# SUBRAMANIA GOUNDAN v. THE STATE OF MADRAS

- **Citation:** [1958] 1 S.C.R. 428
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1956-06-06
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal,No. 127 of 1957
- **Bench:** B.P. Sinha, Govinda Menon, J.L. Kapur
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/subramania-goundan-v-the-state-of-madras-1472
- **Pages:** 15

## Headnote

Criminal law-Retracted confession-Corroboration, requirc111e11t
of-Question by recording magistrate-If an inducement.
The appellant was charged with murder.
The. eye witnesses
against him were not relied upon. He made a confession before a
magistrate. One of the questions put by the magistrate to . the
appellant before recording the confession was : ·"For what purpose are you going to make a statement ?" To this he replied,
"Others will be implicated in the case for murder, I alone have
committed murder." It was argued that an inducement was
given by the magistrate by the manner in which the question was
put. The next day after the murder "a drawer, a baniyan and a
bed-sheet'', all stained with human blood were recovered from the
appellant, for which no explanation was given by him. The confession was retracted before the Court of Session. These recoveries
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
429
were used as corroboration of the confession. It was contended
that this. was no corroboration.
Held, that the confession was voluntary and the putting by
the magistrate of a perfectly innocuous question which was prescribed by the Madras Criminal Rules of Practice did not amount
to an inducement to make a confesion.
Held, further, that there can be no .absolute rule that retracted eonfession cannot be acted upon unless it is
corroborated
materially. But as a matter of prudence and caution, which has
sanctified itself into a rule of law, a retracted confession cannot
be made solely the basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. It
is not necessary that each and every circumstance mentioned in
the confession regarding the complicity of the accused
should
be separately and independently corroborated, nor is it essential
that the corroboration must come from facts and circumstances
discovered after the confession was made. It would be sufficient
if the general trend of the confession is substantiated by some
evidence which would tally with what is contained in the confession. In the instant case the recovery of clothes stained
with
human blood for which the appellant gave no explanation was
sufficient corroboration of the confession.
Balbil' Singh v. State of Punjab, A.LR. (1957) S.C. 216 relied
on.
CRIMINAL
APPELLATE
JURISDICTION:
Criminal
Appeal,No. 127 of 1957.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
order dated the 12th February, 1957, of the Madras
High Court in Criminal AppeJll No. 728 of 1956 and
Referred Trial No. 144 of 1956, arising out of the
judgment and order date'd the 23rd October, 1956, of
the Court of the Addl. Sessions Judge of the Coimbatore Division in S.C. Nos. 120 & 135 of 1956.
H.J. Umrigar and T.S. Venkataraman, for the
appellant.
P. Rama Reddy and T.M. Sen, for the respondent.
1957. September 17. The following judgment of the
Court was delivered by
1957
Subramaniri
Goundan
v.
Tlze State a/
MadraJ
GOVINDA MENON J .-Before the Additional Judge Govi11da Menon J •.
of the court of Sessions of Coimbatore Division there
were four accused, of whom the first accused Subramania Goundan has now appealed to this court against
the confirmation by the High Court of Madras of
the conviction and sentence by the trial court, by which,
1957
·Suhramania
Gou11dan
v.
The State of
Madras
430
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958]
on charges Nos. 1 & 2, he was sentenced to death, and
also sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for tw.o years
on charge No. 3. Special leave to appeal was granted
by order of this court, dated the 6th of May, 1957.
Along with the appellant were tried three others, of
fio.vinda Menon!. whom the second accused (Marappa Goundan) was
his father, the Third accused (Karuppa) was the grandson of the second accused's paternal uncle, while the
fourth accused (Iyyavu) was an agnate in the fourth
.degree of the second accused. It is thus seen that all
the accused were related to each other.
The learned Sessions Judge framed four charges of
which the first was against the appellant, that he on
June 6, 1956, at
night in the vill

## Text

1957
.!vlangoo Singh
V,
The E'/ection
T.-ibunal, Bareil/y
aflrl Others
S. K. Das J.
1957
Septe1nher 11.
