# SUPRE:ME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH v. N. VENUGOPAL AND OTHERS

- **Citation:** [1964] 3 S.C.R. 742
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1962-10-31
- **Bench:** P. B. Gajendragadkar, K. N. Wanchoo, K. C. DAs GUPTA
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/supre-me-court-reports-1964-vol-the-state-of-andhra-pradesh-v-n-venugopal-and-3021
- **Pages:** 21

## Headnote

Oriminal Law-Limitation-Prosecution of Police O.tfiur1-Poliu Officer torturing suspecta during investigationWhellleracl• done under the provi.ians of law-Madras Police
Standing Ordera, Or. No. 145-lj ha,, Ille force of law-Whether
mandatory-Madras District Police Act, 1859 (Mad. 24 of
1869), •• 68.
During the course of the investigation of a case of house·
breaking and theft information was received that R had received
tbe stolen article. The appellants, who were a Sub-Inspector of
Police, a Head Constable and a Constable, respectively, took
R into custody onJanuary 6, 1957. Less than three days later
R was found lying dead with a number of injuries on the body.
The appellants
were prosecuted for having caused injuries to
R, acting in concert for the purpose of extorting from him
Information which might lead to the detection of an offence
and restoration of stolen property, and also for having his body
thrown at the place where it was ultimately found with the
intention of screening
themselves from punishment. The
appellants pleaded inter alia (I) that the prosecution was barred
by limitation by reason of the provisions of s. 53 of the
Madras District Police Act, 1859, and (2) that the trial of the
appellants was vitiated by the fact that the completion of the
investigation of their case was done by an Inspector of Police
and this contravened the Madras Police Standing Orders under
which
investigation
in cases against the police for torture
and causing death had to be conducted by a person of the rank
, of Assistant or Deputy Superintendent of Police or by the
Sub-Divisional Magistrate.
Held that the prosecution of the appellants was not barred
by limitation under s. 53 of the
Madras
District Police
Act, 1859 ..
No provision of law authorised police officers to beat 'a
pe..- wltb a view to induce him to make statement; and
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
743
though in the present case the act of beating was alleged to
bave been done when the appellants were engaged in investi·
gation, there could be no reasonable connection between
those acts and the process of investigation. The acts complained
of could not be said to have been done or intended to be done
under any provision of the Madras District Police Act or the
Code of Criminal Procedure or any other law conferring powers
on the police, and, consequently, s. 53 of the Madras District
Police Act had no application to the present case,
Virupappa Veerappa Kadampur v. The Slate of MgBore,
[1963] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 6, followed.
'
HeUJ, further, that the provisions of the Madras Police
Standing Order No. 145 were nothing more than administra•
tive instructions by the Government of Madras and did not have
the force of law; that, in any case, the requirement of the
Standing Order was merely directory and not mandatory, and
non-compliance did not make the investigation of the case
illegal; and that even assuming that the Standing Order had
the force of Jaw, the trial of the appellants would not be rendered invalid unless it was shown that miscarriage of justice had
been caused on account of the illegal investigation.
H. N. Riahbud anti ln<ier Singh v. TM State of Dellii,
[1955) I S.C.R. 1150, followed.
CRIMINAL APPELLATEJUBISDWTION: Criminal
Appeal No. 142of1961.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
order dated August 31. 1960, of the Andhra Pradesh
High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 551 of 1958.
A. S. R. Chari, K. R. Chaudhuri and P. D.
Menon, for the appellant.
N. N. Keawani, for the respondents.
1963. May 9.
The Judgment of the court was
delivered by
DAS GuPTAj.-The three respondents, Venugopal, Rangaswamy and Subbaiah were tried along
with one Mittala Kamal Sab by the Session Judge,
Sl4t10J '"""'
Pry,
N. Y1nu1.;al
Da#A;t•I.
i96;
Slal• . .ef Andhra ·
fraJes.h
v.
N. Y1nugopal
D1JS Gupt• J.
744
SUPRENIE COURT·REPORTS (1964] VOL.
Anantapur Division, on a number of charges. Kamal
Sab was acquitted of all the charges against him, but
these three respondents were convicted of sev

## Text

1911 -""' '·
742
SUPRE:ME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH
v.
N. VENUGOPAL AND OTHERS
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N. WANCHOO
and K. C. DAs GUPTA JJ.)
Oriminal Law-Limitation-Prosecution of Police O.tfiur1-Poliu Officer torturing suspecta during investigationWhellleracl• done under the provi.ians of law-Madras Police
Standing Ordera, Or. No. 145-lj ha,, Ille force of law-Whether
mandatory-Madras District Police Act, 1859 (Mad. 24 of
1869), •• 68.
During the course of the investigation of a case of house·
breaking and theft information was received that R had received
tbe stolen article. The appellants, who were a Sub-Inspector of
Police, a Head Constable and a Constable, respectively, took
R into custody onJanuary 6, 1957. Less than three days later
R was found lying dead with a number of injuries on the body.
