# SUPl{EME COURT REPORTS v. JATIN CHAKRAVORTY AND OTHERS

- **Citation:** [1960] 3 S.C.R. 968
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1957-08-19
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 96 of 1959
- **Bench:** P. B .. Gajendragadkar, K. N. Wanchoo, K. C. Das Gupta
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/supl-eme-court-reports-v-jatin-chakravorty-and-others-1908
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

Subversive Activity-Public utility concern-Strike by workmen pending conciliation with rival union-Settlement, if binding
on all workmen-Legality of strike-West Bengal Security Act,
r950 (W. B. XIX of r950), s. 2(9)(e), Expl. (ii)-Industrial Disputes Act, r947 (r4 of r947), ss. r8(3)(d), 22(r)(d), 24(r)(i).
Where two rival unions of workmen in a public utility concern, a sugar industry, present demands covering the entire
body of workmen and while one of them carries on conciliation
proceedings with the employer the other commences a strike,
any settlement, arrived at in such conciliation proceedings must
bind all the employees under s. 18(3)(d) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and the strike must, on a reasonable construction of the provisions of s. 22(1)(d) of the Act, amount to a
contravention of it and must be illegal under s. 24( t)(i) of the
Act.
It was not necessary, in order to bind the workmen to the
settlement arrived at before the conciliator, to show that they
belonged to the union which took part in the conciliation proceedings, since the policy underlying s. 18 of the Act is to give
an extended operation to such a settlement.
The Associated Cement Company Ltd., Porbandar v. Their
Workmen, [1960] 3 S.C.R. 157 and M/s. New India Motors (P)
Ltd. v. K. T. Morris, [1960] 3 S.C.R. 350, referred to.
Consequently, where the courts below, on an erroneous view
of the law, acquitted certain workmen of the offence of subversive activity for joining an illegal strike under s. II of the West
Bengal Security Act, 1950, on the ground that the rival union to
which they belonged was not a party to the conciliation proceedings, such acquittal must be set aside.

## Text

Muy5.
[llJtiU]
RAMNAGAR CANE AND SUGAR CO. LTD.
968
SUPl{EME COURT REPORTS
v.
JATIN CHAKRAVORTY AND OTHERS.
(P. B .. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N. WANCHOO
and K. C. DAS GUPTA, JJ.)
Subversive Activity-Public utility concern-Strike by workmen pending conciliation with rival union-Settlement, if binding
on all workmen-Legality of strike-West Bengal Security Act,
r950 (W. B. XIX of r950), s. 2(9)(e), Expl. (ii)-Industrial Disputes Act, r947 (r4 of r947), ss. r8(3)(d), 22(r)(d), 24(r)(i).
Where two rival unions of workmen in a public utility concern, a sugar industry, present demands covering the entire
body of workmen and while one of them carries on conciliation
proceedings with the employer the other commences a strike,
any settlement, arrived at in such conciliation proceedings must
bind all the employees under s. 18(3)(d) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and the strike must, on a reasonable construction of the provisions of s. 22(1)(d) of the Act, amount to a
contravention of it and must be illegal under s. 24( t)(i) of the
Act.
It was not necessary, in order to bind the workmen to the
settlement arrived at before the conciliator, to show that they
belonged to the union which took part in the conciliation proceedings, since the policy underlying s. 18 of the Act is to give
an extended operation to such a settlement.
The Associated Cement Company Ltd., Porbandar v. Their
Workmen, [1960] 3 S.C.R. 157 and M/s. New India Motors (P)
Ltd. v. K. T. Morris, [1960] 3 S.C.R. 350, referred to.
Consequently, where the courts below, on an erroneous view
of the law, acquitted certain workmen of the offence of subversive activity for joining an illegal strike under s. II of the West
Bengal Security Act, 1950, on the ground that the rival union to
which they belonged was not a party to the conciliation proceedings, such acquittal must be set aside.
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION:
Criminal
Appeal No. 96 of 1959.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
order dated August 19, 1957, of the Calcutta High
Court in Criminal Revision No. 1577 of 1956, arising
out of the judgment and order dated August 3, 1956,
of the Magistrate, :First Class, at Krishnagar, Nadia,
in G. R. Case No. 69 of 1954.
0. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India and
P. /(. Ohatlerjee, for the appellant.
Tho respondent did not appear.
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i
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3 S.C.R.
SUPB.EME COURT REPORTS
969
1960. May 5. The Judgmen~ of the Court was
i960
delivered by
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G
J
T . .
l b
· l J
Ramnagar Cane
:xAJENDRAGADKAR,
. -
his apptia
y specia eave and sugar co. Ltd.
raises a short question about the construction and
v.
effect of the provisions of s. 2i(l)(d) of the Industrial Jatin Chak1avorty
Disputes Act, 14 of 1947, (hereinafter called the Act).