428
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958]
'demand' in standard English dictionaries and law
lexicons. When the context makes the meaning of a
word quite clear, it becomes unnecessary to search for
and select a particular meaning out of the diverse
meanings a word is capable of, according to lexicographers. It is sufficient for our purpose to state that
even in standard dictionaries and law lexicons, it is
well recognised that the word 'demand' may mean
simply a 'claim' or 'due' without importing any further
meaning of calling upon the person liable to pay the
claim or due.
For the reasons given above, we hold that not one
of the contentions urged on behalf of the appellant is
worthy. of acceptance.
The election petition was
rightly decided, as the appellant was disqualified for
being chosen as a member of the Municipal Board in
question on the day he filed
his nomination, under
cl. (g) s. 13-D of the Act. Accordingly, the appeal is
dimissed with costs in favour of respondent 3 who
alone constested the appeal before us.
Appeal dismissed.
SUBRAMANIA GOUNDAN
v.
THE STATE OF MADRAS
(B.P. SINHA, GOVINDA MENON and J.L. KAPUR, JJ.)
Criminal law-Retracted confession-Corroboration, requirc111e11t
of-Question by recording magistrate-If an inducement.
The appellant was charged with murder.
The. eye witnesses
against him were not relied upon. He made a confession before a
magistrate. One of the questions put by the magistrate to . the
appellant before recording the confession was : ·"For what purpose are you going to make a statement ?" To this he replied,
"Others will be implicated in the case for murder, I alone have
committed murder." It was argued that an inducement was
given by the magistrate by the manner in which the question was
put. The next day after the murder "a drawer, a baniyan and a
bed-sheet'', all stained with human blood were recovered from the
appellant, for which no explanation was given by him. The confession was retracted before the Court of Session. These recoveries
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
429
were used as corroboration of the confession. It was contended
that this. was no corroboration.
Held, that the confession was voluntary and the putting by
the magistrate of a perfectly innocuous question which was prescribed by the Madras Criminal Rules of Practice did not amount
to an inducement to make a confesion.
Held, further, that there can be no .absolute rule that retracted eonfession cannot be acted upon unless it is
corroborated
materially. But as a matter of prudence and caution, which has
sanctified itself into a rule of law, a retracted confession cannot
be made solely the basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. It
is not necessary that each and every circumstance mentioned in
the confession regarding the complicity of the accused
should
be separately and independently corroborated, nor is it essential
that the corroboration must come from facts and circumstances
discovered after the confession was made. It would be sufficient
if the general trend of the confession is substantiated by some
evidence which would tally with what is contained in the confession. In the instant case the recovery of clothes stained
with
human blood for which the appellant gave no explanation was
sufficient corroboration of the confession.
Balbil' Singh v. State of Punjab, A.LR. (1957) S.C. 216 relied
on.
CRIMINAL
APPELLATE
JURISDICTION:
Criminal
Appeal,No. 127 of 1957.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
order dated the 12th February, 1957, of the Madras
High Court in Criminal AppeJll No. 728 of 1956 and
Referred Trial No. 144 of 1956, arising out of the
judgment and order date'd the 23rd October, 1956, of
the Court of the Addl. Sessions Judge of the Coimbatore Division in S.C. Nos. 120 & 135 of 1956.
H.J. Umrigar and T.S. Venkataraman, for the
appellant.
P. Rama Reddy and T.M. Sen, for the respondent.
1957. September 17. The following judgment of the
Court was delivered by
1957
Subramaniri
Goundan
v.
Tlze State a/
MadraJ
GOVINDA MENON J .-Before the Additional Judge Govi11da Menon J •.
of the court of Sessions of Coimbatore Division there
were four accused, of whom the first accused Subramania Goundan has now appealed to this court against
the confirmation by the High Court of Madras of
the conviction and sentence by the trial court, by which,
1957
·Suhramania
Gou11dan
v.
The State of
Madras
430
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958]
on charges Nos. 1 & 2, he was sentenced to death, and
also sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for tw.o years
on charge No. 3. Special leave to appeal was granted
by order of this court, dated the 6th of May, 1957.
Along with the appellant were tried three others, of
fio.vinda Menon!. whom the second accused (Marappa Goundan) was
his father, the Third accused (Karuppa) was the grandson of the second accused's paternal uncle, while the
fourth accused (Iyyavu) was an agnate in the fourth
.degree of the second accused. It is thus seen that all
the accused were related to each other.
