# SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(1)] GULLAPALLI NAGESWARA RAO ETC v. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH & OTHERS

- **Citation:** [1960] 1 S.C.R. 580
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1958-11-05
- **Case number:** Civil Appeals Nos. 198 to 200of1959
- **Bench:** B. P. Sinha, P. B. Gajendragadkar, K. Subba Rao
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/supreme-court-reports-1960-1-gullapalli-nageswara-rao-etc-v-the-state-of-andhra-1796
- **Pages:** 17

## Headnote

Road Transport-Scheme of nationalisation_:_Chief Minister,
if can hear objections-Doctrine of bias-Motor Vehicles Act (IV of
r939), as amended by Act roo of r956, Ch. IV A, s. 68D.
The appellants were carrying on motor transport business in
Krishna District in Andhra Pradesh. · The General Manager
of the State Transport Undertaking published a scheme for
nationalisation of motor transport and objections to the said
scheme were invited. The appellants, among others, filed their
objections. The Secretary in charge of the Transport Department gave personal hearing to the objectors and heard the
representation made on behalf of the State Transport Undertaking. The Chief Minister, who was in charge of transport,
passed the order approving the scheme.
The appellants moved
this Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution for quashing the said
scheme and this Court in Gr<llapalli Nageswara Rao v. Andhra
Pradesh Road Transport Corporation, previously decided, held
that the Secretary in charge 0f the Transport Department was
incompetent to hear the objections on the ground that no party
could be a judge in his own cause and quashed the order approving the scheme. Thereafter notices were issued by the Government to the objectors. The Chief Minister himself heard the
representatives of the objectors and the Road Transport Corporation and passed the order approving the scheme as originally
published. The appellants moved the High Court under Art.
226 of the Constitution for writs of certiorari quashing the order
passed by the Government confirming the scheme and subsequent
orders made by the Regional Transport Authority cancelling
their stage carriage permits. The High Court rejected the
petitions and the appellants appealed. It was contended, inter
alia, on their behalf that the same infirmity which attached to
the Secretary in charge of the Transport Department on the
previous occasion, attached to the Chief Minister, who was in
charge of transport, and rendered him incompetent to hear the
objections.
Held, that the two well-settled principles of the doctrine of
bias that applied equally to judicial as well as quasi-judicial
tribunals, were,-(r) that no man shall be a judge in his own
cause and that (2) justice should not merely be done but must
also appear to be done. Any kind of bias, therefore, in a judicial
authority, whether financial or other, for or against any party,
or any position that might impute bias, must disqualify him as
a judge.
-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
581
But when a State Legislature or the Parliament, in transgression of the aforesaid principles, by statute empowers an
authority to be a judge in its own cause or decide a dispute
in which it has an official bias, such statute, unlike one passed by
the English Parliament, has to stand scrutiny in the light of
the fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution.
The King v. Bath Compensation Authority, [1925] I K.B. 685
and The King v. Leicester Justices, [1927] I K.B. 557, discussed.
In the instant case, however, the relevant provisions of the
Act do not sanction any transgression of the aforesaid principles
of natural justice or authorise the Government to constitute
itself a judge in its own cause. Nor could it be said that the
State Government, in the present case, acted in violation of the
aforesaid principles.
Since the appellants never questioned the competence of the
Chief Minister to decide the objections on the last occasion and
obtained the judgment of this Court on that basis, it was not
open to them at this stage to reopen the closed controversy or
take a contrary position.
The position of the Chief Minister was quite -distinct from
that of the Scretary of the Department. While the Secretary of
the Department was its head and so a part of it, the Minister in
charge was only primarily responsible for the disposal of the
business pertaining to that Department. It was not, therefore,
correct to say that the Chief Minister was a part of the Department consti

## Text

I959
A11gust 2r
580
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(1)]
GULLAPALLI NAGESWARA RAO ETC.
v.
THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH & OTHERS
(B. P. SINHA, P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR and
K. SUBBA RAO, JJ.)
Road Transport-Scheme of nationalisation_:_Chief Minister,
if can hear objections-Doctrine of bias-Motor Vehicles Act (IV of
r939), as amended by Act roo of r956, Ch. IV A, s. 68D.
The appellants were carrying on motor transport business in
Krishna District in Andhra Pradesh. · The General Manager
of the State Transport Undertaking published a scheme for
nationalisation of motor transport and objections to the said
scheme were invited. The appellants, among others, filed their
objections. The Secretary in charge of the Transport Department gave personal hearing to the objectors and heard the
representation made on behalf of the State Transport Undertaking. The Chief Minister, who was in charge of transport,
passed the order approving the scheme.
