# SUPPLY CO. LTD v. ITS WORKMEN

- **Citation:** [1960] 3 S.C.R. 68
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1960
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 23 of 1958
- **Bench:** P. B. Gajendragadkar, K. Subba Rao, K. c. DAS GUPTA
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/supply-co-ltd-v-its-workmen-1890
- **Pages:** 18

## Headnote

Industrial Dispute-Bonus~Full Bench formula-If applicable to workmen in electricity undcrtaking--Elcctric Supply Act. r948
(54 of r948). s. 57. Sixth Schedule, para, r7(2)(b)(xi).
Can the Full Bench •formula for calculation of bonus apply to
a claim of bonus made by \.vorkmen engaged in electricity concerns and undertakings? That ¥.'as the question raised for decision in this appeal. A Special Bench of the Labour Appellate
Tribunal held in the affirmative and the correctness of its decision
was challenged in this appeal. It was contended on behalf of the
appellant company that the Electricity Supply Act, 1948 (54 of
1948) was a self-contained code intended to regulate the business
and affairs of electricity concerns and that Act and not the
formula applied to a claim of bonus by the workmen in an
electricity concern.
(r) (1933] I J.T.R, 197, 20I,
..
. ' ...
--
I
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
69
Held, that the Special Bench had taken a correct view of the
matter and its decision must be upheld.
It is evident from the provisions of the Electricity Supply
Act, 1948, and its schedules that the respective fields of operation
of the Act and of the principles of industrial adjudication are
•
wholly different, and so there can be no conflict between them and
their relevance and validity in their own spheres are beyond
question.
_.,
While the Full Bench formula seeks to ensure social justice
to workmen by apportioning a share of the profits to them and
thus minimise the gap between the actual and the living wages,
the Act does not provide for wages at all. But it is improper to
suggest on that basis that the workmen in electricty undertakings can be denied social justice. Just as the relevant industrial principles have to be applied for framing a wage structure
for such workmen so also must the problem of bonus be solved
in a like manner.
The working-sheet prepared under the method of accounting required by the Act can be no basis for calculation of the
amount of bonus since it is not possible to ascertain the gross
profit therefrom and the Full Bench Formula has to be applied on the basis of the profit and loss account which a company
has to keep under the Companies Act.
Baroda Borough Municipality v. Its Workmen. [1957] S.C.R.
33, referred to.
Moreover, the intention of the Legislature in enacting cl. (vi)
of paragraph 17(2)(b) of Sixth Schedule to the Act clearly 'was to
1'
include a claim of bonus is within the expenses covered by it and
it was to set at rest any possible doubt on that score that cl. (xiii)
was added by a subsequent amendment.
. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal
No. 23 of 1958.
Appeal by special leave from the decision dated
September 29, 1956, of the Labour Appellate Tribunal,
Bombay, in Appeal (Mad.) No. 96 of 1956, arising m;it
of the Award dated April 9, 1956, of the Industrial
Tribunal, Madras, in I.D. No. 52of1954.
A. V. Viswanatha Sastri, and Naunit Lal, for the
appellants.
T. S. Venkataraman and M. K. Ramamurthi, for
the respondents.
1960. February, 22.
The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
T. T. E. Supply
Co. Ltd.
v.
Its Workmen
GAJENDRAGADKAR, J.-The appellant, the Tinne- GaJendragadkar j.
velli-Tuticorin Electric Supply Co., Ltd., Tuticorin, is
an electric supply undertaking, and it carries on its
business as a licensee under the State Government of
70
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960)
Madras subject to the provisions oft.he Indian Electrir-
city Act, 1910 (Act 9 of 1910) and the Electric Supply
T. T. E. supply Act, 1948 (Act 54 of 1948). This latter Act will
Co. Ltd.
hereinafter be called the Act;.
The business of the
v.
Its workmen
appellant consists of buying electric supply from the
State Hydro-electric Projects and of supplying the
Gajendragadkor J. same to consumers within the areas specified in its
licence; this area is in and around Tinnevelli and
...
Tuticorin Municipalities. The appellant's workmen
(hereinafter called the respondents) made several
demands in respect of their terms of

## Text

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68
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
one of the objects of the appellant bank is to carry on
the general business of banking and therefore subject
Bihar State
h
C
·
S · t'
A t 't h
t
C
P
t .
B
k to t e
o-operat1ve ome ies
c , I
as o carry on
o-o era ive
an
•
•
b
k
Lrd.
its business in the manner that ordmary an s do.
v.
It may be added that the various heads under s. 6 of
Commissioner of the Income Tax Act and the provisions of that Act
Income Tax
applicable to these various heads are mutually excluKapur].
z960
February 22
sive. Section 12 is a residuary section and does not
come into operation until the preceding heads are
excluded. Commissioner of Income-tax v. Basant Rai
Tak hat Singh (1 ).