The learned Sessions Judge framed four charges of
which the first was against the appellant, that he on
June 6, 1956, at
night in the village of Vengakalpalayam, committed the murder of Marappa Goundan
by cutting him with an aruval, while
the second
charge was that at about the same time and place and
in the course of the same transaction, he committed
the murder of Muthu Goundan by stabbing him with a
spear. The third count of the charge was against the
first and the second accused that they conjointly
committed the offence of attempt to murder by stabbing one Munia Goundan with a spear and knife, and
the last count of the charge was against accused
Nos. 3 & 4 that they abetted the commission of the
;>tfence of attempt to murder of Munia Goundan by
being present on the scene.
The learned Sessions
Judge acquitted accused Nos. 2, 3 & 4, but convicted
and sentenced the appellant before us in the manner
stated above.
The village, where the offences were committed, was
fa~tion-ridden in which the appellant, his father and
others took one side, whereas the two deceased individuals, along with Munia Goundan and others, formed
the leaders of the rival faction. It was
also stated
that the appellant's father was the leading man of
the village, having been assigned that dignity by the
consent of the villagers.
The prosecution case is that the dignity of the
appellant's family had been offended
by certain
actions of the rival party and it was apprehended
by the appellant's father that his prestige and
S.C.R.
SUPR~ME COURT REPORTS
431
influence, as the chief-man of the village, were being.
1957
gradually undermined and usurped by the rival group.
suiiramania
About three days prior to the occurrence, which took
Goundan
place on the night between the 6th and the 7th of
The ~tare of
June, 1956, Munia Goundan is said to have stated to
Madras
the hearing of the appellant that he (Munia Goundan) Govinda MenonJ.
would wipe out the appellant's father and his par-_
tisans, and if that were not possible, in a spirit of
humiliation, Munia Goundan would shave off his
moustache. It is further alleged that the two deceased
individuals also proclaimed words to that effect.
Angered at this threat of extermination of his
family and inflamed by the enmity due to the faction
that had already existed, the appellant, according to
the prosecution, having armed himself with an aruval
(a sickle), a spear and a knife left his house on the
night of the 6th and 7th June, 1956, proceeded to a
place known as Chettithottam where the deceased
Marappa Goundan was sleeping in his field-shed, and
cut him on the neck with the aruval, and inflicted
other injuries on him before leaving the place. Thereafter while on his way to the house of Munia Goundan
to do away with him, the appellant met the deceased
Muthu Goundan who was coming in the opposite
direction and thinking that Muthu Goundan would
catch him, inflicted a stab wound on Muthu Goundan.
After this the appellant went to the house of Munia
Goundan (P.W. 5) and stabbed him also. Not being
content with committing these crimes, he set fire to
the shed of Sennimalai Goundan (P.W. 4-who was
also a partisan of the rival faction) which lay at a
distance about four furlongs from the village. Thereafter the appellant returned to his own garden and
lay down.
Karuppa Goundan (P.W. 1) hearing cries and noise
from the direction of the house of Munia Goundan,
ran towards that place, followed by Sennimalai
Goundan-(P.W. 4) who similarly heard the same cries.
They found Munia Goundan (P.W. 5) with injuries on
him and also saw the shed of Sennimalai Goundan
(P.W. 4) aflame. At this P.W. 4 and P.W. 5 proceeded
to the burning shed and on the way saw Natarajan
432
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958}
1957
(P.W.10) the son of the deceased Marappa Goundan,
Subramania
weeping and lamenting in his field.
Reaching the
Goundan
place wherefrom P.W. 10 was wailing, P.W. 4 and
The ~tate of P. W. 5 saw Marappa Goundan lying dead on a cot in
Madras
the shed with injuries. It is in evidence that the
GovlndaMeno11J. witnesses then saw the shed of P.W. 4 completely
burnt down and after that Karuppa Goundan and
Sennimalai Goundan went to the house of the village
Munsif who was living about four miles away from
the village and ·gave a report about the occurrence at
about 5 a.m. on 7-6-1956 and which is on record as
Exhibit P.1. Information reached the Sub-Inspector
of Police of Avanashi (P.W. 17) at 8-30 a.m. who
reached the place of occurrence at 11 a.m. Investigation was then started, the details of which it is unnecessary to mention. At about 12 noon near a temple
in the village finding the appellant there, the SubInspector of Police
arrested him after which the
appellant made a statement the admissible portions of
which are marked as Exhibit P. 13.
