to consider it so far as it related to the acquitted accused
also. One of the grounds on which the appellants had attacked
the prosecution evidence was that it had not been accepted
by the Trial Court against R.
In dealing with this question
the High Court had necessarily to deal with the case against
R and there was no legal bar ag,1inst it doing so.
Besides,
the Trial Court had not held that the evidence against R was
false ; it had merely found that the case against his was not
free from reasonable doubt.
The King v. Plumber (1902) 2 K. B. D. 339; Pritam
Singh v. State of Punjab, A. I. R. 1956 S. C. 415 and
Bimbadhar Pradhan v. The State of Ori8sa, ( 1956) S. C.R. 206
referred to.
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JuRISDICTIO"'° : Criminal
Appeal No. 100 of 196l.
Appeal by special leave. from the Judgment
and Order dated February 24, 1961, of the Punjab
High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 11 of 1961 and
Murder Reference No. 9 of 196l.
Jai Gopal Seth1:, C.. L. Sareen and R. L. Kohli,
for the appellants.
A. S. R. Chari, Gopal Singh and P. D .. Menon,
for the respondent.
1962. January 19.-The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
1962
Su11tfer Singh
v.
Thi Stale of Punjab
GAJENDRAGADKAR, J. The three appellants,
o,/md,.gadka• J.
Sunder Singh and his sons Lal Singh and Gurmukh
Singh along with one Rachhpal Singh were tried
before the learned Additional
Ses~ions Judge,
Karna! with having committed the offence of
murdering Malook Singh, Anup Singh and Darbara
~ingh on January 13, 1960, at about 11 A.M.
in the Abadi of village Hahri. The prosecution
case, was that these three murders were committed
by the four accused persons in furtherance of their
common intention; at the time when the offence
was committed, Sunder Singh and Gurmukh Singh
were armed with •Lathis' and Lal Singh and
1962
SutUkr Sf,,g!r
v.
Tiu Stalt of />un.jnl1
Gaitndragadlutr .J.
656 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
Rachhpal Singh wero armed with guns. According
to tho charge farmed against tho accused persons,
LR! Singh firoo upon Malook Singh and Darbara
Sinizh and thereby killed them, while Raohhpal
Singh fired upon Anup Singh and killed him. This
firing took plaoe in pursuance of the <'ommon
intRntion of All tho accusl"d per8ons. That is how
Lal Singh and Rachhpal Sinizh were charged under
s. 302 rPad with s. 34 of the Indian Penal Code.
The l!'a rnPd trial Judge took the view that the
rvidence adducPd against Rachhpal Singh left room
for doubt and so,
giving Rachhpal Singh the
benefit of doubt, he acquitted him. The remaining
three accnsed persons wne, however, convicted by
him nnder s. 302 read with s. 34 because he held
that the prosecution caae had been proved against
th Pm bevond a reasonable doubt. The three convicts
w<>re ordered by him to suffiPr the sentence of death.
This ordn waa submitted for <'Onfirmation to the
Punjab High Court and it waa also challenged by
th<' three convi!'ts b;v their separate appeal. The
two mattP!'e were heard t0gether by the Punjab Hiizh
Court and in the result, the conviction of the
thr1•r appellants was confirmPd; in regard to the
scntenc<-, however, the High Court took the view
th.'\t the rods nf justice would be met if the sentence
of death impo81"d on Sunder Singh and Lal Singh
wa.~ c•mrirmed bt1t that imposed on Gurmukh Singh
was re<lnced to one of liff' imprisonment. In the
rl'sult, the appeals perferred by the three accused
p<'r~ons substantially failed and the order of
~•mtenr!' was confirmed in reiiard to two of them.
I• is azainst the order of oonviction and sentence
~ ,.11, pasilf>d by the High Court that Sander Singh,
L11l Singh and Gurmukh Singh have eome to this
f'nurt by 11pecial leave.
Befqre dealing wit~ the pomtR t!'\s ~~ before
us hy Mr. Sethi on bt-hnlf of the appellants, 1t would
l1P r~nvenient to Ad out broadly the materi&t facts
),.ading to the prosecution. I>nrbra Singh and the
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
657
deceased Ma.look Singh were the sons of one Phula.
It appears that prior to the partition of India, these
brothers lived in a village Butra.n which is no'w a
pa.rt of West Pakistan. .The appellants also resided
in the same village, Sunder Singh, a brother of
Phula Singh ha~ mortgaged 20 kilias of agricultural
land with possession for Rs.