The appellants
were prosecuted for having caused injuries to
R, acting in concert for the purpose of extorting from him
Information which might lead to the detection of an offence
and restoration of stolen property, and also for having his body
thrown at the place where it was ultimately found with the
intention of screening
themselves from punishment. The
appellants pleaded inter alia (I) that the prosecution was barred
by limitation by reason of the provisions of s. 53 of the
Madras District Police Act, 1859, and (2) that the trial of the
appellants was vitiated by the fact that the completion of the
investigation of their case was done by an Inspector of Police
and this contravened the Madras Police Standing Orders under
which
investigation
in cases against the police for torture
and causing death had to be conducted by a person of the rank
, of Assistant or Deputy Superintendent of Police or by the
Sub-Divisional Magistrate.
Held that the prosecution of the appellants was not barred
by limitation under s. 53 of the
Madras
District Police
Act, 1859 ..
No provision of law authorised police officers to beat 'a
pe..- wltb a view to induce him to make statement; and
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
743
though in the present case the act of beating was alleged to
bave been done when the appellants were engaged in investi·
gation, there could be no reasonable connection between
those acts and the process of investigation. The acts complained
of could not be said to have been done or intended to be done
under any provision of the Madras District Police Act or the
Code of Criminal Procedure or any other law conferring powers
on the police, and, consequently, s. 53 of the Madras District
Police Act had no application to the present case,
Virupappa Veerappa Kadampur v. The Slate of MgBore,
[1963] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 6, followed.
'
HeUJ, further, that the provisions of the Madras Police
Standing Order No. 145 were nothing more than administra•
tive instructions by the Government of Madras and did not have
the force of law; that, in any case, the requirement of the
Standing Order was merely directory and not mandatory, and
non-compliance did not make the investigation of the case
illegal; and that even assuming that the Standing Order had
the force of Jaw, the trial of the appellants would not be rendered invalid unless it was shown that miscarriage of justice had
been caused on account of the illegal investigation.
H. N. Riahbud anti ln<ier Singh v. TM State of Dellii,
[1955) I S.C.R. 1150, followed.
CRIMINAL APPELLATEJUBISDWTION: Criminal
Appeal No. 142of1961.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
order dated August 31. 1960, of the Andhra Pradesh
High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 551 of 1958.
A. S. R. Chari, K. R. Chaudhuri and P. D.
Menon, for the appellant.
N. N. Keawani, for the respondents.
1963. May 9.
The Judgment of the court was
delivered by
DAS GuPTAj.-The three respondents, Venugopal, Rangaswamy and Subbaiah were tried along
with one Mittala Kamal Sab by the Session Judge,
Sl4t10J '"""'
Pry,
N. Y1nu1.;al
Da#A;t•I.
i96;
Slal• . .ef Andhra ·
fraJes.h
v.
N. Y1nugopal
D1JS Gupt• J.
744
SUPRENIE COURT·REPORTS (1964] VOL.
Anantapur Division, on a number of charges. Kamal
Sab was acquitted of all the charges against him, but
these three respondents were convicted of several
offences. All three of them were convicted under
ss. 348, 331, and 201 read with s. 109 of the Indian
Penal Code. Venugopal was further convicted under
s. 343 of the Indian Penal Code. · For the offence
under s. 348 the respondents were sentenced to suffer
rigorous imprisonment for two years; for the offence
under s. 331 of the Indian Penal Code each of them
was sentenced t0 rigorous imprisonment for five
years; for the offence under s. 201 read withs. 109 of
the Indian Penal Code they were sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for three years each. Venugopal
wa~ sentenced to one year's rigorous imprisonment
under section 343 of the Indian Penal Code. All of
them were acquitted of the charge under s. 302 read
with s. 34 of the Indian Penal Code.
The sentences
imposed on them were directed to run concurrently.
These orders of conviction and sentence were set aside
by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in appeal and
the three respondents have been acquitted of all the
charges.
Against that decision the State of Andhra
Pradesh has filed the present appeal after obtaining
special leave from this Court.
Of the three respondents', Venugopal was the
Sub-Inspector of Police, Vempalli police station, in
Cuddapah District from July 20, 1956, to February
22, 1957; Rangaswamy was a Head Constable attached to the same police station from May 4, 1955 to
February 20, 1957; Subbaiah was a Police Constable
at that police station from ~pril 10, 1955 to February
20, 1957. On July 21, 1952 Mittala Kamal Sab,
a resident of Vempalli town lodged at the Vempalli
police station an information of house-breaking and
theft in his house.
After investigation a charge-sheet
was submitted by the police against one Patra
Obanna and three other persons., Those three were
arrested and tried and convicted on October 31, 1962;
-
3 s.a.R..
