# SUNDER SINGH v. STATE OF UTTARANCHAL

- **Citation:** [2010] 11 S.C.R. 927
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2010-09-16
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 1164 of 2005
- **Bench:** V.S. Sirpurkar, A.K. Patnaik
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/sunder-singh-v-state-of-uttaranchal-26248
- **Pages:** 41

## Headnote

A
B
Penal Code, 1860: s. 302 -
Gruesome murders -
Accused allegedly put house on fire, when victim family was
having dinner inside, and locked the house from outside -
C
When one victim tried to escape, accused gave sword attack
on his neck - All the victims except one succumbed to burn
injuries ~ Dying declaration - Surviving victim suffered 70%
bum injuries - Accused remaining absconded - Found after
12 years- Trial court convicted accused u/s.302 and awarded o
death sentence - High Court affirmed the same - On appeal,
held: No reason to interfere with the order of conviction and
sentence - The dying declaration was found to be voluntary
and truthful - Surviving victim was a natural witness and she
herself was injured - The accused was her husband's cousin
E
thus no scope for mistaken identity moreso when the house
was on fire and there was ample light available for identifying
the accused - Her evidence was accepted by courts below
and was found to be reliable - There were some contradictions
and omissions in her evidence but they were not substantial F
enough so as to affect the credibility of her evidence -
Sentence/Sentencing - Evidence - Dying declaration.
Sentence/Sentencing: Death sentence - House set on
fire while victim family was having dinner inside - Door bolted
from outside - Sword blow given on neck of one victim who G
tried to escape - Entire family except one succumbed to burn
injures - Accused held guilty of murder - Courts below held
that it was rarest of rare case and awarded death sentence -
Held: No reason to interfere with the order of sentence - The
927
H
928
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 11 S.C.R.
A
offence was committed with pre-meditated mind and in a cruel
and cold blooded manner -
There was no immediate
provocation and all this was only due to previous enmity over
property - Out of five persons who lost their life, two were
barely 16 and 19 years of age - All of them were without any
B
arms and were helpless - The accused showed scant respect
for the law by absconding for about 12 years- Circumstances
of the case not sufficient to mitigate the horrible crime - Pe,nal
Code, 1860 - s. 302.
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: s.313 - Trial courts
C
ought to be extremely careful about the questions to be put
to the accused persons in examination uls.313 - Record
must show that meticulous care is taken to put all the
incriminating circumstances to the accused - Trial courts
sometimes are extremely casual about this aspect - They are
D expected to be extremely careful in this behalf -
Administration of criminal justice - Criminal trial.
Evidence:
Contradictory statement - Held: If the witness is not
E
specifically given an opportunity to explc;iin contradiction, it
cannot be taken note of
Dying declaration - When a witness making dying
declaration survives, the said declaration does not become
F
substantive evidence and it can only be corroborative
evidence of oral testimony.
Investigation-Duty of investigating agency -
Held:
Investigation should not be conducted in casual and careless
G or slipshod manner - Incompetent investigation should not
result in the accused getting an unfair advantage - Need to
give regular police service to distant villages - Policing
system.
The prosecution case Jras that on the fateful day, the
H
SUNDER SINGH v. STATE OF UTTARANCHAL
929
victim family was taking dinner on the ground floor of A
their house. The accused came there with jerry cans filled
with petrol and a burning torch and after pouring petrol
inside the room and after setting fire with the torch, closed
the door from outside. When one of the victim managed
to come out, the accused gave him a sword blow on the
B
neck. As a result, the victim fell down and died outside
the house. The other five family members also sustained
severe burn injuries. PW-2 informed the patwari, PW-13,
about the incident. When PW-13 reached the spot along
with the other witnesses, PW-3 and PW-4, two victims c
narrated the incident to them

## Text

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[2010] 11 S.C.R. 927
SUNDER SINGH
V.
STATE OF UTTARANCHAL
(Criminal Appeal No. 1164 of 2005)
SEPTEMBER 16, 2010
[V.S. SIRPURKAR AND A.K. PATNAIK, JJ.]
A
B
Penal Code, 1860: s. 302 -
Gruesome murders -
Accused allegedly put house on fire, when victim family was
having dinner inside, and locked the house from outside -
C
When one victim tried to escape, accused gave sword attack
on his neck - All the victims except one succumbed to burn
injuries ~ Dying declaration - Surviving victim suffered 70%
bum injuries - Accused remaining absconded - Found after
12 years- Trial court convicted accused u/s.302 and awarded o
death sentence - High Court affirmed the same - On appeal,
held: No reason to interfere with the order of conviction and
sentence - The dying declaration was found to be voluntary
and truthful - Surviving victim was a natural witness and she
herself was injured - The accused was her husband's cousin
E
thus no scope for mistaken identity moreso when the house
was on fire and there was ample light available for identifying
the accused - Her evidence was accepted by courts below
and was found to be reliable - There were some contradictions
and omissions in her evidence but they were not substantial F
enough so as to affect the credibility of her evidence -
Sentence/Sentencing - Evidence - Dying declaration.