The appellants moved
this Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution for quashing the said
scheme and this Court in Gr<llapalli Nageswara Rao v. Andhra
Pradesh Road Transport Corporation, previously decided, held
that the Secretary in charge 0f the Transport Department was
incompetent to hear the objections on the ground that no party
could be a judge in his own cause and quashed the order approving the scheme. Thereafter notices were issued by the Government to the objectors. The Chief Minister himself heard the
representatives of the objectors and the Road Transport Corporation and passed the order approving the scheme as originally
published. The appellants moved the High Court under Art.
226 of the Constitution for writs of certiorari quashing the order
passed by the Government confirming the scheme and subsequent
orders made by the Regional Transport Authority cancelling
their stage carriage permits. The High Court rejected the
petitions and the appellants appealed. It was contended, inter
alia, on their behalf that the same infirmity which attached to
the Secretary in charge of the Transport Department on the
previous occasion, attached to the Chief Minister, who was in
charge of transport, and rendered him incompetent to hear the
objections.
Held, that the two well-settled principles of the doctrine of
bias that applied equally to judicial as well as quasi-judicial
tribunals, were,-(r) that no man shall be a judge in his own
cause and that (2) justice should not merely be done but must
also appear to be done. Any kind of bias, therefore, in a judicial
authority, whether financial or other, for or against any party,
or any position that might impute bias, must disqualify him as
a judge.
-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
581
But when a State Legislature or the Parliament, in transgression of the aforesaid principles, by statute empowers an
authority to be a judge in its own cause or decide a dispute
in which it has an official bias, such statute, unlike one passed by
the English Parliament, has to stand scrutiny in the light of
the fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution.
The King v. Bath Compensation Authority, [1925] I K.B. 685
and The King v. Leicester Justices, [1927] I K.B. 557, discussed.
In the instant case, however, the relevant provisions of the
Act do not sanction any transgression of the aforesaid principles
of natural justice or authorise the Government to constitute
itself a judge in its own cause. Nor could it be said that the
State Government, in the present case, acted in violation of the
aforesaid principles.
Since the appellants never questioned the competence of the
Chief Minister to decide the objections on the last occasion and
obtained the judgment of this Court on that basis, it was not
open to them at this stage to reopen the closed controversy or
take a contrary position.
The position of the Chief Minister was quite -distinct from
that of the Scretary of the Department. While the Secretary of
the Department was its head and so a part of it, the Minister in
charge was only primarily responsible for the disposal of the
business pertaining to that Department. It was not, therefore,
correct to say that the Chief Minister was a part of the Department constituted as a Statutory Undertaking under the Act.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos.
198 to 200of1959.
Appeals from
the judgment and order dated
the 5th March 1959, of the Andhra Pradesh High
Court, in 'Writ Petitions Nos. 1511 and 1512 of 1958
and 23 of 1959.
N. 0. Chatterjee, G. Suryanarayana, K. Mangach
and T. V. R. Tatachari, for the appellants.
D. Narasaraju, Advocate-General for the State of
Andhra Pradesh, D. Venkatappiah Sastry and T. M.
Sen, for the respondents.
1959. August 21. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
:1959
Gullapalli
Nageswara Rao
Etc.
v.
The State of
A ndhta Pradesh
SuBBA RAO J.-These appeals on certificates are
Subba Rao J.
directed against the judgment of the High Court of
Judicature, Andhra Pradesh, at Hyderabad, dismissing the petitions filed by the appellants under Art. 226
74
1959
Gurlapalli
N11ge 0wara Rao
Et&.
v.
The Slate of
Andhra Pradesh
Subba Rao J.
582
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(1)]
of the Constitution for issuing writs of certiorari to
quash the orders of the Government of Andhra
Pradesh confirming a scheme of nationalization of
transport and the subsequent orders of the Regional
Transport Authority cancelling the appellants' stage
carriage permits.
These appeals are the off-shoot of the judgment of
this Court in (}ullapalli Nageswara Rao v. Andhra
Prarlesh State Road Transport Corporation(') delivered on
November 5, 1958. The facts were fully stated therein.
It would be only necessary to recapitulate briefly the
facts relevant to the present enquiry : The appellants
were carrying on motor transport business for several
years in Krishna District in the State of Andhra
Pradesh. Shri Guru Pershad, styled as the General
Manager of the State Transport Undertaking of the
Andhra Pradesh Road Transport, published a scheme
for nationalization of motor transport in the said State
from the date to be notified by the State Government.