In our opinion, the High Court was in error in
treating interest derived from deposits as not arising
from the business of the Bank and therefore not falling within the income exempted under the Notification. The appeal must therefore be allowed and the
judgment and order of the High Court set aside. The
appellant will have its costs in this Court and in the
Court below.
Appeal allowed.
THE TINNEVELLY-TUTICORIN ELECTltIC
SUPPLY CO. LTD.,
v.
ITS WORKMEN
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. SUBBA RAO AND
K. c. DAS GUPTA, JJ.)
Industrial Dispute-Bonus~Full Bench formula-If applicable to workmen in electricity undcrtaking--Elcctric Supply Act. r948
(54 of r948). s. 57. Sixth Schedule, para, r7(2)(b)(xi).
Can the Full Bench •formula for calculation of bonus apply to
a claim of bonus made by \.vorkmen engaged in electricity concerns and undertakings? That ¥.'as the question raised for decision in this appeal. A Special Bench of the Labour Appellate
Tribunal held in the affirmative and the correctness of its decision
was challenged in this appeal. It was contended on behalf of the
appellant company that the Electricity Supply Act, 1948 (54 of
1948) was a self-contained code intended to regulate the business
and affairs of electricity concerns and that Act and not the
formula applied to a claim of bonus by the workmen in an
electricity concern.
(r) (1933] I J.T.R, 197, 20I,
..
. ' ...
--
I
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
69
Held, that the Special Bench had taken a correct view of the
matter and its decision must be upheld.
It is evident from the provisions of the Electricity Supply
Act, 1948, and its schedules that the respective fields of operation
of the Act and of the principles of industrial adjudication are
•
wholly different, and so there can be no conflict between them and
their relevance and validity in their own spheres are beyond
question.
_.,
While the Full Bench formula seeks to ensure social justice
to workmen by apportioning a share of the profits to them and
thus minimise the gap between the actual and the living wages,
the Act does not provide for wages at all. But it is improper to
suggest on that basis that the workmen in electricty undertakings can be denied social justice. Just as the relevant industrial principles have to be applied for framing a wage structure
for such workmen so also must the problem of bonus be solved
in a like manner.
The working-sheet prepared under the method of accounting required by the Act can be no basis for calculation of the
amount of bonus since it is not possible to ascertain the gross
profit therefrom and the Full Bench Formula has to be applied on the basis of the profit and loss account which a company
has to keep under the Companies Act.
Baroda Borough Municipality v. Its Workmen. [1957] S.C.R.
33, referred to.
Moreover, the intention of the Legislature in enacting cl. (vi)
of paragraph 17(2)(b) of Sixth Schedule to the Act clearly 'was to
1'
include a claim of bonus is within the expenses covered by it and
it was to set at rest any possible doubt on that score that cl. (xiii)
was added by a subsequent amendment.
. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal
No. 23 of 1958.
Appeal by special leave from the decision dated
September 29, 1956, of the Labour Appellate Tribunal,
Bombay, in Appeal (Mad.) No. 96 of 1956, arising m;it
of the Award dated April 9, 1956, of the Industrial
Tribunal, Madras, in I.D. No. 52of1954.
A. V. Viswanatha Sastri, and Naunit Lal, for the
appellants.
T. S. Venkataraman and M. K. Ramamurthi, for
the respondents.
1960. February, 22.
The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
T. T. E. Supply
Co. Ltd.
v.
Its Workmen
GAJENDRAGADKAR, J.-The appellant, the Tinne- GaJendragadkar j.
velli-Tuticorin Electric Supply Co., Ltd., Tuticorin, is
an electric supply undertaking, and it carries on its
business as a licensee under the State Government of
70
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960)
Madras subject to the provisions oft.he Indian Electrir-
city Act, 1910 (Act 9 of 1910) and the Electric Supply
T. T. E. supply Act, 1948 (Act 54 of 1948). This latter Act will
Co. Ltd.
hereinafter be called the Act;.
The business of the
v.
Its workmen
appellant consists of buying electric supply from the
State Hydro-electric Projects and of supplying the
Gajendragadkor J. same to consumers within the areas specified in its
licence; this area is in and around Tinnevelli and
...
Tuticorin Municipalities. The appellant's workmen
(hereinafter called the respondents) made several
demands in respect of their terms of employment.
These demands gave rise to an industrial dispute
which was referred by the Madras Government to the
Industrial Tribunal at Madurai for adjudication under
s. lO(l)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (XIV of "
1947). Amongst the items thus referred for adjudication was included the respondents' claim for additional
bonus for the year 1952-53.
Without prejudice to its
contention that the appellant was not liable to pay
bonus it had in fact voluntarily paid two months'
basic wages by way of bonus to the respondents. The
respondents, however, claimed additibnal bonus and
this claim was one of the items of dispute referred to
,.
the tribunal for its adjudication.