Sentence/Sentencing: Death sentence - House set on
fire while victim family was having dinner inside - Door bolted
from outside - Sword blow given on neck of one victim who G
tried to escape - Entire family except one succumbed to burn
injures - Accused held guilty of murder - Courts below held
that it was rarest of rare case and awarded death sentence -
Held: No reason to interfere with the order of sentence - The
927
H
928
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 11 S.C.R.
A
offence was committed with pre-meditated mind and in a cruel
and cold blooded manner -
There was no immediate
provocation and all this was only due to previous enmity over
property - Out of five persons who lost their life, two were
barely 16 and 19 years of age - All of them were without any
B
arms and were helpless - The accused showed scant respect
for the law by absconding for about 12 years- Circumstances
of the case not sufficient to mitigate the horrible crime - Pe,nal
Code, 1860 - s. 302.
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: s.313 - Trial courts
C
ought to be extremely careful about the questions to be put
to the accused persons in examination uls.313 - Record
must show that meticulous care is taken to put all the
incriminating circumstances to the accused - Trial courts
sometimes are extremely casual about this aspect - They are
D expected to be extremely careful in this behalf -
Administration of criminal justice - Criminal trial.
Evidence:
Contradictory statement - Held: If the witness is not
E
specifically given an opportunity to explc;iin contradiction, it
cannot be taken note of
Dying declaration - When a witness making dying
declaration survives, the said declaration does not become
F
substantive evidence and it can only be corroborative
evidence of oral testimony.
Investigation-Duty of investigating agency -
Held:
Investigation should not be conducted in casual and careless
G or slipshod manner - Incompetent investigation should not
result in the accused getting an unfair advantage - Need to
give regular police service to distant villages - Policing
system.
The prosecution case Jras that on the fateful day, the
H
SUNDER SINGH v. STATE OF UTTARANCHAL
929
victim family was taking dinner on the ground floor of A
their house. The accused came there with jerry cans filled
with petrol and a burning torch and after pouring petrol
inside the room and after setting fire with the torch, closed
the door from outside. When one of the victim managed
to come out, the accused gave him a sword blow on the
B
neck. As a result, the victim fell down and died outside
the house. The other five family members also sustained
severe burn injuries. PW-2 informed the patwari, PW-13,
about the incident. When PW-13 reached the spot along
with the other witnesses, PW-3 and PW-4, two victims c
narrated the incident to them. The dying declaration of
two victims were recorded by the magistrate. One of the
victim who gave dying declaration died while the other
who suffered 70% burn survived. The injured victims
were rushed to the hospital. Some victims died on the way
0
and some in the hospital. The accused remained
absconded and was found after 12 years. the matter was
then committed to Sessions.
The trial court convicted the accused under Sections
302, 307 and 436 IPC on the basis of the evidence of PWE:
1, the dying declaration and the other substantive
evidence and awarded death sentence. The High Court
confirmed the conviction and the sentence. The instant
appeal was filed challenging the conviction and the
sentence.
F
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1. PW-1 was a natural witness and there
could be no dispute about her presence on the spot. She
was also an injured witness having suffered 70% burns.
G
Considering the overall evidence which was accepted by
the trial court arid the High Court, PW-1 was found reliable
and the courts below committed no error in accepting her
evidence. There were undoubtedly some contradictions
H
930
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 11 S.C.R.
A and omissions in her evidence but they were not
substantial enough so as to affect the credibility of her
evidence. Unless a contradiction is proved by· putting it
to the person who records the original statement, such
contradiction is of no consequence. If the witness is not
B specifically given an opportunity to explain suc:h
contradiction, it cannot be taken note of. The seizurepanchnamas duly proved by PW-4 showed that there
were three jerry cans found which were cut from the
above, and as such, were open and they were smelling
c of petrol. Therefore, there can be no dispute that actually
the accused had carried the three jerry cans full of petrol
and the witness had seen the accused pouring petrol
from one of them. It can also be that the accused might
have utilized the two jerry cans in sprinkling. the petrol
0 on the roof from outside and then opening the door,
threw the petrol from the third jerry can remaining with
him. The witness had after all seen the three jerry cans
being presented in the court and had, therefore, tried to
improve upon the story. However, if the three jerry cans
were actually found by PW-13 immediately on the spot in
E a semi-burnt condition, the so-called contradiction loses
all its rigor. PW-1 was very candid when she admitted
before the court that she had not stated that her husband
was cut by the accused and that she had not, therefore,
referred to the pistol in her statement. She was also
F candid in saying that she had not seen the accused
assaulting her husband. She then asserted that the
accused assaulted her husband on his neck only once.
