# SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(1)] ROMESH CHANDRA ARORA v. THE STATE

- **Citation:** [1960] 1 S.C.R. 924
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1960
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 70 of 1957
- **Bench:** S. K. Das, A. K. Sarkar, M. Hidayatullah
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/supreme-court-reports-1960-1-romesh-chandra-arora-v-the-state-1841
- **Pages:** 12

## Headnote

Criminal Trial-Criminal Intimidation-Conviction by Magistrate~Appeal to Court of Session-High Court's power to issue
notice of enhancement of sentence imposed by Magistrate pending
appeal-High Court's power to transfer appeal to itself-Indian
Pena/, Code, z86o (XLV of r86o) ss. 384, 503, 506 and 5u-Code
of Criminal Procedure, z898 (V of z898), ss. 435, 439 and 526.
The appellant took indecent photographs of a girl and
threatened her father, in letters written to him, with publication
of the photographs unless "hush money" was paid to him.
He
was convicted of criminal intimidation under s. 506 Indian Penal
Cade and sentenced to one year's rigorous imprisonment. The
appellant preferred an appeal to the Sessions Judge. The High
Court, not knowing of the filing of the appeal, suo motu called for
the record of the case and issued a notice of enhancement of
sentence to the appeUant. Subsequently, on being informed of
the filing of the appeal, the High Court transferred the appeal to
itself for hearing. The High Court heard the appeal and the
notice of enhancement together, dismissed the appeal and
enhanced the sentence to two years' rigorous imprisonment. The
appellant contended (i) that on the findings he could be convicted
only of attempt to commit extortion under s. 384/5n. Indian
Penal Code and not of criminal intimidation under s. 5o6; (ii) that
the High Court could not issue the notice of enhancement when
an appeal was pending before the Sessions Judge; (iii) that the
order transferring the appeal to the High Court was invalid and
improper; and (iv) that the procedure adopted deprived him of
his right to a decision from the Court of appeal and also from the
High Court in revision.
Held, that the procedure adopted by the High Court was
perfectly legal and that the appellant was rightly convicted and
. sentenced under s. 506, Indian Penal Code.
The appellant was found to have threatened the father of
the girl with injury to his reputation and to the reputation of his
dau~hter with the intent of causing him to do an aet, i.e., to pay
hush money, which he was not legally bound to do, as a means of
avoiding the execution of the threat. This was clearly criminal
intimidation as defined in s. 503 of the Penal Code which was
punishable under s. 506.
The appeal which the appellant had filed before the Session"s
Judge was validly and properly transferred by the High Court to
itself under s. 526(1)(e)(iii) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
The fact that no notice was given to the appellant before the
'
f"
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
925
transfer did not affect its validity as it was open to the High
Court to act on its own initiative. Once there was a validly
transferred appeal before the High Court, it was open to the High
Court to enhance the sentence in exercise of its revisional powers
under s. 439 Code of Criminal Procedure when it dismissed the
appeal en merits. The appellant had full opportunity of being
heard both as to the correctness of his conviction and the propriety of the sentence and he was not prejudiced by the procedure
adopted by the High Court.
In re Chunbidya, (1934) L.R. 62 I.A. 36, applied.
CttrMINAL
APPELLATE
JURISDICTION:
Criminal
Appeal No. 70 of 1957.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated the 21st
December, 1956, of the Punjab High Court (Circuit
Bench) at Delhi, in Criminal Appeal No. 488-C of 1956
and Criminal Revision No. 659-C of 1956.
N. 0. Chatterjee and Vir Sen Sawhney, for the appellant.
H. R. Khanna, R.H. Dhebar and T. M. Sen, for the
respondent.
1959. October 6. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
S. K. DAS J.-This is an appeal on a certificate
granted by the Punjab High Court under Art. 134(l)(c)
of the Constitution.
