# SUKHRAM SINGH AND ANOTHER v. SMT. HARBllEJI

- **Citation:** [1969] 3 S.C.R. 752
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1969-02-19
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 666 of 1966
- **Bench:** M. Hidayatullah, G. K. Mitter
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/sukhram-singh-and-another-v-smt-harblleji-4637
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

I
U.P. Zamindari Abolition end Land Reforms Act 1951-Sections 21
and i51-Amertdment by Act 20 of 1954-Express provision for retrospective application of atnended s. 21-No provision for retrospective
effect of s. 157-lf s. 157 also deemed to have been emended retrospectively-Stc.ten1ent b,v Con1pensation Officer under section 240(F)-When
final.
The respondent as Blmmidhar filed an objection under section 240( G)
of the U.P. Zamindari and Land Abolition Act, 1961. in respect of a preliminary statement compiled by the Compensation Officer under section
240(F) showing the appellants as Adhivasis of certain land. The objection
was dismissed by the Compensation Officer on October 25, 1956. who
held that the appellants had Adhivasi rights and the objector had no interest in the land. The Compensation Offider decided the matter without
framing an issue and referring it for decision to a competent court. In the
meantime, in consolidation proceedings the respondent applied for correction of the records under section 10(1) of Consolidation of Holdings
Act, but her objection was dismissed by the Consolidation Officer. However, on appeal. the Settlement Officer, (Consolidation), reversed this de·
cision holding that the appellants were Asainis. The Director of ConsOlidation, U .P. dismissed a revision application.
In these consolidation
proceedings, the respondent claimed the advantage of the amendment of
secltion 21(h) and section 157 introduced by the U.P. Land Reforms Act,
XX of 1954, on the ground that her husband was suffering from physical
infirmity and was incapable of cultivating land.
The appellants' conten·
tion was that while section 21 had been expressly amended to have retrospective effect, the amendment of section 157 was not effective retros'
pectively; the respondent was therefore not entitled to claim the advantage
from the amendment of section 157. It was further contended by the
appellants that the order of the Compensation Officer made on October
25, 1956, had finally decided the status of the appellants as Adhivasis and
not having been appealed against, the question could not now be reopened.
HELD: Section 157(1)(a) must be read to apply retrospectively.
A
&.
c
F
If the new s. 21 (h) is to be read retrospec/tively from the commence·
ment of Land Reforms Act. the amendment of section 1Sl(l) which was
made simultaneously must also be clearly intended to operate with re..
G
trospection.
There would be no point in making the amendment of s.
21 (h) retrOiSpective if the other clauses were to apply prospectively for
then the force of the retrospectivitv of clause (h) of s. 21 would be made
neutral. [759 E-F]
A law is undoubtedly retrospective if the law says so expressly but
it is not always necessary to say so expressly to malle it retrospective.
ll
There are occasions when a law may be held to be retrospective in opera·
lion.
Retrospection is not to be presumed for the presumption is the
-
other way but many statutes have been regarded as retrospective without
, a decllaration.
Thus it is that remedial sta~es are always regarded as
A
B
c
SUKHRAM V. HARBHEJI (Hidayatullah, C.J.)
7 53
prospective but declaratory statutes are considered retrospective. Similarly
sometimes statutes have a retrospective effect \.vhen the declared intention
is cleatly and unequivocally manifest from the language employed in the
particular· 1aw or in the context of connected provisions.
It is always a
question whether the legislature has sufficiently expressed itself. To find
this one must look at the general scope and purview of the Act and the
remedy the legislature intends to apply in the fOrmer state of the law and
then determine what the legislature intended to do. This line of investigation is, df course, only open if it is necessary. [758 HJ
Main v. Stark [1890] 15- A.C. 384 at 388; referred to.
The Order of the Compensation Officer under s. 240-F did not have
that finality which was claimed for it. That finality attaches only to the
order

## Text

!
752
SUKHRAM SINGH AND ANOTHER
v.