2,500/-
with the
appellant Sunder Singh and his brothers, in about
1943. In lieu of ·this mortgage, the appellant
Sunder Singh and his co-mortgagees, had been
allotted 40 killas of land in the village Habri in the
District of Karna.I. The mortgagor Sunder Singh
later died without leaving an issue or a widow.
Phula Singh, his brother, claimed to be the heir of
the said mortgagor a.nu as such, he asked for
redemption of the land on payment of Rs. 2,500/-.
The appellant Sunder Singh did not recognise
Phula Singh as the heir of the mortgagor and so,
Phula Singh had to make an application in that
behalf on November 29, 1959. By this application
made to the Assi11tant Collector, Kaithal, Phula
Singh claimed to redeem the mortgage. '.!;his claim
was strongly resisted by the appellant Sunder Singh
and his co-mortgaees. They disputed the title of
Phula Singh and in the alternative, they alleged that
they eould not be deprived of the possession of the
land expect on payment of Rs. 25,000/·. The proceeding continued for some time but it appears that Phu la
Singh was not able to place satisfactory evidence
about his title before the Assistant Collector. In the
result, his application was dismissed for default.
Thereafter, the deceased Ma.look Singh applied for a
passport to Pakistan; the prosecution case is that
he wanted to go to Pakistan to obtain copies of
the original mortgage deed and a pedigree-table
from the revenue records kept in Pakistan which
would have supported the claim of Phula Singh to
the heirship of the mortgagor Sunder Singh. An
enquiry was made into the antecedents of the
deceased Malook Singh by the authorities concerned
1~62
SuoJ.,. SW,h
••
Till St•t• •f PUl!id
1962
"•
Ti, .: lot1 .,,_, Piinjab
658 SUPREME C'OUR'l' HEPORTS [ 1962) SUPP.
and on January 11, 1000, his application for paBBport was recommended by tho S.D.O., Kaithal,
tO the Punjab UovPrmnent. On January 13, 1960,
however, tho incident giving rise to tho present
prosecution occurred and Malook Singh along with
his brother Darbara Singh and his relation, Anup
Singh were murdered. The prosecution case is
that the@e murders were committed by the appellants in furtherance of the common intention because they wanted to thwart Malook Singh'~ efforts
to bring satisfactory evidence about the heirship
of his father, Phula Singh to the mortgagor Sunder
Singh. That, in substance, is the motive alleged
by tho prosecution for the eommission of the
three murders.
The actual incidents leading to the triple
murder lie within a narrow compass. January
13, l!J60, was 'Lohri' day. A couple of days earlier
Malook Singh had arranged for an 'Akhandpath'
(Non-stop recitation of the holy Granth Sahib). Tho
Path came to a close on the forenoon of January
12, 1960, and tho closin~ function was attended by
several persons, including Shahbeg Singh who is a
relation of Malook Singh. Between IO and 11 A.M.
on January 13, l!J60, Malook Singh, accompanied
by his wife Amar Kaur, her brother An up Singll and
Shahbeg Singh went to the local Gurdwara to pay
their homage on the auspicious day. Darbara Singh,
Balkar Singh and Mohinder Singh had preceded
them. All of them halted in the Gurdwara for a
few minutes and then came out. Malook Singh was
carrying a spear because he intended to go to his fields
after visiting tho Gurdwara.. As the party reached
tho 'ba.ithak' of Tara Singh whfoh was a few paces
away from the Gurdwara, Malook Singh and his
companions saw the three appellants coming towards
them accompanied by Racbhpal Singh. They also
noticed that all of them were armed. The appellant
Sunder Singh immcdiat.ely railed a shout at Malook
••,.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
659
Singh and said that he would despatch him to
Pakistan where he intended ta go in order to collect
proof for the mortgage and heirship of his father to
the mortgagor. So saying, he aimed a lathi blow
at Malook Singh, but Anup Singh intervened and
entreated Sunder Singh not to assault Malook Singh.
As a result, Anup Singh was hit on the head by the
lathi of Sunder Singh. The three companions of
the appellant Sunder Singh then rushed forward.
Gurmukh Singh gave a lathi blow on one of the
hands of Anup Singh. Malook Singh then stepped
forward to save Anup Singh's life and gave a spear
below to Sunder Singh. .This blow caused injuries
on his chest. Thereupon, Sunder Singh shouted to
his companions not to allow Malook Singh and his
friends to escape. At that stage, Lal Singh and
Rachhpal Singh .used their di:Juble-barrelled guns
and fired ; Lal Singh hit Malook Singh and
Rachhpal Singh injured one of the knees of Anup
Singh Rachhpal Singh then shot at Anup Singh again
and Anup Singh fell down. All the companions of
Malook Singh, except for his wife Amar Kaur, were
frightened and ran for their lives. Lal Ringh then
gave a chase to Darbara Singh, overtook him at a
short distance and shot him dead. Mohinder Singh
and Shahbeg Singh, however, managed to . find the
shelter and thus protected themselves. After shooting Darbara Singh dead, Lal Singh returned to the
spot and shot at Malook Singh and. Anup Singh
again when he found that they were still alive.