The facts giving rise to the appeal are somewhat
sordid and we shall set out such of them only as are
relevant to it. On December 14, 1954, a person whom
we shall refer to as X submitted a written report to
the Superintendent of Police, Delhi City, to the effect
tha.t one of

## Text

I95Y
October 6.
924
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(1)]
ROMESH CHANDRA ARORA
v.
THE STATE
(S. K. DAS, A. K. SARKAR and M. HIDAYATULLAH, JJ.)
Criminal Trial-Criminal Intimidation-Conviction by Magistrate~Appeal to Court of Session-High Court's power to issue
notice of enhancement of sentence imposed by Magistrate pending
appeal-High Court's power to transfer appeal to itself-Indian
Pena/, Code, z86o (XLV of r86o) ss. 384, 503, 506 and 5u-Code
of Criminal Procedure, z898 (V of z898), ss. 435, 439 and 526.
The appellant took indecent photographs of a girl and
threatened her father, in letters written to him, with publication
of the photographs unless "hush money" was paid to him.
He
was convicted of criminal intimidation under s. 506 Indian Penal
Cade and sentenced to one year's rigorous imprisonment. The
appellant preferred an appeal to the Sessions Judge. The High
Court, not knowing of the filing of the appeal, suo motu called for
the record of the case and issued a notice of enhancement of
sentence to the appeUant. Subsequently, on being informed of
the filing of the appeal, the High Court transferred the appeal to
itself for hearing. The High Court heard the appeal and the
notice of enhancement together, dismissed the appeal and
enhanced the sentence to two years' rigorous imprisonment. The
appellant contended (i) that on the findings he could be convicted
only of attempt to commit extortion under s. 384/5n. Indian
Penal Code and not of criminal intimidation under s. 5o6; (ii) that
the High Court could not issue the notice of enhancement when
an appeal was pending before the Sessions Judge; (iii) that the
order transferring the appeal to the High Court was invalid and
improper; and (iv) that the procedure adopted deprived him of
his right to a decision from the Court of appeal and also from the
High Court in revision.
Held, that the procedure adopted by the High Court was
perfectly legal and that the appellant was rightly convicted and
. sentenced under s. 506, Indian Penal Code.
The appellant was found to have threatened the father of
the girl with injury to his reputation and to the reputation of his
dau~hter with the intent of causing him to do an aet, i.e., to pay
hush money, which he was not legally bound to do, as a means of
avoiding the execution of the threat. This was clearly criminal
intimidation as defined in s. 503 of the Penal Code which was
punishable under s. 506.
The appeal which the appellant had filed before the Session"s
Judge was validly and properly transferred by the High Court to
itself under s. 526(1)(e)(iii) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
The fact that no notice was given to the appellant before the
'
f"
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
925
transfer did not affect its validity as it was open to the High
Court to act on its own initiative. Once there was a validly
transferred appeal before the High Court, it was open to the High
Court to enhance the sentence in exercise of its revisional powers
under s. 439 Code of Criminal Procedure when it dismissed the
appeal en merits. The appellant had full opportunity of being
heard both as to the correctness of his conviction and the propriety of the sentence and he was not prejudiced by the procedure
adopted by the High Court.
In re Chunbidya, (1934) L.R. 62 I.A. 36, applied.
CttrMINAL
APPELLATE
JURISDICTION:
Criminal
Appeal No. 70 of 1957.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated the 21st
December, 1956, of the Punjab High Court (Circuit
Bench) at Delhi, in Criminal Appeal No. 488-C of 1956
and Criminal Revision No. 659-C of 1956.
N. 0. Chatterjee and Vir Sen Sawhney, for the appellant.
H. R. Khanna, R.H. Dhebar and T. M. Sen, for the
respondent.
1959. October 6. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
S. K. DAS J.-This is an appeal on a certificate
granted by the Punjab High Court under Art. 134(l)(c)
of the Constitution.
