# SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(2)] STATE OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND OTHERS v. THAKUR GANGA SINGH AND ANOTHER

- **Citation:** [1960] 2 S.C.R. 346
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1960
- **Bench:** B. P. Sinha, P. B. Gajendragadkar, K. SuBBA RAo, K. C. DAs GuPTA, J. C. Shah
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/supreme-court-reports-1960-2-state-of-jammu-kashmir-and-others-v-thakur-ganga-1865
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

Supreme Court, Appellate Jurisdiction of-Special leave to
appeal-When can be granted-Substantial question of law as to the
interpretation of the Constitution-M eam:ng of-Constitution of
India, Art. I32(2).
The respondents filed a petition in the High Court of Jammu
& Kashmir cha)lenging the vires of r. 4-47 of the Jammu and
Kashmir Motor Vehicles Rules. The High Court held that the
said rule was Hltra vires as offending Art. 14 of the Constitution.
The appellants filed an application in the High Court for a certificate under Art. 132(1) of the Constitution which was rejected on
the ground that no substantial question of law as to. the interpretation of the Constitution was involved in the case. Thereafter
the appellant applied to this Court for special leave under
Art. 132(2) of the Constitution, which was granted with liberty
to the respondents to raise the question of maintainability of the
appeal. There was no controversy between the parties in regard
to the interpretation of Art. 14 of the Constitution, and the
dispute centered round the question whether the impugned rule
stood the test of reasonable classification. The respondents raised
a preliminary objection that special leave under Art. 132(2) of
the Constitution could be granted by this court only if it was
satisfied that the case involved a substantial question of law as
to the interpretation of the Constitution, and that since, in the
present case, the interpretation of Art. I4 of the Constitution was
not in dispute by reason of a series of decisions of this Court and
no question of law, much less a substantial question of law, could
arise for consideration, no special leave could be granted under
the said Article.
It was contended on behalf of the appellants that whenever
a question of classification was raised that by itself involved the
interpretation of Art. 14 of the Constitution so far as the
impugned classification was concerned,
Held, that the principle underlying Art. 132(2} of the Constitution is that the final authority of interpreting the Constitution
must rest with the Supreme Court. With that object that Article
is freed from other limitations imposed under Arts. 133 and 134
and the right of appeal of the widest amplitude is allowed
irrespective of the nature of the proceedings in a case involving
only a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the
Constitution.
The interpretation of a provision means the method by which
the true sense or the meaning of the word is understood. Where
I
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
347
rg.sg
the parties agree as to t~e true interpretation or a provision or
do not raise any question in respect thereof, the case does not
involve any question of law as to the interpretation of the
Stale of
.
Constitution. A substantial question of law cannot arise where Jammu 6- Kaslmm
that law has been finally and authoritatively decided by this
v.
Court.
TltaAu, Ganga
In the instant case, the question raised does not involve any
question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution.
T. IM. Krishnaswami Pillai v. Governor Gc?teral in Cosmcil
(1947) 52 C.W.N. (F.R.) I, Blmdan Clzotedhry v. The State of Bihar•
[1955) I S.C.R. 1045. Chiranjit Lal Cltowdhuri v. U11io" of b1dia,
Lrgsol S.C.R. 869, Ram Kr~shna Dalmia v. Jt~slice. Tendolkar,
[1959] S.C.R. 279 and Mohammad Haneef Quareshs v. State of
Bihar, [1959] S.C.R. 629, relied on.
CIVJL APPELLATE JuRISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.
217 of 1959.
•
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
order dated June 20~ 1958, of the Jammu and Kashmir
High Court, in Writ Petition No. 108 of 1958.
H. N. Sanyal, Additional Solicitor-General of India,
N. S .. Bindra, R. H. Dhehar and T. 1J1. Sen, for the
appellants.
R. K. Garg and M. K . Ramamurthy, 8. N. Andley,
J. B. Dadachanji, Rame.shwar Nath and P. L. Volwa,
for the respondents.
1959. November 26. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
Singh
I
SunBA RAo J.-This appeal by· special leave raises
subba nao J.
the question of the

## Text

1959
November z6.
346
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(2)]
STATE OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND OTHERS
v.
