# SUl,REl\IIE COURT RiPt:>RTS [1964] vot. V ALJIBHAI MU~JIBHAI SONEJI AND ANO.THER v. THE S l'ATE OF BOMBA:Y {NOW GUJARAT) AND OTHERS

- **Citation:** [1964] 3 S.C.R. 686
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1964
- **Bench:** S. K. DAs, K. SuBBA RAo, RAGHuBAit DAYAL, N. Rajagopala Ayyangae, J.R. MuDHOLKAR
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/sul-rel-iie-court-ript-rts-1964-vot-v-aljibhai-mu-jibhai-soneji-and-ano-ther-v-3016
- **Pages:** 13

## Headnote

!Anti Acqui1itiun-State Trru11part
Gorp-0ration-If a
Co111pa,.y-Aequi•ition for 11,,,, b•nejit of Oorpor<Uicm-Publk
purpose-D,claration by
Go•ernmenJ,-lf <XJnclu..oi~-Gorpo
ralion, if a local authority-Valulity of acqui•itim prouedirog•-
Road Tranjport Gorporatfon Act, 1950 (64 of 1950), a. 47Bombay Btate Roa.d Transport Act, 1950 ~Bombay 25 of 1950),
•. 29-Gweral clllu."• Act, 1897 (10 of 1897), •. 3 (1Jl)-La11d
Acquisition Act, 1894 (1of1894), 8'. 3 (•), 4,6.
Proceedings were taken under the provisions of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894, by the Government of Bombay for
acquiring a piece of land for the purpose of constructing a bw;
depot required by the State Transport Corporation and for
constructing office and other buildin~s for the said Corporation.
A notification was issued under s. 4 of the Act in which it was
stated that the acquisition was for a public purpose, namely,
for "State Transport" and this fact was reiterated in the
notification under s. 6 which, in addition, stated that the land
was needed to be acquired for the purposes of and at the expense
of the State Transport Corporation. The appellants challenged
the validity of the acquisition proceedings on the grounds,
inter aJia (I) that the purpose mentioned in the notification
under s. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, was indefinite or
vague and therefore, the notification wa< bad, and (2) that the
State Transport Corporation wa! not a "local authority"
within the meaning of the expre!S:sion as used in the Act. but
merely a company, and a• the provisions of Part VII of the
Act were not complied with, the acquisition was invalid. The
provisions of the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1948 and
other provisions of the later
Act' showed that the State
Transport Corporation had been incorporatrd hy an ludian
law within the meaning of" 3 (e) of the Land Acquisition Act,
~ S.C.k.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
687
1894, and that It wa• a company as defined
under that
section.
Held (1) that the
notifications of the
Government
issued under ss. 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894,
were conclusive on the question that the land was required
for a public purpose even though it wa• being acquired for a
corporation and not for the State;
Snmawanti v. The State of Punj•b, [1963] 2 S.C.R. 774
followed.
(2)
that the funds of the State Transport Corporation
could not be regarded as public revenue, and that the Corpor·
ation itself was not a dep:irtrneut of Govern1nent !Jut a separate
legal entity;
(3)
that tho State Tran•pnrt Corpon•tiou
was not a
"local authority" as defined by s. 3 (31)
of the General
Clauses Act, 1897; and
(4)
that the accpiisition impugned in the present caBC
having bcctt marle for the benefit of a Corp<>ration, though
for • public purpoi:;e, \Vas bat I because no part of the com pen·
sation was to co1nc out of public revenues and the provisions
of part VII of the Laud Acquhilion Act, 1894, h.ad not been
complied with.
CIVIL A:r:rELJ;A.TE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal
No. 122 & 123 of 1963.
Appeals by special leave from the orders dated
March 18 and 23, i 960, of the former Bombay High
Court in Applications for leave to appeal under
Letters Patent from judgment and decree dated
March l, 1960, of the said High Court in Second
Appeal No. 1331 of 1959.