The facts giving rise to the appeal are somewhat
sordid and we shall set out such of them only as are
relevant to it. On December 14, 1954, a person whom
we shall refer to as X submitted a written report to
the Superintendent of Police, Delhi City, to the effect
tha.t one of his daughters was being molested and
threatened by the appellant and that he had received
letters of an objectionable nature from him " for the
purpose of blackmailing and extorting money ". ~ome
of these letters were shown to the Superintendent of
Police. The latter sent the report to the Station
Officer, Karol Bagh police stat.ion, with a direction to
register a case under s. 506, Indian Penal Code, and
investigate it. The Station Officer investigated the
case and submitted a charge-sheet against the appellant. He also took in charge some of the letters said
117
I959
Romesh Chandra
Arora
v.
The Stale
S. K. Das).
926
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(1))
z959
to have been received by X. They contained a
Romes-;:;;h•ndra reference to photographs of a daugther of X, and at
Arora
least one of the letters said that a sample photograph
v.
was being enclosed with it. These photographs, it
The Slat•
appeared subsequently in evidence, were taken in the
nude and were of a character which, if made public,
s. K. Das J.
would undoubtedly compromise the reputation of the
girl as well as of her father.
X said in evidence that
he first tried to persuade the father and other relatives
of the appellant to exercise their influence on the
appellant so as to , put a stop to the blackmail. He,
however, failed to get any sympathetic response from
them. In November 1954, he met the appellant and
requested him to behave properly; the appellant,
however, said that it was his profession to extort
money by blackmail through girls and he further
threatened that he would circulate the photographs to
the relat.ives of the girl unless "hush money" was
paid. The appellant was tried on a charge under
s. 506, Indian Penal Code, by the learned Magistrate
exercising first class powers at Delhi. The learned
Magistrate found that the appellant took indecent
photographs of the girl by showing false love to her,
and threatened X, in letters written to him, with
publication of the photographs with intent to extor-t
money from the latter. He accordingly convicted the
appellant and sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment
for one year. This was on May 18, 1956.
On June 9, 1956, the appellant preferred an appeal
from his conviction and sentence to the Sessions Judge
of Delhi. It appears, however, that on June 14, 1956,
Kapur, J., of the Punjab High Court (as he then was)
suo motu called for the record of the case on reading a
report thereof in a newspaper, and directed the issue
of a notice to the appellant to show cause why the
sentence should not be enhanced. Presumably, this
action was taken under the provisions of ss. 435 and
439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. On August
17, 1956, the appeal pending before the Sessions Judge
of Delhi was transferred to the High Court itself for
hearing. We again presume that this order was passed
under the provisions of s. 526(l)(e)(iii) of the Code of
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
927
Criminal Procedure; because neither the order dated
June 14, 1956, nor the order dated August 17, 1956,
have been printed in the paperbook and the exact
terms of the two orders have not been made available
to us. The High Court heard together the appeal and
the rule for enhancement. By a. judgment pronounced
on December 21, 1956, it affirmed the finding of the
learned Magistrate, upheld the conviction, dismissed
the appeal, and enhanced the sentence to two years'
rigorous imprisonment. On or a.bout January 10, 1957,
an application was moved on behalf of the appellant
for a certificate that the case was a fit one for appeal
to this Court in which it was alleged (1) that on the
finding of the learned Magistrate affirmed by the High
Court, the appellant could not only be found guilty of
the offence under s. 384 read with s. 511, Indian Penal
Code, for which the maximum punishment ,was 18
months only ; (2) that the High Court could not issue
a notice for enhancement of the sentence when an
appeal from the conviction and sentence was pending
before the Sessions Judge; (:!)that the order transferring the appeal to the High Court was not validly
ma.de and, in any case, it was improperly 'Ila.de without issuing a notice to the appellant; and (4) that the
procedure adopted had deprived the appellant of his
right of getting first a decision from the court of
appeal and then another from the High Court in the
exercise of its revisiona.l jurisdicti6n. By an order
dated January 14, 1957, Falshaw, J., of the Punjab
High Court gave the necessary certificate. He said in
his order that though the grounds mentioned above
were not urged before him at tlie time when the appeal
and the rule for enhancement of sentence were heard
by him, it appeared to him that the grounds could be
legitimately raised and the case was, therefore, a fit
one for appeal to the Supreme Court. The present
appeal has come before us on that certificate.