SMT. HARBllEJI
February 19, 1969
[M. HIDAYATULLAH, C.J. AND G. K. MITTER, J.]
I
U.P. Zamindari Abolition end Land Reforms Act 1951-Sections 21
and i51-Amertdment by Act 20 of 1954-Express provision for retrospective application of atnended s. 21-No provision for retrospective
effect of s. 157-lf s. 157 also deemed to have been emended retrospectively-Stc.ten1ent b,v Con1pensation Officer under section 240(F)-When
final.
The respondent as Blmmidhar filed an objection under section 240( G)
of the U.P. Zamindari and Land Abolition Act, 1961. in respect of a preliminary statement compiled by the Compensation Officer under section
240(F) showing the appellants as Adhivasis of certain land. The objection
was dismissed by the Compensation Officer on October 25, 1956. who
held that the appellants had Adhivasi rights and the objector had no interest in the land. The Compensation Offider decided the matter without
framing an issue and referring it for decision to a competent court. In the
meantime, in consolidation proceedings the respondent applied for correction of the records under section 10(1) of Consolidation of Holdings
Act, but her objection was dismissed by the Consolidation Officer. However, on appeal. the Settlement Officer, (Consolidation), reversed this de·
cision holding that the appellants were Asainis. The Director of ConsOlidation, U .P. dismissed a revision application.
In these consolidation
proceedings, the respondent claimed the advantage of the amendment of
secltion 21(h) and section 157 introduced by the U.P. Land Reforms Act,
XX of 1954, on the ground that her husband was suffering from physical
infirmity and was incapable of cultivating land.
The appellants' conten·
tion was that while section 21 had been expressly amended to have retrospective effect, the amendment of section 157 was not effective retros'
pectively; the respondent was therefore not entitled to claim the advantage
from the amendment of section 157. It was further contended by the
appellants that the order of the Compensation Officer made on October
25, 1956, had finally decided the status of the appellants as Adhivasis and
not having been appealed against, the question could not now be reopened.
HELD: Section 157(1)(a) must be read to apply retrospectively.
A
&.
c
F
If the new s. 21 (h) is to be read retrospec/tively from the commence·
ment of Land Reforms Act. the amendment of section 1Sl(l) which was
made simultaneously must also be clearly intended to operate with re..
G
trospection.
There would be no point in making the amendment of s.
21 (h) retrOiSpective if the other clauses were to apply prospectively for
then the force of the retrospectivitv of clause (h) of s. 21 would be made
neutral. [759 E-F]
A law is undoubtedly retrospective if the law says so expressly but
it is not always necessary to say so expressly to malle it retrospective.
ll
There are occasions when a law may be held to be retrospective in opera·
lion.
Retrospection is not to be presumed for the presumption is the
-
other way but many statutes have been regarded as retrospective without
, a decllaration.
Thus it is that remedial sta~es are always regarded as
A
B
c
SUKHRAM V. HARBHEJI (Hidayatullah, C.J.)
7 53
prospective but declaratory statutes are considered retrospective. Similarly
sometimes statutes have a retrospective effect \.vhen the declared intention
is cleatly and unequivocally manifest from the language employed in the
particular· 1aw or in the context of connected provisions.
It is always a
question whether the legislature has sufficiently expressed itself. To find
this one must look at the general scope and purview of the Act and the
remedy the legislature intends to apply in the fOrmer state of the law and
then determine what the legislature intended to do. This line of investigation is, df course, only open if it is necessary. [758 HJ
Main v. Stark [1890] 15- A.C. 384 at 388; referred to.
The Order of the Compensation Officer under s. 240-F did not have
that finality which was claimed for it. That finality attaches only to the
order of the Assistant Collector under s. 229-B on a reference of an issue
from the Compensation Officer.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 666 of
1966.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment ·and order dated
September 20, 1963 of the Deputy Di.rector of Consolidation,
U.P. Lucknow in Revision No. 91 of _1963.