Objections to the· said proposed scheme were invited
by the State Government, and the appellants, among
others, filed their objections. On December 26, 1957,
the Secretary in charge of the Transport Department
gave a personal hearing to the objectors and heard the
representations made on behalf of the State Transport
Undertaking. The entire material gathered by him
was placed before the Chief Minister of the State in
charge of transport who made the order approving the
scheme. The approved scheme was published in the
Andhra Pradesh Gazette dated January 9, 1958, and
it was directed to come into force with effect from
January 10, 1958. Thereafter the Andhra Pradesh
Road Transport Corporation, which was formed under
, the provisions of the Road Transport Corporation Act,
1950, took over the Undertaking and proceeded to
implement the scheme under a phased programme.
The appellants moved this Court under Art. 32 of the
Constitution for quashing the said scheme on various
grounds. This Court rejected most of the objections
raised by the appellants except in regard to two pertaining to the hearing given by the Secretary in charge
(1) [1959) S.C.R. (Suppl.) 319.
...
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
583
of the Tr~nsport Department which resulted in the
quashing of the order of the Government approving
the scheme and directing it to forbear from taking over
any of the routes on which the appellants were engaged
in transport business. After the said order, notices
were issued by the Government to all the objectors
informing them that a personal hearing would be given
by the Chief Minister on December 9, 1958, and they
were further informed that they were at liberty to file
further objections before November 30, 1958. The Chief
Mi/iister heard the representatives of the objectors and
the Corporation and passed orders dated December 19,
1958, rejecting the objections filed and approving the
scheme as originally published. The order approving
the scheme was duly published by the Government in
the official Gazette on December 22, 1958. On December 23, 1958, the Corporation applied to the Road
Transport Authority for the issue of permits for plying
stage carriages and for eliminating the permits granted to the private bus operators. On December 24,
1958, the said Authority passed orders rendering the
permits of the appellants ineffective from December 24,
1958, and also issuing permits to the Corpora.tion in
respect of the routes previously operated by the appellants.
The said orders were communicated to the
appellants on December 24, 1958, and they were also
directed to stop plying their buses from December 25,
1958, on their respective routes. The appelbnts, who
were aggrieved by the orders of the Government as
well by the order of the Regional Transport Authority
filed petitions in the High Court under Art. 226 of the
Constitution for quashing the same.
The petitions were heard by a Division Bench of the
said High Court consisting of Chandra Reddy, C.J.,
and Srinivasachari, J., who negatived the contentions
raised by the appellants and dismissed the petitions.
Hence these appeals.
The arguments of Mr. Chatterjee, learned Counsel
for the appellants may be summarized thus: (1) This
Court held in Gullapalli Nageswara Rao v. A.ruZhra
Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation (1), that the
(1) [1959) s.c.R. (Suppl.) 319.
z959
Gullapalli
Nageswara Rao'
Etc.
v.
The State of
Andhra Pradesh
Subba Rao].
1959
Gullapalli
Nageswara Rao
Etc.
v.
The State of
Andhra Pradesh
Subba Rao].
584
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(1))
Secretary in charge of the Transport Department was
disqualified from deciding the dispute between the
Department and the private bus operators on the basis
of the principle that a party cannot be a judge in his
own cause, and that, as ,the Chief Minister was in.
charge of the portfolio of transport, the same infirmity
attached to him also, and, therefore, for the same reason he should also be disqualified from hearing the
objections to the scheme published by the Undertaking ; and (2) the Chief Minister by his acts, such as
1 initiating the scheme, and speeches showed a clear
bias in favour of the Undertaking and against the
private bus operators and therefore on the basis of the
principles of natural justice accepted by this Court, he
was precluded from deciding the dispute between the
said parties.
The learned Advocate-General sought to make out a
distinction between "official bias " of an authority
which is inherent ill a statutory duty imposed on it
and " personal bias " of the said authority in favour
of, or against, one of the parties and contended that the
mere fact that the Chief Minister of the Government
had supported the policy of nationalization, or even
the fact that the Government initiated the said scheme,
did not disqualify him from deciding the dispute unless
it was established that he was guilty of personal bias,
and that there was no legal proof establishing the said
fact.
At this stage, it would be convenient to notice briefly
the decisions cited at the Bar disclosing the relevant
principles governing the " doctrine of bias".
