# SUPREME COURT REPOR'l'S DARSHAN SINGH v. STA'rE OF PUNJAB. ATTAR SINGH

- **Citation:** [1953] 1 S.C.R. 319
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1950-04-05
- **Case number:** Cases Nos.11 and 12 of 1950
- **Bench:** PATANJALI SAsTRI c.J, MuKHERJEA, Ohandrasekhara Aiyar, VIVIAN BosE, Ghulam Hasan J
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/supreme-court-repor-l-s-darshan-singh-v-sta-re-of-punjab-attar-singh-14
- **Pages:** 16

## Headnote

319
East Punjab Cotton Cloth and Yarn Order, 1947-Provincial
law prohibiting export of essential cr:rmrnodity without perrnitValidity-Essential Supplies (Teniporary Powers) Act, 1946, ss. 3
and 4-" ':Trade and Cornrnerce ", rneaninr; of-Whether include
export-Constrnction of statutes-Acts rnust be construed as a whole.
Section 3 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act,
1946, which was passed by the Indian Legislature in 1946 empowered the Central Government by notified order to provide for
regulating and prohibiting the production, supply and distribution
of any essential commodity and trade and commerce therein; s. 4
of the Act empowered the Central Government to delegate its
powers under s. 3 to the Provincial Government or any officer
thereof. The Governor of the Punjab to whom such powers had
been delegated under s. 4 passed the East Punjab Cotton Cloth
and Yarn Control Order, 1947, wl1ich prohibited the export of
cotton cloth and yarn to any country outside India except under a
permit, and made export without permit an offence.
The validity
of this order was questioned on the ground that the Governor had
acted in .excess of his powers in so far as he prohibited export outside India without a permit:
·
Held, (i) that, keeping the object of the Essential Supplies Act,
1946, in view and reading the words " trade and commerce " in
s. 3 of the Act in the light of the context, these words could be interpreted as including the export of goods outside the Province
including a neighbouring foreign State and the Governor in passing
the impugned Order did not 11.ct in excess of the powers delegated
to him;
(ii) that as the Central Legislature was fully competent to
legislate on exports and imports and making any provision relating
thereto under the Government of India Act, 1935, it had power to
make a law prohibiting export to a foreign State, even apart from
the powers conferred on it by the India (Central Government a.nd
a.nd Legislature) Act, 1946 (9 & 10 Geo. VI, c. 39);
1952
Dec. 5.
320
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1953]
1952
(iii) even taking the legislation to be purely on the provincial
•
subjects of production, distribution and supply of goods, restriction
Darshan Singh of import as ancillary to production and supply of essential com-
. v.
modi ties would be quite within the scope and ambit of such legisTh• State of
latton and in pith and substance the enactment would be one
Punjab.
dealing exclusively with these provincial matters.
It is a cardinal rule of interpretation that the language used
by the legislature is the true depository of the legislative intent,
and that words and phrases occurring in a statute are to be taken
not in an isolated or detached manner dissociated from the context,
but are to be read together and construed in the light of the
purpose and object of the Act itself.

## Text

•
-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPOR'l'S
DARSHAN SINGH
v.
STA'rE OF PUNJAB.
ATTAR SINGH
v.
STATE OF PUNJAB.
UNION OF INDIA-INTERVENER.
[PATANJALI SAsTRI c.J., MuKHERJEA,
OHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR, VIVIAN BosE and
GHULAM HASAN J J.]
319
East Punjab Cotton Cloth and Yarn Order, 1947-Provincial
law prohibiting export of essential cr:rmrnodity without perrnitValidity-Essential Supplies (Teniporary Powers) Act, 1946, ss. 3
and 4-" ':Trade and Cornrnerce ", rneaninr; of-Whether include
export-Constrnction of statutes-Acts rnust be construed as a whole.
Section 3 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act,
1946, which was passed by the Indian Legislature in 1946 empowered the Central Government by notified order to provide for
regulating and prohibiting the production, supply and distribution
of any essential commodity and trade and commerce therein; s. 4
of the Act empowered the Central Government to delegate its
powers under s. 3 to the Provincial Government or any officer
thereof. The Governor of the Punjab to whom such powers had
been delegated under s. 4 passed the East Punjab Cotton Cloth
and Yarn Control Order, 1947, wl1ich prohibited the export of
cotton cloth and yarn to any country outside India except under a
permit, and made export without permit an offence.