Having thus committed three murders, the assailants
ran away with their respective weaptins. That, in
brief, is the prosecution case.
As we have already pointed out, the learned
trial Judge gave the benefit of doubt to Rachhpal
Singh and convicted the three appellants of the
offence of murder. Before the High Court, it was
urged on behalf of the appellants that Gurmukh
Singh and Rachhpal Singh had been falsely implicated
196%
Su,,J,r S;,,gh
v.
T1ie 8t•ll of I'..; 1b
1962
s...#rSingh
••
'[,,. 81.U •f /'wUal>
660 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [l 962] SUPP.
by the prosecution witnesses and it was argued
that the appellant, Sunder Singh himself was a
victim of aggression at the hands of the dOOQased
Malook Singh and his comp11nioDR <ind Lal "3?ngh had
8hut at the assailants in ord"r tu sa \ e hio father.
In other words, the contention was t.hat Sundor
Singh and Gurmukh Singh were not guilty of any
offence at all and that Lal Singh would at the worst
be guilty of having exceeded the right of private
defence. The case for the defence being based on
the assumption that Malook Singh and his friends
assaulted Sunder Singh and were themselves the
aggressors, the High Court considered the oral
evidence given by the four eye-witn<'SS<·s, Shahbeg
Singh, Balkar Singh, Mohinder Singh and Amar
Kaur, the injuries inflicted on the three dect'ased
persons, and examined the several points raised
before it by tho defence and came to the conclusion
that tho appellants and Rachhpal :::>ingh were
actuat .. d by the common intention as alleged by the
prosl.'1•11tion.
In its opinion, Sunder 8ingh and
his companions were the aggrl'ssurs and Miilook
Singh ;end his friends were the victims and so, the
learned trial J udgo was right in holdiug the appellants guilty of murder under soction 302 read with
section 34, I.P.C. It appears that the High Court
was in<' lined to take thP. view that the trial Judge
wa8 not right in giving the Lenefit of doubt to
Raehhpal Singh. In the alternativl', tlw High Court
came to the conclusion that even if the meeting
between the two parties was in the nature of a
chanc<' meeting, the circumstances of the ease clearly
indieat1· that the common intention to kill tho throe
dceeas1·il persons developed in the minds of the
appcllnuts and R<\chhpal Singh on the apot.
Their
conduct leading to the three murders, thought the
High Court, irresistibly led to the inft:rence that
even if they did not start with the l'ommon intention
of killing
tho
three
,·idims, that
intention
developed in t.hcir minds as HOUll :is thPy nu·t the
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
661
opposite party by chance. On these findings, the
High Court confirIUed the conviction of the three
appellants, upheld the sentence of death aga.inst
Sunder Singh and Lal Singh and reduced the
eentencil of d~ath passrd on Gurmukh Singh to one
of imprisonment for life. It is the correctness of
the findings recorded by the High Court that is
challenged before us by Mr. Sethi op behalf of the
appellants.
The first point which Mr. Sethi has strenuously
urged l>eforn us is that the High Court was in error
in wcurding a finding that Rachhpal Singh was
present at the scene of the offence, shared the
common intention of the three other appellants
and, in fact, fired at Anup Singh as alleged by the
prosecution.
Mr. Sethi contends that the trial
Court had acquitted Rachhpal Singh of the offence
charged and thne was no appeal by the State
against the said order of acquittal.
Under s. 423
( l)(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it is only
where an appeal from an order of acquittal bas been
preferred that the High Court can reverse the said
order ii it is sati8fi<'!l that the acquit:al was not
justified on the evidence adduced in the case. He,
therefore, contends that the High Court should not
have considered the propriety or the validity of the
order of acquittal in favour of Rachhpal Singh.
Indeed, according to him, the High Court had no
authority or jurisdiction to embark upon that
enquiry and since the High Court has, in terms,
recorded the conoluRion that Rachhpal Singh had
taken part in the offence as alleged by the prosecution, that has introduced a serious infirmity in the
judgment of the High Court.
In support of his argument, Mr. Sethi has
placed strong reliance on the decision in The King
v. Plummer('). In that case, three persons were
jointly tried with conspiring togethet. One of them
(I)
(i902) 2 K,B.D, 339,
1968
s,,,.~h
..