Learned counsel for the appellant has urged before
us the same four grounds which were ta.ken on his
behalf while asking for a certificate under Art. 134
(lXc) of the Constitution.
Z9$9
Romesh Chandra
Arora
v.
The St..U
S. K. Diu ].
r959
Ramesh Chandra
Arora
v.
The State
S. K. Dus J.
928
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(1)]
We proceed now to consider those grounds in the
order in which we have stated them. Learned counsel
for the appellant has drawn our attention to the
charge framed against the appellant by the learned
Magistrate. That charge said, in effect, that in the
years 1953 to 1954 the appellant committed criminal
intimidation by thereatening X and his daughter with
injury to their reputation by publication of the nude
photographs, with intent to cause alarm to them.
It is pointed out that there was no reference to blackmail or extortion in the charge. The argument before
us is that the charge mentioned that the intent was
to cause alarm only to X and his daughter, but the
finding was that there was an attempt to extort
money from X on the threat of publishing the
objectionable photographs. It is contended that on
this finding the conviction of the appellant under
s. 506, Indian Penal Code, was bad; he might have
been found guilty under s. 384 read withs. 511, Indian
Penal Code, if a charge were properly made under
those sections.
·
We are unable to accept this contention as correct.
We agree with the High Court that the charge framed
against the appellant was not as clear as it might
have been. It stated, however, that the offence of
criminal intimidation was committed by threatening
X and his daughter with injury to their reputation
by having the indecent photographs published ; the
intent mentioned was to cause alarm to X and his
daughter. The real intention, as disclosed by the
evidence accepted by the trial Magistrate and the
High Court, was to f6rce X to pay "hush money."
Section 506 is the penal section which states the
punishment for the offence of criminal intimidation;
the offence itself is defined in s. 503. Leaving out
what is not necessary for our purpose, the section last
mentioned is in two parts; the first part refers to the
act of threatening another with injury to his person,
reputation or property or to the person or reputation
of anyone in whom that person is interested; the
second part refers to the intent with which the
threatening is done and it is of two categories: one is
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
929
intent to ca.use a.la.rm to the person threatened and the
second is to cause that person to do any act which
he is not legally bound to do or to omit to do any act
w:hich that person is legally entitled to do, as the
means of avoding the execution of such threat. On
the findings arrived at against the appellant, the first
part of the section is clearly fulfilled; and as to the
intent, it comes more properly under the second
category, that is, to ca.use X to do any act (in other
words, to pay hush money) which he was not le.gaily
bound to do, as a means of avoiding the execution of
the threat. It is perhap·s correct to say that the
threat of publication of the photographs must have
also caused ala.rm to X; but the real intention of the
appellant appears to have been not so much to cause
alarm only as to make X pa.y " hush money" to him.
It is not unoften that a particular act in some of its
aspects comes within the definition of a. particular
offence in the Indian Penal Code, while in other aspects, or taken as a whole, it comes within another
definition. There a.re obvious differences between
the offence of extortion as defined in s. 383 and the
offence of criminal intimidation as defined in s. 503.
It is unnecessary to dilate on those differences in the
present case. All that we need say is that on the
finding of the learned Magistrate, which finding was
affirmed by the High Court, the appellant was clearly
guilty of the offence of criminal intimidation. We,
therefore, hold that the conviction of the appellant
under s. 506 is correct. We further agree with the
High Court that no prejudice was ca.used to the appellant by reason of the defect, if any, in the charge as
to the intent of the appellant. He was fully aware
of the case made by the prosecution and had full
opportunity of rebutting the evidence given against
him.