The
principles governing the " doctrine of bias " vis-a-vis
judicial tribunals are well-settled and they are : (i) no
man shall be a judge in his own cause; (ii) justice
should not only be done but manifestly and undoubtedly seem to be done. The two maxims yield the result
that if a member of a judicial body is "subject to a
bias (whether financial or other) in favour of, or against,
any party to a dispute, or is in such a position that a
bias must be assumed to exist, he ought not to take part
in the decision or. sit on the tribunal " ; and that
" any direct pecuniary interest, however small, in the
s.c.n.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
585
subject-matter of inquiry will disqualify a judge, and
any interest, though not pecuniary, will have the same
effect, if it be sufficiently substantial to create a reasonable suspicion of bias". The said principles are equally
applicable to authorities, though they are not courts
of justice or judicial tribunals, who have to act judicially in deciding the rights of others, i.e., authorities
who are empowered to discharge quasi-judicial functions. The said principles are accepted by the learned
Counsel on both sides; but the question raised in this
case is whether, when a statute confers a power on an
authority and imposes a duty on it to be a judge of its
own cause or to decide a dispute in which it has an official
bias, the doctrine of bias is qualified to the extent of
the statutory authorization. In The King v. Bath
Compensation Authority {1) the licensing justices of a
county borough referred the application for the renewal of the licence of a hotel to the compensation
authority of the borough and also resolved that a
solicitor should be instructed to appear before the compensation authority and oppose the renewal of the
licence on their behalf. The solicitor no instructed
appeared before the authority and supported the
opposition, and in the result the compensation authority refused the renewal subject to payment of compensation. It may be mentioned that a majority of
the justices who sat on th~ compen1:1a.tion tribunal and
voted against the renewal of the licence had as members
of the licensing committee been parties to the resolution referring the question of renewal to the compensation authority. The Court of Appeal by a majority,
Atkin, L. J., dissenting, held that in view of the provisions of the Licensing Act, 1910, t}le facts in that case
did not disclose such bias or likelihood of bias as would
disqualify them from sitting on the tribunal. This
decision was reversed by the House of Lords on appeal
(reported in 1926 A.C. 586). The House of Lords
held that the decision of the tribunal, whereon three
justices who referred the matter to the said authf>rity
sat, must be set aside on the ground that no one can
both be a party and a. judge in the same ca.use.
(I) (1925] I K.B. 685.
r959
Gullapalli
N ageswara Ra"
Etc.
v.
The Stale "J
A ndhra PradesTI
Subba RISO I.
z959
Gullapalli
Nageswara Rao
Etc.
v.
The State of
Andhra.Pradesh
Subba Rao].
586
SUPREME COUR.T REPORTS [1960(1))
Viscount Cave, L.C., meets the argument based upon
the statutory duty thus at p. 592 :
" No doubt the statute contemplates the possibility of the licensing justices appearing before the
compensation authority and taking part in the
argument; for it is provided by s. 19, sub-s. 2, that
the compensation authority shall give any person
appearing to them to be interested in the question
of the renewal of a licence, "including the licensing
justices," an opportunity of being heard. . But the
statute now here says that justices who elect to
appear as opponents of the renewal and take active
steps (such as instructing a solicitor) to take their
opposition effective, may nevertheless act as judges
in the dispute ; and in the absence of a clear provision to that effect I think that the ordinary rule,
that no one can be both party and judge in the same
cause, holds good."
This decision, therefore, is an authority for the proposition that, unless the
legislature clearly and
expressly ordained to the contrary, the principles of
natural justice cannot be violated. In The King v.
Leicester Justices (1), a case also arising under the
Licensing (Consolidation) Act, 1910, the King's Bench
Division held that the mere fact that the licensing
justice has originated an objection to the renewal of a
licence does not disqualify him by reason of interest
from sitting and adjudicating as a member of that
authority upon the matter of that licence. Salter, J.,
brought out the distinction between the Bath Justices'
Case(') and the case before him in the following terms,
at p. 565:
"The distinction is that, in that case, Parliament
had not sanctioned what was done; in this case
it has."
Dealing with the argument that there was some risk
of bias if the statutory duty was discharged, the
learned Judge rejected it with the observation that
"some risk of bias is inseparable from the machinery
which Parliament has set up". At first sight this
judgment appears to be inconsistent wit.I). the decision
(1) [1927] 1 K.B. 557•
(2) [1925] 1K.B. 685'
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
587
of the House of Lords in Bath Justices' Case (1 ), but a
scrutiny of the latter case shows that in that case the
licensing justices had themselves actively opposed the
renewal of the licence before the compensation authority
and instructed a solicitor to do so on their behalf.