Thi 81#14 of l'wJob
---
Gojend..-.. J.
IHI
a..- B;.,A
...
'1'111 ,,.. •I IVli•b
G .......
~~1rJ.
662 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.
pleaded guilty and judgment was passed ag"inst him
on his plea. The other two pleaded i1ot guilty.
They were tried and acquitted. It was held that
the judgment passed against the one who had
pleaded guilty was bad and could not stand.
It
would he noticed that the indictment in that caso
contained five counts charging the obtaining of
money by false pretences and also a sixth count
alleging a conspiracy betwP.en the three accused tu
defraud the prosecutors. The sixth count did not
allege that there wore any other or unknown parties
to the conspiracy and all the three defendants \~ere
included in one arraignment. All of thorn pleaded
not guilty to tho five counts. Only one pleaded
guilty
to the sixth count, the
others pleaded
not guilty even to that count. It was on these factl!
that the conviction of the one who had pleaded
guilty to one charge was set aside and the decision
setting aside the BA.id conviction was based on two
grounds. It appears. that at a later stage bf the
trail the defendant who had pleaded guilty to the
sixth chargo wanted to withdraw his plea and the
Court did not. allow him to withdraw that plea on
tho ground that it had no jurisdiction to do so.
Tho King's Bench Division for whose opinion the
relevant questions were referred held that the trial
Court had no doubt a discretion in the matter, but
since it had acted upon the erroneous opinion that
it had no power to allow the withdrawal of the plea,
it had, in fac~, not exercised any discretion. Therefore, if the discretion had been properly exercised
and the ploa of guilty had been allmved to bo withdrawn, then clearly the defendant pleading .<?uilty
would have bee1! acquitted. That is one r<>ason for
the order of acquittal passed by the King's Bench
Division. The other r<>ason was that whcrn the
indictment charges that A, B and C combined,
confederated and agreed together to <lo a certain
thing, and A and B are acquitted by the vordiot
of the jury from the charge, it is inconsistent with
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
663
that finding that there could have been any combination, confederation, and a.greement between them
and C ; and unless they combined, confederated,
and agreed together with C, C could not be found
guilty of the charge. It is on these two grounds
tha.t the conviction recorded against one defendant
for the sixth count to which he had pleaded guilty
was set aside.
It is difficult to see how this decision can
asRist Mr. Sethi in the present case. It is not
sng-gested by him that the order passed by the
trial Court convicting thll three appellants even
after acquitting Rachhpal Singh was itself invalid.
Logically, if the decision in the case of Plummer
was applicable to the present.case, Mr. Sethi would
have been able to attack the validity of the conviction of the three appellants in the trial Court
itself. His argument is that the
Appeal Court
should uot have considered the propriety· and the
validit.y of the acquittal of Rachhpal Singh. That
is a question with which wa will presently deal; but
in deciding that question, the case of Plummer
does not appear to afford any material assistance.
Cases sometimes arise where persons are
charged with being members of an unlawful assembly and other charges are framed against them in
respect of offence committed by such an unlawful
assembly. In suc:h ca.sea, if the names of persons
constituting the unlawful assembly are specifically
and clearly recited in the charge and it is not
suggested that any other persons known or unknown also were members of the unlawful assembly,
it may be that if one or more persons specifically
charged are acquitted, that may introduce a serious
infirmity in tiie charge in respect of the others
against whom the prose1JUtion ca.ae may be proved.
It is in this class of cases, for instance, that the principle laid down itJ the case of Plummer may have
some relovirnoe. If out of the six persons charge<l
1961
SUlltltiSingA
n, s,.,. ~f Pw!Jd
GaJ""1'6"'1k• j.
1H2
B-'n Bia16
••
n. 1J1111 of P!/14/oi
(J ej,,,.., ... J.
664 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1962] SUPP.
under sootion 149 of the Indian Penal Code along
with other offencea, two persons are acquitted, the
remaining four may not be convicted because the
essential requirement of an unlawful assembly
might be lacking. In the present case, however,
the failure of the prosecution to
prove that
Raohhpal Singh took part in the commission of
t.he offence does not introduce an infirmity in its
oas<i against the appellant at a.II.
Even ifRachhpa.l
Singh is held not to be presont at the scene of the
offence, that, in law, cannot prevent the proseeution
from presenting its case against the three appellants
if the evidence adduced by it is otherwise satisfactory and cogent. Therefore, we are satisfied that
t.he case of Plummer does not make the conviction
of the appellants either unreasonable or illegal.