We now go to the second point. Learned counsel for
the appellant has drawn our attention to ss. 435 and
439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Leaving out
what is not essential for our purpose, s. 435 states in
substance that the High Court may call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior
.r959
Romesh Charidra
Arora
v.
The Siata
S. K. Das J.
930
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(1))
z959
criminal court situate within the local limits of its
R
h Ch
d
jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself as to
omes
•• ra h
1
l"
. t
f
fi d"
Arora
t e correctness, ega 1ty or proprie y o any
n mg,
v.
sentence or order recorded or passed and as to the
The state
regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court.
Section 439 then states (we are again leaving out what
5· K.Das].
is not essential for our purpose) that in the case of a
proceeding the record :if which has been called for by
the High Court, it mar, in its discretion exercise any
of the powers conferred on a court of appeal and may
enhance the sentence. In the case under our consideration it is obvious from the materials on the record
that the High Court called for the record on June 14,
1956, in order to satisfy itself as to the propriety of
the sentence passed by the learned Magistrate, and
on the materials placed before us it is not possible to
s-.i.y that the High Court was aware that a few days
earlier than June 14, 1956, the appellant had preferred an appeal to the Sessions Judge of Delhi. The
argument before us is that when an appeal was
pending before the Sessions Judge, the High Court
had no power to call for the record of the proceeding
of the learned Magistrate in order to satisfy itself
about the propriety of the sentence passed. Learned
counsel has put his argument in the following way.
Firstly, he submits that the sentence passed by the
learned Magistrate was itself one of the points for
consideration in the appeal before the Sessions Judge
and the question of the propriety of that sentence could
only arfae after that ·appeal had been disposed of.
Secondly, he submits that the expression "any proceedings of such inferior court " in s. 435 cannot refer
to the court of the Magistrate when an appeal was
pending before the Session Judge. Learned Counsel
submits that in the circumstances of this case the
power to call for the record of any proceeding before
any inferior criminal court given by s. 435 could be
exercised only in respect of the proceeding before the
learned Sessions Judge of Delhi after the latter had
dealt with the appeal. \Ve do not think that these
contentions are correct. Firstly, these contentions do
not take notice of what happened on A_ugust 17, 1956,
'
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
931
when the appeal pending before the Sessions Judge of
Delhi was transferred to the High Court itself for
hearing. Assuming that that order was valid, and
we shall presently give reasons for holding that it was
a valid or<ler of transfer, the legal position was really
this: the High Court had before it the appeal preferred by the appellant as also the rule for enhancement of the sentence which had been issued after calling for the record under s. 435, Criminal Procedure
Code. It is necessary to mention here that sub-s. (2)
of s. 439 says that no order under s. 439 shall be made
to the prejudice of an accused person unless he has an
opportunity of being heard either personally or by
pleader in his own defence, and sub-s. (6) says that
when an opportunity is given to a convicted person
to show cause why his sentence shoulp not be
enhanced, he will be entitled also to show cause
against his conviction. The notice to show cause why
the sentence should not be enhanced was issued in the
present case by reason of the provisions of sub-s. {2)
of s. 439, and in showing ca.use the appellant was
entitled to show that the conviction itself was wrong.
The whole case against the appellant was, therefore,
at large before the High Court. In the 9ircumstances
of this case there is no point in the distinction which
learned counsel for the appellant is seeking to make
a.s to the meaning of the expression, " such inferior
court"; for, when the High Court was'itself in seizin
of the appeal, the inferior court from whose decision
the appeal was being heard was clearly the court of
the Magistrate who convicted and sentenced the appellant. After the appeal had been transferred from the
file of the Sessions Judge of Delhi, the latter was no
longer in the picture. Secondly, we do not consider
that learned counsel for the appellant is right in limiting the scope of s. 435 in the way suggested by him.
If the High Court was not aware of the filing of an
appeal, it was open to it to call for the record of the
proceeding before the Magistrate in order to satisfy
itself whether the sentence passed was a. proper one
or not. When, however, it was brought to the notice
of thEl High Court that an appeal was pending before
z959
Romash Chandra
Arora
v.