Before the industrial tribunal the appellant contended that since it was working as a licensee under the
Act no claim for bonus was admissible outside the
provisions of the Act. Jn support of this plea the
appellant relied on the scheme of the Act which
restricted the profit-making of the electricity concerns
to a prescribed limit with a possibility of a surplus
only in cases of overcharging provided for in the
rules. The appellant's case was that, having regard
to the scheme, object and the background of the Act
under which the appellant was carrying on its business, the respondent's claim for additional bonus was
wholly misconceived. No claim for bonus can be
entertained, it was urged on behalf of the appellant,
without reference to the provisions of the Act which
governs the business 0£ the appellant.
·
The tribunal, however, rejected the appellant's
contentions and held that the appellant was liable to
pay two months' basic wages as additional bonus to
-
3 S.C.R.
SUPRE~IE COURT REPORTS
71
i· the respondents. This award was passed on· March 4,
1955.
.
T. T. E. Supply
Against this award the appellant preferred an
co. Ltd.
appeal, No. 56 of 1955, to the Labour Appellate
v.
Tribunal, and contended that no additional bonus
Its Workmen
should have been awarded in the absence of proof of
. d--d'
1
bl
,,
. Ga;en raaa ,.ay ].
an excess of "c ear profi.ts over reasona e return ; 1t
"
was the appellant's case thaj; it was only from excess
of clear profits over reasonable return as defined by
the Act that bonus can be legitimately awarded to <i
the respondents. It appears that about this time a
number of appeals raising the same question were
pending before the Labour Appellate Tribunal, and
decisions given. by the Labour Appellate Tribunal
Y
showed divergence of opinion on the question about
the effect of the Act in respect of the claim for bonus
made by employees of electricity concerns and undertakings. That is why the Chairman of the Labour
Appellate Tribunal issued an administrative order that
aH appeals which raised the said question should be·
grouped together and posted for hearing before a
specially constituted fuller bench of five members.
The Chairman thought that a decision by a fuller
bench would finally resolve the apparent conflict
disclosed in several decisions pronounced thereto, and
give proper guidance to the tribunals in future.
The special bench of the appellate tribunal then
heard the group of appeals including the appeal
preferred by the appellant. It held that bonus could
be ordered to be paid notwithstanding the limitations
of the Act, and that the quantum of bonus should be
determined even in the case of electricity concerns or
undertakings by the application of the Full Bench
formula laid down in that behalf. Having decided
the question of law in this manner, the appeals were
remanded to .the respective benches of the Labour
Appellate Tribunal for disposal in accordance with
law. The appeal preferred by the appellant was in
due course taken up by the Industrial Tribunal at
Madras the Industrial Tribunal at Madurai having
been in the meanwhile abolished and the appeals on
its file .. transferred to the Industrial Tribunal at
Madra.s. · This latter tribunal considered the merits
72
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
z960
of the contentions raised by the parties, applied the
Full Bench formula, and ultimately passed an award
T. T. E. supply on April 9, 1956, directing the appellant to pay ~an
Co.v~td.
additional bonus of two months' basic wages to the
Its WOl'kmen
respondents.
.
Thereupon the appellant preferred another appeal
Ga2endrngadkar J. to the Labour Appellate Tribunal, and it was numbered as Appeal (Madras) No. 96 of 1956. Certain
y
contentions were raised before the appellate tribunal
!> on the merits, and it was urged that the directi<:m to
pay an additional bonus of two months' basic wages
was improper and unjustified. The appellate tribunal
negatived most of the contentions raised by the
appellant, but it was satisfied that the calculation
made by the tribunal in regard to the quantum of
¥
a vai!a ble surplus was erroneous, and so, after rectifying the said error, it· held that the additional bonus
which the appellant should pay to the respondents
was one month's basic wage. It is against this decision of the appellate tribunal that the present appeal
by special leave has been filed by the appellant before
this Court. The main question which the appeal
raises for our decision is whether the fuller bench of
~
the Labour Appellate Tribunal was justified in holding
that the Full Bench formula can and should be applied
in adjudicating upon the respondents' claim for bonus
against the appellant.
Incidentally, we may point out that the fuller bench
of the Labour Appellate Tribunal in the case of
U. P. Electricity Supply Go. Ltd. & Ors. v. Their
Workmen(') has decided two questions of law. The
'"
first was in regard to the applicability of the Full
Bench formula to the employees' claim for bonus
against their employers carrying on the business of
the supply of electricity, and the second was in regard
to the extent of the statutory depreciation allowed by
the Full Bench formula. The question was whether
it should not include initial depreciation and additional depreciation which are given for the purpose
'-
of allowing relief in the matter of taxation under
s. 10(2) (vi-b) of the Income-tax Act. The fuller bench
had decided that in allowing a prior charge in the
(1) (1955) L.A.C. 659.