SUPIUmB COURT UPOllTS
74'5
but Patra Obanna remained absconding and ·the can
against him remained pending in the Magistrate's
Court. After sometime the Magistrate wrote to the
District Superintendent of Police of Anantapur,
requesting him either to withdraw the case or to try
and arrest Patra Obanna.
Thereafter, Venugopal, who was then the
Vempalli Sub-Inspector of Police, took action in
this matter and his attempt to arrest Patr a Obanna
met with success. Patra Obanna was actu lly arrested on January 6, 1957. On the same da eon being
inforsned by him that he had given the g ld gajjalu
which formed part of the stolen property to a ·person
in Kadiri Taluk, Venugopal proceeded to Kadiri
police station. On the night of January 6, Venugopal, accompanied by Constables of the Kadiri
police station and Rangaswamy and Subbaiah, who
had come with him to Kadiri went to Dasaravandlapalli in Gandlapenta police station and there on ,the
identification of Patra Obanna as the person to whom
he had given the gold gajjallu took one Arige
Ramanna into custody.
The police party then
returned with Arige Ramanna to Kadiri police· station. Less then three days later Arige Ramanna
was found lying dead not far from the house of,one
Sugali Baginigadu, in Udumulagutta Thanda, fa
Kadiri village. There were a number of injuries on
the body. The prosecution case is that these injuries
had been caused by the three rerpondents acting,in
concert for the purpose of exto.rting from 1him ·information which might lead to the detection of an
offence and restoration of stolen 'property. It is also
the prosecution case that for this purpose these three
respondents wrongfully confined Arige Ramanna in
a room at the Kadiri police station and it was •there
when he was thus confined that the injuries were
caused. The prosecution · case further is that when
-after infliction of the injuries Arige Ramanna.appeared to be in a bad state these respondents had hiru
. St.,iefl+l//tr•
'Pl<Nllfi
••
N:!Yf1111l!fll
IHJ
Sta11 .; . .!Mhta
Proini
••
N. V1,..,,.;.l
DuGtt;la /.
746 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1964) VOL.
removed from the police station and his body thrown
at the place where it was ultimately found with the
intention of screening themselves from punishment .
As to the events which led to such acts by the
respondents, the prosecution story is that Arige
Ramanna had on being interrogated at the Kadiri
police station given information that he had· sold
the gajjalu to Appalla of Nallasanivandlapplli.
Following up this information the three respondents
accompanied by Patra Obanna and Arige Ramanna
went
to that village and qeustioned Nallasani
Appalla. One gold gajjlu was seized from his house
and to check on Arige Ramanna's statement that
this had been sold by him to Appalla in the presence of Fakruddin of Kataruppalli, the Sub· Inspector
tried to contact Fakruddin. Fakruddin was found
at Madanapplli on January 8, 1957; but he denied
any knowledge about the sale of gold gajjalu by
Arige Ramanna
to Appalla. The
respondent
Venugopal then returned to Kadiri police station
bringing Arige Ramanna and Appalla with him.
It was then the early morning of January 9, 1957.
Both Arige Ramanna and Appalla were then taken
by Venugopal into the Sub-Inspector's room at
Kadiri police station. Subbaiah and Rangaswamy
also went into the room. There, after some further
interrogation, Arige Ramanna was beaten up by
Subbaiah, Rangaswamy, and Kamal Sab, who was
the complainant in the theft case, under the instructions of Venugopal.
These three respondents as well as Kamal
Sab pleaded not guilty. We are not concerned with
the case of Kamal Sab. He was acquitted by the
Session Judge and after the State's appeal against
the acquittal order was dismissed by the High Court
the State has not sought to appeal against that order
of dismissal.
...
•
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT RBPORTS
747
.The defence of these three respondents was
that they had nothing to do with the injuries that
were found on Arige Ramanna's body.
The fact
that Arige Ramanna was taken into custody and
brought by them to th( l(adiri police station was not
disputed, though they dispute the correctness of the
prosecution story that this happened on J auuary 6,
1957. They do not also deny the visit to Appalla
and the seizure of a gold gajjalu from his house and
the visit thereafter to Madanapplli to meet Fakruddin
nor the fact that Fakruddin denied having witnessed
any sale of gold gajjalu. Their case however is that
after t.he return from Madanappalli both Arige
Ramanna and Appalla were asked to go away and
they went away and did not come to the police
station at all.
After this they say they as well as
Obanna came to the
police station and slept
there.
According to them, the whole story of Arige
Ramanna being taken into the Sub·lnspector's
room and being beaten up there and then being
taken away from there is entirely false.
On a consideration of the evidence, oral and
documentary, and the statements of the accused
persons the Sessions Judge believed the prosecution
case about the confinement and beating up of Arige
Ramanna by these appellants and that when Arige
Ramanna was in a bad state after receiving the
injuries they got him removed from
the police
station. He also rejected the defence contention that
the investigation in the present case had not been
made in accordance with the law. Accordingly, the
Session Judge convicted these respondents, as already
stated, under sections 348, 331 and 201 read withs.