From the
appellant material objects Nos. 10 and 11, a bloodstained drawer and a baniyan respectively worn by
him were seized and the appellant thereafter took the
Police Officer to his garden and took out M.O. 12,
a blood-stained bed-sheet from a rafter in the garden
shed which, according to the prosecution, was used by
the appellant for wrapping himself up after he lay
down in his shed subsequent to the commission of the
crime.
Statements were taken by the Sub-Inspector
from a number of persons, including Natarajan (P.W.
10), son of Marappa Goundan, Nachimuthu Goundan
(P.W. II) son of Muthu Goundan, Munia Goundan
(P.W. 5) and others. We do not think it necessary to
describe the details of the investigation and the
examination of witnesses regarding the accusations
against the acquitted persons.
On June 9, 1956, at about 3-50 p.m. the appellant
was produced before Sri P.I. Veeraswami,
SubMagistrate (P.W. 7), who administered the necessary
warnings under the Criminal Rules of Practice and
being satisfied that the appellant wanted to make a
voluntary statement, he was given two day's time for
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
433
reflection till June, 11, 1956, on which date the appel1957
lant was produced before the same
Magistrate at
subra111a11ia
3-50 p.m. The same warnings were again administered
Goundan
to him and the Magistrate was satisfied that the stateThe State 0.f
ment about to be made was a voluntary one. ThereMadras
after it was recorded in the appellant's own words, Govi11da MenonY.
read over to him and acknowledged by him to be
.c;orrect.
This
statement in which the appellant
confessed to having committed the murder-of Marappa
Goundan and Muthu Goundan and also
inflicted
injuries on Munia Goundan on the night in question,
is exhibited as P. 3/A.
In order to prove the case against the appellant the
main reliance on the side of the prosecution was on
Natarajan (P.W. 10), the eye-witness to the attack on
his father Marappa Goundan, and with regard to the
murder of Muthu Goundan, the case rested on the
testimony of Nachimuthu Goundan (P.W. 11), son
of Muthu Goundan, who is said to have told the
witness (P.W. 12) that the appellant had stabbed
Muthu with a spear .. Subbanna Goundan (P.W. 12),
a neighbour
of Muthu Goundan, also
spoke
to
the fact that he heard Muthu Goundan saying
that
the appellant
had
stabbed
him with a
spear. The assault on Munia Goundan (P.W. 5) is
spoken to by himself. In addition to this evidence,
the prosecution rested its case on the confession of the
appellant.
Before
the learned Sessions Judge
the
appellant denied the offence and retracted the confession made by him on the ground that the Sub-Inspector and the Circle Inspector of Police threatened to
implicate the appellant's father and five others in the
crime if he did not confess and that was the reason
why he made a false confession.
The learned Sessions Judge accepted the testimony
of Natarajan (P. W. 10), Nachimuthu Goundan
(P.W. 11) and Subbanna Goundan (P.W. 12) with
regard to the murders and also that of Munia Goundan
(P.W. 5) and Komaraswami Goundan (P.W. 6) with
regard to the attack on Munia Goundan. He also held
that the confession, Exhibit P. 3/A was voluntary
and true and on the footing of the oral evidence,
M2SC61-9
434
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958]
1957
corroborated amply by the confession, the appellant
Subramania
was convicted and sentenced. In the High Court
Goundan
Somasundaram J. who delivered the judgment of the
The State of court, was not inclined to place reliance on the oral
Madras
testimony of P.W. 5, P.W. 10 and P.W. 11. The learned
GovindaMenonJ. Judge was of the opinion that it was not safe to act
on the evidence of Natarajan (P.W. 10) and convict
the appellant of the offence of murder of Marappa
Goundan. 'The high Court did not accept the evidence
of Nachimuthu Goundan (P.W. 11) and Subbanna
Goundan (P.W. 12). In the same strain the judgment
of the High Court states that it is not safe to act on
the evidence of Munia Goundan (P.W. 5) and (P.W. 6)
Komaraswami Goundan. The conclusion was that
the oral evidence did not reach that standard of proof
necessary for reliance to sustain a conviction, but the
learned Judge upheld the conviction on the ground
that as the confession was voluntary and true, it can
be believed though the same was retracted. Opinion
was also expressed that the confession was corroborated by the recovery of M.O. 12, as a result of the
statement made by the appellant which contained
human-blood for which there was no explanation
whatsoever. Corroboration was also afforded by the
existence of human-blood on M.Os. IO & 11.