))
J. P. Goyal and R. S. Gupta, for the appellants.
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S. P. Sinha and M. I. Khowaja, for the respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Hidayatullah, C.J. The parties in this appeal are the same as
in Civil Appeal No. 286 of 1966 which we declared to have
become infructuous because of the operation of s. 5 of the Uttar
Pradesh Consolidation Act. The judgment in that appeal was
delivered by us on February 7, 1969. For the narration of facts
in this appeal we have, however, referred to certain orders which
were passed by the High Court from
the sister appeal. The
parties to this appeal as in the other appeal are Sukhram Singh
and Laiq Singh of the one part and Smt. Harbheji of the second
part. These two parties have been fighting a long drawn litigation over khata No. 271 of village Shahgarh. Two separate
proceedings took place before the Revenue Courts and reached
this Court by way of special leave, one of which has been disposed
of and the other is now before us.
The points involved in this
appeal are short but in view of the length of litigation a Jong
narration is necessary.
On March 10, 1954 Smt. Harbheji as bhumidar filed a suit
(No. 38 of 1954) under s. 202 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition
and Land Reforms Act, 1955 agaitist the other party in the court
of the Assistant Collector, !st Class, Aligarh. The allegation in
the suit was that Sukhram Singh and Laiq Singh were Asamis
who were leased the khata in 1947
from
year to year. Smt.
Harbheji asked for their ejectme;nt from the khata.
The defence
of the other side was that the occupants were Adhivasis. The
754
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1969] :; s.c.R.
Land Reforms Act was passed in 1951. Under the Act the
intermediaries were abolished and their rights and title vested in
the State from July 1, 1952. The Act was later amended from
time to time and we are concerned with one such amendment
made by the U.P. Land Reforms Act XX of 1954 which came
into force on October 10, 1954.
Reverting to the facts, the suit No. 38 of 1954 was dismissed
by the Assistajnt Collector, 1st Class, Aligarh on April 20, 1956
and it was held that Sukhram Singh and Laiq Singh were not
Asamis and therefore not liable to ejectment.
On appeal the
Civil Judge of Aligarh allowed it on February
1,
1957 and
declared Sukhram and Laiq Singh to be Asamis. A second
appeal in the High Court before a Single Judge succeeded on
February 19, 1958. Sukhram Singh and Laiq Singh were again
declared to be Adhivasis.
A Letters Patent Appeal was filed in
the High Court. Meanwhile the Consolidation of Holdings Act
was brought into force in this area and a notification under s. 4
of the Consolidation of Holdings Act declaring village Shahgarh
area to be under consolidation was published on November 11,
1961. The appeal in the High Court was decided on February
8, 1962. It appears that the arguments were already heard and
the case was reserved for judgment when the notification came
into force.
The learned Judges did not apply s. 5 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act which provides that on notification issuing any suit, proceeding or appeal must be taken to have abated.
The Division Bench gave its decision reversing the judgment of
the Single Judge.
As a result Sukhram Singh and Laiq Singh
were again declared to be Asamis. An appeal was then brought
to this Court by special leave and it is that appeal which we
declared had become infructuous by reason of the abatement of
the suit. This was the end of the proceedings under s. 202 of the
Land Reforms Act.
Meanwhile Smt. Harbheji as bhumidar was entitled to compensation for the extinguishment ()f her rights.
The Compensation Officer prepared a preliminary statement under s. 240F and
showed Sukhram Singh and Laiq Singh as Adhivasis.
Smt .. ~ar
bheji filed an objection under s. 240G but on the date of heanng
(October 25, 1956) she did not appear before the Compensation
Officer who dismissed her objection holding that Laiq Singh and
Sukhram Singh had Adhivasi rights aind the objector had no
interest in the land.
The statement of compensation was also
confirmed on the <;ame date.
In the consolidation proceedings
Smt. Harbheji applied for correction of the records under s. 10(1)
of the Consolidation of Holdings Act. This niatter was decided
by the Consolidation Officer ill Khera Narainsingh on March 7,
1963. The objection filed by Smt. Harbheji was dismissed. On
~
the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) reversed the above
A.