109 of the Indian Penal Code. The learned Judge also
held that as after the arrest of Arige Ramanna on
the night of January 6, 1957 he was not sent to
the magistrate and kept in restrain.t for three days,
the respondent Venugopal committed the further
otfence under s. 343 of the Indian Penal Code. He
Stol10J~.a
Praiuh
v.
N. II' moPIOI
Dos C.pi. J.
!/968
SlftM/.A,tdJ.<o
-P,,du~
.. '
N., "'"•toJ•I
Das G.Jftl• J,
748 SUPRENIE COURT REPORTS (1964] VOL.
found that the case against Kamal Sab had not been
proved and acquitted him of all the charges.
When the appeal preferred by Venugopal,
Rangaswany, and Subbaiah came up for hearing
before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh a preliminary point was raised on their 6ehalf that the
prosecution was barred by reason of the provisions
of s. 53 of the Madras District Police Act, 1859
(hereinafter referred to as the
"Police Act").
Thereupon Basi Rtddy J, before whom this point
was raised framed the following question :
"In the circumstances of this case, is the
prosecution
of the appellants , barred by
limitation by reason of the provision of section
53 of the Madras District Police Act, 1859 ?"
and referred it for determination by a Division Bench
of two judges. The Division Bench to whom the
case was referred, referred this question and a further
question framed by them, viz., In what circumstances,
the bar of limitation prescribed by s. 53 of the
Madras District Police Act would be available to
an accused officer ? , for determination by a Full
Bench. After discussing the relevant legal provisions
and authorities the Full Bench disposed of the matter
in these words :-
-
"We would therefore answer the first question
referred to us by saying that the bar of limitation prescribed by s. 53 of the Act would be
available to an accused officer only whep the
act complained of has been committed in _the
discharge of his offieial duties. We have
already laid down that the question as to
whether a particular act would be regarded
as having been done
in the discharge of
one's official duties would have to be determin-
·ed on the facts -and particular circumstaiices
•
a $.C.R.
SUPRENIE COURT REPORTS
741)
of the case. 1It is
unnecessary
for us to
answer the second question.
This will be
decided by a Single Judge."
The appeal then came to be heard by Mr.
Justice Anantanarayan;; Ayyar. The learned Judge
was of opinion, after considering the decision of the
Full .Bench and certain observations in some other
cases, that if the police officers were alleged to have
committed the acts complained of "when" they
were investigating into the cases of house-breaking
and theft, s. 53 of the Police Act would apply.
Observing that there was no doubt or dispute about
the fact that these officers were investigating the case
of house-breaking and theft officially at all material
times they were alleged to have committed the
offences which formed the subject matter of the
charges, he concluded, that as the prosecution was
made beyond the period prescribed in s. 53 of the
Police Act they were entitled to an acquittal. He
proceeded however to consider the case also on
the merits and came to the conclusion that on facto
also there was room to doubt the guilt of these
officers on the charges. In this view of the law and
facts the learned Judge set aside the orders of conviction and sentence passed by the Trial Court and
acquitted these three respondents of the charges
framed against them.
In our opinion, the High Court is clearly
wrong in thinking that the prosecution was barred by
s. 53 of the Police Act.
That section provides in the
first place for a period of limitation for certain actions
and prosecutions and makes certain other provisions
in respect of civil actions with which we are not
concerned. The actions and prosecutions for which
the limitation is prescribed can be best understood
from the actual words used by the legislature, which
are these :-
"All actions and prosecutions against any person,
which may be lawfully brought for anything
1161
Slot.of ...
p,,.,,,..
••
N. ·V1•"111J1i•I
11 .. a.pta J.
196'
Sllll1 o j Alldl>rs
~A
v •.
x. vmu;.;.t
Das Gupta I.
750 SUPREM:E COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
done or intended to
be done under the
provisions of this Act or under the provisions of
any other law for the · time being in force
conferring powers on the police shall be commenced. within three months
after the act
complained of shall have been committed and
not otherwise."
·
It is plain that in order that any person against
whom a prosecution has been launched can get the benefit of the three months period of limitation thus prescribed, it must appear either, (i) that the act complained of was done under the provisions of the Police Act
or (ii) the act complained of was done under the
provisions
of some
other law in force conferring
powers on the police or (iii) the act complained of
was intended to be done under the provisions of the
Police Act, i.e., though strictly speaking the act was
not done under the provisions of the Act, the intention of the accused in doing the act was to act under
the provisions of the Police Act or (iv) the act complained of was intended to be done under the provisions of some other law in force conferring powers
on the police i.e., though the act was strictly speaking not done under the provisions of 'such other law
the intention of the accused in doing the act was to act
under such provisions.
The Police Act contains several provisions
under which the police officers or other persons may
act or intend to act. Section 6 vests in police authorities appointed under the Act all powers not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act which up to the
passing of the Act belonged by iaw to the existing
police authorities. Section 7 confers full powers of
a magistrate on the Inspector· General of Police and
authorises the State Government to vest the District
Superintendents of Police with all or any of these
powers.