She also asserted that besides the accused, she did not
see anyone else on the spot. All this suggested her
G truthfulness. She did not implicate anybody else than the
accused. Therefore, the fact that the accused was alone
and further that one of the victim after opening the door,
ran out and was thereafter immediately found cut would
lead to the only inference that it was the accused alone
H
SUNDER SINGH v. STATE OF UTTARANCHAL
931
who assaulted him. At that time, the whole house was A
burning. The witness explained that the other people
came and extinguished the fire, otherwise the whole
house would have burnt. There was, therefore, enough
light for the witness to see the accused. There was
nothing to disbelieve this witness on account of the soB
called contradictions. In fact, the presence of PW-1
alongwith the other victims on the spot, was not
challenged. Had she not been present there, she would
not have suffered 70% burns. She thus had the best
opportunity to watch everything. She herself had lost all C
her kith and kin including her husband and, therefore, she
would not be interested in screening the real accused.
She cannot be viewed as the interested person. In fact,
the doctor, PW-12, in his first medical statement
specifically mentioned that she was fully conscious 0
when she was examined at the hospital. Therefore, it
cannot be said that she was not able to see and
comprehend. [Paras 11, 12, 13] [943-E-F-H; 944-A-B; 945B-E; 946-D-H; 947-A-H]
1.2. There can be no dispute that the dying E
declaration can be made a basis of conviction. For basing
the conviction on the dying declaration, the declaration
must pass all the tests of voluntariness, the fit condition
of mind of the declarant and the declarant was not being
influenced by any other factors. The critical examination. F
of the dying declaration showed that it was voluntary,
truthful and uninfluenced by any other factor. The only
criticism against this dying declaration was that the
magistrate had not got it certified by the doctor to the
effect that the witness was in a fit state of mind to make G
the dying declaration. However, the magistrate (PW-9)
very specifically asserted that he had obtained the
opinion of the doctor,. but there was no crossexamination at all on this very vital aspect. Therefore, the
assertion that he had asked the doctor and was H
932
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010) 11 S.C.R.
A
convinced that the injured was in a fit position to make
a dying declaration had gone unchallenged. This witness
very specifically stated that he completed all the
formalities and had taken all the cautions. After examining
all the circumstances, particularly, the evidence of the
B
magistrate, the dying declarations of PW-1 and the other
victim did pass the test of credibility. There can be no
dispute that when a witness making a dying declaration
survives, the said dying declaration does not remain
substantive evidence. Of course, the dying declaration
C of PW-1 cannot be substantive evidence and it can only
be corroborative evidence of oral testimony since she
survived. However, the evidence of the other declarant
did become substantive evidence and wholly reliable.
The trial court and the appellate court committed no error
0
in relying on that dying declaration. [Paras 12, 18, 19)
[945-E-H; 946-A-C; 950-D-F; 951-B-D]
Lax man v. State of Maharashtra 2002 (6) SCC 710 -
relied on.
E
Shanmugham @ Ku/andaivelu v. State of Tamil Nadu
(2002) 10 SCC 4; P. V. Radhakrishnan v. State of Karnataka.
(2003) 6 SCC 443; Ramprasad v. State of Maharashtra 1999
(5) sec 30 - referred to.
1.3. The assertion of PW-3 in the examination-in-chief
F
that one of the victim had told him that when they were
having their food at that time the accused had poured the
petrol and had put the house on fire, was not challenged
In the cross-examination. The only challenge in the
cross-examination was that he had himself not seen the
G incident. The evidence of this witness also thus went
unchallenged. Though the Panchnamas on which these
two witnesses have put their signatures, were put to the
accused, however, this fact of oral dying declaration to
both of them was not put to the accused. It is really a
H matter of concern that even the trial Judge did not frame
SUNDER SINGH v. STATE OF UTIARANCHAL
933
the question in Section 313 Cr.P.C. examination
A
specifically putting the names of these two witnesses.
Thereby a very important circumstance is lost. The trial
courts ought to be extremely careful about the questions
to be put to the accused persons in examination under
Section 313 Cr.P.C. Record must show that meticulous
B
care is taken to put all the incriminating circumstances
to the accused. It is found that the trial courts sometimes
are extremely casual about this aspect and fail to put all
the incriminating circumstances to the accused. The trial
courts are expected to be extremely careful in this behalf. c
{Para 21] [951-G-H; 952-A-G]
'
1.4. Nothing was brought in the cross-examination of
the doctors excepting the suggestion to practically all of
them that if there was an accidental fall of a can
containing oil or petrol in the hearth, there could be a
D
possibility of the witnesses receiving burn injuries. Such
possibility was merely an imagination and there was no
material whatsoever to see any such possibility. This is
all the more true considering that one of the victim was
given a blow by a sword resulting in his instantaneous
E
death. The defence thus could not get any advantage
from the medical evidence. [Para 23] [954-B-C]
2. The investigation in the instant case was not up
to the mark. In the distant hilly areas in the State of
Uttarakhand, the investigation is conducted by village
police through a Patwari who is the lowest officer in the
revenue department. Much more could have been done
F
in the case. Some of the victims were alive when the
investigating officer allegedly reached the spot as per his
G
own evidence. He could have recorded their dying
declarations. That was not done. Even the FSL report
was not obtained and filed. The trial was started only after
the arrest of the accused after 12 years. All this suggested
that the investigation was conducted in a very casual and
H
934
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 11 S.C.R.