This is not a duty cast on them by the statute whereas
the licensing justices in dealing with an application for
renewal of a licence and, when the question of renewal
was referred for decision to the compensation aut.horjty,
in sitting as members of that authority are merely
carrying out the duties in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the legislature. These decisions
show that in England a statutory invasion of the
common law objection on the ground of bias is tolerated by decisions, but the invasion is confined strictly
to the limits of the statutory exception. It is not out
of place here to notice that in England the Parliament
is supreme and therefore a statutory law, howeve.r
repugnant to the principles of natural justice, is valid;
whereas in India the law made by Parliament or a
State Legislature should stand the nest of fundamental
rights declared in Part III of the Constitution.
In the instant case the relevant provisions of the
Act do not sanction any dereliction of the principles
of natural justice. Under the Act a statutory authority, called the 1I'ransport Undertaking, is created and
specified statutory functioI\s are conferred on it. The
said Undertaking prepares a scheme providing for road
transport service in relation to an area to be run or
operated by the said Undertaking. Any person affected by the Scheme is required to file objections before
the State Government and the State Government,
after receiving the objections and representations,
gives a personal hearing to the objectors as well as to
the Undertaking and approves or modifies the scheme
as the case may be.
The provisions of the Act, therefore, do not authorise the Government to initiate the
scheme and thereafter constitute itself a judge m its
own cause. The entire scheme of the Act visualises,
in case of conflict between the Undertaking and the
opera.tors of private buses, that the State Government
(1) [1925] I K.B. 685.
I9$9
Gullapalli
Nageswara Rao
EJc.
v.
The State of
Andhra Pradesh
St4bba Rao J.
r959
Gtdlapalli
Nageswara Rao
Etc.
588
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(1)]
should sit in judgment and resolve the conflict. The
Act, therefore, does not authorise the State Government to act in derogation of the principles of natural
justice.
The next question is whether the State Government,
The state 0!
in the present case, acted in violation of the said
Andhra Pradesh . principles. The argument that as this Court held in
v.
Swbba Rao].
the previous stage of this litigation that the hearing
given by the secretary in charge of the Transport
Department offended the principles of natural justice,
we should hold, as a logical corollary to the same,
that the same infirmity would attach to the Chief
Minister. This argument has to be rejected on two
grounds: firstly, for the reason that on the last occasion
the appellants did not question the right of the Chief
Minister to decide on the objections to the scheme,-and
indeed they assumed his undoubted right to do so-but
canvassed the validity of his order on the basis that
the secretary, who was part of the Transport Department, gave the hearing and not the Chief Minister ,and,
therefore, a party io the dispute was made a judge of
his own cause. If, as it is now contended, on the same
reasoning the Chi'ef Minister also would be disqualified
from deciding the dispute, that point should have
been raised at that stage: instead, a distinction was
made between the Secretary of a Department and
the Chief Minister, and the validity of the order of the
Chief Minister was questioned on the basis of this
distinction. This Court accepted that argument.
Having obtained the judgment of this Court on that
basis, it could not be open to the appellants, at this
stage, to reopen the closed controversy and take a.
contrary position. That a.part, there are no merits in
this contention. There is a clear distinction between
the position of a. Secretary of the Department and the
Chief Minister of the State. Under the Constitution,
the Governor is directed to act on the advice of the
Ministers headed by the Chief Minister. In exercise
of the powers conferred by els. 2 and 3 of Art. 166 of
the Constitution the Governor of Madras made
rules styled as " The Madras Government Business
Rules and Secretariat Instructions", and r. 9 thereof
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
589
prescribes that without prejudice to the provisions of
r. 7, the Minister in charge of a department shall be
primarily responsible for the disposal of the business
pertaining to that department. The Governor of
Andhra,in exercise of the powers under the Constitution, directed that until other provisions are made in
this regard the bm:iness of the Government of Andhra
shall be transacted in accordance with the said Rules. It
is, therefore, manifest that under' the Constitution and
the Rules framed thereunder a Minister in charge of a
department is primarily responsible for the disposal of
the business pertaining to that department, but the
ultimate responsibility for the advice is on the entire
ministry. But the position of the Secretary of a
department is different. Under the said Rules, the
Secretary of a department is its head i.e,, he is part
of the department. There is an essential distinction
between the functions of a Secretary and a Minister;
the former is a part of the department and the latter
· is only primarily responsible for the disposal of the
business pertaining to that department. On this distinction the previous judgment of this Court wai:I based,
for in that case, after pointing out the position of the
Secretary in that Department, it was held that "though
the formal orders were ma.de by the Chief Minister, in
effect and substance, the enquiry was conducted and
personal hearing was given by one of the parties to the
dispute itself". We cannot, therefore, accept the
argument of the learned Counsel that the Chief Minister
is part of the department constituted as a statutory
Undertaking under the Act.