Under s. 9 the Inspector-General may from
time to time fr<1me rules and re~ulations inter -aliq
3 S.C.R.. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
751
for collecting and communicating intelligence and
information; section 21 describes the duty of every
police officer to be "to use his best endeavours and
ability to prevent all crimes, offences and public nuisances; to preserve the peace; to apprehend disorderly
and suspicious characters; to detect and bring offenders to justice; to collect and communicate intelligence affectini? the public peace; and promptly to
obey and execute all orders and warrants lawfully
issued to him." Section 42 which is the next section
in the act-the original sections 22 to 43 having been
repealed by the Central Act XVII of 1862-empowers any police officer above the rank of a constable or any member of the Madras Fire Service
above the rank of a fireman to do a number of things.
These include the closure of a street or passage in or
near which any fire is burning and the breaking into
or through, or pulling down or using the passage of
houses or other appliances, any premises for the
purpose of extinguishing the fire.
The effect of s. 53 of the Police Act is that all
prosecutions whether against a police officer or a
person other than a police officer (e.g., a member of
the Madras Fire Service, above the rank of a fireman
acting· under s. 42 of the Act) must be commenced
within three months after the act complained of, if
this act is one which has been done or intended to be
done. "under" any of the provisions detailed above.
The protection ?f s. 53 is not confioed however only
to acts done or intended to be d<me under the provisions of the Police Act.
It extends to acts done or
intended to be done under the provisions of any other
law conferring powers on the police. One such law
is the Code of Criminal Procedure which confers
numerous powers on the police in respect of arrest,
search and investigation. Among other laws conferring powers on the police may be mentioned the
Opium Act, the Excise Act, the:: Petrqleum Act, etc.
St•ll of A"4r•
PT"'"1A
v.
N.V-...... 1
/Jas Gwplw J.
196J.
lt.t•c•/An•k<a
• PrU.sL
.:·
JV. v,,,,,,.;.i
, __ ._._
75.2
SU:P,Rl!U~IB COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL;
Any prosecution in respect of any act done or
intended to be done under the provisions of any of
these laws has also to be commenced· within three
months of the act complained of. It is clear that if
in any of these cases the prosecution is commenced
beyond three months after the act complained of,
it will be the duty of the courts to dismiss the same.
But it is equally clear that unless the act complained
of appears to have been done or intended to be done
"under" the provisions of the police Act or of the
other laws conferring powers on the police the protection oC s. 53 will not be available. Thus, if the
prosecution is for an offence under s. 341 of the
Indian Penal Code said to have been committed by
the act of closing a street or passage in or near
which a fire is burning in exercise of powers under
s. 42 (b) of the Police Act, or for an offence under
s. 426 of the Indian Penal Code said to have been
committed by the pulling down of a house for the
purposes of extinguishing a lire, under. s. 42 ( c) of
the Police Act,
the prosecution must fail unless
brought within three months of the act complained
of.
So also if a police officer is prosecuted for an
offence under s. 323 ofthe Indian Penal Code said
to hav_e been committed in making an arrest, the
prosecution must fail unless commenced within three
months of the act complained of.
It is easy to see that if the act complained of
is wholly justified by law, it would not amount to an
offence at all in view of the provisions of s. 79 of the
Indian .Penal Code. Many cases may however arise
where in acting under the provisions of the Police
Act or other law conferring powers on the police
the police officer or some other person may go beyond
what is strictly justified in law.
Though s. 79 of the
Indian Penal Code will have no application to such
cases, s. 53 of the Police Act will apply.
But
s. 53 applies to only a limited class of persons. So,
it becomes
the task or the court,
whenever
3 S.C.k.
StTPRE1'IE COURT Rl!JPORTS
753
any
question whether this section applies or not
arises to bestow particular care on its decision. In
doing this it has to aiicertain first what act is complained of and
then to examine if there
is any
provision of the Police Act or other law conferring powers on the police under which it may be
said to have been done or intended to be done. The
Court has to remember in this connection that an
act is not "under" a provision oflaw merely because
the point of time at which it is done coincides with
the point of time when some act in the exercise of the
powers granted by the provision or in performance
of the duty imposed by it. To be abk to say that
an act is done "under" a provision of law, one must
discover the existence of a reasonable relationship
between the provisions and the act. In the absence
of such a relation the act cannot be said to be done
"under" the particular provision of law.
This aspect of the matter was emphasized by
this Court recently in Virnpappa Veerappa Kadampur
v. 1'he Stare of Mysore (1)
when . examining the
language of a similar provision in the Bombay District
Police Act.