A careless manner. Same was the story of prosecution. The
prosecuting agency did not even bother to look into the
questions before they were asked to the accused in his
Section 313 Cr.P.C. examination. Merely because this
heinous offence took place in the remote corner of
B District Bageshwar which at the time when the offence
took place was Almora District, it did not mean that the
investigating agency could do some slipshod
investigation and thereafter the prosecution could be
allowed to be equally casual as it appears to have been
C in conducting the prosecution. This also speaks about
the duty of the trial court judge who cannot be a mere
spectator to what goes on in the name of the trial. The
trial judge has to control the trial by active application of
mind. A time has come when the village police system
0 prevalent in the State of Uttaranch~I in respect of distant
areas should be changed and the distant villagers be
given the protection and services of the regular police.
It is really strange that the four Districts which are in the
plains have had advantage of the police system while in
the remaining Districts, the distant part of those Districts
E are deprived of a police system. Such deprivation
undoubtedly results in affecting the law and order
situation, the detection of crimes and the protection of
the poor villagers. In fact effective policing is the need
of the whole society, urban as also rural. However, all
F these factors have not prejudiced the accused. Even with
these factors, the prosecution fully proved the heinous
offence
committed
by him.
The
incompetent
investigation should not result in the accused getting any
G
H
unfair advantage. [Para 24] [954-D-H; 955-A-E]
3. As regards the sentence, it must be said that the
instant case is one of the rarest of the rare cases, in
which the whole family was wiped out. Five persons lost
their life while the sixth person, a helpless lady, who is
SUNDER SINGH v. STATE OF UTTARANCHAL
935
now left to be the only member of the family, has to live
A
her life with 70% burn injuries. The murder was
committed in a cruel, grotesque and diabolical manner.
The act of pouring petrol when all the family members
were together in a room and setting it to fire and then
closing the door from outside was the most fouled act,
B
by which the accused actually intended to burn all the
persons inside the room. Barring PW-1, everyone in that
room was burnt. When one of the victim somehow, was
able to open the room and come out, even he was not
spared and almost beheaded by the accused. It is clear c
that the accused had done this with pre-meditated and
cold-blooded mind, as he had taken the trouble of
carrying petrol to his own cousin's house. He was also
carrying a sword, and probably prepared himself to fire
on the complainant party, as a pistol with two bullets in
it was also found on the spot. The accused had shown
extreme depravity of mind in causing a sword blow on
the neck of the victim who himself was burnt and was
trying to escape. A murder by burning, by itself, would
be a very cruel act. The agony caused to the dying
victims because of their burn injuries would be
enormous. Again, when it is seen that there was no
immediate provocation to the accused and all this only
was on account of the enmity going on in respect of the
family lands, the enormousness of the crime is increased
'
by many folds. Out of the five persons who lost their life,
two were barely 16 and 19 years old. Their life was nipped
D
E
F
in the bud. All the victims were without any arms and
were helpless. They could not have even saved
themselves and did succumb to the burn injuries. The
balance sheet of the aggravating circumstances thus
G
exceeds the mitigating circumstances. In fact, there was
no mitigating circumstance in this case. The accused
showed scant respect for the law by remaining
absconding for about 12 years and only because of that
H
936
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 11 S.C.R.
A
he could not be brought to books. It is only his accidental
arrest and being lodged in another jail that the
prosecuting agency was able to prosecute him. The age
is not on the side of the accused. Insofar as the other
circumstance of the accused remaining under the
B
shadow of death sentence right from 2004 is concerned,
the circumstance, by itself, is not sufficient to mitigate his
horrible crime. [Para 35] [965-D-H; 966-A-H]
Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1980 SC 898;
C
Machhi Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab AIR 1983 SC 957;
Devender Pal Singh v. State of NCT of Delhi AIR 2002 SC
1661; Atbir v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi JT 2010 (8) SC 372;
Ravji Alias Ram Chandra v. State of Rajasthan 1996 (2) SCC
175; Dhananjoy Chatterjee v. State of West Bengal 1994 (2)
SCC 220; State of UP. v. Dharmendra Singh & Anr. 1999
D
(8) SCC 325; Triveniben v. State of Gujarat 1988 (4) SCC
574; Sushi/ Murmu v. State of Jharkhand AIR 2004 SC 394;
Ediga Anamma v. State of A.P. AIR 1974 SC 799; Gurdev
Singh & Anr. v. State of Punjab with Piara Singh & Anr. v.