THAKUR GANGA SINGH AND ANOTHER
(B. P. SINHA, C.J., P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR,
K. SuBBA RAo, K. C. DAs GuPTA and J. C. SHAH, JJ.)
Supreme Court, Appellate Jurisdiction of-Special leave to
appeal-When can be granted-Substantial question of law as to the
interpretation of the Constitution-M eam:ng of-Constitution of
India, Art. I32(2).
The respondents filed a petition in the High Court of Jammu
& Kashmir cha)lenging the vires of r. 4-47 of the Jammu and
Kashmir Motor Vehicles Rules. The High Court held that the
said rule was Hltra vires as offending Art. 14 of the Constitution.
The appellants filed an application in the High Court for a certificate under Art. 132(1) of the Constitution which was rejected on
the ground that no substantial question of law as to. the interpretation of the Constitution was involved in the case. Thereafter
the appellant applied to this Court for special leave under
Art. 132(2) of the Constitution, which was granted with liberty
to the respondents to raise the question of maintainability of the
appeal. There was no controversy between the parties in regard
to the interpretation of Art. 14 of the Constitution, and the
dispute centered round the question whether the impugned rule
stood the test of reasonable classification. The respondents raised
a preliminary objection that special leave under Art. 132(2) of
the Constitution could be granted by this court only if it was
satisfied that the case involved a substantial question of law as
to the interpretation of the Constitution, and that since, in the
present case, the interpretation of Art. I4 of the Constitution was
not in dispute by reason of a series of decisions of this Court and
no question of law, much less a substantial question of law, could
arise for consideration, no special leave could be granted under
the said Article.
It was contended on behalf of the appellants that whenever
a question of classification was raised that by itself involved the
interpretation of Art. 14 of the Constitution so far as the
impugned classification was concerned,
Held, that the principle underlying Art. 132(2} of the Constitution is that the final authority of interpreting the Constitution
must rest with the Supreme Court. With that object that Article
is freed from other limitations imposed under Arts. 133 and 134
and the right of appeal of the widest amplitude is allowed
irrespective of the nature of the proceedings in a case involving
only a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the
Constitution.
The interpretation of a provision means the method by which
the true sense or the meaning of the word is understood. Where
I
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
347
rg.sg
the parties agree as to t~e true interpretation or a provision or
do not raise any question in respect thereof, the case does not
involve any question of law as to the interpretation of the
Stale of
.
Constitution. A substantial question of law cannot arise where Jammu 6- Kaslmm
that law has been finally and authoritatively decided by this
v.
Court.
TltaAu, Ganga
In the instant case, the question raised does not involve any
question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution.
T. IM. Krishnaswami Pillai v. Governor Gc?teral in Cosmcil
(1947) 52 C.W.N. (F.R.) I, Blmdan Clzotedhry v. The State of Bihar•
[1955) I S.C.R. 1045. Chiranjit Lal Cltowdhuri v. U11io" of b1dia,
Lrgsol S.C.R. 869, Ram Kr~shna Dalmia v. Jt~slice. Tendolkar,
[1959] S.C.R. 279 and Mohammad Haneef Quareshs v. State of
Bihar, [1959] S.C.R. 629, relied on.
CIVJL APPELLATE JuRISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.
217 of 1959.
•
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
order dated June 20~ 1958, of the Jammu and Kashmir
High Court, in Writ Petition No. 108 of 1958.
H. N. Sanyal, Additional Solicitor-General of India,
N. S .. Bindra, R. H. Dhehar and T. 1J1. Sen, for the
appellants.
R. K. Garg and M. K . Ramamurthy, 8. N. Andley,
J. B. Dadachanji, Rame.shwar Nath and P. L. Volwa,
for the respondents.
1959. November 26. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
Singh
I
SunBA RAo J.-This appeal by· special leave raises
subba nao J.
the question of the scope of Art. 132(2) of tho Consti- •
tution.
The first respondent is one of the shareholders of the
second respondent, M/s. Jammu Kashmir Mechanics
And Transport Workers Co-operative Society Limited
Jammu {hereiua.fter called the Society). The Society
was registered under the Jammu and Kashmir
Co-operative Societies Act No. 6 of 1993 (Vikrimi).