-
-
-+ '
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
73
working of the formula it is only the normal incomez96o
tax depreciation (including multiple shift dapreciation)
that should be allowed. The correctness of this latter T. T. E. supply
Co. Ltd.
decision was challenged before this Court in Sree
v.
Meenakshi Mills Ltd. v. Their Workmen (1) but the
Its Workm1n
challenge failed and the decision of the fuller bench
-
was confirmed. In the present appeal it is the Gajendragadkar f.
correctness of the fuller bench decision on the first
question which is challenged before us.
Let us being by stating briefly the appellant's
contention. It is urged on behalf of the appellant
that it is only where the "clear profits" are in excess
of the " reasonable return " under the Act that a case
for the payment of bonus can really arise in regard to
the electricity concerns and undertakings. The Act
is a self-contained code intended to regulate the
business and affairs of electricity concerns including
the claim of their employees for bonus, and as such
an industrial dispute between such concerns and their
employees in regard to bonus must be determined
solely by reference to the provisions of the Act and
and not by the application of the Full Bench formula.
As to the quantum of bonus which should be awarded
it would depend upon the circumstances in each case;
but it is urged that it may as an ad hoc measure be
decided that I/4th of the excess between clear profits
and the reasonable return may be taken as a fair
quantum of bonus which electricity concerns should
be ordered to pay to their employees. Before dealing
with the validity of this argument it is necessary to
examine the scheme of the Act.
Let us first consider some of the provisions in the
Indian Electricity Act 9 of 1910 which may be
relevant. Section 3(2)(d)(i) provides that the State
Government may, on an application made in the
prescribed form, and on payment of the prescribed
fee (if any), grant, after consulting the State Electricity
Board, a licence to any person, and that the said
licence may prescribe such terms as to the limits
within which, and conditions under which, the supply
of energy is to be compulsory or permissive, and
generally as to such matters as the State Govern-
<1> (1958] S. C.R. 878.
IO
74
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
z96o
ment may think fit.
Section 3(f) provides that the
T. T. E. Supply provisions.contained in the Schedule shall be deemed
co. Ltd.
to be incorporated with, and to form part of, every
v.
licence granted under this Part, except as in the
Its Workmen
manner therein described. Section 4(l)(b) empowers
the State Government inter alia to revoke the licence
Gajend.agadkar J. where the licensee breaks any of the terms or the
conditions of his licence the breach of which is
expressly declared by such licence to render it liable
to revocation. Section 7(1) provides to the authorities
specified in it option to purchase the undertaking.
Section II requires the licensee to prepare and render
to the State Government or to such authority as the
State Government may appoint in that behalf, on or
before the prescribed date in each year an annual
statement of account of his undertaking made up to
such date, in such form and containing such particulars, as may be prescribed in that behalf. Section 22
imposes on the licensee obligation to supply energy
subject to the conditions prescribed ; and s. 23
provides that a licensee shall not, in making any
agreement for the supply of energy, show undue
preference to any person. The licensee_ cannot also
charge for such supply any rates higher than those
permitted. The appropriate Government is authorised to fix the maximum charges, and by appropriate
rules both the maximam and minimum charges have
been prescribed. These are the relevant provisions
of Act 9 of 1910.
Let us now refer to some of the relevant provisions
of the Act. Section 57 provides the licensee's charges
to consumers. According to it the provisions of the
Sixth Schedule and the Seventh Schedule shall be
deemed to be incorporated in the licence of every
licensee, not being a local authority, in the manner
specified by it. This section further provides inter
alia that as from the specified date the licensee shall
comply with the provisions of the said Schedules and
not provisions of Act 9 of 1910, and the licence
granted to him thereunder and of any other law,
agreement or instrument applicable to the licensee
shall, in relation to the licence, be void and of no
effect in so far as they are inconsistent with the
-
r
-
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
75
provisions of s. 57 A and the said Sched1lles. Section
x960
57 deals with the licensee's charges to the consumers
and lays down provisions which shall have effect in T. T. E. Supply
relation to the licence where the provisions of the
Co. Ltd.
v.
Sixth Schedule and the table appended to the Seventh
Its Workmen
Schedule are under sub-s. (1) deemed to be incorporated in the said licence. These provisions relate to the Gajendragadkar J.
appointment of the Board and the rating committee.
Section 57 A prescribes the principles and the procedure which hQ.s to be followed by the rating committee
in making its report to the State Government
regarding the charges for electricity which the licensee
may make to any class or classes of consumers.. This
provision gives us an idea as to the object which the
Legislature had in mind in ultimately fixing the
minimum and maximum rates chargeable to the
consumers. Sections 78 and 79 provide for power to
make rules and regulations. Nine Schedules are
attached to the Act. Schedule Six deals with the
financial principles and their application; Schedule
Seven deals with the depreciation of assets ; Schedule
Eight provides for the determination of cost of production of electricity at generating stations ; and
Schedule Nine prescribes the method for allocation of
costs of production at generating stations.