. -
The appellant,, Ramnagar Cane & Sugar Co. Ltd., Ga1endragadli~r J.
Calcutta, is a company incorporated under the Indian
Companies Act and carries on the business of manufacturing sugar which is an essential commodity in its
factory at Plassey in the District of Nadia. The
appellant was declared a public utility concern or
service by a notification duly issued in that behalf on
October 8, 1953. The appellant employs in its business
about 545 permanent men and 703 seasonal men
excluding casual labourers.
A majority of the workmen employed by the appellant belong to the Ramnagar Cane & Sugar Co. Employees' Union (hereinafter called the Employees' Union), whereas a minority
of workmen belong to the rival Union called Ramnagar
Sugar Mill Workers' Union (hereinafter called the
Workers' Union). It appears that on December 9,
1953, the Workers' Union presented a charter of
demands to the appellant. This was followed by a
similar charter of demands by the Employees' Union
on January 20, 1954. On the same day the Workers'
Union served a notice of strike on the appellant. On
February 1, 1954, a meeting was held before the
Conciliation Officer which was attended by the Employees' Union and the appellant. A notice of the said
meeting had been served on the Workers' Union as
well.
On February 2, 1954, the appellant suggested
to the conciliation officer that it should discuss the
matter separately with the representatives of the two
Unions but to this suggestion the Workers' Union
took an objection. Thereupon the said Union informed
the conciliation officer that it assumed that the conciliation had failed. Consequently on February 3, 1954,
the conciliation officer sent his report under s. 12,
sub-s. (4) of the Act about the failure of conciliation
with the Workers' .Union only. On February 25, 1954,
the appellant and the Employees' Union arrived at a
settlement, and it was recorded in the form of a memo
970
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1960]
r960
of settlement which was duly signed by both the
-
parties. Meanwhile, on Februa'ry · 13, 1954, the
Ramnagar Cane W k
, U ·
•
A
1
. and sugar co. Ltd.
or ers
mon commenced a strike.
.e>S a resu t of
v.
this strike a crimjnal complaint was filed against the
Jatin Chukravorty eleven respondents under s. 11 of the West Bengal
-
Security Act, XIX of 1950, and a charge was subseGa~••dragadkar J. quently framed against them.
The case as formulated in the charge against the
said respondents was that on or about February 13,
1954, at Plassey each one of them did commit subversive acts which were intended or likely to impede,
delay or restrict the work of Ramnagar Cane & Sugar
Co. Ltd., which was a public utility concern for
production of sugar, an essential commodity. The
respondents pleaded not guilty to the charge substantially on the ground that the strike in question was
not illegal. It was not denied that they had gone on
strike on February 13, 1954; it was, however, urged
that since the strike was lawful the offence charged
could not be said to be proved. The learned magistrate upheld the respondents' plea and acquitted the
respondents. The appellant challenged the correctness
of the said order of acquittal by preferring a revisional
application before the Calcutta High Court. Its
revisional application, however, failed since the High
Qourt held that the strike was not illegal and agreed
with the conclusion of the trial magistrate. The
appellant then applied for a certificate before the said
High Court but its application was dismissed. Then
the appellant applied for and obtained special leave
from this Court; and the only point which is raised
on its behalf before us is that in coming to the cone.lusion that the strike in question was not illegal the
Courts below have misconstrued the provisions of
s. 22(l)(d) of the Act.
Before we consider this point it is relevant to refer
to the relevant provisions of the West Bengal Security
Act. Section 11 of this Act provides that if any
person commits any subversive act he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extenq
to five years or with fine or with both. Section 2(9)(e)
defines a subversive act as meaning any act which is
intended or is likely to impede, delay or restrict-
)
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3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
971
(i) any work or operation, or (ii) any means of transport
r96o
or locomotion,-necessary for the production, procureR
l
d.
'b t'
f
t' l
amnagar Cane
ment, supp y or
istn u 10n o any essen ia com- and Sugar co. I.Id.
modity, except in furtherance of an industrial dispute
v.
a:> defined in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. JatinChakravorty
Explanation (ii) to this definition provides that an
--
illegal strike or an illegal lock-out as defined in s. 24 Gajendragadkarf.
of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, shall not be
deemed to be an act in furtherance of an industrial
dispute for the purposes of sub-cl. (e). It is thus clear
that if the impugned strike is held to be illega.l it
would constitute a subversive act as defined by s.2(9)(e)
of the West Bengal Security Act. This position has
been accepted in the courts below. That is why the
only question which arises for our decision is whether
the strike in question is an illegal strike under s. 24 of
the Act.