State of.Punjab AIR 2003 SC 4187; Rajendra Prasad v. State
E
of Uttar Pradesh 1979 (3) SCC 646; A. Devendran v. State
of Tamil Na du 1997 ( 11) SCC 720; Kumudi Lal v. State of
UP. 1999 (4) SCC 108; Om Prakash v. State of Haryana
1999 (3) SCC 19; Mohd. Chaman v. State (NCT of Delhi)
2001 (2) SCC 28; Lehna v. State of Haryana 2002 (3) SCC
F
76; Haru Ghosh v. State of West Bengal 2009 (15) SCC 551;
Dilip Premnarayan Tiwari & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra etc.
2010 (1) SCC 775; Swamy Shraddananda @ Murali
Manohar Mishra v. State of Karnataka AIR 2008 SC 3040referred to.
G
Case Law Reference:
1999 (5) sec 30
referred to
Para 12
2002 (6) sec 11 o
relied on
Para 18
H
(2002) 1 o sec 4
referred to
Para 18
SUNDER SINGH v. STATE OF UTTARANCHAL
937
(2003) 6 sec 443
referred to
Para 18
A
AIR 1980 SC 898
referred to
Para 30, 32
AIR 1983 SC 957
referred to
Para 30
AIR 2002 SC 1661
referred to
Para 30
B
JT 2010 (8) SC 372
referred to
Para 30, 32, 35
1996 (2) sec 115
referred to
Para 31
1994 (2) sec 220
referred to
Para 31
c
1999 (8) sec 325
referred to
Para 31
1988 (4) sec 574
referred to
Para 31
AIR 2004 SC 394
referred to
Para 32
AIR 1974 SC 799
referred to
. Para 32
D
AIR 2003 SC 4187
referred to
Para 33
1979 (3) sec 646
referred to
Para 33
1997 (11) sec 120
referred to
Para 33
E
1999 (4) sec 108
referred to
Para 33
1999 (3) sec 19
referred to
Para 33
2001 (2) sec 28
referred to
Para 33
F
2002 (3) sec 76
referred to
Para 33
2009 (15) sec 551
referred to
Para 34
2010 (1) sec 775
referred to
Para 34
AIR 2008 SC 3040
referred to
Para 34
G
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
No. 1164 of 2005.
From the Judgment and order dated 20.07.2005 of the
H
938
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 11 S.C.R.
A High Court of Uttaranchal at Nainital in CRLR No. 7 of 2004
and CRLJA No. 249 of 2004.
Y.P. Singh, C. Siddharth and P. Purudura for the Appellant.
S.S. Shamshery and Jatinnder Kumar Bhatia for the
B Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
V.S. SIRPURKAR, J. 1. Appellant herein challenges the
C judgment of the High Court affirming the judgment passed by
the Sessions Court. The Sessions Judge convicted the
appellanUaccused Sunder Singh for offences under Sections
302, 307 and 436, Indian Penal Code (IPC). While he was
awarded the death sentence along with a fine of Rs.5,000/-
D and in default to suffer further rigorous imprisonment for one
year, he was given the punishment of seven years along with
fine of Rs. 5,000/- and in default to suffer further rigorous
imprisonment for one year separately on the other two counts.
2. The incident in this case had taken place on 30 .6 .1989
E in village Mahargheti, Patwari Circle Dangoli in the newly
formed District Bageshwar (which was part of District Almora
at the time of incident). In this ghastly incident, Pratap Singh,
his wife Nandi Devi, his elder son Balwant Singh (aged about
28 years), another son Prem Singh (aged about 19 years),
F daughter Kamla (aged about 16 years) lost their lives while
I
wife of Balwant Singh, namely, Vim la, Devi (PW-1) sustained
I
grievous burn injuries. Five victims who lost their lives including
Balwant Singh were roasted alive atld 1died either on the spot
or while being taken to the hospital or in the hospital. Balwant
G Singh, however, was almost beheaded while he also suffered
the burn injuries. The prosecution alleged that this incident
took place at about 10 p.m. when all the victims were taking
their dinner in the ground floor room of their house. The
appellanUaccused came there with jerry can containing petrol
H and burning torch and threw the petrol in the room and ,after
SUNDER SINGH v. STATE OF t.JTTARANCHAL
939
[V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.]
--°'~
setting fire by torch, he shut the door of the room. Though
A
Balwant Singh was in flames he managed to come out of the
room by opening the door. However, as soon as he came out
of the room, the accused who was still waiting there gave him
a sword blow on the neck because of which he fell down dead
out side the house. The other five family members who
B
sustained severe bums also died barring Vimla Devi who alone
survived. Nandi Devi died on the way to the Primary Health
Centre at Baijnath while Pratap Singh also died there itself.
l<amla and Prem Singh died in the District hospital, Almora
later on, where they were shifted from Baijnath.