They put in a number of applications before the third
appellant for the grant of stage carriage and public
carrier permits to them for various routes in the State
of Jammu & Kashmir, but no permits were granted to
thom on the ground tha.t under r. 4-47 of the ,Ja.mm~
348
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960 (2)]
z9s9
and Kashmir Motor Vehicle Rules (hereinafter called the
state of
Rules), service lic~nce could only be issued t? a person
Jamm14 &-Kashmir or a company registered under the Partnership Act and
v.
that, as the Society was neither a person nor a partnerThak11r Ganga ship, it was not entitled to a licence under the Rules.
Singh
The respondents filed a petition in the High Court of
Jammu & Kashmir under s. 103 of the Constitution of
Snbba Rao ]. Jammu & Kashm.ir challenging the vires of r. 4-4 7 of
the Rules. To that petition the appellants herein,
viz., the Government of Jammu & Kashmir State, the
Transport Minister, the Registering Authority and the
Traffic Superintendent, were made party-respondents.
The High Court held that the said rule was ultra vires
_as offending Art. 14 of the Constitution, and, on that
finding directed a writ of mandamus to issue against
the appellants herein from enforcing the provisions of
the said rule. The appellants filed an application in
the High Court for a certificate under Art. 132(1) of
the Constitution, but the High Court rejected it on the
ground that no substantial question of law as to
the interpretation of the Constitution was involved in
the case. Therefter the appellants applied for special
leave under Art. 132(2) of the Constitution and this
Court granted the same. The order giving the special
leave expressly granted liberty to the respondents
herein to raise the question of the maintainability of
the appeal at its final hearing.
Learned Counsel for the respondents raises a preli-
• _minary objection to the maintainability of the appeal.
Shortly stated his objection is that under Art. 132(2)
of the Constitution special leave can be given only if
the Supreme Court is satisfied that the case involves a
substantial question of law as to the interpretation of
the Constitution that in the present case the interpretation Art. 14 of the Constitution has been wellsettled and put beyond di~pute by a series of decisions
of this court, that, therefore, no question of law as to
the interpretation of the Constitution, much less a
substantial question of law in regard to that mattter,
arises for consideration and that, therefore, no special
leave can be granted undel· the said Article,
..4
•
-
-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
349
Z959
This argument is sought to be met by the learned
Additional Solicitor-General in the-following manner:
Whenever a question of classification. is raised, it
5
':e;~~;;:~u
involves the interpretation of Art. 14 of the Constitution with reference to the classification impugned. To
state it differently, the argument is that the question
in each case is whether the classification offends the
v.
Thakur Ganga
Singh
Subba Rao ].
principle of equality enshr-ined in Art. 14. Therefore,
whether a registered firm, a limited company and a
person have equal attributes is' a question of interpretation of Art 14 of the Constitution.
•
Before considering the validity of the rival contentions it would be convenient to ascertain precisely
what was the question raised in the High Court and
what was the decision given thereon by it. The argument advanced before the High Court on behalf of the
Society was that under r. 4-47 a licence can be issued
only to a person or a firm registered under the Partnership Act and· not to a ~orporation registered under the
Co-operative Societies Act or othenvise, and, therefore, ·
the said rule, being discriminatory in nature, offends
Art. 14 of the Constitution. The learned AdvocateGeneral appearing for the appellants contended that
under Art. 14 of the Constitution rational classification
is permissible and the legistature has framed tbe
impugned rule on such a basis, the object of which is
to safeguard the interest of the public. The High
Court, after considering the rival arguments, expressed
the opinion that the said rule did not proceed· 011 any
rational basis of classification and that, as a corporation had been arbitrarily singled out for discriminatory, treatment, the impugned rule offended the
equality clause of the Constitution. The appellants
in their petition for special leave filed in this Court
questioned the correctness of the conclusion ofthe High
Court. They asserted that the said role was based
upon reasonable classification and therefore could not·
be struck down a.s repugnant to Art. 14 of the Constitution. In other grounds they elaborated the same point
in an attempt to bring out the different a.ttribntes of
the two classes affording an intellisible differentia for
;
I959
State of Jammu
&Kashmir
v.
Thakur Ganga
Singh
Subba Rao.