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F
c.
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A
B
SUKHRAM v. HARBHEJI (Hidayatul/ah, C.J.)
755
decision on June 14, 1963 holding that Sukhram Singh and Laiq
Singh were Asamis.
The Deputy Director
of Consolidation,
exercising the powers of the Director of Consolidation Uttar Pradesh dismissed the revision petition on September 20, 1963 filed
by Sukhram Singh and Laiq Singh. The present appeal is from
the last decision by special leave.
Two points were argued before us, namely, that Smt. Harbheji was not entitled to the benefit of s. 21 as amended by Act
XX of 1954 and secondly that the order of the Compensation
Officer made on October 25, 1956 had finally decided the status
of Sukhram Singh and Laiq Singh as Adhimsis and not having
C
been appealed against, the question cannot now be reopened. We
shall take these points one by one.
D
E
F
G
H
The U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act was
amended in 1954 by the above amending Act in several respects.
We are only concerned with the amendment of ss. 21 and 157
and the addition of Chapter IX-A. Stll;tion 21 leaving out portions not necessary for our purposes provides after the amendment as follows :
"Sec. 21. Non-occupancy tenants, sub-tenants
of
grove-lands and tenant's mortgagees to be assamis.
( 1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this
Act, every person who, on the date immediately
preceding the date of vesting, occupied or· held
as--
(h) A tenant of sir land referred to in sub-clause
(a) of clause (i) of the Explanation under section
16, a sub-tenant referred to in sub-clause (iI) of
clause (a) of Section 20 or an occupant referred
to in sub-clause (i) of clause (b) of the said section where the landholders or if there are more
than one landholders, all of them were person or
persons belonging-
(b) if the land was let out or occupied on "' after
the ninth day of April, 1946, on.the date of letting or occupation,
to any one or more of the clauses mentioned in
sub-section (1) of Section 157
shall be deemed to be 8'1) asami thereof."
756
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1969) 3 S.C.R.
Before the amendment the corresponding part of the section read
A
ls follows:
"Section 21 ( 1). Notwithstanding anything contained
in this Act, every person who, on the date immediately
preceding the date of vesting, occupied or held land
as-
(h} a tenant of sir or land referred to in sub-clause
(a) of clause ( i) ol' the explanation under section
J 6, a sub-tenant or an occupant referred to in
section 20, where the landholder or if there are
more than one landholder all of them were
person or persons belonging, both on the date of
letting and on the date immediately preceding
the date of vesting, to any one or more of the
classes mentioned in sub-section ( 2) of section 1 O
or clause (e) of sub section (1) of section 157.
shall be deemed to be an asami thereof."
The difference between the two sections material for our
purposes lies in the mention of all clauses of s. 157 sub-section 1
after the amendment whereas before the amendment only clause
(e) of sub-section 1 of s. 157 was mentioned. Section 157 also was
amended. Again for the purposes of this case it is not necessary
to reproduce the whole of the section. It read before the amendment as follows :
"Section 157(1). A bhumidhar or a sirdar or an
asami holding the land in lieu of maintenance allowance
under section 11, who is--
(a) an unmarried woman, or if married, divorcea or
separated from her husband, or a widow;
(b) a minor whose father has died;
( c) a lunatic or an idiot;
( d) a person incapable of cultivating by reason of
blindness or other physical infirmity;
( e) prosecuting studies in a recog)nised institution
and does not exceed 25 years in age;
(f) in the Military, Naval or Air service of the Indian
Dominion; or
(g) under detention or imprisonment.
may let the whole or any part of i)is holding."
After the amendment it reads as follows :
"Section 157-Lease by a disabled person.-(1) A
bhumidhar or a sirdar or an asami holding the land in
B
c
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8
c
D
E
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G
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SUKHRAM V. HARBHEJI (Hidayatullah, C.J.)