·
c
3. Informant Kheem Singh (PW-2) prepared a written
report and handed over to the Circle Patwari, Hyat Singh (PW13). In fact Hyat Singh (PW-13) came almost immediately after
the incident and so did the other witnesses like Chanar Singh
(PW-3) and Rewadhar (PW-4). At the time when they reached
D
the spot almost simultaneously, Pratap Singh was alive, who
told these witnesses that accused Sunder Singh had burned
them by throwing petrol from jerry can and by torching the
house thereafter. Even Vimla Devi (PW-1), the wife of Balwant
Singh told Hyat Singh (PW-13) about the incident and also
E
about the attack on Balwant Singh by the accused. Hyat Singh
(PW-13) started the investigation. He inspected the burnt
house and the spot where Balwant Singh's body was lying. He
found that Balwant Singh was dead and had suffered a serious
injury on his neck. The other injured barring Balwant Singh
F
were sent first to the Primary Health Centre, Baijnath. Nandi
Devi, however, died even before reaching the Primary Health
Centre, Baijnath, while Pratap Singh is said to have died after
reaching the Health Centre. Dr. K.C. Joshi (PW-12) examined
Vim la Devi (PW-1) and noted the injuries suffered by her, so
G
also Kamla and Prem Singh were examined by him, and he
noted their injuries in the medical certificates (Exhibits Ka-9,
Ka-10 and Ka-11 ). Thereafter, the injured were sent to District
Hospital, Almora in view of the seriousness of their injuries.
When the three injured were at District Hospital, Almora, the
H
940
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010) 11 S.C.R.
A dying declarations of Prem Singh and Vim la Devi (PW-1) were
recorded on 1. 7 .1989 by Narender Singh Patel (PW-9), SubDivisional Magistrate, Baramandal, District Almora. Before this,
Hyat Singh (PW-13) had completed his inspection of all the
spots and had attached burnt radio, damaged plastic gallons,
B burnt breads and cut pieces of can from the scene of offence.
He also found a cover of the sword (described as 'Khol') and
also a pistol which had two bullets in it. He also held the
inquest on the dead body of Balwant Singh and thereafter on
the body of Pratap Singh and Nandi Devi. These bodies were
c sent for post mortem. In the District Hospital, Almora, Prem
Singh died on 1.7.1989 itself while Kamla died later on after
the treatment. Vimla Devi (PW-1), however, miraculously
suNived. The inquests and the post mortem on the dead bodies
of Kamla and Prem Singh were also conducted later on by the
D doctors. All the five dead bodies had suffered extensive burn
injuries, almost to the extent of 70% or 80%. Vimla Devi (PW1 ), however, miraculously escaped and suNived, though she
had also suffered 70% of the burn injuries. After the preliminary
investigation was completed by Hyat Singh (PW-13), the same
E was entrusted to C.B.C.l.D. and Inspector K.R. Tamta (PW14), who completed the remaining formalities of the
investigation. The accused was absconding. He was found
only in July, 2002 after a lapse of 12 years. It was then that the
matter was committed to Sessions on the basis of the
chargesheet already filed.
F
4. The chargesheet was for the offences under Sections
302, 307 and 436, IPC. The Sessions Judge framed charges.
Fourteen witnesses were examined in support of the charges
including Vim la Devi (PW-1) who was the injured eye witness.
G Kheem Singh (PW-2), who was the author of the First·
Information Report (FIR), was examined to prove the same.
Chanar Singh (PW-3) and Rewadhar (PW-4) were the
witnesses who reached the spot almost immediately after the
incident. They were examined as the panch witnesses. Dan
H Singh (PW-5) also acted as a panch on the inquest, so also
SUNDER SINGH v. STATE OF UTTARANCHAL
941
[V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.]
Daya Krishna (PW-7) and Ramesh Singh Rotella (PW-8) were
A
examined to prove the inquest panchnamas on the dead
bodies. Narender Singh Patel {PW-9), Sub-Divisional
Magistrate, Baramandal, District Almora was examined to
prove the dying declarations of Vim la Devi (PW-1) and Prem
Singh, which was recorded by him on 1.7.1989. Dr. N.D.
B
Punetha (PW-6), Dr. H.G.S. Manral (PW-10) and Dr. Nanda
Vallabh Sharma (PW-11) were the doctors conducting the post
mortem, while Dr. K.C. Joshi (PW-12) was the doctor who
had examined Vim la Devi (PW-1) and Prem Singh and had
issued medical certificates to them. Hyat Singh (PW-13), the c
investigating Patwari and Inspector K.R. Tamta (PW-14) were
examined as.the investigating witnesses.
5. The accused abjured his guilt. He raised the defence
of false implication on account of the enmity due-!o-land.
However, learned Sessions Judge came to the conclusion on
D
the basis of the evidence of Vim la Devi (PW-1) and the dying
declaration of Prem Singh and the other substantive evidence
that it was accused Sunder Singh who had torched the ground
floor room on the fateful day resulting in the victims being
roasted alive. It was also held that the prosecution had proved
E
that the accused had dealt a sword blow on Balwant Singh
almost beheading him and on that count proceeded to convict
the accused and awarded the sentences which have already
been mentioned.