J. O. Bhatt
and V. J. Merckanl, for the
appellants.
C. K. Daphtary, Attorney-General for India,
S.S. Bin.Wra and R.H. Dhebar, for respondents
Nos. 1 and 3.
1963
Voi}iihai Muljiihai
S<m#ji
v.
Stale oj Bombay
/9iS
f"4ljiiUi Muljibhai
.
S•n1ji
v.
.St•te ef •tmt~
Alui.Mlk•r /,·
688
SUPRENIE COURT REPORTS (1964] VOL.
1963. May 8. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
M11n1IOLXAR J.-· This judgment will also
g.ivern C.A. No. 123 of 19G3
These two appeals
have come up before this Court by virtue of special
leave granted by it on April 27, 1960.
The appellants before us were plaintiffs in suits
instituted by them before the second Joint Civil
Judce (S.D). Ahmedabad, in which they challenged
the validity of certain pro

## Text

196$
686
SUl,REl\IIE COURT RiPt:>RTS [1964] vot.
V ALJIBHAI MU~JIBHAI SONEJI
AND ANO.THER
v.
THE S l'ATE OF BOMBA:Y {NOW GUJARAT)
AND OTHERS
(S. K. DAs, K. SuBBA RAo, RAGHuBAit DAYAL,
N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAE and
J.R. MuDHOLKAR. JJ.)
!Anti Acqui1itiun-State Trru11part
Gorp-0ration-If a
Co111pa,.y-Aequi•ition for 11,,,, b•nejit of Oorpor<Uicm-Publk
purpose-D,claration by
Go•ernmenJ,-lf <XJnclu..oi~-Gorpo
ralion, if a local authority-Valulity of acqui•itim prouedirog•-
Road Tranjport Gorporatfon Act, 1950 (64 of 1950), a. 47Bombay Btate Roa.d Transport Act, 1950 ~Bombay 25 of 1950),
•. 29-Gweral clllu."• Act, 1897 (10 of 1897), •. 3 (1Jl)-La11d
Acquisition Act, 1894 (1of1894), 8'. 3 (•), 4,6.
Proceedings were taken under the provisions of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894, by the Government of Bombay for
acquiring a piece of land for the purpose of constructing a bw;
depot required by the State Transport Corporation and for
constructing office and other buildin~s for the said Corporation.
A notification was issued under s. 4 of the Act in which it was
stated that the acquisition was for a public purpose, namely,
for "State Transport" and this fact was reiterated in the
notification under s. 6 which, in addition, stated that the land
was needed to be acquired for the purposes of and at the expense
of the State Transport Corporation. The appellants challenged
the validity of the acquisition proceedings on the grounds,
inter aJia (I) that the purpose mentioned in the notification
under s. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, was indefinite or
vague and therefore, the notification wa< bad, and (2) that the
State Transport Corporation wa! not a "local authority"
within the meaning of the expre!S:sion as used in the Act. but
merely a company, and a• the provisions of Part VII of the
Act were not complied with, the acquisition was invalid. The
provisions of the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1948 and
other provisions of the later
Act' showed that the State
Transport Corporation had been incorporatrd hy an ludian
law within the meaning of" 3 (e) of the Land Acquisition Act,
~ S.C.k.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
687
1894, and that It wa• a company as defined
under that
section.
Held (1) that the
notifications of the
Government
issued under ss. 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894,
were conclusive on the question that the land was required
for a public purpose even though it wa• being acquired for a
corporation and not for the State;
Snmawanti v. The State of Punj•b, [1963] 2 S.C.R. 774
followed.
(2)
that the funds of the State Transport Corporation
could not be regarded as public revenue, and that the Corpor·
ation itself was not a dep:irtrneut of Govern1nent !Jut a separate
legal entity;
(3)
that tho State Tran•pnrt Corpon•tiou
was not a
"local authority" as defined by s. 3 (31)
of the General
Clauses Act, 1897; and
(4)
that the accpiisition impugned in the present caBC
having bcctt marle for the benefit of a Corp<>ration, though
for • public purpoi:;e, \Vas bat I because no part of the com pen·
sation was to co1nc out of public revenues and the provisions
of part VII of the Laud Acquhilion Act, 1894, h.ad not been
complied with.