The validity
of this order was questioned on the ground that the Governor had
acted in .excess of his powers in so far as he prohibited export outside India without a permit:
·
Held, (i) that, keeping the object of the Essential Supplies Act,
1946, in view and reading the words " trade and commerce " in
s. 3 of the Act in the light of the context, these words could be interpreted as including the export of goods outside the Province
including a neighbouring foreign State and the Governor in passing
the impugned Order did not 11.ct in excess of the powers delegated
to him;
(ii) that as the Central Legislature was fully competent to
legislate on exports and imports and making any provision relating
thereto under the Government of India Act, 1935, it had power to
make a law prohibiting export to a foreign State, even apart from
the powers conferred on it by the India (Central Government a.nd
a.nd Legislature) Act, 1946 (9 & 10 Geo. VI, c. 39);
1952
Dec. 5.
320
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1953]
1952
(iii) even taking the legislation to be purely on the provincial
•
subjects of production, distribution and supply of goods, restriction
Darshan Singh of import as ancillary to production and supply of essential com-
. v.
modi ties would be quite within the scope and ambit of such legisTh• State of
latton and in pith and substance the enactment would be one
Punjab.
dealing exclusively with these provincial matters.
It is a cardinal rule of interpretation that the language used
by the legislature is the true depository of the legislative intent,
and that words and phrases occurring in a statute are to be taken
not in an isolated or detached manner dissociated from the context,
but are to be read together and construed in the light of the
purpose and object of the Act itself.
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Cases Nos.11
and 12 of 1950. Appeals under Art. 13~ (1) of the
Constitution of India from the Judgment and Order
dated April 5, 1950, of the High Court of Judicature
for the State of Punjab at Simla (Khosla J.) in Criminal Revision Nos. 1144and1147 of 1949.
Achhru Ram (Gopal Singh, with him) for the appellant in Case No. 11.
H. J. Umrigar for the appellant in Case No. 12.
S. M. Sikri (Advocate-General of Punjab) {H. S.
Gujral, with him) for the respondent, the State of
Punjab.
M. 0. Setalvad (Attorney-General for India) ( B. Sen,
with him) for the Intervener.
1952. December 5.
'l'he Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
MUKHERJEA J.-The facts giving rise to these two
connected appeals may be briefly narrated as follows:
Darshan Singh, the appellant in Case No. 11, and
Attar Singh, who is the appellant in Case No. 12,
along with three other persons were tried by the
Special Magistrate, Ambala, East Punjab, on charges
under section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, read
with-section 3/10 of the East Punjab Cotton Cloth
and Yarn (Regulation of Movement) Order, 1947,
and section 7 of· the Essential Supplies Act, 1946.
There was a further charge under section 8 of the
Essential Supplies Act against three of these accused,
Darshau Singh being one of them.
-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
321
The allegation against all the accused, in sub1952
stance, was that they conspired to export 76 bags of D
h~S. h
mill-made cloth to Pakistan without a permit, by
ars ~n ing
smuggling them through the customs barrier near The State of
Wagha, on the morning of the 26th May, 1948. · Punjab.
Wagha is about 18 miles from Amritsar, and at a
distance of nearly half a mile from this place lies the Mukherjea J.
actual ludo-Pakistan border. B·etween the customs
barrier and the border there is a small Police Post
a·nd almost opposite the Police Post is the customs
office which is located in a tent. The prosecution·
case is that at about 7 a. m. on the 26th of May,
1948, a truck, loaded with a large quantity of millmade cloth owned by the accused Ram Singh, arrived
at the customs barrier near Wag ha. Rajendra Singh,
another accused, who was on duty at that time as the
Customs Supervisor, allowed the truck to pass
through and the truck stopped naar th!l customs
office on the side of the Police Post.
As soon as the
truck stopped, Darshan Singh, who was the Deputy
Superintendent in charge .of the customs barrier, and
Attar Singh, who was a Customs Preventive Officer
at Amritsar and was then under order of transfer to
some other place, went. tG the Police Station and
asked Kulraj, the Sub-Inspector in charge of the
same, to allow the lorry to pass through upto the
border.
