# SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959) Supp. M/S. SASA MUSA SUGAR WORKS (P) LTD v. SHOBRATI KHAN AND OTHERS

- **Citation:** [1959] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 836
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1956-05-21
- **Case number:** Civil Appeals Nos. 746 and 747 of 1957
- **Bench:** B. P. Sinha, P. B.. Gaje, Ndragadkar, JC N. vVANcHoo
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/supreme-court-reports-1959-supp-m-s-sasa-musa-sugar-works-p-ltd-v-shobrati-khan-1682
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

· Industrial Dispi<te-Go-slow-Employer's application for perm.ission to dismiss worhmen-Tribunal's poie;er-Perverse findingGrant of permission-Indi<strial Disputes Act, r947 (r4 of r947),
s. 33·
Pending an adjudication proceeding between the workmen
and the Mills, the management of the appellant Mills served
notices on thirty-three of its workmen and thereafter suspended
them for taking a leading part in a protracted go-slow in contravention of the Industrial Disputes Act.
For similar reasom,. a
few days later, it again served similar notices on fifteen others
and suspended them.
Thereafter the management made two
applications under s. ·33 of the Industrial Disputes Act for permission to dismiss the said workmen. The forty-eight workmen
in their turn applied under s. 33A of the Act alleging breach of
s. 33 by the management in suspending them by way of punishment. The Industrial Tribunal found that the suspension was not
by way of punishment and that there was a deliberate resort to
go-slow by the workmen which was unjustified; it refused the
permission with respect to sixteen of the workmen on the ground
of want of evidence but granted leave to the management to
suspend the rest for seven days, thus disallowing the prayer for
dismissal. It also rejected the workmen's application under
s. 33A of the Act.
Appeals were filed by both the parties and
when they came up for hearing, the Appellate Tribunal allowed
the workmen to withdraw their appeal so far as it related to
their application under s. 33A of the Act, with the result that
the finding of the Tribunal that the suspension was not a punishment but only pending enquiry by the management and proceedings before the Tribunal, stood confirmed.
While agreeing with
all other findings of the Tribunal, the Appellate Tribunal took
the view that the suspension ordered by the management was
substantive.punishrnent since the notices did not state that it
was pending enquiry, and the subsequent application for permission to dismiss the workmen was, therefore, mala fide and dismissed the appeal of the management.
'
Held, that the material findings arrived at by the Industrial
Tribunal not having been upset by the Appellate Tribunal, the
only possible order on the applications of the management under
s. 33 of the Act was to permit it to dismiss the workmen provided
there was evidence against them all. It was not open to the
Industrial Tribunal to substitute some other form of punishment
and give permission therefor.
(2) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPOH.TS
837
The Appellate Tribunal was clearly in error in holding that
suspension, in the instant ca.se, was not an interim order pending
enquiry and proceedings before the Tribunal under s. 33, b_ut
substantive punishment, contrary to the finding of the Industrial
Tribunal which stood confirmed by its own order permitting the
withdrawal of the appeal against it by the workmen.
The finding of the Industrial Tribunal that there was no
evidence against sixteen workmen was, on the face of it, perverse, since the evidence against them was the same as against
the thirty-two others.
As go-slow was serious misconduct, insidious in nature and
could not be countenanced,· and since the workmen were found
guilty of snch misconduct, the management must be granted the
permission to dismiss them.
CIVIL
APPELLATE
JURISDICTION:
Civil Appeals
Nos. 746 and 747 of 1957.
Appeals by special leave from the judgments and
orders dated June 3, 1955, and May 21, 1956, of the
Labour Appellate Tribunal of India, Calcutta, in
Appeal No. Cal. 366/52 and Misc. Case No. 145 of 1955
respectively, arising out of an A ward dated September 22, 1952, of the Industrial Tribunal, Bihar, and
published in the Bihar State Government Gazette on
October 21, 1952.
M. 0. Setalvad,
Attorney-General for India and
R. 0. Prasad, for the appellant.
The respondent did not appear.
1959.