757
lieu of maintenance allowance under Section 11 who
is-
(a) an unmarried woman, or if married divorced or
separated from her husband or whose husband
suffers, from any of the disqualifications mentioned in clause (e) or (d) or a widow;
(b) a minor whose father suffers from any of the
disqualifications mentioned in clause (cl or (d)
or has died; and
(c) a lunatic' or an idiot;
(d) a person incapable of cultivating by reason of
blindness, or other physical infirmity;
( e) prosecuting studies in a recognised institution
and does not exceed 25 years in age and whose
father suffers from any of the disqualifications
mentioned in clause ( e) or ( d) or has died : "
"(f) in the Military, Naval, or Air service of the
Indian Dominion; or
(g) under detention or imprisonment;
may let the whole or any part of his holding."
The difference here is that a lease by a woman although
married was possible if her husband was suffering from insanity or
idiocy or was a person incapable of cultivating by reason of
blindne$s or other physical infirmity. Smt. Harbheji in her applications wished to take advantage of the amendments of ss. 21 and
157 on the ground that her husband was suffering from sinus and
hence from physical infirmity and was incapable of cultivating
the land. The difficulty arises because the Legislature while making the amendment made the amendment in clause (h) of s. 21
retrospective from the date of the passing of the Abolition Act
but in s. 157 it did not expressly state that the amendments were
retrospective. The short guestion that arises is whether s.
157
when read with s. 27 also becomes recrospective notwithstanding
that there are no express words of retrospectivity.
The second point is concerned with the addition of Chapter
IX-A which is headed Conferment of Sirdari Rights on Adhivasis.
The grounds on which the ejectmf\ltt of an A dhivasi could be
made were contained in s. 234 of the Land Reforms Act but none
~ the grounds applies here. Thus if Sukhram Singh and Laiq
Singh were adhivasis they could not be ejected by Smt. Harbheji
.but if they were only asamis then the ejectment could take place
because they were only tenants from year to year. Chapter IX-A
added sections 240A to 240N. Jt provides that the Government
758
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1969) 3 S.C.R;
may by a notification declare that the rights, title and interest of
the landholders in the land held by Adhivasis shall cease and vest
in the State and also provides for payment of compensati<Jill to the
landlord whose rights, title or interest iu the land are acquired.
The compensation statement is required to be published under
s. 240F and s. 2400 gives a right to any person interested to file
objections.
Section 240H deals with the procedure for disposal
of the objections under s. 240G. It provides that the Compensation Officer shall frame an issue regarding it and refer it for
disposal to the Court which has jurisdiction to decide a suit under
s. 229B read with s. 234A and that thereupon all the provisions relating to the hearing and disposal of such suit shall apply
to his reference as if it were a suit. Section 229B provides that
any person claiming to be an Asami of the whole or a part of it
may sue the landlord for a declaration of his rights as Asami. Subsection 3 of the same section provided that the provisions are to
apply mutatis mutandis to a suit by a person claiming to be sirdar
(Adhivasi).
Section 234A then provides that the provisions of
s. 229B mentioned above shall apply to lil1l Adhivasi as if he were
an Asami. Schedule II to the Land Reforms Act in Item 34
appoints the Assistant Collector, 1st Class, as competent court
for the trial of suits for declaration of rights under s. 229B. The
Schedule also provides for an appeal to the Commissioner from
the order and to the Board of Revenue by a second appeal.
In the present case the Compensation Officer who passed the
order on October 25, 1956 was also Assistant Collector, 1st Class
but he did not refer the case to himself after framing an issue and
hence his order has been treated to have been passed by him in
his capacity as a Compensation Officer.
We will now come to the question whether s. 157 also operates
retrospectively with s. 21.
The latter was made retrospective
expressly.