Kulraj did not accede to this request and
thereupon both Darshan Singh and Attar Singh went
back to the austoms tent.
The truck was then unloaded and the goods were handed over to a large
number of coolies who began carrying them towards
the border, being followed by both Attar Singh and
Ram Singh. A little later, Kaila.sh Chandra, a Police
Sub-Inspector of Amritsar who was at that time on
special duty in co~nection with checking and detection of smuggling cases, arrived at the place on a
motor bicycle and being informed by Kulraj of what
had happened before, both he and Kulraj proceeded
in his motor cycle towards the border and overtook
the coolies who were carrying the goods. The coolies
were rounded up and brought back to the border along
322
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1953]
195•
with Attar Singh, though Ram Singh managed to
D
h~8
.
h slip away. Kailash Chandra made a report of the
ars an ing
I d
s·
h
v.
occurrence to n er
mgh, w o .was the head of the
The Stat• of S}:>ecial Police Establishment at Delhi dealing with
Punjab. ·
smuggling cases, and after a detailed investigation,
the five accused were sent up to take their trial. The
Mukherjea J. trying Magistrate convicted all of them under section
120-B of the Indian Penal Code, read with section
3/10 of the East Punjab Cotton Cloth and Yarn
Order, 1947, and sentenced them to rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year each. Attar Singh was
further convicted under section 7 of the Essential
Supplies Act and Darshan Singh under section 8 of
the said Act, and there was a sentence of one year's
rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,000 upon
each one of them under these sections, the sentence
of rigorous imprisonment to run concurrently with
that on the previous charges.
~gainst this judgment there was an appeal taken
by all the accused to the Court of the Sessions J ndge
at Amritsar.
The Additional Sessions Judge, who
heard the appeal, acquitted two of the accused but
maintained the conviction of the other three, namely,
Attar Singh, Ram Singh arid Darshan Singh, though
their sentences were reduced.
Thereupon these three
persons presented three separate revision petitions to
the High Court of East Punjab at Simla which were
heard and disposed of by Mr. Justice Khosla sitting
singly.
The learned Judge dismissed the revision
petitions but granted a certificate under article 132
of the Constitution on the ground that the cases involved a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution. It is on the strength
of this certificate that these two appeals have come
before us, one being filed by Darshan Singh and the
other by Attar Singh.
No appeal has been preferred
by the accused Ram Singh.
The constitutional point involved in these appeals
has
been
presented before us very lucidly by
Mr. Achhru Ram who appeared on behalf ot Darsha1l
--
-
'
~
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
323
Singh, the appellant in Case No. 11, and his con ten19511
tiou, in substance, is that the East Punjab Cotton D
h-8 .
L
.
l
~rs an
ing~
Cloth and Yarn Order, 1947, whwh was promu gated
v.
by the Governor of East Punjab by notification dat.ed
The.Statt of
15th November, 1947, and under the provisions of
Punjab,
which the prosecution was launched
agairn~t the
a.cc used, was ultra vires the authority of the Governor, Mukh6rj•a J.
in so far as it purported to legislate on matters, of
export and import across the customs frontier; and
congequentl] the accused could not be held guilty of
any offence for having violated such provisions.
For ·a proper appreciation of the contention raised
by the learned counsel, it would be necessary to refer
to . certain provisions of the Government of India
Act, 1935, as well as to those of a number of
later enactments.
Under entriea 27 and 29 of
List II of the Government of India Act, 1935, "trade
and commerce within the province" and " production ...... supply and distribution of goods" were
provincial subjects, while "import and export across
the customs frontier" was a central subject being
covered by item 19 in List I. Section 102 of the
Government of India Act, 1935, gave the Central
Legislature the power to legislate on provincial
subjects if and when a proclamation was issued by the
Governor-General that a state of emergency existed
in the country, and such legislation would, under
sub-section ( 4) of the section, cease to have effect on
the expiration of :t period of six months after the
proclamation had ceased to operate. It appears that
these extraordinary powers were assumed by the
Central Legislature during the period of the last war
when there was a Proclamation of Emergency brthe
Governor-General, and the Defence of India Rules
promulgated during this period dealt with various
provincial matters. The Proclamation of Emergency
was revoked by the Governor-General under section
102, clause (3), of the Constitution·Act on 1st April,
1946, and the result of the revocation was that all
orders passea on the basis of the Defence of India
Act or the Defence of India Rules ceased to be
fZ
324
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1953]
19~
2
operative after the 30th of September, 1946.