Revertting then to tho argument based •m the
provisions of s. 423(1 )(a) of the Criminal Procedure
Code, it is obvious that the order of acquittal
passed in favour of Rachhpa.! Singh cannot be set
asiclc un le~R an apf'cu.I had been duly preferred in
that behalf against the said order. But do the provisi0ns of s. 4:!:! (I )(a) create a bar against the High
Court iu~iliPntally considering the question about
lfachhpal Singh's 11rcsence and conduct at the relevant time while it is dealing with the prosecution
cruie a~ain8t the three appellants before it ?
Wh~n
the High Court in appeal considered the ca.so
against the three appellants, it had inevitably to
examine the comment made by Mr. Sethi against
the reliability of the witnesses on tho ground that
their evidence against H.achhpal Singh had not been
accepted Ly the trail Court and that neoeasarily
meant that the High Court had to apply its mind
to that problem as well. If in dealing with the case
presented Lefore it on behalf of tho appellants it
Lccame necessary for tho High Court to deal indirectly or incidentally with the case
against
Raehupal Singh. them iH no fogal bar at all. It
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
665
may be that in considering the evidence as a whole
the High Court may have come to the conclusion
that the evidence against Rqchhpal Singh was
unsatisfactory and if it had come to such a conclu·
si<>n, it would have examined the said evidence in
the light of this infirmity. On the othur hand,
after considering the evidence, tho High Court may
well have com" to the conclusion, as it has, in fact,
done in the present case, that the evidence against
Rachhpal Singh is also good and need not have
been discarded. Iu our opinion, there is no doubt
that if in appreciating the points made by the
appellants before it the High Court hn,d to consider
the whole of the evidence, in respect. of the acoused
persons, it was freo to come to one conclusion or
the other in respect of the said evidence, so far a.s
it related to Hachhpal Singh. Thn,t is why we
think that the point made by Mr. Sethi that
s. 4:'3(l)(a) precluded the High Court from considering the merits of the order of acquittal even incidentally or indirectly cannot be upheld.
Mr. Sflthi, however, sought to derive assistance from the decision of this Court in the case of
Pritam S·ingh v. Si,awof Punj11b('). In that case, this
Court has observed "that the pffect of a verdict of
acquittal pronounced by a competent Court on a
lawful charge aud after a lawful trial is not completely stated by saying that tho person acquitted
cannot be tried again for the same offence.
To
that it must be added that tlie verdict is binding
and conclusive in all subsequen¥ proceedings between the parties to t.he adjudication.
The maxim
'res judiratii pro veritate accipitm' is no less applicable to criminal than to civil proceedings."
These observations were m'itle wlwn dcspitr the
order of acquittal passed against a pcrnon under
sections Hl (ft of t.he Amrn Ad in 1rn cm·lier proceeding, the same allegation \\·a~ 1na.<le aga.iust him
in a subRcqu<'nt case where he was charg<'d with
(l) A.1,H .. ll~!JUJ S.C.R. ·ll.[1.
11112
SWllfrr Si ... ~
••
Th• Sfdle ., f'ttt(jri
,,.,
s .. •Sio&•
••
i118 .... •f "'-jol
C~orJ.
666 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [l!Hl2] SLl'P.
murder.
[n other words, the derision of this Court
in the case of Prit.am Singh rn<'l'P ly shows that if a
person is acquitted of an off.·nce on a charg<' frarn('()
against him which had heen tried in a court of
competent jurisdiction, tho acquittal is conclusive
between the said person and the prosc<·ution and
it cm be challenged or reopened only by an appeal
against the said acquittal, not otherwise.
This
proposition has no relevance to the present case.
When the High Court considered Mr. Sethi's cri·
tioism against the prosecution evidence based on
the a.BBumption that the said evidence was found
to be unreliable in rn far as Rachhpal Singh is
concerned, it was not appreciating that evidence
with a view to reverse the order of acquittal passed
in favour of R&chhpal Singh ; it wn.A appreciating
that evidence only with a \'iew to decide whetl1er
the said evidence shoul<I be believl'd against the
appellants before it.
That is wlty we think no
assistance c9.D be legitimately claimed by Mr. Sethi
from the decision in the case uf Pritam Singh in
support of his argum<'nt that the High Court has
acted illegally or improperly in
<'Xpr<·ssin)(
its
opinion that tho
prosecution •·vi<lencc
against
Raohhpal Singh was not unsatisfactory.