The next question is whether the Chief Minister by
his acts and speeches disqualified himself to ·act for the
State Government in deciding the dispute. In the
a.ffida vit filed by N a.geswara Rao, one of the appellants
herein, in respect of the writ petitions filed in the High
Court, he states in ground (8) of paragraph (14) thus:
"He (the Chief Minister) is the Minister in charge
of the Transport Department at whose instance the
Schel}le was first published under Section 680 of the
Act. He is not only the initiator of the Scheme but
also the person who is interested in its approval and
75
1959
Gullapalli
N ageswara Rao
Elc.
v.
The Slate of
Andhra Pradesh
• Subba Ran].
r959
Gullapally
Nageswara Rao
Etc.
v.
The Stat~ of
Andhra Pradesh
Subba Rao].
590
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(1)]
implementation. He has thus a direct and specific
connect\on with the dispute being a party thereto
and he would be acting asa Judge in his own cause
when he gives a personal hearing and considers the
objectiens."
Mr. Chatterjee contends that this allegation embodied
in ground (8) has not been contradicted by the respondents. It is not correat to say that these allegations
went unchallenged, for in paragraph 6 of the countera.ffidavit filed on behalf of the State, we find the following statements :
" The contentions of the petitioner in para. 14 of
his affidavit are without substance. The scheme as
approved by the Government is neither illegal nor
without jurisdiction."
In sub-paragraph (3) of paragraph 6, it is alleged:
"The allegations that the hearing and determination of the questions in issue are not in accordance
with law or principles of judicial procedure, but only
a farce gone through to satisfy the direction of the
Supreme Court, is not correct."
Sub-paragraph (7) of paragraph 6 reads:
" The Minister in charge i.e., the Chief Minister
can hear and decide. The State Government itself
cannot be regarded as interested in the ca.use and
therefore disqualified to decide."
Sub-paragraph (8) of the said paragraph says:
" The contention that the Chief Minister is not
competent to give the hearing and consider the
objections inasmuch as he is biassed and has also
prejudged the issue, is not well-founded. On facts
on 9-12-1958, there was no
Road Transport
Department at all but a Road Transport Corporation, which is a completely autonomous body,
with which the Chief Minister has no concern.
Hence on the date of the enquiry, the Corporation
being a completely autonomous body is an entirely
independent body altogether and hence there can be
no question of bias to the Chief Minister hearing the
objectors. The hearing given by th.e Chief Minister
is just like a hearing of the c;ourt of law after remand
'S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
591
by a Superior Court ....................... The allegation
that the Chief Minister had closed his mind and was
biased is absolutely baseless. He kept an open mind
and considered all the objections fully."
The counter-affidavit further gives in detail how the
scheme was initiated by Guru Pershad and how the
various steps were taken in compliance with the provisions of the Act. It is therefore clear that the Government did not accept the allegations made by the
appellants in their affidavits. Whatever may be the
policy of the Government in the matter of nationalisation of the bus transport, it cannot be said that the Chief
Minister initiated the scheme in question. The learned
Counsel then relied upon certain extracts from the
reports published in the newspapers purporting to be
the speeches of the Chief Minister. Exhibit IV is said
to be a summary of the speech of the Chief Minister
made on October 14, 1957, and the relevant portion
thereof reads :
"I do not have any prejudice against the Krishna
District. The bus transport in Telangana was
nationalised 25 years ago. The Bus Transport
nationalisation was extended to Krishna District
since it is contiguous to Telangana in regard to
transport services. It will be extended to the other
districts gradually. It requires 12 crores of rupees
to introduce nationalisation in all the districts at the
same time. The Government is aware that Nationalisation of Bus Transport is not profitable. But we
should fall in line with other States and move with
the times. There are 360 buses in Krishna District.
I cannot give an assurance that all these would be
taken over. It is regrettable that these should be
subjected to severe criticism when they are being
done in public interest."
This speech only reflects the policy of the Government.
Exhibit V is said to be an extract from the report of
the Indian Express dated October 18, 1957.
The
material part of it runs thus :
"Nationalisation of road transport services in the
Andhra area was a settled fact and there was absolutely no question of going ha.ck on it ............ "
z959
Gullapally
Nageswara Rao
Etc.
v.