The
D
18 .
7 state of the country, however, was at that time far
at·s tan. ing i
.
.
v.
· from normal and it was considered necessary that the
Tha Stat• of co.ntrol of the Central Legislature over the producPuujab.
tion, supply and distribution of goods should not be
discontinued.
To meet this situation, the British
Mukherjea J. Parliament passed a temporary Act (9 and 10 Geo.
6 chapter 39) which gave the Indian Legislature,
during the period specified in the Act, the power to
make laws with regard to certain provincial subyects.
The provision of section 2 of the Act: so far as is
necessary for our present purpose, stood as follows :
" ( 1) Notwithstanding anything in the Government ofindia Act, 1935, the Indian Legislature shall,
during the period mentioned in section 4 of this Act,
have power to make laws with respect to the follow-
. ing matters:
(a) trade ~nd commerce (whether or not within a
Province) in :i.nd the production, supply and distribution of, cotton and woollen textiles, paper, petroleum products, spare parts of mechanically propelled
vehicles, coal, iron, steel and mica; ".
Armed with this authority, the Indian r~egislatnre
passed the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers)
Act of 1946, sections 3 and 4 of which are in these
terms:-
" 3.
The Central Government so far as it appears
to it necessary or expedient for maintaining or increasing supplies of any essential commodity or for
securing their equitable distribution aud availability
at fair prices may, by notified order provide for
regulating and prohibiting the production, supply
and distribution thereof and trade and commerce
th1'lrein.
•
•
*
*
4. · The Central Government may
by
notified
order direct that the power to make orders under section 3 shall in relation to such matters and ~nbject to
such conditions, if any, as may be specified in th!)
direction, be exercisable a.lso by
)
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
325
(a)
*
*
*
*
(b) such Provincial Government or such officer
or authority subordinate to a Provincial Government
as may be specified in the direction."
•
By a notification· dated 20th of December, 1946,
issued under section 4 mentioned above, the Central
Government delegated to the Governor of Punjab the
powers under section_3 of the Act.
On the 15th of
November, 1947, the Governor of East Punjab, in
exercise of the powers ·delegated by the said notifica- .
tiqp, passed the East Punjab Cotton Cloth and Yarn
(Regulation of Movement) Order, 1947, and sections
2, 3 and 10 of the Order are material for our present
purpose.
Section 2 is in these terms:-
" In this Order unless there is anything repugnant
in the subject or context, (a) "export" means to take
out of the Province of .the East Punjab or the said
land by rail, road or river to any Province or State
of the Dominions of India and Pakistan and includes
taking out of the Province of East Punjab to any
place, situated in the said lands as well as out of
the said lands to any place situated in the East
Punjab."
Section 3 runs as follows :-
" No person shall export or attempt to export
cotton cloth or yarn except under the authority and.
'in accordance with the conditions of a permit, issued
by a permit issuing authority .......... The permit shall
be in form IV, specified in Schedule 'A' annexed to
this Order".
Section 10 provides:-
"If any person contravenes any provision of this
Order, he shall be punishable with
imprisonment
which may extend to 3 years, with fine or both and
without prejudice to any other general punishment
which may be imposed by any court trying such contravention may direct that any cotton cloth and/or
yarn in respect of which the court is satisfied that
this order has been contravened 'together with the
1962
Darshan Singh
v.
Thi State of
Punjab.
Muklt1rjea J.
328
8 UPREM.E COURT REPOR'l1S
[1953j
1952
covering and packing of such cloth shall be forfeited
Darshan Singh to His Majesty."
·
v.