CIVIL A:r:rELJ;A.TE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal
No. 122 & 123 of 1963.
Appeals by special leave from the orders dated
March 18 and 23, i 960, of the former Bombay High
Court in Applications for leave to appeal under
Letters Patent from judgment and decree dated
March l, 1960, of the said High Court in Second
Appeal No. 1331 of 1959.
J. O. Bhatt
and V. J. Merckanl, for the
appellants.
C. K. Daphtary, Attorney-General for India,
S.S. Bin.Wra and R.H. Dhebar, for respondents
Nos. 1 and 3.
1963
Voi}iihai Muljiihai
S<m#ji
v.
Stale oj Bombay
/9iS
f"4ljiiUi Muljibhai
.
S•n1ji
v.
.St•te ef •tmt~
Alui.Mlk•r /,·
688
SUPRENIE COURT REPORTS (1964] VOL.
1963. May 8. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
M11n1IOLXAR J.-· This judgment will also
g.ivern C.A. No. 123 of 19G3
These two appeals
have come up before this Court by virtue of special
leave granted by it on April 27, 1960.
The appellants before us were plaintiffs in suits
instituted by them before the second Joint Civil
Judce (S.D). Ahmedabad, in which they challenged
the validity of certain proceedings instituted by the
then Government of Bombay for acquiring a piece of
land belonging to respondent No. 2 for the purpose of
c0n,tructing a bus depot required by the State Transp•rt Corporation and for constructing office and
"
ether buildings by the said Corporation. The appellants, in addition, sought an injunction restrainm'
the State of Bombay and the State Transport Carperation from proceeding with the acquisition and
dispossessing them.
The suit was founded on a
number of grounds but ultimately when the matter
went up to the High Court in second appeal Mr.
Rajni Patel who appeared for the appellants based
tl!e claim only on three· grounds : ( 1) that the purpese
mentioned in the notification under s. 4 of the Land
Aociuisition Act, 1894, was indefinite or vague and,
tberefore, the notification was bad; (2) that the
proceedings were collusive and were initiated by the
State Government for the benefit of the owner of the
land, the second respondent; (3) that the State Transport Corporadon was not a local authority but
morely a company and as the provisions of Part VII
of the Land Acquisition Act were not complied with,
the acquisition was bad.
Mr. J. C. Bhatt who appears for the appellants
ltcfQre us has likewise confined his attack to these
three grounds.
On behalf of the respondents it was
contended in the Courts below and ia contended before
3 S.C.R.
SUPRE.\1E COURT REPORtS
689
us that the Corporation is a local authority within the
meaning of the expression as med in the Land Acquisition Act, that even if it is held that it is not a local
authority the acquisition was made al public expense,
that the purpose of the acquisition is a public purpose
and that the appellants are not entitled to go behind
the notification of the Government issued under s. 4 ol
the Land Acquisition Act and finally that the acquisition was not mala fide or collusive.
In addition,
the learn :d Attorney-General, who appeared for the
respondents I and 3, contended that the suits were
premature inasmuch as they were instituted before the
notification under s. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act
was made.
Taking up the last point first, we may point out
that no such plea was taken on behalf of the respon·
dents in the trial court.
This point was apparently
not taken because even before the written statement
was filed a notification under s. 6 was in fact made
by the State Government.
The suits proceeded
throughout on the footing that there was no formal
defect in regard to their maintainability. In the
circumstances we do not think that it would be fair
to allmw the suits to be defeated merely on such a
technical ground.