Section 24 of the Act provides, inter alia, that a
strike shall be illegal if it is commenced or declared
in contravention of s. 22 or s. 23. That takes us to
the provisions of s. 22, and we have to find out
whether in commencing the strike on February 13,
1954, the respondents had contravened the provisions
of s. 22(l)(d) of the Act.
Section 22(1J(d) lays down
that no person employed in a public utility service
shall go on strike in breach of contract during the
pendency of any conciliation proceedings before a
conciliation officer and seven days after the conclusion of such proceedings. The effect of this provision
is clear. If a strike is declared in a public utility
service during the pendency of a conciliation proceeding it is illegal. Was any conciliation proceeding
pending between the appellant and the respondents at
the relevant time? That is the question which calls
for an answer in the present appeal. The respondents
contend that the Workers' Union to which they
belonged had left the conciliation proceedings on February 2, 1954, and that in fact the conciliation officer
had submitted his failure report to that effect on
February 3, 1954; and so, between the Workers'
Union and the appellant no conciliation proceeding
was pending after February 5, 1954, in any case when
the Government received the failure report of the
972
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
'96°
conciliation offi.cer.
On the other hand, the appellant
contends that conciliation proceedings with the EmploRamn.7.f:ar Cane
U
d
1
d ·
and Sugar Co. Ltd. yees'
11ion contin"{Jc unti February 25, 1954, an m
v.
fact settlement was arrived at between the parties on
.Jatin ChakrnvMty that date and duly signed by them. The appellant's
--
argument is that the pendency of the conciliation
Gajendragadkar ].
d •
b
h
II
d h E
1
'
procee mgs etween t e appe ant an t e
mp oyees
Union makes illegal the strike in which the respondents joined on February 13, 1954. The High Court
bas held that since it is not shown that the respondents belong to the Employees' Union it would not be
possible to hold that any conciliation proceeding was
pending between them and the appellant. It is the
correctness of this view that is challenged before us.
In appreciating the merits of the rival contentions
thus raised in this appeal it is necessary to bear in
mind the scheme of the Act. It is now well settled
that an industrial dispute can be raised in regard to
any matter only when it is sponsored by a body of
workmen acting through a union or otherwise. When
an industria.l dispute is thus raised and is decided
either by settlement or by an award the scope and
effect of its operation is prescribed by s. 18 of the Act.
Section 18(1) provides that a settlement arrived at by
agreement between the employer and the workman
otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceed-,
ing shall be binding on the parties to the agreement ;
whereas s. 18(3) provides that a settlement arrived at
in the course of conciliation proceedings which has
become enforceable shall be binding on all the parties
specified in els. (a), (b), (c} and (d) of sub-s. (3).
Section 18(3)(d) makes it clear that, where a party referred
to in cl. (a) or. (b) is composed of workmen, all persons
who were employed in the establishment or part of
the establishment, .as the case may be, to which the
dispute relates on the date of the dispute and all
persons who subsequently become employed in that
establishment or part., would be bound by the settlement. In other words, there can be no doubt that
the settlement arrived at between the appellant and
the Employees' Union during the course of conciliation proceedings on February 25, 1954, wonld bind not
only the members of the said Union but all workmen
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3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
973
employed in the establishment of the appellant at that
x960
date. That inevitably me!l.ns that the respondents Ramnagar Cane
would be bound by the said settlement even though and sur,ar co. Lid.
they may belong to the rival Union. In order to
.
v.
bind the workmen it is not necessary to show that the Jatm Chakravorty
said workmen belong to the Union which was a partyG . d--dk 1
h
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b c
h
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Th
h l
a1en rag, ar
.
to t e
tspute
e1ore t e conc1 ia or.
e w o e
policy of s. 18 appears to be to give an extended
operation to the settlement arrived at in the course
of conciliation proceedings, and that is the object with
which the four categories of persons bound by such
settlement are specified in s. 18, sub-s. (3).
In this
connection we may refer to two recent decisions of
this Court where similar questions under s. 19(6)
and s. 33 (l)(a) of the Act have been considered.
(Vide: The Associated Cement Companies Ltd., Porbandar v. Their Workmen(1) and Messrs. New India Motors
(P.) Ltd. v. K. T. Morris (2) ).
This position has an important bearing on the
construction of s. 22(l)(d).
When the said provision
rafers to the pendency of any conciliation proceedings
it must reasonably be construed to mean any conciliation proceedings which may lead to a settlement before
the conciliation officer and which settlement may bind
all the workmen concerned ; in other words, if a conciliation proceeding is pending between one union and
the employer and it relates to matters concerning all
the employees of the employer, the pendency of the
said conciliation proceeding would be a bar against all
the employees of the employer employed iri a public
utility service to go on a strike during the pendency
of the said proceeding under s. 22 (I )(d).