The point for our consideration is, whether the
The State of ab!Jve provisions which prohibit inter alia the export
Punjab,
of certain essential commodities to auy country outside India without a permit and make the violation of
Mukherjr;a ·J. such provisions au offence, were validly made by the
Governor in exercise of the powers delegated to him
under section 4 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary
Powers) Act, 1946?
It is not suggested by the learned counsel t~at
there was anything improper in the Central Government's delegating its powers to the Governor of East
Punjab under section 4 of the Essential Supplies
(Temporary Powers) Act.
His contention is that the
Governor, in making the order, acted iu excess of his
delegated authority by prohibiting th.e export of
cotton cloth aud yarn to' any place outside India.
'Matters of export· and import, it is said, were not
within the scope of section 3 of the Essential Supplies
Act, and the notification under section 4 could only
delegate to the Governor such powers as the Central
Government could itself exercise under section 3.
Section 3 of the Essential Supplies Act, it is true,
authorised the Central Government to make provisions for regulating and prohibiting the production,
supply and distribution of the essential commodities
specified in the Act and also trade and commerce
therein; but it is argued by the learned counsel that
the expression "trade and commerce", as used in the
section, must be taken to mean trade and commerce
within a provipce or at the most between_provinces
f
inter se, but it cannot include any transaction by way
of exporting goods outside India. This interpretation,
somewhat restricted as it appears to us, is sought to
be supported by a two-fold argument. In the first
place, it is said, that the Essential Supplies Act, as
its preamble shows, was passed by the Central Legislature in exercise of the authority conferred upon it
by the India (Cen~ral Government and Legislature)
Act, 1946, (9 and 10 Geo. 6, c. 39) and that statute
S.d.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
327
conferred, only for a short period of time, a power in
the Central Indian Legislature to legislate on certain
provincial matters, which it could not do after the
revocation of the Proclamation of Emergency ()n
the termination of the war.
It is said, therefore,
that the Essential Supplies Act purported to deal
exclusively with provincial matters, and import and
export of goods outside the Indian territory, being a
central subject, could not reasonably be . brought
within tha purview of the Act.
The other line of
reasoning that. is put forward in support of the
argument is, that the intention of the Central Legislature not to include export and import within the
provisions of the Essential Supplies Act is evidenced
by the fact that the Central Legislature dealt with
export and import of goods separately and by an
altogether different set of enactments which existed
side by side with the Essential Supplies Act and
other legislation of the same type preceding it. It is
pointed out,that there was an order made under the
Defence of India Rules on 3rd November, 1945,
(being Order No. 91 c. w. (1) 45) imposing prohibitions
on export of various descriptions of goods specified
therein.
'fhe Defence of India Rules were due to
expire on the 30th September, 1946.
On the 2.5th
September, 1946, the Essential Supplies Ordinance
was passed and this was later replaced by the Essenti!tl
Supplies Act.
On the very day that this Ordinance
was passed, another Ordinance, being Ordinance No.
XX of 1946, was promulgated, which inter alia continued the provisions of the Defence of India Rules
relating to prohibition and restriction of import and export of goods. Subsequently on the 25th of March,
1947, the Imports and Exports (Control) Act was
passed, which dealt comprehensively with the subject of control over exports and imports. As it
would be unnatural to suppos(:) that the legislature
was legislating on the same subject simultaneously by
two parallel sets of legislation existing side by side,
i~ i~ argued that export and import of goods were
not within the scope
and intendment of the
Essential Supplies Act.
1952
Darshan Singh
v.
The State of
Punjab.
328
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1953)
1952
'rhese arguments though somewhat plausible at
-
8 .
• first sight, do not appear to us to be sound or convinDarahan "'9"
·
I ·
d.
1 1
f ·
·
h
h
v.
cmg.
tis a car ma rue o mterpretat10n t at t e
i'he stat• of .)aliguage used by the legislature is the true depository
Punjab.
of the legislative intent, and that words and phrases
occurring in a statute are to be taken not in an iso1aMu7<horjea J. ted or detached manner dissociated from the context,
but are to be read tog.ether and construed in the light
of the purpose and object of the Act itself.