6. Since the death sentence was ordered there was a
death reference made in the High Court. The accused also
filed an appeal challenging his conviction. The High Court came
F
to the conclusion that the Sessions Judge was right in
convicting the accused. The High Court also endorsed the G
opinion of the Sessions Judge that this was a rarest of rare
case and, therefore, affirmed the death sentence awarded to
the accused by the Sessions Judge. The judgment affirmed
by the High Court has now fallen for our consideration.
H
942
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 11 S.C.R.
A
7. Shri Y.P. Singh who was appointed as Amicus Curiae
urged before us that it could not be said that it was the accused
who was the perpetrator of this crime. According to the learned
Counsel, the prosecution was not able to prove the guilt. He
contended that the evidence of Vim la Devi (PW-1) could not
B
be accepted as there were inherent pitfalls in her evidence.
Firstly, she was an interested witness and secondly, her ability
to see at night at 10 .O'clock was suspect. We have been
taken through the whole evidence to show that there were
contradictions and material omissions in her evidence. The
C
learned Counsel further argued that the so-called dying
declaration by Prem Singh was also a suspect document and
was not creditworthy. He pointed out that tlile said dying
declaration of Prem Singh did not have the endorsement of
the doctor about Prem Singh being in fit condition to make a
0
dying declaration.
E
F
8. Lastly, learned Counsel suggested that this could not
be said to be a rarest of rare case and the High Court has
erred in affirming the death sentence.
9. As against this, the learned Counsel appearing on
behalf of the State supported the judgment and contended
that the evidence of Vimla Devi (PW-1) was extremely
important and credible and she was herself an injured witness.
He pointed out that being a relative and having lost her near
and dear ones she is not likely to screen the real offender.
She had all the opportunity to see and since the accused was
the real uncle of her husband, there was no question of any
mi~-identification also. He pointed out that the evidence is
extremely natural and she had not tried to rope in other persons.
G It was further pointed out that there was nothing to suspect the
dying declaration of Prem Singh. As regards the absence of
the endorsement of the doctor, the learned Counsel suggested
that it cannot be forgotten that the said dying declaration is
recorded by an independent witness. He_also pointed out that
the victim was fully conscious and had~survived after the dying
H
SUNDER SINGH v. STATE OF UTTARANCHAL
943
[VS. SIRPURKAR, J.]
declaration for substantial time which would suggest that he . A -
was completely conscious at the time when the dying
declaration was recorded. It was further argued by the learned
Counsel that this was the most dastardly act on the part of the
accused that he not only set the house to fire but also closed
the door thereby he displayed his foul intention to eliminate
B
the whole family and he was successful in eliminating the whole
family. Learned Counsel pointed out that two of the victims
were extremely young being 16 years and 19 years old and
had not even seen their lives. The learned Counsel brought to
our notice the fact that the accused remained absconding for c
12 long years. His being remaining absconding for 12 years
was also a clear cut circumstance against him. According to
the learned Counsel, therefore, this was a rarest of rare case.
10. It has to be borne in mind in this case that there is no
scope of a mistaken identity for the simple reason that the D
accused was the real brother of Pratap Singh. Again, because
the house was set to fire there was ample light available for
identifying the accused.
11. The prosecution basically relied on the evidence of E
Smt. Vimla Devi (PW-1) whose evidence was examined by us
very closely. She is a natural witness and there can be no
dispute about her presence on the spot. She is also an injured
witness as she has herself suffered 70% burns. She was very
fortunate to survive. Learned counsel criticized the evidence
F
by saying that she had obviously deposed in an unnatural
manner by claiming that the accused was carrying three Jerry
cans, opened them one by one and poured petrol. It was also
pointed out that initially in her statement which was recorded
as dying declaration, she had suggested that the room was G
set to fire by a match stick. In her cross examination, however,
she refuted that claim. A fantastic theory was introduced in her
cross-examination that her husband died because he dashed
against sharp stone. Considering the overall evidence which
has been accepted by the Trial Court and the High Court, we
H
944
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 11 S.C.R.
A
are of the clear opinion that this witness is reliable and the
Courts below committed no error in accepting the evidence of
Vimla Devi (PW-1 ). It cannot be forgotten that the witness has
identified the jerry cans, the sword etc. which were lying in her
courtyard. There were undoubtedly some contradictions and
B
omissions in her evidence and the dying declaration but in our
opinion they were not substantial enough so as to affect the
credibility of her evidence. She undoubtedly suggested in her
Examination-in-Chief that the accused was carrying jerry cans.
She has referred 'jerry cans' in plurals- "Uske hath me petrol
C
va diesel k jerry can thhe". She then identified the three jerry
cans when the three jerry cans, which were attached, were
produced in the Court. She also identified the cover of the
sword and also the pistol which was left behind and was found
by Hyat Singh (PW-13). She has then identified all the other
D material objects like radio etc. In her Cross-Examination, she
again asserted that the accused had three jerry cans, which
she described as gallons. She then described that the caps of
these jerry cans were cut. She could not, however, tell as to
the capacity of the said jerry cans nor could she speak about
their colour. She accepted the suggestion that the accused
E
first threw the petrol from one jerry can and then from the
second and the other. She then asserted that they were not
set to fire with the match box on which she was contradicted
with her previous statement, wherein she had suggested that
the accused had set fire by the match stick. This was, by far,
F
the only contradiction which was brought in her CrossExamination.