Indel'd,
as an appellate Court, the High Cvurt has tu consider indirectly and incidentally the evidencu adduced against an accused person who had been
acquitted by a trial Court in several roses where it
is dealing with the appeals brfore it by the cu.
accused persons who had been convicttd at the
same trial and in. doing so, the High Court and
even this court some times records its indirect
conclusion that the evidence against the acquitted
persons was not weak or unsatisfactory and that
the acquittal may in that sense be regard as unjustified, !'ide Bimbadl111r Pradhrm v. 'l'he State of
Oris.<a. (1)
Therefore, we do not think tha.t there
is any substance in the point ma.du by Mr. Sethi
that the judgment of the High Court Ruffers rrom a
\I)
[1951i]S.C,R.2W,~19.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME coerrT REPORTS
667
serious infirmity in that it examined the evidence
against Rachhpal Singh and came to the conclusion
that the said evidence was not unsatisfactory.
In
this connection, we may incidentally poin.t out that
even the trial Court which acquitted Rachhpal
Singh has expressly observed that it did not say
that the eyewitnesses were false in their claim that
Rachhpal Singh also took part in the furtherance
of the afqresaid common intention, but it thought
that the case against him was not proved beyond
all reasonable doubt.
In other words, even the
finding of the trial Court was not that the prosecution evidence against Rachhpal Singh was false;
it only was to the effect that it left room for reasonable donbt. That .is about all.
That takes us to the merits of the case. On
the merits, Mr. Sethijias raised· some general considerations affecting the credibility of the oral
evidence adduced by tho prosecution in support of
itR case.
It appears that in the trial Court the
prosecution case was that shooting had taken place
from n 8hort distance of 9 to 12 inch< s between the
assailants and their victims.
This case appears
to receive support from the evidence of Dr. (Mrs.)
Iqbal Shukla who had conduckd post mortem
examinr,'.ina of the three dead bodies.
While giving the details of various gun-shot injuries, she
noted that in most cases the wounds l1ad burnt
irregular edgts and signs of burning wrre also
found in some of the internal or1wns, such as lungs
and heart, through whirh the bullet or the pellets
passed. It is true that ~he does not appear h1 have
been seriously cross-!':xamined at th<' trial on this
part of the evidence ; but it was pointed out to the
High Court that if the culprits werr alleged to have
fired from the lieens<•d guns, the buming of the
edges could take place on!~' if th<• rliManre lwtwe<>n
the muzzle of the gun and the bod.v mis not more
than nine inchrs, but since the wound8 on the dead
1969
s"""'r sn.,i. .
"
Th• s1a1, of r..v•
(
668
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] .SWP.
J:RSZ
hoclies '.plearly showed that ,the pellets had ·n.ot
Sanihr Sinth
entered the body en masse but had dispersed, .it
v.
woul_d be obvious that the deceased persons were.
T7rt sr.zr, •/ Pulij•b shot from a: distance of not less than 20 or 25 •·feet i
GaJmkrirt..Zkn .-,
The High Court was impresse':l: by this argument
and so examined Dr. (Mrs.) Shukla and Dr. K.S.
Rai who is a Professor of Forensic
Medicines.
Dr. (Mrs.) Iqbal Shukla adhered to the opinion
already given py her but Dr. Rai's evidence completely destroyed the evidence giyen by· Dr. (Mrs.)
Shukla. Besides, the clothes of, the deceased which
were examined by Dr. Rai should that there were
no marks of burning on them.
Jn
the result,
the High C9urt"<!ame to the conclusion th11,t it wns
diffiC:vlt to accept Dr. (Mrs.) Shnkla's evidence that
thii gun-shot injuries on the deceased had burnt
edges and it also held that the shooting must have
taken pface from q. dista~ce of 20 to 25 feet.
'Fhis
findihg of the. High Court is not disput,ed ,before
us by Mr. Chari wpo appeared for the l::itate.
Mr,. Sethi contends that the finding as to the
dist.anc~ fro~ whfoh shooting took place introduces,
a Sl'ri<;>us infirmity in the prosecution evidence in
as such as the eye-witnesAes suppo_rteq the. proAccution case .as priginally. set out al,Joqt the· cjistanc!l;
t)Jey said that the firing took place from a distance
- of '9•...
Tp.e .Ft;igl). Cour.t tliought that this ,infirmity
was. true only in the C\l~e of .;:ihahbeg S,ingh.
'.!'.hat,.
ho.wever, i.s clearly erron.e'ous.
'.l'hat injirm.it.y is
presept evep in the easy .of B!i-lkar j3ingh., n.nd .A,ma,r
Kaur, th9ugh Amar J(anr put the clistance ,at 2 to
4 fee~. ' Tb,e .High Court _d,oes not appear to have
npti~ed the fact that ev!ln B.\tlkar Singh like Sh&hbeg_ :Singh dyscribed the clis~nce from whi.ch firing.
too!f P,lace as' .being 9 inches, t rt
,i~ true that
Mohinqer ~ingh d_oes
no~ give. (l.nyl <wjdenco ahout,
tliis.ili~tanoo.,,
,'
Therefor'c;:Mr. Setl)i js right ip con~(\ndiNg' tjlat
thet hree· e:v.c.witheslles· have clriposetl to Lho distnace
from which" firing t.ook p1acc \\'hich is demonstrated .