It is necessary at this stage to refer briefly to some of
the provisions contained in the Sixth Schedule, because
Mr. Viswanatha Sastri, for the appellant, has relied
on the scheme of the said Schedule in support of his
principal argument. These provisions prescribe the
financial principles which have to be followed by the
electricity concerns and undertakings covered by the
Act. It is urged by the appellant that these principles along with the rest of the Schedules and the
provisions of the Act constitute a self-contained code
which govern the business and the financial affairs of
electricity concerns, and as such even the claim of
the appellant's employees for bonus must be dealt
with in the light of these provisions. Paragraph 1 of
Sixth Schedule provides :-'
"I. Notwithstanding anything contained in the
Indian Electricity Act, 1910 (9 of 1910) (except
sub-s. (2) of s. 22A), and the provisions in the
76
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
x960
licence of a licensee, the licensee shall so adjust his
rates for the sale of electricity whether by enhancT. T. E. supply
ing or reducing them that his clear profits in any
Co. Ltd ..
v.
year of account shall not, as far as possible, exceed
Its Workmen
the amount of reasonable return;".
-
This provision is made subject to four provisos
Gajendrogadfar J. -which it is unnecessary to mention.
Paragraph 2 reads thus:-
"II. (1) If the clear profit of a licensee in any
year of account is in excess of the amount of
reasonable return, one-third of such excess, not
exceeding five per cent. of the amount of reasonable
return, shall be at the disposal of the undertaking.
Of .the balance of the excess, one-half shall be
appropriated to a reserve which shall be called the
Tariffs and Dividends Control Reserve and the
remaining half shall either be distributed in the
form of a proportional rebate on the amounts
collected from the sale of electricity and meter
rentals or carried forward in the accounts of the
licensee for distribution to the consumers in future,
in such manner as the State Government may
direct.
(2) The Tariffs and Dividend Control Reserve
shall be available for disposal by the licensee only
to the extent by which the clear profit is less than
the reasonable return in any year of account.
(3) On the purchase of the undertaking under
the terms of its licence any balance remaining in
the Tariffs and Dividends Control Reserve shall be
handed over to the purchaser and maintained as
such Tariffs and Dividends Control Reserve."
Paragraph 3 provides for the creation from existing
reserve or from the revenue of the undertaking a
reserve to be called Contingencies Reserve. Paragraph
4 prespribes the manner in which the licensee shall
appropriate to Contingencies Reserve from the
revenues of each year of account. Paragraph 6 directs
that there shall be allowed in each year in respect
of depreciation of fixed assets employed in the
business of electricity supply such an amount as
would if set aside annually throughout the prescribed
period and accumulated at compound interest at 4 per
-
•'
-3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
77
cent. per annum, produce by the end of the prescribed
rg6o
period amount equal to 90 per cent. of the original
cost of the asset after taking into account the sums T. T. E. supply
already written off or set aside in the books of the
Co. Ltd.
v.
undertaking; annual interest on the accumulated
Its Workmen
balance will be allowed as expense from revenue as
well as the annual incremental deposit. Paragraph 7 Gajendragadkar J.
deals with assets which have ceased to be avilable for
u~e through obsolescence, inadequacy, superfluity or
for any other reason, and it allows the licensee to
describe the said assets as no longer in use, and no
further depreciation in respect thereof shall be allowed
as a charge against the revenue. Paragraph 8 prohibits any further depreciation where an asset has
been written down in the books of the undertaking to
10 per cent. or less of its original cost. Under paragraph 9, where a fixed asset is sold for a price exceeding its written down cost, the excess has to be credited
to the Contingencies Reserve. Paragraph 10 requires
the consent of the State Government to carry sums to
a reserve or to declare a dividend in excess of 3 per
cent. on share capital or other matters specified there·
in. Paragraph 13 imposes limitations in respect of
ordinary remunerations of managing agents; whereas
paragraph 14 provides that the Board of Directors
shall not contain more than 10 directors ; and paragraph 15 prescribes the way in which the licensee can
make any capital expenditure which exceeds Rs. 25,000
or 2 per cent. of the capital ·base within three years
before the next option of purchase under the licence
arises.
Paragraph 16 contains an arbitration clause .
. Paragraph 17 gives definitions for the purpose of this
Schedule. Capital base is defined by paragraph 17(1);
clear profit is defined by paragraph 17(2) as meaning
the difference between the amount of income and the
sum of expenditure plus specific appropriations made
up in each case as prescribed in several sub-clauses of
clauses (a}, (b) and (c). It is necessary to refer to two
sub-clauses under clause (b) :-
"(xi) other expenses admissible under the law for
the time being in force in the assessment of, Indian
Income-tax and arising from and ancillary or incidental to the business of electricity supply;
:c960
T. T. E. Supply
Co. Ltd.
v.