The Stal• of
A K<lhra Pradesh
Subba Rao J.
I959
Gullapalli
N ageswara Rao
Ete.
v.
The Slate of
.Andhra Pradesh
Subba Rao].•
592
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(1)]
This speech also only states the policy of the Government and has no reference to Krishna District or to
the transport services in that district. Exhibit VI is
an extract from the report in the Hindu dated October
25, 1957, wherein it is alleged that the Chief Minister
made the following statement :
"Mr. N. Sanjiva Reddy, Chief Minister, said here
today that the nationalised road transport in Krishna
would be administered by a Corporation.
The Chief Minister, who was addressing a press
conference said : " There is no <1uestion of postponement of the decision to nationalise bus transport in
that district ".
. .................... The Chief Minister
said firmly that there was no public support to the
contention of the private bus operators that there
should be no nationalisation."
This speech has a direct reference to the nationalisation of bus transport in Krishna District and indicates
a firm determination on the part of the Chief Minister
not fo postpone it any further. Exhibit IX is an
extract from the report in the Indian Express dated
December 13, 1957 and it reads:
"The Andhra Pradesh Chief Minister Sanjeeva
Reddy told pressmen here to-d>iy that the State
Government would go ahead with the implcmentaLion of its decision to extend nationalisation of bus
transport to Krishna district from April l next."
This also indicates the Chief Minister's determination
to implement the scheme of nationalisation of bus
transport in Kri.<ihna District. from a particular date.
Exhibit.Xis a rnport in the ;\fail under date April l,
1958, purporting to be a speech made by the Chief
Minister jn inaugurating the first phase of the extension of the nationalised road transport services to
Guntur and Krishna Districts by the State l-l,oa<l
Transport Corporation. R.elevant extracts of the speech
read thus:
" He (the Chiefl\finister) considered the implementation of the scheme simple first, but he regretted to
find it difficult since bus operators filed writ petitions
in the High Court, raised a ' huge noise ' and fought
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
593
till the very end against the scheme and finally even
approached the Congress President Mr. U. N. Dhebar
to save them ................................................... .
Mr. Sanjeeva Reddi affirmed that the Government
was determined to implement the scheme of nationalisation of bus transport services against all opposition and persons like him trained by the late
T. Prakasam were never afraid of opposition."
If it had been established that the Chief Minister made
the speeches extracted in Exhihits VI, IX and X, there
would have been considera,hle force in the argument of
the learned Counsel for the appellants; but no attempt
was made to prove that the Chief Minister did in fact
make those speeches. It is true that the extracts from
the newspapers were filed before the Chief Minister
and they were received subject to proof; but no
person who heard the Chief Minister making those
speeches filed an affidavit before him. The Chief
Minister did not admit that he made the statements
attributed to him. The Chief Minister in his order
approving the scheme says:
"As regards the paper cuttings, I may mention
that in the course of a long and varied political
career I have made hundreds of statements on many
an occasion and many of thom may be purely personal opinions. Moreover, it is not always that the
press people consult the persons on the accuracy of
the statements made before they are published. The
press cuttings filed before me are not· communiques
issued by the Government, with the approval of the
Government. They are published records of several
statements said to have been made by me on various
occasions. It is common knowledge press cuttings
here and there, torn out of context, will give a completely twisted picture and version of a man's real
intentions. It is not possible for me to state any
thing definite about the veracity of these statements
said to have been made by me at different points of
time. It is quite possible that I might have made
many such, on many an occasion, and it is also quite
possible, that some points spoken here and there may
have been published with Head lines in the papers.
z959
Gullapalli
Nagcswara Rao
Etc.
v.
The State of
A ndhra Pradesh
Subba Rao].
1959
Gullapalli
Nageswara Rao
Etc.
v.
The State of
Andhra Pradesh
Subba Rao ].
594
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(1))
It is not possible nor desirable to treat paper cuttings of statements said to have been made on
several occasions as legal evidence in a judicial
enquiry."
Notwithstanding the fact that the Chief Minister did
not accept the correctness of the statements attributed
to him in the newspapers, no attempt was made by the
appellants to file any affidavit in the High Court sworn
to by persons who had attended the meetings addressed by the Chief Minister and heard him making the
said statements. In the circumstances, it must be held
that it has not been established by the appellants that
the Chief Minister made the speeches indicating his
closed mind on the subject of nationalisation of bus
transport in Krishna District. If these .newspaper
cuttings are excluded from evidence, the factual basis
fur the appellants' argument disappears. We, therefore, hold that the Chief Minister was not disqualified
to hear the objections against the scheme of nationalisation.