April 29.
The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
1959
M /s. Sasa Jiusa
Sugar Works
(P) Ltd.
v.
Shobrati Khan
& O

## Text

1959
April zg.
836
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959) Supp.
M/S. SASA MUSA SUGAR WORKS (P) LTD.
v.
SHOBRATI KHAN AND OTHERS
(B. P. SINHA, P. B.. GAJE,NDRAGADKAR and
JC N. vVANcHoo, JJ.)
· Industrial Dispi<te-Go-slow-Employer's application for perm.ission to dismiss worhmen-Tribunal's poie;er-Perverse findingGrant of permission-Indi<strial Disputes Act, r947 (r4 of r947),
s. 33·
Pending an adjudication proceeding between the workmen
and the Mills, the management of the appellant Mills served
notices on thirty-three of its workmen and thereafter suspended
them for taking a leading part in a protracted go-slow in contravention of the Industrial Disputes Act.
For similar reasom,. a
few days later, it again served similar notices on fifteen others
and suspended them.
Thereafter the management made two
applications under s. ·33 of the Industrial Disputes Act for permission to dismiss the said workmen. The forty-eight workmen
in their turn applied under s. 33A of the Act alleging breach of
s. 33 by the management in suspending them by way of punishment. The Industrial Tribunal found that the suspension was not
by way of punishment and that there was a deliberate resort to
go-slow by the workmen which was unjustified; it refused the
permission with respect to sixteen of the workmen on the ground
of want of evidence but granted leave to the management to
suspend the rest for seven days, thus disallowing the prayer for
dismissal. It also rejected the workmen's application under
s. 33A of the Act.
Appeals were filed by both the parties and
when they came up for hearing, the Appellate Tribunal allowed
the workmen to withdraw their appeal so far as it related to
their application under s. 33A of the Act, with the result that
the finding of the Tribunal that the suspension was not a punishment but only pending enquiry by the management and proceedings before the Tribunal, stood confirmed.
While agreeing with
all other findings of the Tribunal, the Appellate Tribunal took
the view that the suspension ordered by the management was
substantive.punishrnent since the notices did not state that it
was pending enquiry, and the subsequent application for permission to dismiss the workmen was, therefore, mala fide and dismissed the appeal of the management.
'
Held, that the material findings arrived at by the Industrial
Tribunal not having been upset by the Appellate Tribunal, the
only possible order on the applications of the management under
s. 33 of the Act was to permit it to dismiss the workmen provided
there was evidence against them all. It was not open to the
Industrial Tribunal to substitute some other form of punishment
and give permission therefor.
(2) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPOH.TS
837
The Appellate Tribunal was clearly in error in holding that
suspension, in the instant ca.se, was not an interim order pending
enquiry and proceedings before the Tribunal under s. 33, b_ut
substantive punishment, contrary to the finding of the Industrial
Tribunal which stood confirmed by its own order permitting the
withdrawal of the appeal against it by the workmen.
The finding of the Industrial Tribunal that there was no
evidence against sixteen workmen was, on the face of it, perverse, since the evidence against them was the same as against
the thirty-two others.
As go-slow was serious misconduct, insidious in nature and
could not be countenanced,· and since the workmen were found
guilty of snch misconduct, the management must be granted the
permission to dismiss them.
CIVIL
APPELLATE
JURISDICTION:
Civil Appeals
Nos. 746 and 747 of 1957.
Appeals by special leave from the judgments and
orders dated June 3, 1955, and May 21, 1956, of the
Labour Appellate Tribunal of India, Calcutta, in
Appeal No. Cal. 366/52 and Misc. Case No. 145 of 1955
respectively, arising out of an A ward dated September 22, 1952, of the Industrial Tribunal, Bihar, and
published in the Bihar State Government Gazette on
October 21, 1952.
M. 0. Setalvad,
Attorney-General for India and
R. 0. Prasad, for the appellant.
The respondent did not appear.
1959.
April 29.
The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
1959
M /s. Sasa Jiusa
Sugar Works
(P) Ltd.
v.