Its Workmen
Gajendragadkar ].
78
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
(xii) contributions to Provident Fund, staff pension, gratuity and apprentice and other training
schemes."
Paragraph 17(9) defines a reasonable return as meaning:-
" in respect of any year of account, the sum of
the following :
(a) the amount found by applying the standard
rate to the capital base at the end of that year;
(b) the income derived from invesments than
those made under paragraph IV of this Schedule;
(c) an amount equal to one half of one per centum
on any loans advanced by the Board under subparagraph (2) of paragraph I of the First Schedule."
One of the points which we have to decide in the
present appeal is whether an amount of bonus paid
by the employer to his employees is included under
paragraph 17 (2) (b)(xi) of the Sixth Schdule.
It would thus be clear that the provisions of the
Act in general and those of the Sixth Schedule in
particular, are no doubt intended to control and regulate the rates chargeable to consumers and to provide
the method and the machinery by which the electrical
system of the country could be properly co-ordinated
and integrated. The rates chargeable are fixed, so is
a reasonable return provided for.
But it is not as if
the Act intends to guarantee a minimum return to the
undertaking. \Vhat it purports to do is to prohibit a
return higher than the one specified. Appropriations
permissible under revenue receipts are also defined and
enumerated and a clear profit as contemplated by the
Act is also prescribed and defined. Large powers have.
been given to the Electricity Authority, Boards and
Councils for the purpose of canalising the activities of
the concerns as well as for adjusting their activities
for changing conditions and circumstances. Just as
the Act has made provision for the control of rates
chargeable to consumers its policy also is to give a fair
deal to the undertaking and persons engaged in the
business of supplying electricity. It is with this twin
object that a working-sheet is required to be prepared
under the provisions of the Act. It is, however, clear
that the working-sheet thus prescribed is essentially
-
•
-
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
79
different from the balance-sheet and profit and loss
x960
account which companies keep under the provisions of
the Companies Act. The determination of clear profits T. T. E. Supply
on the basis of the working-sheet '.proceeds on the
Co. Ltd.
v.
consideration of previous losses, contributions towards
Its workmen
the arrears of depreciation and several appropriations
authorised by the ~tate Government, matters which Gajendragadkar J.
have no relevance to commercial accounting. The
principles of commercial accounting on which the
balance-sheets are prepared and profit and loss account
made are very different from_ the principles on which
the working-sheet as specified in the Act is required
to be prepared. The question which arises for our
decision is whether the appellant is right in contending
that the present dispute arising from the respondents'
claim for bonus must be decided by the provisions of
the Act alone and that the Full Bench formula is
wholly inapplicable for the purpose.
In dealing with this contention it is necessary to
bear in mind that the fields covered by the Full Bench
formula and by the provisions of the Act are entirely
different. , The Full Bench formula has been evolved
by industrial adjudication for the purpose of doing
social justice to workmen and it is now well-established that the workmen's claim for bonus is justified on
the ground that they contribute to the employer's
profit and are entitled to claim a share in the . said
profit with a view to fill the gap between their actual
wages and the living wage which they aspire to earn.
On the other hand, the Act does not purport to deal
with this problem at all. It is significant that though .
the Act makes detailed provisions in respect of matters
intended to be covered by it, it does not refer to the
wages which the employer may h~ve to pay to his
employees. Can it be said that in fixing the wagestructure as between an electricity undertaking and its
employees considerations of social justice would be
irrelevant? In fixing such wage-structure none of the
provisions of the Act can afford the slightest assistance
to industrial tribunals. That task must be attempted
by the tribunals in the light of principles of social
justice and other relevant considerations such as the
capacity of the employer to pay and the wages
80
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
x96o
received by employees in comparable trades in the
same region. Just as the problem of wage-structure
T. T. E. Supply
co. Ltd.
has to be solved in the case of electricity concerns
v.
apart from the provisions of the Act and in the light of
Its Workmen
the relevant industrial principles, so must the problem
of bonus be resolved in the like manner. There is
Gajendragadkar J. really no conflict beween the Act and the principles
of industrial adjudication. In fact they cover different fields and their relevance and validity is beyond
question in their respective fields.
As we have just indicated the method of accounting
required by the Act in preparing the working-sheet is
substantially different from the commercial method of
accounting which yields the gross profits in the form
of profit and loss account. Determination of gross
profit is the first step which industrial tribunals take ,
in applying the Full Bench formula. Such gross profit
cannot be ascertained from the working-sheet prepared under the Act. It is not denied that the appellant
has to keep accounts under the Companies Act on a
commercial basis. That being so, in dealing with the
respondents' claim for bonus, it is the balance-sheet
and the profit and loss account prepared by the
appellant thl<t must be taken as the basis in the present
proceedings, and that is precisely what the tribunals
below have done.
Therefore, we are satisfied that the
Labour Appellate Tribunal was right in coming to the
conclusion that the respondents' claim for bonus must
be governed by the application of the Full Bench
formula.