The High Court in the Division Bench decision held
that s. 157 was also retrospective by implication. The contention
of the. appellant~ is that Smt. Harbheji was not entitled to take
the benefit of the amendment and to plead that she could let out
her sir Ia;nd because her husband was suffering form an infirmity
and was not able to look after the cultivation. If Smt. Harbheji
is entitled to plead the amended section then under s. 21 Sukhram
Singh arui Laiq Singh must be treated as Asamis because that is
what s. 21 enacts. If the unamended section is to be read with
s. 21 the,n the contrary result is reached.
Now a law is undoubtedly retrospective if the Jaw says so ex•
pressly but it is not always necessary to say so expressly to make
the law retrospective.
There are occasions when a law may be
held to be retrospective in operation. Retrospection is not to be
presumed for the presumption is the other way b1Jt many statutes
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A
B
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SUKHRAM v. HARBHEJI (Hida.vatu/lah, C.J.)
759'
have been. regarded as retrospective without a declaration. Thus
it is that remedial statutes are always regarded as prospective but
declaratory statutes are considered retrospective. Similarly sometimes statutes have a retrospective effect when the declared intention is clearly and unequivocally manifest from the language employed in the piirticular law or in the context of connected provisions.
It is always a question whether the legislature has sufficiently expressed itself. To find this one must look at the general
scOpe and purview of the' Act and the remedy the legislature intends to apply in the formet state of the law and then determiqle
what the legislature intended to do. ThiS line of investigation is,
of course, only open if it is necessary.
In the words of Lord·
Selbome in Main v. Stark(') there might be something in the context of an Act or collected from its language, which might giveto words prima facie prospective a large operation. More retrospectivity. is not to be given than what can be 'gathered from expressed or clearly implied intention of the legislature.
Applying these tests to the statute we have in hand, we are
clear that section 157(1 )(a) must.be read to apply retroSpectTvely.
It is clear that s. 21 (h) mentioned only one of the clauses viz.
clause (e) as furnishing a ground for declaration. After the
amendment of clause (h) one or more of the clauses of s. 157(1)
are to be taken into account. Now there would be no point i,11
making the amendment of s. 2l(h) retrospective if the other clauses
E
were to apply prospectively for then the force of the retrospectivity
of clause (h) of s. 21 is made neutral. Therefore if the new s. 21
(h) is to be read retrospectively from the commencement of Land
Reforms Act, the amC\nldment of section 157 ( 1) which was made
simultaneously must also be clearly intended to operate with retrospection. The legislature intended that at any givein moment of
time from the commencement of the Lands Refonns Act all the
clauses or one or more them and not clause (e) alone were to be
taken note of. The amendment of clauses (h) speaks of one or
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more clauses and when we read the clauses of s.' 157(1) we find
them altered also. Therefore the new clauses must be read and
not the old clauses.
The High Court was thus right in its conclusion that the clauses of s. 157 (1) as amended also operate
retrospectively.
This disposes of the first point.
The next point is about the finality of the order of October 25,
1956 passed by the Compensation Officer. We cannot refer that
order to his capacity as the Assistant Collector. An act would,
no doubt be refemble to a capacity ·which would give it validity.
But the law required the compensation officer to frame an issue
and refer it to the competent court.
He could not decide the
matter without do~g so. One of the parties was before it and he
(I) [1890) 15 A.C. 384 at 388.
760
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1969] 3 S.C.R,
ought to have asked that party to prove its case. He did nothing.
A
It is, therefore, not wrong for the Settlement officer and the Deputy
Director to treat the order as proceeding from the Compensation
Officer. Further since proceedings under s. 202 of the I.:and Reforms Act were already pending for the decision of the identical
question the Compensation Officer ought to have stayed his hands.
In our opinion, the order of the Compensation Officer did not haye
B
that finality which is claimed for it.
That finality attaches only
to the order of the Assistant Collector on a reference of an issue
·from the Compensation .Officer.
There was thus no finality.
The order of the Deputy Director ~ot, therefore, be assailed. The appeal must fail and is dismissed but in view of the fact
that an amendment of the law deprives the present appellants of
C
a valid plea we make no order about costs.
R.K.P.S.
Appeal dismissed.