Shobrati Khan
& Others
WANCHOO, J.-These are
two appeals by the
Wanchoo J.
management by special leave in an industrial matter
arising out of two applications under s. 33 of the
Industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter called the Act).
The facts of the case are briefly these : The appellant,
Messrs. Sasa Musa Sugar Works (Private) Ltd. is a
sugar factory in District Saran (Bihar). The factory
was established in 1932. In June 1942, a trade union
was formed in this factory. In July 1943, trouble
arose between the workmen and the management
resulting in the discharge of three office-bearers of the
union, including one Shams-ud-din, who was then the
1959
Mfs. Sasa i11usa
Sugar Worl~s
(PJ Ltd.
v.
Shobrati Khan
& Others
lVanchoo ].
838
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
joint secretary. That matter was referred to adjudication and the discharged workmen were ordered to
be reinstated in the beginning of 1944. In December
1944, there was trouble again and a large number of
workmen were dismissed, including Shams-ud-din, who
had by now become the president of the union.
This
dispute was again referred to an Industrial Tribunal,
which again ordered reinstatement of the dismissed
workmen in August 1947.
There was peace for some
time after this. But in June 1951, the management
again
discharged
seventeen
workmen, including
Shams-ud-din, who was at that time secretary of the
union.
The trouble continued up to December 1951,
when .an agreement was arrived at .between the union
and the management, as a result of which twelve of
the workmen were reinstated hut five, including
Shams-ud-din, were not and their cases were to be
referred to adjudication. It appears, however, that
another reference between the management and its
workmen was already pending since September 8, 1951,
before an Industrial Tribunal, when this agreement
was arrived at. Thereafter the work in the factory
proceeded smoothly for some time. But on January 1,
1952, a notice was iss~ed by the union to the management enlisting as many as 40 demands and it was
threatened that if the demands were not met within
seven days, the union would have to advise the workmen to adopt go-slow and call upon them to offer
passive resistance with effect from January 9, 1952,
and take all legitimate means to see that the decision
of go-slow was carried out till the demands of the
union were fulfilled.
This notice was received by
the management on January 4, which immediately
contacted the officers of the Labour Department as
well as the Sub-Divisional Magistrate at Gopalganj.
On January 8, the Deputy Labour Commissioner
wrote to the union that as the conciliation officer
was busy in the general elections, the status quo
should be ·maintained till the elections were over, so
that the matter migji.t be looked into by the concilia·-
tion officer. The union, however, gave no heed to
this advice and go-slow began from January 9 and
(2) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPOHTS
839
was continued· till January 12, 1952.
Then the
Labour Commissioner himself came to the factory on
January 12 and advised Shams-ud-din who was the
moving spirit behind all this to call off the go-slow, as
it was proposed to start conciliation proceedings at
Patna on January 17, 1952.
Conciliation proceedings
then began on January 17 and an agreement was
arrived at as to some of the demands on January 23,
and it was decided that. further conciliation proceedings would be held in February. But in spite of this
agreement go-slow was again resorted to from January 24 to January 31. In the meantime, the Labour
Officer had arrived at the factory on January 28,
1952, and further talks took place. The workmen,
however, did not pay heed to the advice of the Labour
Officer. He, therefore, reported on January 31 to the
Labour Commissioner that go-slow was still continuing.
The Labour Commissioner then ordered the
Labour Officer to tell the workmen that no further
conciliation proceedings would take place until the goslow was called of.
The Labour Officer then informed
the management that it could take disciplinary action
against the workmen concerned with the permission
of the Industrial Tribunal. Consequently, the management suspended thirty-three workmen by a notice
given on the night of January 31 as from February 1.
It was said in the notice that these thirty-three workmen had been found taking a leading part in the unjustified go-slow which was in contravention of the Act
and they were therefore suspended from service until
further orders. This notice had some good effect and
work improved for four days; but from :February 5 goslow was started again. Consequently, the management
suspended seven more workmen from February 6 and
eight more from February 7 by giving notice to them
in the same terms in which the notice had been given
to the thirty-three workmen, on' January 31.