Coming to the fi1111t point raised on behalf or
the appellants it is sufficient to point out that the
notification under s. 4 of the Act clearly states that
the acquisition is for a public purpose, namely, for
'State Transport'. The notification under s. 6 reite ·
rates this fact and in addition says that the land was
needed to be acquired for the purposes of and at the
expense of the State Transport Corporation.
There
i1 thus a clear declaration of the Government that
the purpose of acquisition was a public purpose and
a' has been consistently held by this Court in a num·
her of cases, including
the most recent one,
Smt. SOJMwanti v. The ~tate of Punjab (1), the
ll!t96SJl8.C.R. 17t
190
YaljiM.i M•lii•h••
Son1ji
••
Stot1 ef B .. H)
M""'-IU. J.
196'
Valjibi.ai Mulji6hoi
'
~ontji ·
••
.. S141i of Bo1da,
Mudhclku. J;
690 SUPREME COURT REPORTS {1961) VOL.
declaration as to public purpose by . the Govern·
ment is final except where it is a colourable exercise
of power. Unless, therefore, it is shown that there
was collusion as alleged by the appellants, between
the respondents 1 and 3 on the one hand and respon·
dent No. 2 on the other, the notification will have to
be regarded as conclusive on the question that the
land was required for a public purpose. Thus, even
. though the land was being acquired for a corporation
and not for the State the acquisition must nonethe-
. less be said to be for a public purpose, as has been
held in Somawanti' s case (' ), provided that it is not
fouud to be a colourable exercise of power by the
Government.
What is then to be considered is whether the
action of the Government can be regarded as colou·
rable being collusive or mala fide.
The question
whether the acquisition was colusi ve or mala fide is
one of fact and on this point the High Court and the
two courts bel01v have come to the conclusion
that the appellants have not been able to substantiate
their pleas. It is not for this Court to review the
evidence in a case where there are concurrent findings
of fact, unless there be exceptional reasons, and we
find none here. It must, therefore, be held that the
notifications of the Government' issued under ss. 4
and 6 are conclusive on the question that the land
was required for a public purpose.
We must, however, point out that before effect
can be given to a notification under sub-s. (1) of s. 6
of the Land Acquisition Act the terms of the proviso
to that section should be satisfied. Section 6(1) and
the proviso read thus :
~'Subject to the provisions of Part VH of this
Act, when the appropriate Government is satisfied after considering the report, if any, made
under section 5-A, sub-section (2), that anv
(11 [1963] 2 S.C.R. 114
'.:
3 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
691
particular land is needed for a public purpose,
or for a Company, a declaration shall be made
to that effect under the signature of a Secretary
to ·such Government or of some officer duly
authorised to certify its orders :
Provided that no such declaration shall be made
unless the compensation to be awarded for such
property is to be paid by a Company, or wholly
or partly out of public revenues or some fund
controlled or managed by a local authority."
The proviso clearly precludes the Government
from making a notification under sub-s. (1) of s. 6
unless the compensation to be awarded for such propeity (a) is to be paid by a company, or (b) is to come
wholly
or partly out of (i) public revenues or
(ii) some fund controlled or managed by a local
authority.
It is no doubt true that it has been the appe•
llants' case throughout that the State Transport Corporation is a company. It is also a fact that the entire
compensation is to come out of the funds of the State
Transport Corporation. If, therefore, we accept the
contention of the appellants on this point the terms
of the proviso will be said to have been satisfied. On
the other hand it has been the case of the respondents
that the State Transport Corporation is not a company but a local authority. The reason why this
contention is raised on behalf of the respondents is
that the provisions of Part VII of the Act have not
been complied with here and, therefore, if in fact the
acquisition is on behalf of a company it will have
to be said to be bad on the ground of non·compliance
with the provisions of Part VII.
The expression 'company' has been defined
thus in s. 3( e) of the Land Acquisition Act:
"the expression 'Company' means a Company
registered under the Indian Companies Act, 1882
/JU
V•ljibh•i MuQiMal
s .... ji
••
ital• of s ..... _,
Mrd},./kN J.