In this connection it may be useful to refer to the
decision of this Court in the case of Baroda Borough
Municipality v. Its Workmen (1).
One of the points
raised on behalf of the Baroda Borough Municipality
in resisting the claim for bonus by its workmen was
that the scheme of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs
Act 18 of 1925 by which the Municipality was governed did not permit the making of any claim for bonus :
and so it was not open to the labour court or
tribunal to direct payment of bonus to municipal.
employees. This argument was rejected.
"The
demand for bonus as an industrial claim ", it wu.s
\I) LI957J S.C.R. 33·
-
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8 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
81
observed, "is not dealt with by the Municipal Act;
r96o
it is dealt with by the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. T. T. E. supply.
Therefore, it is not a relevant consideration whether
co. Ltd.
there are provisions in the Municipal Act with regard
v.
to bonus. The provisions of the Municipal Act are
Its Workmen
relevant only for the purpose of determining the G . d-dk
quality or the nature of the municipal property or a;e
11 raga ar f.
fund ; those provisions cannot be stretched beyond
their limited purpose for defeating a claim of bonus".
That is why this Court came to the conclusion that
the absence of provisions in the Municipal Acts for
payment of bonus to municipal employees was not a
consideration which was either determinative or conclusive of the question at issue before it.
The next question which arises is whether a claim
for bonus can be said to be included under paragraph 17 (2)(b)(xi). This provision includes under
expenditure other expenses admissible under the law
for the time being in force in the assessment of Indian
Income-tax and arising from, and ancillary or incidental to, the business of electricity supply. It is
admitted that bonus paid by an employer to his
employees constitutes expenses admissible under
section 10(2)(vi) of the Income-tax Act, but it .is urged
that it is not an expense which can be said to arise
from, and ancillary or incidental to, the business of
electricity supply. The argument is that cl. (xi) lays
down two tests, one of which is satisfied viz., that it
is expense admissible under the Indian Income-tax
Act, but the other is not satisfied, and so the clause is
inapplicable to the amount paid by way of bonus.
The appellate tribunal has held that even the other
test is satisfied and that the expenditure in question
can be said to arise from, or to be ancillary or incidental to, the business of electricity supply. In our .
opi:r;i.ion, it is difficult to accept the appellant's argument that the construction placed by the appellate
tribunal on the latter part of this cJaus!') is not
reasonably possible. Besides, it may be relevant to
point out that by a subsequent amendment made in
1957 cl. £xiii) has been added under paragraph 17(2)(b)
of the Sixth Schedule. This clause which is numbered (xiii) reads thus : "Bonus paid to the employees
n
82
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
•96o
of the imdertaking-(a) where any dispute regarding
such bonus has been referred to any tribunal or other
T. T. E. Supply authority under any law for the time being in force
Co. Ltd.
v.
relating to industrial or labour disputes in accordance
Its Workmen
with the decision of such tribunal or authority ; (b) in
-
any other case, with the approval of the State
Gajendragadkar J. Government". After the insertion of this clause
there can be no doubt that the amount paid by the
employer to his employees by way of bonus would
definitely be admissible expenditure under paragraph 17(2)(b). In our opinion, the insertion of this
clause can be more reasonably explained on the
assumption that the Legislature has thereby clarified
its original intention. Even when cl. (xi) was enacted
the intention was to include claims of bonus under
expenses covered by the said clause, but in order to
remove any possible doubt the Legislature thought it
better to provide specifically for bonus under a
separate category. Otherwise, it is difficult to appreciate how contributions to Provident Fund were
treated as admissible expenditure all the time since
they were covered by cl. (xii) and bonus could not
have been treated as admissible expenditure under
cl. (xi).
That is why we are on the whole prepared to
agree with the construction put upon cl. (xi) by the
appellate tribunal. If that be the true position then
bonus has always been an admissible expenditure
under the scheme of the Act, and as such there is no
conflict between the scheme of the Act and the claim
made by the respondents in the present case. Incidentally, we may add that this point appears to have
been conceded by the appellant before the appellate
tribunal. We must accordingly bold that the appellate tribunal was right in coming to the conclusion
that the Full Bench formula applied in adjudicating
upon the respondents' claim for bonus against the
appellant in the present proceedings. As we have
already indicated, before the fuller bench reached this
decision there was a conflict of opinion in the decisions
of the Labour Appellate Tribunals, but in view of our
conclusion it is unnecessary to refer to the said earlier
decisions.