The Stat1
S. K. Das].
z959
Romesh Chand,.a
AroP'a
v.
The Slal6
S. K. Das].
932
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(1))
the Sessions Judge of Delhi, it could order that the
appeal be withdrawn to the High Court so that the
appeal and the rule co11ld be heard together.
We are
unable to hold that the High Court committed any
illegality in adopting the course which it did,
We must make it clear that we are not considering
in the present case the question whether in exercise of
the combined powers of appeal and revision, it is open
to the High Court to set aside an order of acquittal.
That is a different question altogether, one aspect of
which was dealt with by the Privy Council in Kishan
Singh v. The King Emperor ('). Some of the earlier
decisions of Indian High Courts on that question were
referred to by their Lordships. The later decisions on
the same question were briefly summarised is a decision
of the Patna High Court, Ambika Thakur v. Emperor(•).
As we a.re not dealing with the question of the
power of the High Court to set a.side an acquittal in
exercise of the combined powers of appeal and revision,
no useful purpose wiRbe s.erved by reviewing the decisions on that question. It is sufficient to state that
there is clear authority in the decision.of the Privy
Council in In re Ohunbidya (') that in the exercise of
its revisional powers under s 4311, Criminal Procedure
Code, a High Court upon having the record of a
criminal proceeding brought to its notice on an appeal
from the conviction therein, can call upon the appellant to show cause why the sentence should not be
enhanced, and having heard and dismissed the appeal
can forthwith enhance the sentence under that revisiona.l power although precluded by s. 423, (as it stood
prior to its amendment in 1955) from doiug so in the
appeal. It is true that the appeal in the present case
was originally preferred to the Sessions Judge of Delhi
and was subsequently transferred to the High Court.
To that extent, the pre8ent case can be distinguished
from the facts of the case which the Privy Couucil
was considering (Jn re Ohunbidya)(').
We do not,
however, think that, on principle, the distinction is of
any materiality.
Provided the appeal was validly
(1) (19>8) L.R. 55 I.A. 390.
(2) A.I.R. (1939) Pat. 6n.
(3) ( 1934) J..R. 62 I.A. 36.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
933
transferred for hearing to the High Court, it was open
to the High Court to enhance the sentence in exercise
of its revisional power under s. 439, Criminal Procedure Code, when it dismissed the appeal on merits
after hearing the appellant. There can be no doubt
in the present case that the appellant has had an
opportunity of being heard both as to the correctness
of his conviction and the propriety of the sentence.
Section 423, Criminal Procedure Code, deals with the
powers of the appellate court in disposing of an appeal.
This section was amended by the Code of Criminal
Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1955 (26of1955) which
came into force on January 1, 1956, and sub-s. (IA) was
added which says that where an appeal from a conviction lies to the High Court, it may enhance the sentence
notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in cl. (b) of sub-s. (I).
We wish to make it
clear that we are not basing our decision on the provisions of sub-s. (IA). Those provisions do not apply in
the present case, because an appeal from the conviction of the appellant did not lie to the High Court,
but lay to the Sessions Judge of Delhi. The appeal
came to the High Court on a valid order of transfer
made under s. 526, Criminal Procedure Code.
We are
basing our decision on the power of the High Court to
enhance the sentence under s. 439, Criminal Proceciure
Code, after having given the appellant an opportunity
to show cause in the matter of his conviction as well
as sentence. The decision of the Privy Council in In re
Chunbidya (1) was a decision with reference to s. 423
as it stood before its amendment in 1955. If in the
present case an appeal from the conviction lay to the
High Court, it would have been unnecessary for the
High Court to invoke its powers under s. 439, Criminal
Procedure Code. It could act under its powers under
sub-s. (lA) of s. 423, Criminal Procedure Code.