The object of the Essential Supplies Act; as set out
iu the preamble, was to provide for the continuance,
during a limited period of time, of the p·ower to control the production, supply and distribution of, and
trad0 and commerce in, foodstuffs, cotton and woollen
textiles, petroleum, iron and other essential commodities, a list of which appeared in the Act itself. Section 3, which is the most material part of the Act,
authorised the Central Government, whenever it considered expedient or necessary, for maintaining or
increasing supplies of any essential commodity or for
securing their equitable distribution and availability
at fair prices, to provide by notified order, for regulating or prohibiting, the productioI), supply and distribution
thereof or trade and commerce therein.
Keeping this object in view and reading the words
"trade and commerce" in the light of the context,
there appears to be no reason why these words should
not be taken in their ordinary or natural sense and
why restriction on the export of goods to any place
outside a province, including a neighbouring foreign
State should be_ deemed to be outside their scope and
ambit. For maintenauce or increase of supply of
essential commodities within a province and to secure
their equitable distribution and availability at fair
prices, it might certainly be necessary to restrict
export of the goods outside the province, and Pakistan being a foreign State abutting on the very borders
of East Punjab, it was quite natural fm the East
Punjab Governor to mention Pakistan as orie of the
places to which export of goods from his province
should not be allowed without a proper permit. As
l
1
-
S.O.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
329
the main object of the legislation was the continuance
1952
of control over the production, supply and distribu-
-
.
t.
f
d" ·
"d
d
t. l t
th
Darshan Singh
10n o commo ities cons1 ere essen ia o
e comv.
munity and as these are provincial subjects, 1'he
Th6 state of
Central Legislature in legislating on them must have
Punjab.
to invoke the powers conferred upon it by the India
(Central GoYernment and Legislature) Act, 1946 Mukherjea J.
(9 _& 10 Geo. 6, c. 39) spoken of above; and that
is plainly the reason why a reference to that statute
was made in the second parn,graph of the preamble.
\
But from this it cannot be argued that the Central
-',
Legislature was fogislating only in exercise of the
·powers which it derived from the British Parliament
and that it did not exercise the powers which it itself
had under the Government of Indja Act. It is not
disputed that the Central Legislature was fully com~
petent to legislate on exports and imports which are
central. subjects and in making any provision relating
thereto, it cannot be said that it acted in excess of its
authority.
·
Even taking the legislation to be purely on the
provincial subjects of production,_ distribution and
supply of goods, restriction of export as ancillary to
production and supply of essential commodities would,
in our opinion, be quite within the scope and ambit
of sucli legislation and in pith and substance it would
be an enactment dealing exclusively with these provincial matters.
Looked at from this standpoint, the other argument
advanced by Mr. Achhru Ram would also be found
to be without any substance. 'l'he 'imports and Exports Act or the earlier Order and Ordinance, referred
to by the learned counsel, were legislation essentially
on the subject of exports and imports.
Their object
was to regulate or control imports and exports generally and they dealt with a large variety of articles far
outnum'bering those enumerated in the Essential
Supplies Act. The object of the Imports and Exports
Act was not to regulate production and distribution
pf coμrμiodities considered essential ~ the communit~
330
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1953)
195a
and it was not as a means to secure that object that
D
h8 .
h it purported to prohibit or restrict exporting of goods.
ars an ing
h
h
f h
,
v.
T us t e scope and purpose o t e two sets of Ieg1sThe State of
Iatioion were totally different and there was nothing
Punjab,
wrong if they existed side by the side and were in
operation at one and the same time, We are not told
Mukherjea J, that there was any overlapping of the provisions of
these two statutes; and as the competency of
~he
legislature to enact both these sets of provisions is not
disputed, we do not think that any occasional overlapping, even if it is assumed to exist, would be at all
material. In our opinion, therefore·, the contentions
taised in regard to the constitutional point involved
in these appeals are unsupportable and could not be
accepted.
As the appeals have come up before us on the
strength of a certificate granted under article 132(1)
of the Constitution, the appellants are not entitled to
challenge th!l propriety of the decision appealed against
on a ground other than that on which the certificate
was given except with the leave of this court as
provided for by cl_ause (3) of article'l32 of the Constitution.