These principles apply equally to the decisio12
of the question whether the act complained of was
"intended to be done" under the provisions of the
Police Act or some other law conferring powers on
the police. When we apply these principles to the
facts of the present case we look in vain for any
provision of law-whether under the Police Act or
under some other law under which the acts complained of, viz., beating a person suspected of a crime or
confining him or sending him away in an injured
condition can be said to have any relation.
Mr.
Keswani tried to say-it is fair to him to staterather faintly- that these acts were done under the
provisions of s. 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. That section empowers any police officer
\ IUlffl lapp; 2 S,C.R, t.
1963
Stale a/ ..4•••
PT.wluh
v.
N. V ""'1¥<1
Das G•it• J.
1963
Stall •f Andhra
Praihsh
v.
N. Yeau1.Pal
Dos ~toJ.
754
SUPREN.IE COURT RElPORTS [1964] Vot.
investigating a crime or any other police officer
acting on his requisition to
examine orally any
person supposed to be acquainted with the facts and
circumstances
of the case. The section
further
provides that such person shall be bound to answer
all questions relating to such case put to him by
such officer, other than questions answers to which
would have a tendency to expose him to a criminal
charge or to a penalty or forefeiture.
By no stretch
of imagination can it be· said that the provisions
of this section authorise the officer examining a
person to beat him or to confine him for the purpose
of inducing him to make a particular statement.
It is worth noticing here s. 163 of the Gode of
Criminal Procedure. The first sub-section of s. Hi3
prohibits any police officer from making any induce·
ment, threat or promise for the purpose of obtaini11:g
a statement. The second sub-section _provides that
no police officer shall prevent by caution or otherwise any person from making a statement which he
may be disposed to make on his own free will. The
provisions of s. 163 thus . emphasised the fact that
s. 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not
authorise the police officers to beat or to confine a
person with a view to induce him to make a
statement.
The act of beating or the act of confining wa!i,
it is true alleged to be done at a time when Venugopal was engaged in · in·vestigation, But it is not
possible to see v :1at reasonable connection
thes•~
acts had with the prncess of investigation. Nor can
one see how the act of sending away the injured
person
had
any
relation
to
the process of
investigation.
The High Court fell into the error of thinking
that whatever a police officer does to a person
suspected of a crime at a time when the officer is
engaged in investigating that crime should be held to
3 S:C.lt'.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
755
be done in the discharge or his official duties to investigate and as such under the provisions of the law
that imposed this duty on him.
This view is wholly
unwarranted in law.
In our opinion, it cannot possibly be said that
the acts complained of in the present case were done
or intended to be done under any provision of the
Police Act or the Code of Criminal Procedure or
any other law conferring powers on the police.
Section 53 of the Police Act had
therefore no
application to this case.
After holding that the· prosecution was barred
under s. 53 of the Police Act, the High Court still
proceeded to consider the merits o( the case and
recorded a conclusion that the evidence left room
for doubt as regards the guilt of the accused on
the different charges. When the High Court held
that the conviction had to be set aside on the
preliminary ground that the prosecution had been
commenced in contravention of s. 53, it might hav<t
chosen not to examine the merits of the case. When
it did choose, however, to do so, it was necessary
tliat this should be done with proper care. We are
constrained to say that the examination of the evidence was done by the High Court in what can only
be called a cursory or casual manner. It has been
necessary therefore for us to try to assess the evi·
dence for ourselves.
But . before we proceed to the discussion of the
evidence we must consider a contention raised on
behalf of the respondents that the very trial was
vitiated by the fact that the investigation was not
done in accordance with law.
The argument is that
under the Madras Police Standing Orders, the investigation in cases against the police for torture and
causing· death' has to be conducted by a person of the
rank of Assistant or Deputy Superintendent of police
1110,
Slalnf And/J,,...
Prui1li·
v.
N. f'en•ttlol
1J6J·
•
SIMI •I""'"''
Pr.iuh
v.
N. v,..,.,.i
Da Gupta J.
756
SUPREME COURt REPORTS [1964] vot.
or by the Sub.Divisional Magistrate. In the present
case, though the initial investigation was conducted
by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Penkondu, it was
taken up from him by an Inspector of the Police,
C.1.D., Hyderabad. It was this Inspector of Police
who completed the investigation and submitted the
charge-sheet. It has to be noticed that the respondents do not say that the investigation was not :in
accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Their case, as raised before the
Session Court, apparently at the time of argument
and again repeated here is that the investigation by
the Inspector contravened the Madras Police Standing
Orders.
Order No. 145 of the Madras Police Standing
Ordcn prescribes the procedure in respect of charges
of torture or of death or grievous hurt against a
police officer.