The
question, therefore, before us is whether the High
Court erred in Jaw in agreeing with the trial court
regarding the guilt of the appellant.
Had the High Court come to the conclusion that
the evidence of P.Ws. 5, JO & JI can be accepted in
order to sustain the conviction of the appellant, the
question would have been simpler of solution, and
alternatively were this court inclined to
appraise
the credibility or otherwise of their testimony,
whether a different conclusion would have been
arrived at, is unnecessary to speculate.
On a perusal
of the evidence of these witnesses, it cannot be said
that their testimony is such as should be relegated to
the realm of disbelief. Even so, we have decided to
proceed on the footing that the testimony of the
important prosecution witnesses would not be sufficient
S.C.R. SUPREME
COURT
REPORTS
435
for a conclusion that the appellant is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt.
1957
S11brama11ia
Go1111da11
The. ultimate approach, therefore, to the question
, v.
should be whether the confession, Ex.
P. 3/A. is
The slate of
Madras
entitled to credence and be acted upon. The learned
counsel for the appellant, Sri Umrigar, was at pains Govinda Menon .1.
to show, firstly that the confession was not voluntary;
secondly it is not true and lastly that even if these
two tests are answered in the affirmative so far as the
prosecution is concerned,, it would be very unsafe to
act on this retracted confesssion which, according to
him, was resiled from as early as an
opportunity
occurred. Dealing with the first question, he pointed out
that the appellant was produced at 3-45 p.m.,
on
June 9, 1956, before the Sub-Magistrate in the court hall
which was cleared of all police officials, and the Jail
Warder alone was placed in-charge; thereafter the
Sub-Magistrate gave the necessary warnings and
enough time was given for reflection. The criticism
levelled by the appellant's counsel is that despite these
beneficient actions, the influence of the police on
the appellant still remained and that even at the time
when the confession was given, it cannot be said that
the appellant was free from
police pressure. Our
attention was invited to passages in cross-examination
of P.\¥. 7 where he had stated that on both the
occasions when the appellant was produced for
recording of the confession, the Police Constable in
guard at the Sub-Jail was in charge and further that
there is a gate way between the Police Station and the
court, and that gate way is the approach to the SubJ ail. From these circumstances inference is sought to
be drawn that though during the relevant periods the
incarceration of the appellant was in a Sub-Jail, still
he was under police custody and inflence and, there.:
fore, there was no clearance of the supervening police
control on him, in order to make his mind free from
all such influence. We have carefully gone through
the questions put by the Magistrate, not only on
June 9, 1956, when the appellant was given ·time fo~
reflection, but also on those on June 11, 1956, when he
gave the confessional statement, and we are satisfied
436
SUPREME
COURT
REPORTS
(1958]
1957
that
nothing could be said against the
procedure
subramauia
followed.
The learned Magistrate has clearly conGouudan
formed to the procedure prescribed by ss.164 and 364
Tl:e s~~1e of of the Criminal Procedure Code, as well as to the
Madras
directions laid down in the Madras Criminal Rules of
Guvinda Menon J. Practice as a preliminary to the recording of the confession.
The meagre cross-examination
of the SubMagistrate has not brought out any material circumstances which would, in any way, detract from the
satisfactory way in which he has performed his official
duty.