As
adjudication proceedings were pending since September 1951 between the management and its workmen,
the former applied on February 6, 1952, under s. 33 of
the Act for permission to dismiss the thirty-three
workmen and on February 11, 1952, for permission to
r959
M /s. Sa.sa Musa
Sugar Works
(P) Ltd.
v.
Shobrati Khan
& Others
Wanchoo ].
1959
l\f /s. Sasa :\1usa
Sugar Works
(P) Ltd.
v.
Shobrati Khan
Q;. Others
Wanchoo j.
•
840
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
dismiss the remaining fifteen workmen who had been
suspended later. The forty-eight workmen in their
turn applied on March 29, 1952, under s. 33-A of the
Act to the Industrial Tribuhal and their case was that
they had been suspended as a measure of punishment
and that as this was done without the sanction of the
Indnstrial.Tribunal, the management had committee]
a breach of s. 33.
The three applications were tric<l together by the
Industrial Tribunal and the contentions raised before
it were these:
(1) The management's applications under s. 33
had not been preceded by any enquiry into the miscon-
<luct of the workmen and were, therefore, liable to be
rejected;
(2) The order of suspension in this case amounted
to punishment and therefore s. 33 had been contra vened; and
(3) There was an unjustified go-slow by the workmen in January and February 1952.
On the first point, the Industrial Tribunal found that
no enquiry had been held by the management before
the two applications under s. 33 were made; but it
hel<l that all the evidence which could have been
taken in the enquiry by the management had been
led before it and it was in foll possession of the facts,
and no question of any prejudice to the workmen
arose, as it would be open to it on a review of the
entire evidence before it to decide whether the applications for permission to dismiss should be granted or not.
On the second point, it held that the order of suspension was not as a measure of punisment in the circumstances of this case and that it was an order pen<ling
enquiry by the management and proceedings under
s. 33 before the tribunal and tha£, as there were no
Standing Orders as to suspension in this factory, the
management's liability to pay the workmen their
wages during the period of suspension remained. On
the third point., the Indnstrial Tribunal, after an
elaborate discussion of the evidence, came to the conclusion that there-was a deliberate go-slow resorted to
by the workmen in J·anuary and February 1952 and
(Z) s.c.:R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
841
that it was unjustified as it took place while conciliation proceedings were pending.
Having given these findings; the Industrial Tribunal
had then to decide what orders it should pass on the
applications under s. 33 and s. 33-A. It held that
there was no evidence to show that of the forty-eight
workmen concerned, sixteen workmen named by it had
taken part in the go-slow or instigated it. It therefore
refused the application under s. 33 with respect to
these sixteen workmen.
As to the remaining thirtytwo workmen it held that as some Standing Orders
which were under contemplation at the time provided
either dismissal or suspension for seven days in case of
misconduct, it was proper to grant leave to the management to suspend the workmen for seven days, in view
of some opinion expressed by a Go-Slow Committee
appointed some time before by the Bihar Central
(Standing) Labour Advisory Board. In effect, therefore, it rejected the prayer of the management for dismissal with respect to these thirty-two workmen also.
Finally, it rejected the application under s. 33-A.
This award led to two appeals before the Labour
Appellate Tribunal; one was by the management
against the entire award so far as it related to its applications under s. 33, and the other by the workmen
against the dismissal of their application under s. 33-A
and against the award relating to the applications of
the management under s. 33.
When the matter came
up for hearing before the Appellate Tribunal, the
workmen withdrew their appeal with respect to their
application under s. 33-A and it wa.s consequently dismissed. The result of the dismissal of the appeal of
the workmen was that the finding of the Industrial
Tribunal that the suspension was not a punishment and
was only pending enquiry by the management and
the proceedings before the tribunal, stood confirmed.
As to the appeal by the management with respect
to the applications under s. 33, it was contended on its
behalf before the Appellate Tribunal that the Industrial Tribunal had gone wrong on two substantial questions of law, namely-
(1) the Industrial Tribunal could either grant or
ro6
I959
M/s. Sasa Musa
Sugar Works
(P) Ltd.
v.