In our
opinion, this construction would be consistent with
the specific provisions as to the effect of conciliation
settlements prescribed bys. 18(3)(d) and is harmonious
with the general policy of the Act ; otherwise, it would
unnecessarily disturb industrial peace, if one union
employed in a public utility service is allowed to go on
strike even though demands common to the members
of the said union as well as the rest of the workmen
are being considered in conciliation proceedings bet ween the said employer and his other employees
(r) [196o] 2 S.C.R. 974·
(2) [1960] 3 S.C. R. 350.
126
97±
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
z91;o
represented by another union. It would be another
matter if the conciliation proceedings in question are
Ramnaga• Cane confined to specific demands limited to a specified
and Sugar Co Ltd.
v.
class of employees. In such a caee it may be contend·
]atin Chakrnvmty ed that the other workmen who are not interested in
--
the said demands may not be bound by the said
Gajendragadkar J. proceedings. That, however, is another aspect of the
matter with which we are not concerned in the
present appeal. We have seen the charter of demands
submitted by both the Unions to the appellant, and
it is clear that the said demands cover all employees
of the appellant and not only one section of them;
in other words, both the charters have made demands
the benefit of which was; intended to accrue to all the
workmen of the appellant; they are not demands by
one section of the workmen belonging to one separate
part of the establishment run by the appellant. The
demands made are no doubt by two Unions but they
cover the same ground and in effect they represent
the demands made by the whole body of workmen. In
fact the conciliation settlement reached between the
appellant and the Employees' Union has benefited the
members of the Workers' Union as much as those of
the Employees' Union. That :being so we think the
courts below were in error in putting an unduly
narrow and restricted construction on the provisions
of s. 22(l)(d) of the Act. In our opinion, the pendency
of the conciliation proceedings between the appellant
and the Employees' Union attracts the provisions of
s. 22(l)(d) to the strike in question and makes the
said strike illegal under s. 24 (1 )(i) of the Act. If the
strike is illegal it follows that the respondents· have
taken part in a subversive activity as defined by
s. 2(9)(e) of the West Bengal Security Act and as such
ha.ve committed an offence punishable under s. 11 of
the said Act.
We would accordingly set aside the order of acquittal passed by the High Court in favour of the respondents and convict them of the offence charged. The
Solicitor-General has fairly told us that the appellant
has come to this Court not so much for the purpose
of pressing for the conviction of, and a heavy sentence
against, the respondents but for obtaining a decision
h
r
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L
....,....
,._~ -._,
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
975
on the important question of law in regard to the
c960
construction of s. 22 (l)(d) of the Act.
Under the R
-- c
circumstances of this case we think the ends of justice anI';::;::~/2~a.
would be met if we convict the respondents of the
v.
offence charged and direct that each one of them Jatin Chakravo1ty
should pay a fine of rupee one.
Appeal allowed.
JAI KAUR & OTHERS
v .
SHER SINGH & OTHERS.
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N. W ANCHOO and
K. c. DAS GUPTA, JJ.)
Hindu Law-] ats of Grewal got-Customary law of successionN on-ancestral property-Daughter, if pref erred to collateralsDoctrine of surrender-Gift to daughter by widow, if accelerates
succession-Rattigan's Customary Law of the Punjab, para 23-Riwaji-am, r882, Question 43.
Under the customary law prevalent amongst the Hindu Jats
of Grewal got in Ludhiana, a daughter is a preferential heir to
her father in respect of his self-acquired property to his collaterals.
Rattigan's Digest of Customary Law, paragraph 23, which records
the correct law on the point, is not in conflict with Riwaj-i-am,
1882, Question No. 43, which refers only to ancestral property
and not to self-acquired property at all.
Mt. Hurmate v. Hoshiaru, A.I.R. 1944 Lah. 21, approved.
Mohinder Singh v. Kher Singh, A.LR. 1949 East Punjab 328,
disapproved.
Mt. Subhani v. Nawab, A.LR. 1941 (P.C.) 21, referred to.
Case-law discussed.
The doctrine of surrender in Hindu Law is based on a theory
of complete self-effacement by the widow in favour of the reversioner and in order that such surrender·. can accelerate the
reversion, it must be of the entire interest in the entire property.
The law does not recognise a partial self-effacement nor a division
between ancestral and non-ancestral property. The exception
made in respect of a small portion of the property retained for
the widow's maintenance does not detract from the rigour of the
rule.
Rangaswami Gounden v. Nachiappa Gounden, (1918) L.R. 46
I.A. 72 and Phool Kau.r v. Prem Kaur, [1952] S.C.R. 793, referred to.
Consequently, in a case where a Hindu widow of the Jat
Grewal got made a gift only of the self-acquired property of her
husband to her daughters such gift had not the effect of a
surrender in law so as to accelerate the daughters' succession and
the gift could not be valid beyond her lifetime.
Gajsndragadkar j
1960
May 6.