This order it may be mentioned,
superseded the previous order No. 157 on the subject
and was in force in 1957. The main features of the
procedure when the case occurs in the Mufassal in the
State of Madras are that :-
( 1) A Gazetted Police Officer on hearing of
such an occurrence on a complaint made to him or
otherwise should immediately start an informal
investigation but when an information is received by
a police officer below the rank of Assistant or Deputy
Superintendent of Police, he should instead of making
an investigation himself report the case to his Assistant or Deputy Superintendent of Police. In either
case a report should be sent to the Revenue Divisional Officer;
·
(2) The Revenue Divisional Officer should
conduct an informal enquiry to see whether there are·
grounds for launching a criminal prosecution and to
ii.x the responsibility on individual officers;
(3) Where a complaint has been filed in the
Court of a judicial magistrate as regards the
3 S.C.R. · SUPREl\18 COURT REP0RTS
757
'0ccurrence the Revenue Divisional Officer should after
arriving at his own findings keep them confidential
and decide on the further course of action in the light
or the judicial decision when it is available;
(4) When no complaint has been filed in the
court of the Judicial Magistrate the Revenue Divisional Officer should after completing the investigation submit his report to the Collector. The Collector
shall where necessary issue instructions for laying a
formal complaint by the Revenue Divisional Officer
before the Court of the 1st Class Judicial Magisrate.
It is contended that the provisions of the Code
of Criminal Procedure for investigation of crime are
superseded by this Standing Order and so the investigation by the Inspector, C.I.D., was illegal. In our
opinion, there is no substance in this argument. It
appears to us that this Standing Order is nothing
more than administrative instructions by the Government of Madras and has not the force of law. It is
worth noticing in this connection that in the Madras
Police Standing Orders as published by the Government of Madras it is mentioned in the prefatory note
that the orders marked with asterisk were issued by
the Inspector-General of police under s.9 of the
Madras District Police Act.
The Standing Order
145 is not marked with asterisk and it could be safely
held that it was not isqued under s. 9 of the Madras
District Police Act. The marginal note against the
order as printed shows that it was issued by a Government Order of the Home Department dated October
12, 1955. It does not appear that this was done
under any statutory authority. There can be no
doubt that quite apart from the fact that the Government may and often should issue instructions to its
officers, including police officers, such instructions
have not however the authority of Jaw.
We are not
satisfied therefore that the Standing Order No. 145
J:iad the force of law,
1913
s""' ~....,.
rr-u1t
Y,
N. y mu Pia I
... C.,io/.
196'
,s1o1, oj-J.ndh•
1Pratlesh
v.
r N I y muzojHU
DIU C.;ta /,
758
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964]VOL.
'We are further-of opinion that, in any .case,.the
requirement . of this order wa~ merely directory ,and
not mandatory. Non-compliance with the provisions
of this order therefore does not make the investigation
of the case illegal.
It is also to be mentioned that no objection that
the investigation had been conducted in violation of
the Standing Orders appears to have been taken at
any stage earlier than the trial in the Sessions Court.
It will be proper to hold therefore on the authority
of Rishbud's Oase (1), that even if the provision that
the investigation had to be held and completed by a
Magistrate had the force of law and was mendatory
the trial would not be renderi:d invalid unless it was
shown that miscarriage of justice had been caused on
account of the illegal investigation. Learned Counsel was not able to show how the accused were in any
way prejudiced by reason of the fact that the investigation. was completed by the Inspector of Police. We
have therefore no hesitation in rejecting the contention raised on behalf of the respondent that the trial
was bad in law because investigation was completed
by an Inspector of Police.
(See Munnalal's· Case,
Criminal Appeal Nos. 102-104 of 1961, decided on
April 17, 1963).
Turning -now to the evidence in the case we
find it proved by unimpeachable evidence, and also
undisputed fact that Arige Ramanna was taken away
from his house by these respondents and was with
them on January 8, 1957. It is also clearly proved
and is not disputed that Arige Ramanna's dead 'body
was found on January 9, lying by the side ofa.hut
in Sugali Tanda. The report of the Asstt. Ci vii
Surgeon who held the post mortem examination . of
the body on January 11, 1957 shows that the body
bore nine injuries. Seven of these were contusions
on different parts of the body ancl two abrasions.
One of the contusions on the right parietal scalp .,had
(I) [1955] 1 S. C, R, 1150 •
31S:C.R.
SUP&EMB COURT REPORTS
759
the internal injury of the congestion of the brain with
capillary haemorrhage corresponding to it. The
doctor's report shows that this injury would be
necessarily fatal. The question is : Has the prosecu- ·
tion been able to prove beyond reasonable doubt its
case that these injuries were caused on the morning
of January 9, at Kadiri police station by these
accused persons.
[After ·discussing the evidence His Lordship
proceeded.]
When all these circumstances are considered
together they show one clear connected picture that
intent upon getting some clue about a gold gajjalu
which had been stolen from Kamal Sab's house in
1952 and exasperated by what he thought to be
Arige Ramanna's deliberate attempt to conceal the
truth, Venugopal brought Arige Ram•mia back to
Kadiri police station on the morning of January ii,
1957 and there under hi~ instruction, his rnbordinates
the two police constables, Rangaswamy and Subbaiah
beat up Arige Ramanna and between them inflicted
the injuries which were ultimately discovered by the
doctor.