S hobrati Khan
Q>. Others
Wanchoo ].
842
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
I959
M /s. Sasa Musa
Sugar Works
(P) Ltd.
refuse permission to dismiss on an application for such
permission under s. 33 and it could not substitute its
owu judgment about the quantum of punishment; and
(2) it was wrong in rejecting the applications
v.
against sixteen workmen on the ground that there was
Shobrati Khan no evidence.
& Others
The Appellate Tribunal was of the opinion that the
wanchoo J .. contention of the management on both these points
was correct and that the appeal involved substantial
questions of law. It also found that the Industrial
Tribunal's finding that the workmen had resorted to
go-slow was not perverse and could be the only finding
on the evidence. It then went on to say that go-slow
was insidious in nature and could not be countenanced,
and that it was serious misconduct normal punishment
for which was dismissal. It also held that the Industrial Tribunal was not right in relying upon the
recommendations of the Go-Slow Committee and the
contemplated Standing Orders which were not till then
in force. Having said all this, we should have expected that the Appellate Tribunal would set aside the
order of the Industrial Tribunal and grant permission
• to the management to dismiss the workmen for what
was serious misconduct of an insidious nature which
could not be countenanced. But it went on to say
that it was well settled that where an employer could
not punish a workman without obtaining permission
from the tribunal under s. 33, an application for permission would be mala fide if it was made after any
punishment had already been meted out to the workman. It held that in the present case, the suspension
of the workmen by the management was substantive
punishment, because the notice did not in so many
words state that it was pending enquiry and therefore
the applications for permission having been made after
punishment had been meted out were mala fide. In
coming to this conclusion, the Appellate Tribunal
seems to have forgotten that it had already dismissed
the appeal of the workmen from the order of the Industrial Tribunal on their application under s. '33-A,
which in effect amounted to confirming the order of the
Industrial Tribunal that the suspension was not a
punishment but was rightly made pending enquiry by
,
(2) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
843
the management and proceedings before the tribunal.
The Appellate Tribunal supported its decision on this
question of punishment by stating that the mala .fides
of the management were clear from the fact that
though the suspensions had been made between January 31 and February 7, 1952, the application was filed
by the management on March 29, 1952, after the application by the workmen under s. 33-A had been filed.
This observation was clearly wrong, for the applications under s. 33 were filed on February 6 and 11 by
the mana.gement, and it was the application of the
workmen under s. 33-A which was filed on March 29.
Having thus inverted the order in which the applications were made to the Industrial Tribunal, the Appellate Tribunal held that the applications of the management under s. 33 were not bona fide. It then dismissed
the appea.l of the management, thus upholding the
order of the Industrial Tribunal so far as the suspen -
sion of thirty-two workmen for seven days was concerned on 1;he ground that the workmen had withdrawn
their appeal, though in the earlier part of the judgment
all that w2~s said was that the workmen had withdrawn
their appeal against the order under s. 33-A.
As the Appellate Tribunal had obviously made a
mistake and inverted the order in which the applications under ss. 33 and 33-A had been made, a review
application was filed by the management. It, however, held that though the dates had been wrongly
mentioned by accident, it saw no reason to review its
order. That is how the management filed two special
leave petitions in this Court.
We are of opinion that on the findings of the Industrial Tribunal on the three points formulated by it
which have not been upset by the Appellate Tribunal,
the only order possible on the applications of the management under s. 33 was to permit it to dismiss the
forty-eight workmen, provided there was evidence
against them all. It was not open to the Industrial
Tribunal when it was asked to give permission to dismiss to substitute some other kind of punishment and
give permission for that. The Industrial Tribunal was
satisfied that there was misconduct and that finding
has been upheld by the Appellate Tribunal. As such
1959
M /s. Sasa Musa
Sugar Works
(P) Ltd.
v.
Shobrati Khan
& Others
Wanchoo ].