A subsidiary argument is raised on the basis of r. 11
of the Andhra Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules. It is
contended that the Road Transport Authority made
an order rendering that the permits of the appellants
ineffective without giving them due notice as required
by that rule and therefore the said order was invalid.
Rule 11 of the said Rules reads :
" In giving effect to the approved scheme, the
Regional Transport Authority or Authorities concerned shall, before eliminating the existing services
or cancelling any existing permit or modifying the
conditions of the existing permit so as to -
(i) render the permit ineffective beyond a specified date;
(ii) reduce the number of vehicles authorised to
be used under a permit ; or
(iii) curtail the area or route covered by the.
permit in so far as such permit relates to the notified
route:
.
give due notice to the persons likely to be affected
in the manner prescribed in these rules."
S.C.R
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
595
This rule will hav:e to be read along with s. 68:F,
sul>-s. 2, which reads:
" For the purpose of giving effect to the approved
sch,eme in respect of a notified area or notified
route, the Regional Transport Authority may, by
order,-
(a) refuse to entertain any application for the
renewal of any other permit :
(b) cancel any existing permit;
(c) modifiy the terms of any existing permit so as
to-
( i) render the permit ineffective beyond a specified date:
(ii) reduce the number of vehicles authorised to
be used under the permit ;
(iii) curtail the area or route covered by the
permit in so far as such permit relates to the notified area or notified route."
A combined reading of s. 68F (2) and r. 11 makes it
clear that the order contemplated under the said subsection can be made by the Regional Transport
Authority only after giving due notice to the persons
likely to be affected by the said order. On December
24, 1958, the Regional Transport Authority made the
following order:
"The permits of the following buses are rendered
:ineffective beyond 24-12-1958, under section 68F
(2)(c)(i) of Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (as amended
by Act 100 of 1956) for the purpose of giving effect
to the approved scheme of Nationalisation in respect
of the following notified routes."
The routes on which the appellants were operating
their buses were also included in the routes mentioned
in the order. On December 24, 1958, the Regional
Transport Authority issued an order to the operators
directing them to stop plying their buses on their
respective routes from December 25, 1958, and that
order was served on the appellants on the same day
i.e., December 24, 1958. Though the learned Advo.
cate-General suggested that the provisions of r. 11
have been satisfied in the present case, we find it
impossible to accede to his contention. There are
two defects in the procedure followed by the Regional
I959
Gullapalli
Nageswara Rao
Etc.
v.
Tlie State of
Andhra Predesh
Subba Rao ].
Z959
Gullapalli
Nageswara Rao
Etc.
v.
The State of
Andhra Pradesh
Subba Rao].
596
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(1)]
Transport Authority : (i) while the rule enjoins on the
Authority to issue notice to the persons affected before
making the relevant order, the Authority made the
order and communicated the same to the persons
affected; and (ii) while the rule requires due notice i.e.,
reasonable notice, to be given to the persons affected
to enable them to make representations against the
order proposed to be passed, the Regional Transport
Authority gave them only a day for complying with
that order, which in the circumstances could not be
considered to be due notice within the meaning of the
rule.
We have, therefore, no hesitation to hold that
the Regional Transport Authority did not strictly
comply with the provisions of the rule.
But, in view
of the supervening circumstances, the High Uourt,
while noticing this defect in the procedure followed
by the Regional Transport Authority, refused to
exercise its jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution. Pursuant to the order of the Regional
Transport Authority the appellants withdrew their
vehicles from the concerned routes and the vehicles
of the Road Transport Corporation have been plying
on those routes.
The judgment of this Court conclusively decided all the questions raised in favour of
the respondents, and if the order of the Regional
Transport Authority was set aside and the appellants
were given another opportunity to make their representations to that Authority, it would be, as the High
Court says, only an empty formality.
As their vechicles have already been withdrawn from the routes and
replaced by the vehicles of the Corporation, the effect
of any such order would not only he of any help to
the appellant but would introduce unnecessary complication and avoidable confusion. In the circumstances,
it appears to us that as the appellants have failed all
along the line, to interfere on a technical point of
no practical utility is "to strain at a gnat after
swallowing a camel". We cannot, therefore, say
that the High Court did not rightly exercise its discretion in this matter. The appeals fail and, in the
circumstances, are dismissed without costs.
Appeals disrnissed.