It is not possible to accept Venugopal's suggestion that after he returned from Madanappalli to
Kadiri early in the morning of January 9, he asked
Arige Ramanna and Nallasani Appalla to go away.
It would not be normal human conduct for him to
acknowledge defeat at that stage and the probabilities of the case strongly support what is proved by ·
the direct evidence of the witnesses that Arige
Ramanna was taken by him to Kadiri police station
on the morning of January 9, and not allowed to go
away.
We are unable to find a single circumstance inconsistant with the prosecution case that these three
eresPondent beat up Arige Ramanna at Kadiri police
1963
Stal~ qf A11.~ra
Pradesli
v.
N. V1nugopal
Das Gupto /.
_1963
'StiZU of A.a4hr4
Prat4sh
y,
N. ,.,.,,,.;.i
Du Gupta J •. \
--
760 . SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
station for the purpose of extorting from him infor·
mation as regards the disposal of a gold gajjalu that
might lead to further -detection in connection '~ith
the case of house-breaking and theft committed at the
,.house of Kamal Sabin 1952.
The circumstances that have been established
are in our opinion incapable of explanation of any
other reasonable hypothesis than the, trut.h of the
prosecution case that these' respondents voluntarily
caused hurt to Arige Ramanna for the purpose of
extorting from him information regarding the disposal
. of the gold gajjalu which might lead to fuller detection of the· crime. The circumstances speak so
clearly that any other view would, we think, be
unreasonable, arbitrary and indeed perverse.
On a consideration ·of the injuries that were
caused, we do not find it possible to be certain that
the respondents had the intention of causing grievous
hurt to Arige ~amanna. What is proved beyond
doubt however is that they voluntarily caused hurt
to Arige Ramanna for the purpose mentioned above.
Thereby, they committed an offence under s. 330 of
the Indian Penal. Code, though not under s. 331 of
that Code.
In view of this conclusion from the circumstan·
tial evidence adduced in the case it is hardly necessary to discuss the direct testimony given by Nallasani
Appalla, the prosecution witness No. 1. As however
·the Trial Court on a consideration of the evidence
believed it to be substantially true except as regards
the fourth accused Kamal Sab, who is no longer
before us,· and the High Court has expressed a contrary opinion, we shall briefly refer to his evidence •.
\Ve think it proper to point out that the judg-
. ment of the High Co~rt does not contain any discus-
$ion worth the name of what this witness has said or
3 S.C.R.
SUPR.Bl'tlB COURT R.BPOR T3
761
of the reasons which induced the High Court to
characterize it as "unreliable".
(After discussing the evidence His Lordship
proceeded.]
On a consideration of all the circumstances
of the case, we are of opinion that the Session Judge
was right in his assessment of this witness's testimony
againsr these three respondents and the High Court
was worng in c,onsidering his evidence as wholly
unreliable.
Nallasani's evidence
by
itself would be
sufficient to prove that the accused had committed
an offence under s. 330 of the Indian Penal Code.
But the circumstantial evidence we have discussed
aboves > clearly establishes their guilt for this offence
that it is unnecessary to seek any further support
for it.
For the reasons mentioned above, we have
come to the conclusion that the decision ..if the High
Court that there was any doubt about the truth of
the proseci1tion case that these respondents beat up
Arige Ramanna does not bear scrutiny and is wholly
unjustified. The interests of justice demand that the
High Court's decision on this question should not be
allowed to stand.
Accord!n~ly, we set aside the order of High
Court acqu1ttmg the responde11ts
altogether in
respect of injuries caused lo Arige Ramanna, and convict them all of an offedce mider s. 330 of the
Indi.n Penal Code.
On behalf of the State Mr. Chari does .not press
the appeal against the acquittal of the respondents on
the other charge<, viz , ss. 343, 348 and s. 201 read
with s. l09 of the ludia!l Penal Code,
..
1963
St.ti •f AMhra
l'r~Ush
v.
N. v,,..,_,.,
Das Gupi. J.
1963
Sl•I• of An'hro
Pr11.J•sli
v.
N. V11nuto/uzl
D"' Gupta J.
762 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
The learned Session Judge.awarded a sentence
of five years' rigorous imprisonment for the offence
under s. 331 of the Indian Penal Code.
Though we
have altered the conviction to one under s. 330 of
the Indian Penal Code, we do not think we shall be
justified in reducing the sentence.
A serious view
cannot but be taken of such a barbarous method of
dealing with persons suspected of a crime as was
committed by these respondents in this case. It is
necessary that deterrent sentences should be inflicted
for such an offence when established.
Accordingly, we convict the respondents under
s. 330 of the Indian Penal Code and we sentence
each of them to five years' rigorous imprisonment:
The appeal is thus allowed in part and is dismissed as regards the acquittal of the respondents on
other charges.
The accused to surrender to their
bail.
A ppe,al allowed in part .
•