•
•
3 S.C.R. SUPREME• COURT REPORTS
83
That takes us to the merits of the award. The first
r960
point is in regard to the appellant's claim for rehabilitation. Before the Labour Appellate Tribunal it T. T. E. Supply
Co. Ltd.
was fairly conceded by the respondents that at least
v.
income-tax at seven annas in a rupee on the gross
Its Workmen
profits less depreciation, and also a contingency
. -
reserve of Rs. 6,047 have to be allowed in arriving at Ga;endragadka• I·
the figure of net available surplus for the purpose of
bonus payable to the respondents ; and that in regard
to normal statutory depreciation the correct figure
must be taken to be Rs. 99,038 instead of Rs. 90,393
as given by the industrial tribunal. Then, as to the
rehabilitation the appellant has led no evidence at all
and so the appellate tribunal refused to grant any
sum by way of rehabilitation in addition to the total
amount of Rs. 1,13,950. In our opinion, the appellate
tribunal was right in holding that the adoption of a
factor of 2·7 for all assets purchased before 1945 was
not justified, and that the adoption of the figures of
the estimated life of the assets from the Schedule to
the Electric Supply Act without even deducting the
respective portions of the life of the assets which had
already expired was equally unjustified. In that view
of the matter we do not see how the appellant can
make any grievance against the finding of the appellate tribunal on the question of rehabilitation. The
appellate tribunal has fairly observed that, in future
if a dispute arises between the appellant and its
employees, the appellant may substantiate its claim
for rehabilitation by leading proper evidence.
The claim of the appell1J,nt for the triple shift
allowance in respect of the mains has been allowed by
the appellate tribunal and there is no dispute in
respect of it; but it is urged that rule 8 of the Income.
tax Rules justifies the appellant's claim in respect of
a.ll its electric plant and machinery under Entry
IIIE (1).
Rule 8 provides that the allowance under
s. IO (2) (vi) of the Act in respect of depreciation of
buildings, machinery, plant or furniture shall be a
percentage of the written down value or original cost,
as the case may be, equal to one-twelfth the number
shown in the corresponding entry in the second
column of the following statement. There are two
•
84
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
x960
provisos to this rule which it is not necessary to set
out. The appellant makes a claim under IIIE (1)
T. T. E. supply which deals with electric plant, machinery and boilers,
Co.v~td.
whereas, according to the respondents, the appellant's
Its Workmen
case in this behalf falls under IIIO (4) and (5) which
rcspectivilly deal with underground cables and wires
Gajendragadkar]. and overhead cables and wires. The argument for
the respondents is that in respect of these items the
appellant's claim is inadmissible. In support of this
argument the respondents rely upon the remark
against item 3 on page 8 of the Rules. This remark
would show that the benefit claimed by the appellant
does not apply to an item of machinery or plant
specifically excepted by the letters N, E, S, A being
shown against it. These letters are the contraction
of the expression " No Extra Shift Allowance ".
There is no doubt that these letters are to be found
against items in IIIO (4) and (5).
Therefore, the
point which arose for decision before the appellate
tribunal was whether the appellant's claim falls
under IIIE (1) or IIIC (4) and (5).
The appellate
tribunal has observed that the appellant made no
attempt to show that any such claim for shift depreciation in respect of its cables and wires had been put
forward by it before the income-tax authorities, or
that it was held to be admissible by them. It has also
observed that if the appellant's case was true that the
cables and wires foll under IIIE (I) it was difficult to
understand why separate provision should have been
made in respect of depreciation of cables and wires
under IIIO (4) and (5).
Besides, the appellate tribunal
was not satisfied that such cables and wires wonld
depreciate in value to a materially greater extent
when electrical energy is allowed to pass through them
for more than one shift .. That is why, on the
materials as they were available on the record, the
appellate tribunal saw no reason why the appellant
should be allowed any extra shift depreciation in
respect of underground -a1ld overhead cables by way
of a prior charge. The appellant's claim for the provision of Rs. 23,516 in that behalf was, therefore,
rejected. It would thus be seen that the appellant
seeks to claim this amount by way of prior charge;
•
...
•
J(
'
-
'
3 S.O.R. SUPREME OOlJRT REPORTS
85
and in substance this claim has been rejected by the
i96o
appellate tribunal on the ground that sufficient
materfal has not been placed before it by the appellant T. ~0~}.1~'.pzy
on which the claim could be examined and grantedi
v.
In such a case we do not see how we can interfere in
Its Workmen •
favour of the appellant.' The present decision will
. --
not preclude the appellant from making a similar Ga1endragadkar J.
claim in future and justifying it by leading proper
evidence.
In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with
costs.
-
Appeal dismissed.
THE BRIHAN MAHARASHTRA SUGAR
SYNDICATE LTD.
~
'
JANARDAN RAMOHANDRA KULKARNI
AND OTHERS
(S. K. DAS, A. K. SARKAR AND
M. HIDAYATULLAH, JJ.)
Company Law-Proceedings pending under the repealed Act-If
and when could be continued-Indian Companies Act, I9IJ, (VII of
I9I3) s. IS3-C-Companies Act, Ig56, (I of Ig56) ss. IO and 647.
The respondent had made an application under s.