196S
Yaljibhai Muljibhai
:iont}i
••
Stat1 of B om6ay
.MudAa1kar J.
692
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1964] VOL.
or under the (English)· Companies Acts, 1862 to
1890, or incorporated by an Act of Parliament
of the United Kingdom or by an Indian law,
or by Royal Charter or Letters Patent and
includes a society registered under the Societies
Registration Act 1860, and a registered society
within the meaning of the Co· operative Socie·
ties Act, 191.2."
The State Transport Corporation is not regis·
tered under any Companies Act nor has it been incor·
porated under Royal Charter or Letters Patent. Nor
again, is it a ~ociety registered under the Societies
Registration Act, !860. ft is not incorporated by an
Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom; but
it is incorporated by an "Indian law". In this con·
nection it is necessary to refer to certain legislation.
The Central legislature enacted the Road Transport
Corporation Act, 1948, which received the a•sent of
the Governor-General on April 16, 1948, and came
into force in the erstwhile province of Bombay by
virtue of a notification made shortly thereafter.
Section 2 of the Act
defin~s
"Corporation" to
mean a Road Transport Corporation
appointed
by the Provincial Government in pursuance of this
Act. Section 4 of the Act provides for the appoint·
ment of a Road Transport Corporation by the Provin·
cial Government. In exercise of those powers the
State of Bombay appointed the State Road Transport
Corporation. Section 4 of the Act further provides that
a Corporation appointed by a Provincial Government
in pursuance of this Act shall be a body corporate
having prepetual succession and common. seal and
may sue and be sued by or under relevant provincial
law. On May 26, 1950, the State legislature of
Bombay enacted the Bombay State Road Tramport
Act, 1950 (25 of 1950). But it is not clear as to when
it came into force.
However, nothing turns on the
date on which it came into force. The fact, however,
is not disputed that this Act was actually put into
force.
By Act 64 of 1950 Parliament repealed the
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
693
Road Transport Corporation Act, 1948, and replaced
it by an entirely new law. The earlier Act consisted
only of 7 sections but the new law is an elaborate
piece of legislation dealing with the establishment of
Road Transport Corporations in the States, their
incorporation,
constitution, powers and duties,
finance, accounts, audit etc. Section 3 of that Act
deals with the establishment of Road Transport Corporations in the States and s. 4 provides that every
corporation shall be a body corporate by the name
notified under s. 3, having perpetual succession and a
common seal and shall sue and be sued by the said
name. Section 4 7 of the Act contains special provisions relating to Bombay and reads thus :
"(l) The body known as the Bombay State
Road Transport Corporation and the Board
thereof, referred to io the notification of the
Government of Bombey, No. l 7b0/5, dated the
16th November, 1949 (hereinafter referred to
as 'the existing Corporation' and 'Board'
respectively) shall, notwithstanding any defect
in, or invalidity of, the enactment or order under
which they were constituted, be deemed for
all purposes to have been validly constituted
as if all the provisions of the said notification
had been included and enacted in this section
and this section had been in force continuously
on and from the said date, and accordingly-
(a) all action by, and all
transactions
with, the existing Corporation or Board,
including any action or transaction by
which any property, asset or right was
acquired or any liability or obligation
whether by contract or otherwise, was
incurred, shall be deemed to have been
validily and lawfully taken or done; and
(b) no suit, prosecution or other legal
proceedin~ shall lie against the Government of Bombay or any member of the
IHI
Yt2ljibhai 1\-111/jiW.i
Son1ji
v.
Stall cf o.,,.11r,
Mudno;ku J.
196~
V dji6hoi Mulji&hoi
Sonfji
••
Slllie of Bom6•j'
Mullh•lk•r J.
694 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
Board or any officer or servant of the
existiug Corporation in respect of any
action taken by, or in relation to the
setting up of, the existing Corporation or
Board merely on the ground of any defect
in, or invalidity of. the enactment or order
under which the existing Corporation or
Board was constituted.