,•
I!
(
I
~
I
(
I
'i
"
.1
·I
I I
•I l
·~j
I
..
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
669
to be wholly inaccurate, Incidentally, we would
like to add that in dealing with the evidence of
Amar Kaur, the High Court has referred to her
8tatement in the committal court and erroneously
treated it as substantial evidence in the present
case. Thus, it may be conceded in favou; of the
defence that three out of the four eye-witnessas
have deposed to the distance in terms of the theory
propounded by Dr. (Mrs.) Iqbal Shukla and that,
no doubt, is an infirmity in the evidence.
Then, Mr. Sethi contends that the prosecution
story as to how the incident occurred is not consis·
tent with its case that the appellants ca.me to the
scene of the offence pre-determined to assault
Ma.look Singh and his companions. If the common
intention of the appellants wa.e to attack Ma.look
Singh and his companions, they would not have
allowed the appellant Sunder Singh to gu ahead
armed with a lathi, particularly when his son, La.I
Singh was armed with a. gun. Sunder Singh was an
old man of 65 and seeing that Ma.look Singh has a
spear in his hand, it is very unlikely that Sunder
Singh's son would have allowed him to go a.head
with a lathi to assault Malook Singh and his com·
pa.nions. Therefore, the sequence of events as it
is described by the prosecution witnesses, it is urged,
is not consistent with the story of a pre-concerted
plan on the part of the appellants. In our opinion,
this contention. cannot be rejected as wholly un·
reasonable.
On the other hand, it appears to be fairly clear
that Sunder Singh attempted to attack Ma.look Singh
before he received the injury himself. As the High
Court has pointed out, having regard to the real
nature of the injury inflicted on Sunder Singh by
Malook Singh, it is very unlikely that Sunder Singh
attacked Anup Singh after he himself was assaulted
by l\falook Singh. Therefore, it oan be taken to be
established on probabilities that when Sunder Singh
1/1112
v •
TJi..6-.tf~·
67<> SUPREME COUHT REl'OR'.l'S [1962J SUP.I:' .
.IHI
and his sons met Malook SiT1gh and his com-
..., .tirfA
{!anions, Sunder. Singh must have attempted to
.,...,,,,v;, 1"o#iJoJ dllll&Ult Malook Smgh and in the process, injury was
_
cauaed to Anup Singh .
............ ,.
The fact that Sunder Singh assaulted Malook
Singh does not, however, show a pre-concerted plan
in the minds of Sunder Singh and his sons. In our
opinion, it was a chance encounter which, iD all
probability, led to an exchange of words and
Sunder Singh took the aggressive and wanted to
aasault Malook Singh. Tho oral evidence given by
the four eye-witnesses describes the incident as
though Sunder Singh and his companions came
armed determined tO attack Malook :Singh ; but that
evidence appears to us to be artificial and as we have
just indicated, Sunder Sinizh could not have been left
1.lone to tackle Malook Singh and hi11 companions
if his 11on and he had decided to attack Malook
Singh even before they mat.
It is, however, urged that Lal Singh who had
deposited the gun with the Police when proceedings
had been commenced against his father and the
members of hi1 party under s. I 07 of the Criminal
Procedure Code, took the gun back on January 9,
1960, and the argument is that Lal Singh took the
gun back because he and his father had decided toaasaultMalook Singh. The High Court appears to have
attached considerable importance to this circum·
stance. Unfortunately, this circumstance h88 not
been put to Lal Singh when he was examined under
s. 342 of the Code in the trial Court. If it was
thought that the conduct of Lal Singh in taking
back his gun on .January 9, 1960, was an incriminating circumetanoo, the trial Judge should have
given an opportunity to Lal Singh to explain that
ciroumstance. In the absence of any question put
to him in that behalf, it would, we think, not be fair
w press this circumstance very much against Lal
Singh and in support of the theory of the common
2 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
671
intention of Lal Singh, his father and his brother.
Besides, even the High Court has observed that
going about with a gun in that part of the oountry
and amongst the class to whom the parties belong
is not such an unusual circumstance at a.IL
Just as
Malook Singh was going about with a spear, so Lal
Singh may be going about with a gun for which he
had a licence. 'l'herefore, the fact that Lal Singh
was armed with a gun which he had taken ha.ck
from the Police custody on January 9, would not,
in o.ur opinion, support tho theory of a pre-oonoerted plan.