1959
M /s. Sasa Musa
Sugar 111 orhs
(P) Ltd.
v.
Shobrati J{ han
c;. Others
TVanchoo ] .
844
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959) Supp.
if there was evidence that these forty-eight workmen
were guilty of misconduct, the Industrial Tribunal was
bound to accord permission asked for.
We cannot
agree with the Appellate Tribunal that the suspension
in this case was substantive punishment. and was not
an interim order pending enquiry and proceedings
before the Industrial Tribunal under s. 33.
We have
already pointed out that the Labour Officer told the
management on January 31, 1952, that it was free to
take disciplinary action with the permission of the
Industrial Tribunal. It was thereafter that thirty.
three workmen were suspended on January 31 and the
notice clearly said that the suspension was pending
further orders, thus intimating to the workmen that
the order of suspension was an interim measure. This
notice of January 31 was followed by an application
on February 6 to the Industrial Tribunal for · permission to dismiss the thirty-three workmen involved in
it, and this also clearly shows that the suspension was
pending enquiry (if any) by the management and proceedings before the Industrial Tribunal. Similarly, the
suspension notices of February 5 and 6 relating to
fifteen workmen said that they were suspended till
further orders and were followed on February 11 by an
application under s. 33 to the Industrial Tribunal for
permission to dismiss them. In the circumstances it is
quite clear that suspension in this case was not a
punishment but was an interim measure pending
enquiry and proceedings before the tribunal. We have
already pointed out that this was the finding of the
Industrial Tribunal on the basis of which the application under s. 33-A was dismissed and this finding stood
confirmed when the workmen withdr.ew their appeal
with respect to their application under s. 33-A. The
Appellate Tribunal therefore was clearly in error in
holding. that the suspension was punishment.
The only question that remains is about the sixteen
workmen about whom the Industrial Tribunal held
that there was no evidence to connect them with the
go-slow. The Appel.late Tribunal's view in this matter
was that the contention of the management that the
Industrial Tribunal was wrong in holding that there
was no evidence against these sixteen workmen was ·
(2) S.C.R.. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
845
correct. It has been shown to us that evidence against
these sixteen workmen is of exactly the same witnesses
and of the same kind as the evidence against the remaining thirty-two. The finding, therefore, of the
Industrial Tribunal that there was no evidence against
the sixteen workmen is patently perverse, for there
was the same evidence against them as against the
remaining thirty-two. It follows, therefore, that all
the forty-eight workmen (two of whom are since said
to have died) are exactly in the same position. As held
by the .Appellate Tribunal, go-slow is serious misconduct which is insidious in its nature and cannot be
countenanced. In these circumstances as these forty.
eight workmen were taking part in the go-slow and
were thus guilty of serious misconduct, the management
was entitled to get permission to dismiss them. But as
the management held no enquiry after suspending the
workmen and proceedings under s. 33 were practically
converted into the enquiry which normally the management should have held before applying to the Industrial Tribunal, the management is bound to pay the
wages of the workmen till a case for dismissal was
made out in the proceedings under s. 33 ; (see the decision of this Court in the Management of Ranipur Colliery v. Bhuhan Singh (1) ).
As already pointed out,
this is the view taken by the Industrial Tribunal while
dealing with the application under s. 33-A which stood
confirmed by the dismissal of the appeal by the workmen in that behalf.
The management will therefore
have to pay the wages during the period of suspension
till the award of the Industrial Tribunal.
We therefore- allow the appeals and set aside the
orders of the two Tribunals so far as the applications
under s. 3;3 are ·concerned and grant the appellant the
permission sought for by it in these applications subject to the workmen being paid all their wages during
the period of suspension up to the date of the award
of the Industrial Tribunal, i.e., 22-9-1952. As the workmen did not appear to contest these appeals, we pass
no order as to costs.
Appeals allowed.
(1) [1959] Suppl. 2 S.C.R. 719.
I959
M /s. Sasa kfosa
Sugar Works
(P) Ltd.
v.
Shobrati Khan
& Others
Wanchoo ].
•