(2)
On the establishment of a Corporation
under section 3 in the State of Bombay (hereinafter referred to as 'the New Corporation')-
(a) the existing Corporation and Board
shall be deemed to be dissolved and shall
cease to function;
(b) all property and assets vesting in the
existing Corporation shall vest in the new
Corporation;
(c) all rights, liabilities and obligations
of the
existing
Corporation, whether
arising out of any contract or otherwise,
shall be the rights, liabilities and obligagations, respectively, of the new Corporation; and
( d) all licences and permits granted to all
contracts made with, and all instruments
executed on behalf of the existing Corporation or Board shall be deemed to have
been granted to, made with, or executed
on behalf of, the new Corporation and
shall have effect accordingly."
It will be clear from these provisions that the old
Corporation
was recognised as
having always
had valid legal status and deemed to have been
properly incorporated. On the establishment of a
Corporation under s, 3 of the Act of 1950 the old
'·
'
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
695
Corporation was dissolved. But all action by and
transaction with the old Corporation including any
action or transaction by which any property or asset
etc., was acquired by or for the old Corporation was
deemed to have been validly or lawfully taken or
done. It is common ground that in consequence
of the passing of the Act of 1950 the Bombay
Act
of 1950 stood
impliedly
repealed
and
was in fact expressly repealed by the
Bombay
Act 29 of 1955. The provisions which we have
set out above clearly show that the State Transport
Corporation having been incorporated by an Indian
law is a Company. Since, however, the compensation to be awarded for the acquisition is to be
paid only by the Corporation and no portion of it
was paid by the Government, could it be said that
the terms of the proviso to sub-s. (1) of s. 6 have
been satisfied ? It is contended by the learned
Attorney·General on behalf of the respondent that the
funds of the Corporation have themselves come out
of public revenue inasmuch as they consist of moneys
provided by the State of Bombay. Even assuming
that the funds of the Corporation consist only of the
moneys which have been provided by the State of
Bombay it is difficult to appreciate how they could
be regarded as part of the public revenue. No doubt,
the source of the funds would be public revenue but
the funds themselves belong to the Corporation and
are held by it as its own property. They cannot,
therefore, be regarded as 'public revenue' in any
s~nse. It was then said by reference to several provisions of the Act that the Government is entitled to
exercise control over the Corporation, that the profits earned by
the Corporation would go to the
government, that if the Corporation was wound up all
its assets would also go to the Government and that
~herefore, the Corporation could be regarded as noth:
\ng more than a limb o'f the Government. Even though
tnat may be so. the Corporation is. certainly not a
department of Government but is a separate legal
1963.
Valji6!•i Muliibhoi
Son1ji
v.
$tall oj s ... 1.,,
MudhalkM J.
1961 -
V i~iJli•i M •/jibh1i
Son1ji
••
St111 (lf BPm'O'
Mu•holkar J.
,
696 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (I 964] VOL.
entity and, therefore, moneys coming out of public
revenues whether invested; loaned or granted to it
would change their original character and become
the funds or assets of the Corporation when they are
invested in or transferrt>d or loaned to it. While,
therefore, the terms of the proviso could be said to
have been satisfied because compensation is to be
paid by the Corporation, the acquisition will be bad
because the provisions of Part VII of the Land Acquisition Act have not been complied with. In order
to get out of this difficulty the learned AttorneyGeneral argued that the State Transport Corporation
is a local authority.
The expression "local authority" is not defined
in the Land Acquisition Act but is defined in s. 3 (31)
of the General Clauses Act, 1897, as follows :
"'local authority' shall mean a municipal
committee, district board, body of port commissioners or other authority legally entitled to,
or entrusted by the Government with, the
control or management of a municipal or local
fund:"
The definitions given in the General Clauses Act,
1897, govern all Central Acts and Regulations-made
after the commencement of the Act. No doubt, this
Act was enacted later in point of time than the
Land Acquisition Act ; but this Act was a consolidating and amending Act and a definition given therein of the expression "local authority" is the same as
that contained in the earlier Acts of 1868 and I 887;
The definition given ins. 3 (31) will, therefore, hold
good for construing the expression "local authority"
occurring in the Land Acquisition Act. We have
already quoted the definition.