It is also urged that whatever may be said
against the evidence of Shahbeg Singh, Balkar
Singh and Amar Kaur, Mohinder. Singh is an independent witness and since he has given evidence in
support of the prosecution case of a pre-concerted
plan, there is no reason why that evidence should
not be believed. Apart from the fa.ct that the probabilities do not support the prosecution case of a
pre-concerted plan, we are not satisfied
that
Mohinder Singh can claim to be an absolutely independent witness as the High 'Court seems to have
thought. Mohinder Singh was •asked in cross-examination whether he was not related to Malook
Singh and in order to establish his relationship, it
was put to him that Gehna Singh was his grandfather and that Gehna Singh was the cousin of
Phula Singh. Mohinder Singh replied that he did
not know the name of his grandfa~her because he
had not seen him and he had not enquired
from any relation about the name of
his
grandfa.~~er either: The High
Court thought
that this explanat10n was genuine. We are not
satjrdied that.the view taken by the High Court is
right. In our . opinion, the trend of the answers
given by Mohinder cingh in hiE cross· examination
clearly suggests that he was evading to give truthful
replies in respect of his relationship with Phula Singh
IHI -
v,
n. Sttlll of ""VU
Cojmdr•ga/Ur 1.
JJ/62
S,...r.Sii14l
v.
~..,. •f '"1ifab
672 Sl:PBEME COl:RT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.
Besides, it appears in evidnnce that proceedings
had been taken against whom lllalook Singh and
his friends amongst l\Iohindcr Singh was included,
under HS. I 07 and 150 of the Code of Criminal Procedur1» Hazur Singh was the person who had made
the complaint in that behalf. The allegations made
hy Hazur Singh clearly point to the fact that
disputes were going on between two groups-one
led by the appellant Sunder Singh and the other
led by Malook Singh. The High Court thought that
there was nothing on the record to show. that
Sunder Singh or members of his party were witnesses in those proceedings. That, however, is not
decisiv<'.
What is important is tho fact that disputes were going on between two rival groups to
one of which Mohinder Singh belonged and that
was the point of the croBB-examination to which
Mohindor Singh was s11 hjccted at the trial. Therefore, we are not incline< I to hold that l\Iohinder Singh
ia an absolutely independent
witn~ss. Like the
other eye-witnosrs, he also must be characterised as
the partisan witness. That is wh.)' the argument
based on the unimpcu.chable character of the evidence given by .Mohindcr Singh in support of the
theory of the common intention of the appellants
cannot be accepted. We must, therefore, hold that
the prosecution evidem c fails to establish its CMe
that the appellants case on the scene of the offence
determined to attack Malook Singh.
On the other hand, it appear to have been a
chance meeting which bP.gan with an exchange of
hot words between Sur.der Singh and Malook Singh
and the verbal exchange was followed by an attack
by Sunder Singh on Malook Singh. That means
Sunder Singh was the a.ggreesor and so La.I Singh
could claim no right of private defence.
Indeed,
in the present appeal, Mr. Sethi's arguments were,
in 1111betance, confined to the case ofGurmukh Singh.
Sunder Singh who had been ordered to be hanged
28.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
673
died in jail pending the present appeal, and the
case of Lal Singh, as Mr. Sethi himself fairly conceded, is difficult to defend. It is on the case of
Gurmukh Singh that Mr. Sethi naturally concentrated, and it is to Gurmukh Singh's case that we must
now turn.
If the prosecution case about the pre-concerted
plan does not succeed and if it is held that Sunder
Singh began the assault against Malook Singh and
was followed by Lal Singh who fired at Malook
Singh and his companions, there can be no doubt
that Sunder Singh and Lal Singh can be held to
have been actuated by the common intention of
murdering Malook Singh and his companions.
Sunder Singh knew that La.I Singh was armed with
a gun and when he deliberately provoked a controversy with Malook Singh and proceeded. to
assault him, he musi; have known that Lal Singb
was behind him, he would follow up the attack and
do the rest of the work. That is why we are inclined
to a0cept the conclusion of the High Court that the
common intention to murder Malook Singh arid his
companions must have developed in the minds of
Sunder Singh and Lal Singh soon after they met
Malook Singh and his companions and Sunder Singh
attacked Malook Singh.
But can we reasonably
hold that Gurmukh Singh also developed the same
common intention?
And that must take us to the
evidence which implicates Gurmukh Singh. As we
have already pointed out, Gurmukh Singh is alleged
to have caused an injury to Anup Singh on his knee
and an injury to Amar Kaur.