12. Very strangely, a suggestion was put to her that since
the accused threw the petrol from three jerry cans one after
G the other, they could run out and catch the accused. In her
further Cross-Examination, however, she admitted that her
statement was properly recorded by Narender Singh Patel
(PW-9), Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Baramandal, District
Almora. She also admitted that she had stated in her dying
H declaration that there was one jerry can. In our opinion, the
SUNDER SINGH v. STATE OF UTTARANCHAL
945
[V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.]
witness, in her dying declaration dated 1. 7 .1989, mentioned
about one jerry can as she had seen the accused throwing the
petrol from one jerry can. Very strangely, this contradiction
was not got proved from Narender Singh Patel (PW-9), SubDivisional Magistrate, Baramandal, District Almora nor was it
put to him. Unless a contradiction is proved by putting it to the
person who records the original statement, such contradiction
A
B
is of no consequence. The only Cross-Examination of Narender
Singh Patel (PW-9), Sub-Divisional Magistrate was to the effect
that there was no certification on the dying declarations to the
effect that both the witnesses were in fit condition to give the c
statement When we see again the evidence of Vimla Devi
(PW-1 ), even she was not specifically questioned about her
previous statement nor was she given an opportunity to explain
as to why she had made the statement in her evidence that
there were three jerry cans as in her statement in dying
D
declaration that there was one jerry can. Unless the witness is
specifically given an opportunity to explain such contradiction,
it cannot be taken note of. The very purpose of putting the
contradiction to the witness is to give an opportunity to him/her
to explain a contradictory statement, if any. There can be no
dispute that when a witness making a dying declaration
survives, the said dying declaration does not remain substantive
evidence. However, as held · ' Ramprasad v. State of
Maharashtra [1999 (5) SCC 30] when such dying declaration
has been recorded by a Magistrate then it can be used as a
corroboration to the oral evidence of such witness. This Court
E
F
in the aforementioned decision of Ram Prasad (cited supra)
specifically held that where such statement is recorded by a
Police Officer, its user is barred under Section 162 Cr.P.C.
However, where it is recorded by a Magistrate under Section
164, Cr.P.C. it becomes usable to corroborate the witness as
G
proved under Section 157 of the Evidence Act. That is precisely
the case here. We have very critically examined the dying
declaration and we are of the clear opinion that the dying
declaration was voluntary, truthful and uninfluenced by any other
H
946
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(2010) 11 S.C.R.
A factor. We have considered the dying declaration vis-a-vis the
substantive evidence given by this witness. The only criticism
against this dying declaration was that the Magistrate had not
got it certified by the doctor to the effect that the witness was
in a fit state of mind to make the dying declaration. That really
B appears to be the case. However, it can not be forgotten that
in his evidence, the Magistrate Narender Singh Patel (PW-9)
very specifically asserted that he had obtained the opinion of
the doctor. Very surprisingly, there was no cross-examination
at all on this very vital aspect. Therefore, the assertion that he
c had asked the doctor and was convinced that the injured was
in a fit position to make a dying declaration has gone
unchallenged. This witness has very specifically stated that he
completed all the formalities and had taken all the cautions.
13. When we see the Exhibits Ka-30 and 31, which are
D seizure Panchnamas duly proved by Rewadhar (PW-4), it is
seen that there were three jerry cans found which were cut
from the above, and as such, were open. Out of these three
jerry cans, one was white and the others were black. It is
specifically stated in the panchnama that all the jerry cans
E were smelling of petrol. In Exhibit Ka-31, the cut parts of the
jerry cans were shown, which were found lying on some distance
on the Western side of the spot of incident. Therefore, there
can be no dispute that actually the accused had carried the
three jerry cans full of petrol and the witness had seen the
F accused pouring petrol from one of them. It can also be that
the accused might have utilized the two jerry cans in sprinkling
the petrol on the roof from outside and then opening the door,
threw the petrol from the third jerry can remaining with him.
The witness had after all seen the three jerry cans being
G presented in the Court and had, therefore, tried to improve
upon the story. However, if the three burnt jerry cans were
actually found by Hyat Singh (PW-13) immediately on the spot
in a semi-burnt condition, the so-called contradiction loses all
its rigor. The witness was very candid when she admitted
H before the Court that she had not stated that her husband was
SUNDER SINGH v. STATE OF UTTARANCHAL
947
[VS. SIRPURKAR, J.]
cut by the accused and that she had not, therefore, referred to
A
the pistol in her statement. She was also candid in saying that
she had not seen the accused assaulting her husband. She
then asserted that the accused assaulted her husband on his
neck only once. She also asserted that besides the accused,
she did not see anyone else on the spot. All this suggests her
truthfulness. She did not implicate anybody else than the
accused.