It will be clear from the definitiOn that unless
it is shown that the State Transport Corporation is an
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
6g.7
'authority' and is legally entitle i to or entrusted by
tae Government with control oc management of a
local fund it cannot be regarded as a local authority.
No material has been placed befnre us from which
it could be deduced that the funds of the Corporation
can be regarded as local funds. It was no doubt
submitted by the learned Attorney-General that the
Corporation was furnished with funds by the Government for commencing its business ; but even if that
were so, it is difficult to appreciate how
th~t would
make the funds of the Corporation local funds.
Learned Attorney-General then relied upon the
provisions of s. 29 of the Bombay State Road
Transport Act, 1950, which provides that the Corporation shall for all purposes be deemed to be a local
authority. No doubt, that is so. But the definition
contained in this Act cannot override the definition
contained in the General Clauses Act of 1897 which
alone muKt apply for construing the expression occur·
ring in a Central Act like the Land Acquisition Act
unless there is something repugnant in the subject OI'
context. Though land acquisition is now in the
concurrent list and, therefore, the State can legislate,
the Bombay Act not having received the President's
assent, cannot prevail against the meaning of the
expression 'local authority' in that Act. No repug·
nancy is pointed out.
Then again, the Act of 1948 had empowered
the Province of Bombay, among other provinces, to
appoint Road Transport Corporations and conferred
power on the Provincial Govrrnments under ss. 5 and
6 to deal with compensation and winding up of Corporations so appointed. In pursuance of this power
and after the commencement of the Coastitution the
Bombay Act of 1950 had been enacted by the State
Legislature of Bombay. But by the repeal of the Act
of 1948 by the Central Act of 1950 the
foundation
for the continuance anc;l e~tcnce of the Bombay Act
J'J(j!f
Y alji6/Jai MuljiW..i
SfJfllji
••
St•ll of B11111t.1
M•dMlw J,
1963
l'aljibfo Muljibhai
Sofleji
v.
Slllt1 o/JJomff.v
MadhoJka1 J.
1969
M•J 9.
69s·· SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964) VOL;
of1950 disappeared. Moreover, siuce s. 41 of the
Central Act provided thl\t a Corporation shall be
deemed to be a local authority within the meaning
Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, and not within the mean'
ing of any other . law, the provisions of s. 29 of the
Bombay Act could in ·no circumstan·ces be said to
survive. In view of all this the learned Attorney·
General did not press his argument on the point
further.
In our view the
acquisition impugned in
this case having been made for the benefit of a
Corporation, though for a public purpose, is bad
because no part of the compensation is to come out
of public revenues and the provisions of Part VII of
the Land Acquisition Act have not been complied
with. We, therefore, allow the appeals and decree
the suits of the appellants with costs in all the courts.
Appeals allowed.
SRI GOPAL JALAN & COMPANY
"·
CALCUTT A STOCK EXCHANGE
ASSOCIATION LTD.
(A. K. SARKAR, M. HIDAYATULLAH and
J. C. SHAH JJ.)
Oompany-.Allotmenl of iliaru-Forfeiture of ahar......-
Forftiletl. •haru reiaauetl.-lf jilinv of relurn compul1ory-Tli.•
Oompaniu .Act, 19ti6 (I of 1966), •· 75.
~,
:,
The respondent-company did not file any return of the
re-issued forfeited 1hares under•• 75 (I) of the Act arid there-.
fore the appellant·shareholdar moved the High Court for an:
order requiring it to do 10.
•
f,
· · , Held that the wo.rd1 "allotment of shares" have been iiled
ili·.;'15:to lndi~te ch• lll"Catloa of 11uifc. by appropriation out