In the endorsement at the foot of the confessional statement the Sub-Magistrate (P.W. 7) says
that he had explained to the appellant that he (the
appellant) was not bound to make a confession and if
he does so, it may be used as evidence against him;
and the endorsement further goes on to add that the
Sub-J\1agistrate
believed
that the confession
was
voluntarily· made. The next remark
is that it was
taken in his presence and hearing and read over to the
confessor who admitted it to be correct. But it is
urged against the :voluntary nature of the confession,
that an inducement was given by the Magistrate by
the manner in which the questions were put. One of
the questions was 'Why do you want to give a statement?' and the answer given was 'It is suspected that
those who have committed murder are others. To
prove that it is I who have stabbed, I am giving the
statement.' The above was the question put and the
answer given on June 9, 1956. On June 11, 1956, the
question and the answer were as follows:
"Q . For what purpose are you going to make a
statement ?
A. Others will be implicated in the case for murder,
I alone have committed murder. I am going to give
the statement to that effect.''
When he resiled from the confession in the Sessions
Gourt, the appellant stated that the
Sub-Inspector
an.;hthe Circle Inspector went to him in Sub-Jail and
threatened to implicate his father, accused No. 2 in
the lower court, and five others, unless he confessed.
Ther~fore, it was on this account that the statement
Ex>,P; 3/ A was made before the Magistrate which the
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
437
accused alleged was neither true, nor voluntary. The
1957
argument of the learned counsel is that in order to
subramania
save his father and some others, the appellant impliGoundan
cated himself and confessed falsely to an act which he
The s~~te 01
did not commit. Criticism has been levelled against
Madras ·
the mode and manner in which the question was put Govinda Menoi: 1.
as directly inducing the appellant to immolate himself and thereby save his kith and kin.
We are asked
to say that the appellant, being an emotional young
man of noble sentiments and spirit, did not desire to
have his father implicated in a crime of this sort and
what may be ascribed as a filial obligation was per-
•
formed in trying to get release of his father from the
enmeshes of the police. Such an argument, we are
afraid, cannot carry any conviction. The form of the
question is prescribed by the Criminal Rules of Practice
and if the officer before whom the confession is made,
fails to put it, then his failure will be criticised as
blameworthy. We do not feel that any nefarious ob.feet
existed in putting a perfectly innocuous and obligatory
question to the appellant asking him "Why he wants
to make a statement?" Further, P.W. 17, the Investigating Sub-Inspector,.. has clearly denied the alleged
inducement by .the police that if he did not confess,
others, including his father, would be implicated in the
case. It is, therfore, difficult to conclude that there
was any kind of inducement or threat as a result of
which an involuntary confession was made.
A complaint is made by the learned counsel that
before the Committing Magistrate no qu-estion under
s. 342 Cr. P.C. was put to the appellant with regard to
the confession and, therefore, he had no opportunity
to put forward his complaint about the confession
until the case came before the Sessions court. No
doubt a scrutiny of the statement of the accused before
the Sub-1\fagistrate does not reveal any specific questions as having been put to him about the confession
but the fact remains that the confession was exhibited
before the Committing court and the contents were
known to the appellant then and there. Under s. 207-A,
sub-cl. (3) of the Criminal Procedure Code, even at the
commencement of the enquiry into a case triable by a
438 SUPREME
COURT
REPORTS
[1958]
1957
Sessions Court the Committing Magistrate is enjoined,
Subramauia
when the accused is brought before him to satisfy himGoundan
self that the documents mentioned in s. 173 have been
Th• I,~,. of furnished to the accused and if it is found that they
Madra.<
have not so far been furnished, it is the duty of the
Go••inda Menon J, Magistrate to cause the same to be furnished.
Section
173, sub-cl. (4) makes it obligatory upon the Police to
furnish the accused free of cost with a copy of the
police report, the F.T.R. under s. 154 and all other
documents on which the prosecution propose to rely,
including statements and confessions if any recorded
under s. 164. The result, therefore, is that even before
the commencement of the committal proceedings, the
appellant had been provided with the copy of the
confessional statement sought to be relied upon for
justifying a prima facie case against him.
We do not
think, granting that the confession was not placed in
the fore-front as a piece of evidence against the accused
in the Committing Court, such a default if it is one,
would in any way show that the confession was
involuntary.