As,
however, the appeal came to the High Court on an
order of transfer, the High Court had before it the
appeal as well as the rule asking the appellant to show
cause why the sentence should not be enhanced. It was
necessary, therefore, for the High Court to consider
(I) (1934) L.R. 62 I.A. 36,
ns
z959
Ramesh Chandra
Arora
v.
The Slate
S. K.Das ).
934
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(1)]
1959
both the appeal and the rule and this the High Court
Romes-;:;;,andra did in the judgment which it pronounced on DecemAroro
her 21, 1956.
v.
Now, as to the order of transfer. The provisions of
The Stole
s. 527, Criminal Procedure Code, appear to us to be a
sufficient answer to the contention urged on behalf of
5· K. Das J.
the appellant. It states, inter alia, that whenever it is
made to appear to the High Court that such an order
is expedient for the ends of justice, the High Court
may order that any particular case or appeal be transferred and tried before itself.
This is stated in express
terms in s. 526(i)(e)(iii) and sub-s. (3) of s. 526
states expressly that the High Court may act on its
own initiative in passing such an order. In this
particular case the High Court had the further circumstance that it had earlier issued a rule for enhancement
of sentence, without knowing perhaps that an appeal
had been filed to the Sessions Judge of Delhi a few
days earlier.
\Vhen this latter circumstance was
brought to the notice of the High Court, it thought it
expedient for the ends of justice to transfer the appeal
to the High Court.
We are unable to agree with
learned counsel for the appellant that the High Court
committed any illegality in passing the order of transfer.
[t is true that the record does not disclose that
any notice was issued to the appellant before the order
of tmnsfer was made. It was open to the High Court
to act on its own initiative and the appellant can
make no grievance of the order of transfer on the
ground of prejudice, because the appellant was fully
heard both as to the correctness of his conviction and
the propriety of the sentence originally passed against
him by the learned Magistrate.
As to the last point that the procedure adopted had
deprived the appellant of his right of getting first a
decision from the court of appeal and then another
from the High Court in the exercise of its revisional
jurisdiction, we do not think that there is any substance in it. · The High Court had validly before it
both the appeal and the rule for enhancement of
sentence. It heard the appellant fully with regard to
both. Therefore, no question arises of depriving the
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
935
appellant of any of his 'rights under the Code of Criminal Procedure.
In conclusion, we wish to add that we have
considered in the present case the question if the High
Court committed any illegality in passing the two
orders, one on June 14, 1956, and the other on August
17, 1956. We have held that the High Court committed no illegality. Nothing said in this judgment should
be taken as commending or encouraging a departure
from the usual practice which, we understand, is that
when an appeal is pending before an inferior court, the
High Court exercises, if necessary, its powers of
revision after the appeal has been disposed of. There
may, however, be exceptional cases where the ends of
justice require that the appeal itself be heard by the
High Court and in such a case it is open to the High
Court to exercise its powers of revision under s. 439,
Criminal Procedure Code, of enhancing the sentence
after having heard and dismissed the appeal. The
present case was an exceptional case of that nature
and we do not think that the procedure adopted by
the High Court was in any way illegal or prejudicial
to the appellant. We find no good grounds for interference by this Court.
Accordingly, we hold that the appeal is devoid of
merit and direct that it be dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.
BIBHUTI BHUSAN CHATTERJEE
v.
THE STATE OF BIHAR
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR and K. SuBBA RAO, JJ.)
Court Fee-Certified copies of the lower courts filed along with
Criminal Revision Application-Whether chargeable ie•ith Court fees
-Court Fees Act, z870 (VII of z870), s. 4, Sch. I, Art. 9.
The appellant who was aggrieved by the. orders passed by
the Magistrate against him in a proceeding under s. 107 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure and confirmed by the Additional
Sessions Judge, took the matter before the High Court at Patna
by a Criminal Revision Application and filed along with it the
certified copies of the orders passed by the two courts below
without any court fees.
The High Court took the view that the
I959
Romesh Chandra
Arora
v.
The State
S. K. Das J.
z959