At the close of the arguments of the
parties in regard to the constitutional point referred
to above, we made it clear to the learned counsel
appearing for both the appellants that we would not
allow any question relating to the merits of the cases
. to be raised before us which turned merely on appreciation of evidence by the courts below. Mr. Umrigar,
who appeared for Attar Singh the appellant in Case
No. 12, however stated to us that he would crave
leave to bring to our notice one important matter
which, according to him, resulted in grave miscarriage
of justice at least so far as his client was concerned.
He pointed out that both the Additional Sessions
Judge and the learned Judge of the High Court in
deciding the case against his client relied upon an
admission alleged to have been made by the latter
that he was present at the customs barrier at Wagha
on the morning of the day of occurrence and had
gone there to say good-bye to the customs staff, he
'" '
-
-' '
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
331
being under an order of transfer from Amritsar to
· 19011
Gurdaspur. It is said by the learned counsel that his
-
client never admitted his presence at the customs Darshan Singh
barrier on the morning of 26th May, 1948, and t'1at
The ;;ate of
he neither did nor had any occasion to. put forward
Punjab.
any explanation regarding his presence there at that
time.
The whole thing, it is said, is based upon sheer Mu'kherJea J.
misapprehension and is. not warranted by anything
appearing on the record.
There is no doubt that the Additional Sessions
Judge as well as the High Court did refer in their res-
•
pective judgments to the alleged, admission of Attar
Singh and rely upon the same to arrive at their decision in the case.
The Additional Sessions Judge said
in his judgment:
" The next important man is Attar Singh accused.
He admits his presence at the barrier on that morning,
when he says that he had gone to bid good-bye to the
customs staff on his transfer to Gurdaspur. According to the leave obtained by him he had yet to remain
at Amritsar till 28th and in view of illness of his wife
he need not have been in hurry to go to the barrier
for this purpose SQ soon.
I am not convinced with
his explanation."
The High Court in referring to the said admission
observed as follows :
·" Atta,r Singh admitted tha,t he was present at the
barrier on that morning but the explana,tion he gave
was this. His office is at Amritsar but he had received
orders of ttansfer to Gurdaspur. His wife was ill and,
therefore, he could not move immediately.
So he
applied for a few days leave, and on the morning of
the 26th of May he went to the barrier to say goodbye to his colleagues in the Customs Department and
while he was there this incident took place without
his knowledge ......... Attar S ingh's explanation of his
presence at the spot does not convince me at all."
It a pp ears that in course of the examination of the
!\iCCUlled Att~r Singh unqer section 342 of ~he OriminSil
43
332
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1953)
1952
Procedure Code before the trial Magistrate a specific
-
.
question was put to him as to whether he could exDarshan 8•ngh plain his presence on the scene of occurrencg on
The s~~t. of tlte 26th May, 1948, although it was alleged that
. Punjab.
he was on, leave.
To this question he replied
categorically that he was not present as alleged.
Nu"116rjea J. In this state of the records, we asked the learned
Advocate-General, who appeared for the State of
East Punjab, as to when and how was the admis-
•
sion referred to above made by Attar Singh.
The
Advocate-General, answered that the admission
might be in the written statement which Attar Singh
said he would file when he was interrogated under
section 342 of the Criminal Procedure Code. In order
to clear up the matter we had the further hearing of
the case adjourned to enable the Advocate-General to
produce before us the written statement, if any, that
was filed by Attar Singh in the trial court.
The case
was again taken up for hearing on the 26th of
November last and the Advocate-General frankly
stated to us that no written statement by Attar Singh
was on the records at all. It is clear, therefore, that
both the courts below in coming to their decision
regarding the guilt of the accused did rely to a considerable extent on the so-called admission of Attar
Singh which, it must be held, had no existence in
fact.
The Advocate-General contends that even if
there was an error committed by the courts below in
this respect, we should nevertheless dismiss the appeal
inasmuch as there is sufficient evidence to support
the conviction of the accused independently of the
so-called admission of Attar Singh; and he invited
us to examine the evidence ourselves and come to our
own decision on the point.
Without in any way disputing our right to adopt this course in cases where
it may be considered necessary, we think that in the
circumstances of the present case the proper order to
make will be to direct a rehearing of the appeal by
the Sessions Court on the evidence as it actually
stands after excluding from consideration the alleged
11dmission of Attar Singh.