The second aspect of the learned counsel's contention is that the confession is not true. In Sanvan
Singh and Harbans Singh v. The State of Punjab(') this
court expressed the opinion that for the purpose of
finding out whether a confession is true, it would be
necessary to examine the same and compare it with
the rest of the prosecution evidence and the probabilities of the case, and Mr. Umrigar relying on these
observations urges that on a comparison of the confession with the other parts of the prosecution evidence,
the irresistible conclusion should follow that on the
face of it the confessional statement is untrue. The
material portions of the confessional
document
concerning the actual crime are to the following effect:
"So, on Wednesday night at about 11 O'clock, I
took aruval, spear and knife sharp on both sides and
went to Chetty Thottam, near our garden. Marappa
Goundan, then was lying on the cot in his shed and
sleeping. I cut him with aruval on the neck. While
coming from there, to the house ofMuniappa Goundan
(1) Criminal Appeals Nos. 22 and :::i:3 of 1957, decided April 10, 1957.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
439
in our village, Muthu Goundan came opposite to me in
1957
our village street. Thinking that he came to catch
subramania
me, I stabbed him. The aruval fell there itself.
Go1111dan
Then, I W.'.!nt to Muniappa Goundan's house, and
The lt~te of
stabbed Muniappa Goundan.
Madras
Afterwards, I set fire to the shed of Sennimalai Govlnda Menon J.
Goundan at a distance of four furlongs to our village.
Then I came to our garden and lay."
From this, according to the defence counsel, it is seen
that/only one cut was inflicted with an aruval on the
neck of Marappa Goundan and a single stab was given
to Muthu Goundan. Similarly Munia Goundan was
only stabbed once, but in Ex. P. 4 the post-mortem
certificate on the body of Marappa Goundan there are
as many as thirteen injuries of which the neck injuries
were 4, 5 and 6, the others being on other parts of the
body. It is, therefore, urged that the unquestionable
fact of the existence of a number of injuries oh Marappa
belies the truth of the confession, in that only one cut
was given on the neck. Similarly the confession does
not make any mention of the presence of any one else
when Munia Goundan was stabbed, though both P.W. 5
and P.W. 6 have deposed that there were three persons
who were coming northward from the shed of Marappa
Goundan at the time P.W. 5 was stabbed. The statement made by P.W. 5 (Ex. D. 2) before the Medical
Officer on June 8, 1956, was also to the effect that more
persons than one were involved in the attack on him.
The confession also does not make any reference to the
recovery of the incriminating articles such as M.O. 12
as a result of a statement made by the appellant to
the police officer. From these circumstances we are
asked to say that the confession cannot be true. Mr.
Umrigar urges that the learned Judges of the High
Court have not paid sufficient attention to this method
of examining how far a confession is true by comparing it with the other evidence in the case in accordance
with the test laid down by this court.
Even in the
absence of such comparison in the judgment of the
High Court we do not think that on that ground it
can be predicated that the appellant made an. untrue
statement voluntarily. After all the absence of elaborate
440
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958]
1957
details in a confession cannot braad it as false.
subramonia
There is no statement in the confession which is
Goundan
contrary to the oral evidence though the details put
The l,~,e of forward when the witnesses were examined in court
Madras
do not appear in extenso in the confession and for that
Govinda Menon./. reason we are not prepared to say that the confession
in untrue.
The next question is whether there is corroboration
of the confession since it has been retracted. A confession of a crime· by a person, who has perpetrated it,
is usually the outcome of penitence and remorse and
in normal circumstances is the best evidence against
the maker.
The question has very often arisen
whether a retracted confession may form the basis of
conviction if believed to be true and voluntarily made.
For the purpose of arriving at this conclusion the court
has to take into consideration not only the reasons
given for making the confession or retracting it but
the attending facts and circumstances surrounding the
same. It may
be remarked that there can be no
absolute rule that a retracted confession cannot be
acted upon unless the same is corroborated materially.
It was laid down in certain cases one such being
Kesava Pillai alias Kora/an and another and Kesava
Pillai alias Thillai Kannu Pillai(') that if the reasons
given by an accused person for retracting a confession
are on the face of them fal~e. the confession may be
acted upon as it stands and without any corroboration
But the view taken by this co t•rt on more occasions
than one is that as a matter of prudence and caution
which has sanctified itself into a rule of law, retracted confession cannot be made solely
the basis of
conviction unless the same is corroborated one·of the
latest cases being 'Balbir Singh Versus State of
Punjab' (2), but it does not necessarily mean that each
and every circumstance mentioned in the confession
regarding the complicity
of the accused must be
separately and independently corroborated, nor is it
essential that the corroboration must come from facts
and circumstances discovered after the confession was
made. It would be sufficient, in our opinion, that the
C<) I.L.R. 53 ~ad. 160.
