# SUKHDEV SINGH & ORS v. GRAM SABHA BARI KHAD & ORS

- **Citation:** [1977] 2 S.C.R. 862
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1977-01-28
- **Case number:** CIVIL .APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 527 of 1975
- **Bench:** P. K. Goswami, N. SHJNGl-TAL
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/sukhdev-singh-ors-v-gram-sabha-bari-khad-ors-7113
- **Pages:** 3

## Headnote

Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act 1961, S. 2(g)
proviso
(iv), application to land under possession of owners.
The appellants filed a suit for a declaration that the suit land inherited by
them was not "shamlat deh" within the meaning of section 2(g) of the Punjab
Village Common Land (Regulation) Act, 1961, because ·it was excluded
by
virtue of proviso (iv.) to the clause.
They contended that the revem1e records
describing the land as "shamlat deb" also stated it to be "in possession of the
owners", showing that it was not used as "shamlat deh'', and furthermore, that
it had been partly purchased and partly received as gift by their ancestor before
26th January, 1950, and thereby came within the scope of s. 2(g) proviso (iv)
of the Act. The appellants failed before the Trial Court, Court of first appeal,
and the High Court in second appeal.
Dismissing the appeal by special leave, the Court,
HELD : ( 1) The fact that in 1914-15 it was recorded in the 'jamabandi'
as "shamlat deh", shows that that particular character of the land was recognised even so far back, and it could not detract from that nature of the
land
merely because it was further stated in tbe 'jamabandi' that it was in the possession of the owners "as per respective shares in khewat".
[863 F-G]
(2) Proviso (iv) requires that in order to be excluded from the category
of "shamlat deb", the land should have been acquired by purchase or in exchange for proprietary land from a co-sharer in the "shamlat deb", which is
not so in the case of the appellants. [863 G]
CIVIL .APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 527 of 1975.
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated the
6-9-74 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in R.S.A. No. 933 of
1970.
K. L. Gosain, N. N. Goswamy and Arvind Minocha for the Appellant.
"
Gokal Chand Mittal, J. D. Jain, Arun Jain and (Miss) K. Migkmi
for Respondent.

## Text

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862
SUKHDEV SINGH & ORS.
v.
GRAM SABHA BARI KHAD & ORS.
January 28, 1977
[P. K. GOSWAMI AND ·p, N. SHJNGl-TAL, JJ.]
Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act 1961, S. 2(g)
proviso
(iv), application to land under possession of owners.
The appellants filed a suit for a declaration that the suit land inherited by
them was not "shamlat deh" within the meaning of section 2(g) of the Punjab
Village Common Land (Regulation) Act, 1961, because ·it was excluded
by
virtue of proviso (iv.) to the clause.
They contended that the revem1e records
describing the land as "shamlat deb" also stated it to be "in possession of the
owners", showing that it was not used as "shamlat deh'', and furthermore, that
it had been partly purchased and partly received as gift by their ancestor before
26th January, 1950, and thereby came within the scope of s. 2(g) proviso (iv)
of the Act. The appellants failed before the Trial Court, Court of first appeal,
and the High Court in second appeal.
Dismissing the appeal by special leave, the Court,
HELD : ( 1) The fact that in 1914-15 it was recorded in the 'jamabandi'
as "shamlat deh", shows that that particular character of the land was recognised even so far back, and it could not detract from that nature of the
land
merely because it was further stated in tbe 'jamabandi' that it was in the possession of the owners "as per respective shares in khewat".
[863 F-G]
(2) Proviso (iv) requires that in order to be excluded from the category
of "shamlat deb", the land should have been acquired by purchase or in exchange for proprietary land from a co-sharer in the "shamlat deb", which is
not so in the case of the appellants. [863 G]
CIVIL .APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 527 of 1975.
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated the
6-9-74 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in R.S.A. No. 933 of
1970.
K. L. Gosain, N. N. Goswamy and Arvind Minocha for the Appellant.
"
Gokal Chand Mittal, J. D. Jain, Arun Jain and (Miss) K. Migkmi
for Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SHINGHAL, J.-The plaintiffs who have been unsuccessful in the
trial court, the court first appeal, and the High Court in
second
appeal, have filed the present appeal by special leave.
They raised
their suit for a declaration that the suit land continued to be in their
ownership in spite of the provisions of the Punjab Village Common
Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961, hereinafter referred to as the
Act.
They pleaded that the land had been purchased by their
ancestor
Udham Singh, who founded the village, from Raja Sansar Chand of
Dholwaha, some time before 1884, and that some other land
was
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SUKHDEV SINGH v. GRAM SABHA (Shinghal, J.)
86°3
gifted to him by one Smt. Dhani.
They claimed that what they had
thus acquired was not "shamlat deh" within the meaning of clause (g)
of section 2 o'f the Act because it was excluded by virtue of
subclause (iv) of the proviso to the clause.
That contention has been
negatived all through, and the short question for decision is whether
:my interference is called for with that view .
It ha,s not been disputed before us that the land in questiolll was
described in the revenue records as "shamlat deh'', . and
excluded
"abadi deh."
That has in fact been amply proved by the 'jamabandi'
of the year 1914-15 which has been produced by the 'plaintiffs themselves and its genuineness has not been controverted before us.
As
such, by virtue of the definition of "shamlat deh" in clause
(g) of
section 2, the suit land fall within the definition of "shamlat deh".
The question remains whether it was excluded from that definition by
virtue of sub-clause (iv) of the proviso to clause (g) which reads as
follows.-
"(iv) having been acquired before the 26th January, 1950,
by a person by purchase or in exchange for proprietary land
from a co-sharer in the shamilat deh is so recorded in the
jamabandi or is supported by a valid deed;"
It has been argued by counsel for the appellants that as the suit
land was recorded in the aforesaid Jamabandi as "village shamilat'',
in possession of the owners, it should be held that the land was
not
used as "shamlat deh."
Counsel has argued further that as
the
land was purchased by the plaintiffs' ancestor Udham Singh who had
founded the vil1age, from Raja Sansar Chand, and a part of it was
.received by way of gift from Smt.
Dhani, before January 26, 1950,
and it was so recorded. in the 'jamabandi', the suit land was excluded
from the definition of "shamlat deb" by virtue of the aforesaid subclause (iv') of the proviso.
The argument is however untenable because: of two reasons.
Firstly, the entry in the 'jamabandi' of 1914-15
which recorded that the land was in possession of: the owners,
was
quite innocuous, because it was made for the reason that it was
in
, nobody'else's possession.· The fact that even
then it was recorded
in the 'jamabandi' as "sbamlat deh" shows that that particul11r character of the land was recognised even as far back as 1914-15, and it
could not detract from that nature of the land merely because it was
further stated in the 'Jamabandi' that it. was in the possession of the
owners "as per respective shares in khewat".
Secondly, the aforesaid sub-clause (iv) requires that in order to be excluded from
the
category of "shamlat deh", the land should have been acquired by
purchase or in exchange for proprietary land from a co-sharer in the
"shamlat deh." It is not in controversy before us, and is not even
the case of the appellants,
that the suit
land was· acquired by
purchase or in exchange for
proprietary land from any
co-sharer
in the "shamlat deh."
Then there is the
further fact
that
the
appellants have not been able to prove that the suit 'land was recorded
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864
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1977] 2 s.c.R.
in the 'Jamabandi' as having been so ac·quired; and they have
not
been able to produce any valid deed of purchase or exchange from
any such co-sharer.
We are therefore unable to think that th~ view
taken in the impugned Judgment of the High Court requires reconsideration.
The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
M.R.
Appeal dismissed.
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