There can be no doubt
... .
. )
-' A
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
333
that the supposed admission was of a very damaging
1962
character and was highly prejudicial to the accused. D
h-8 .
It .
.
bl
. t
1
't
ff
th
ars an •ngh
is quite pro emat1c o va ue i s e ect upon
e
v
minds of the Judges in the courts below ana it ts
The St~te of
difficult for us to say that had it been excluded from
Punjab •
consideration the courts would have come to the same
decision of guilt or that conversely a verdict of Mu.kherJea J.
acquittal would have been a perverse one. In such
cases, the function of this court, which is not an
ordinary court of criminal appeal, is not so much to
weigh and appraise the evidence again, to find out the
guilt or innocence of the accused as to see that the
accused gets a fair trial on proper evidence.
It has been argued by Mr. Achhru Ram, and in our
opinion quite rightly, that if the case of Attar Singh
is to be heard afresh, the same order should be made
in the case of Darshan Singh as well.
Not only are
the two cases closely interconnected, but so far as
Darshan Singh is concerned the prosecution sought
to establish his complicity in the affair primarily by
adducing evidence to show that he was in the company of Attar Singh when both of them approached
Kulraj, the officer-in-charge of the police station, and
requested him to allow the truck to pass through.
The Additional Sessions Judge observed in his judg~
ment that the only motive of Darshan Singh was to
help his colleague, namely Attar Singh, who was about
to leave the district. It is necessary, therefore, the.b
the case of Darshan Singh should also be reheard and
the whole evidence against him reconsidered with a.
view to find out whether he is guilty or innocent.
The result, therefore, is that both the appeals are
allowed.
The judgment of the High Court as well a.s
that of the Additional Sessions Judge are set aside
and the cases remitted to the Sessions Court in order
that they may be heard afresh on the evidence on
record in the light of the observations made above
after excluding
from consideration the supposed
admission of Attar Singh .. Pending the decision of
195•
Darshan Singh
V,
The Stat~ of
P1iiijab.
1952
334
SUPREME COURT R~PORTS [1953)
the Sessions Court, the accused would remain on bail
on the same terms as before.
•
Appeals a.llowed.
Agent for
the appellant m Case No. 11:
Nau.nit Lal.
Agent
for the appellant
m Case No. 12:
A. D. Mathur.·
Agent for the respondent and the intervener:
G. H. Rajadhyaksha.
STATE OF MADRAS
v.
C. P. SARATHY AND ANO'I'HER.
[PATANJAr;r SASTRI c.J., MUKHERJEA,
CHANDHASEKHARA -AIYAH, VIVIAN BosE and
GHULAM HASAN JJ.J
lnd1lstrial Disputes Act (XIV of 1947), ss. JO (1) (c), 29Refercnce to Industrial ~Tribunal-Nature of ili_spnte or partieR to
1'.t not specijied-Va,licUty of reference ancl atvard-Dema .. nds lry
Union of ernployees of several concerns-Employers of some concerns
accepting terrrf,S of thei.r employees-Reference a.s to rill co1~cerns
Vakdity.
The South Indian Cinema Employees' Association 1 a regis.
terecl trade union whose members were the employees of the 24
cinema houses operatillg in the l\1adras City including some of the
employees of the Prabhat Talkies, submitted to the Labour Commissioner a n1emorandum setting forth certain demands against
their emplo)~ers for increased \Vagas etc. a11d requestjng him to
/
settle the disputes.
The J_,abour Commissioner suggested certain
f
"minimum terms" which ,,;ere accepted by some of the companies including the Prabbat · Talkies and at a meeting of the employees of the Prabhat Talkies a resolution was ·pa.ssed to the
effect that no action be taken about the demands of the Association.
The Association clecidod to go on strike. Tbe Labour Commissioner reported to the Government, and the Government made
·a reference to an Industrial Tribunal, the material portion of which
was: "Whereas an induStrial dispute has arisen between t.he workers
and m'anagement of the Cinema Talkies in the 1'1adras City in respect of certain matters and whereas in the opinion of His _Excellency the Governo1· of l\Iadras it is necessary, to refer the said industrial dispute for adjudication: now therefore etc." The Prabbat
. ~