(2) A.LR. 1957 S.C. 216.
S.C.R. SUPREME COURT RE;I>ORTS
441
general trend of the confession is substantiated by
some evidence which would tally with what is contained in the confession. In this connection it would be
profitable to contrast a retracted confession with the
evidence of an approver 'or an accomplice. Though
under s. 133 of the Evidence Act a conviction is not
illegal merely because it proceeds on the uncorroborated testimony of witnesses, illustration (b) to s. 114
lays down that a court may presume that an accomplice is unworthy of credit unless he is corroborated in
material particulars. In the case of such a person on
his own showing he is a depraved and debased individual
who having taken part in the· crime tries to
exculpate himself and wants to fasten the liability on
another. In such circumstances it it absolutely necessary that what he has deposed must be corroborated
in material particulars. In contrasting this with the
statement of a person making a confession who stands
on a better footing, one need only find out when there
is a retraction whether the earlier statement, which
was the result of remorse, repentence and contrition,
was
voluntary and true or not and it is with that
object that corroboration is sought for. Not infrequently
one is apt to fall in error in equating a retracted confession with the evidence
of an
accomplice and,
therefore, it is advisable to clearly understand the
distinction between the two. The standards
of
corroboration in the two· are quite different.
In the
ca e of the person confessing who has resiled from his
statenient, general corroboration is sufficient while an
accomplice's evidence
should be corroborated
in
maierial particulars.
In addition, the court must
feel that the reasons given for the retraction in the
case of a confession are untrue.
Applying this test to the present case, we are of the
opinion that when .the appellant has given no satisfactory explanation for the presence of human-blood
on material objects Nos 10, 11, & 12, it follows that
the
blood of the murdered was on these material
objects. The reasons for retraction are also false.
A criticism is levelled that the
Chemical Examiner's
report does not show the extent of blood on M. 0.
1957
S11hrama11ia
Goundan
v.
The Slate of
Madra'
Gorbula M e11011 J.
442
SUPREME ,COURT REPORTS
[1958]
1957
No.12, the bed-sheet, in which the appella11t wrapped
s11brama11ia
himself after the offence. All that the document states
Gozmdan
is that among other items it is also stained with humanThe s~~te of blood, but Mr. Umrigar argues that this description
Madras
only shows that there would have been only a speck
Govinda Meuo11 1. or a spot of blood on the bed sheet, for according to
him, as a matter of fact, there should have been a
large quantity of blood on the hands of the appellant
if he had, without washing, used a bed-sheet, thereafter large patches of blood are likely to be present on
the bed-sheet. If that is so, the mere fact that the
presence of blood is described as stains would show that
the prosecution case cannot be true. We do not feel
inclined to put such a restricted meaning on the word
'stain'. 'Stained with human blood' is an expression
commonly found in Chemical Examiner's reports and
it does not necessarily refer to specks of blood alone.
We do not thirtk that any inference can be drawn
from the use of the word 'stain'
in the the Chemical
Examiner's report, that there was not sufficient blood
on the bed-sheet. The appellant has given no explanation as to how blood came to be present on material
objects Nos. 10 to 12. Agreeing with the High Court
that this is corroboration of the confession made by the
appellant, we are of the opinion that the confession
can be acted upon. If that is so, the appellant's guilt
has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
1957
Septe1nber 17.
The appeal is dismissed.
S.S. SHETTY
v.
Appeal dismissed.
BHARAT NIDHI, LTD.
(BHAGWATI, S K. DAS and GAJENDRAGADKAR, JJ.)
Industrial
dispute-Wrongful dismissal-Tribunal
directing
reinstatement-Failure to implement award-Benefit of reinstatement-Monetary
value-Computation-Code of Civil Procedure
(Act V of 1908), s. 95-Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal)
Act, 1950 (XLVIII of 1950), s. 20(1), (2).
The appellant Wll.$ in the service of the respondent but subsequently he was discharged on the plea that he had become surplus