350
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960 (2)]
classification. They clearly posed the question proposed to be raised by them in the appeal as under :
Ground iv:
"The aforesaid rule 4-4 7 (of the
Motor Vehicle8 Rules) is based upon reasonable
classification and is and was perfectly intra vires
and valid and could not be struck down as repugnant to Art. 14 of the Constitution of India."
Ground vi: "There is a marked difference between
a corporate body and partnership registered under
the provi~ions of the P-artnership Act and these
points of difference provide an intelligible differentia
~
for classification. The Hon'ble High Court has only
referred to one point of difference and has overlooked
other points of distinction and has erred in striking
down the aforesaid rule 4-4 7."
Ground viii : " Rule 4-4 7 was framed in the light
of local conditions prevailing. Co-operative Societies
and Corporations in the matter of transport were
not considered to be proper objects for the grant of
licence or permit. The classification is rational and
reasonable. The exclusion of artificial persons from
the ambit of the Rule is natural and not discriminatory."
The other grounds are only a further clarification of
the said grounds. In part II of their statement of case
the appellants stated as follows;
"It is now well-established that while Art. 14
forbids class legislation, it does not forbid reasonable
classification for the purpose of legislation."
The respondents, in their statement of case, accepted
the said legal position but contested the position that
there was reasonable classification. It is therefore
~
manifest that throughout there has never been a controversy between the parties in regard to the interpretation of Art. 14 of the Constitution, but their dispute
·centered only on the question whether the impugned
rule stood the test of reasonable classification.
In' the premises, can special leave be granted to the
appellants under Art 132(2) of the Constitution ?
Article 132(2) reads:
"Where the High Court has refused to give
such a certificate, the Supreme Court may, if it is
..
•
•
~-,. ' """! · -::-
·
• - - ·----
..
~
-S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPOR'rS : ..
351
I959 -
satisfied that· the case involves a substantial ques~
tion oflaw as to the interpretation of the. Constitu~ . State of Jammu
tion, grant special leave to appeal from such judge. Kashmir -
· ment, decree or final order/,
v.
Thakur Ganga
Singh
Under cl. (2) of Art. 132 there is no scope for granting
a special leave unless two conditions are satisfied: . (i)
the case should involve a. question oflaw as to the
Subba Rao f.
interpretation of the _Constitution; and {ii). the said
question should be a substantial question of law. The
principle underlying · the Article is that the_ final
authority of interpreting the Constitution must rest
with the Supreme Court. \Vith that object_ the Article
is-freed from other limitations imposed under Arts. _13.3
and 134 and the right of appeal of the_ widest; am-··
plitude is allowed irrespective of the :nature.oCthe
proceedings in a case involving only· a substantial
questi9n of law as to th~ interpretation of the Consti·
·tution.
·
\Vhat does interpretation of a -provision·· mean ?
Interpretation is the method by which the true sense_·
or the meaning of the word is understood. The
question of interpretation can ar!se only if two or
mo!"e possible constructions are sought to be placed on
a. pro~is;on-one· party suggesting one construction
and the other a different one. But where the parties
agree on the true interpretation of a provision or· do
not raise any question in respect thereof, it is not.
possible to hold that the case involves any;question of
law as to the interpretation of the Constitution. On an
interpretation of Art. 14~ a series of decisions of this
Court evolved the doctrine of classification~ · As ·we
have pointed out~ 'at no stage of the proceedings either
the correctness of the interpretation_ of Art. 14 or the
principles go~erning the doctrine of classification have
been questioned by either of the parties. Indeed
accepting the said doctrine, the appellants contended
that there was a valid classification under the rule ··
while the respondents argued contra. The h~arned
Additional Solicitor General contended, for the -(irst'
time, before us that the appeal raised a new facet of
the doctrine of equality, namely, whether an artifiCial
person and a natural person have ·equal attributes
I959
State of T ammt~
& Kashmir
v.
Thakur Ganga
Singh
Subba Rao ].
352
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(2)]
within the meaning of the equality clause, and, therefore, the case involves a question of interpretation of
the Constitution. This argument, if we may say so,
involves the same contention in a different garb. If
analysed, the argument only comes to this : as an
artificial person and a natural person have different
attributes, the classification made between them is
valid. This argument does not suggest a new interpretation of Art. 14 of the Constitution, but only
attempts to bring the rule within the doctrine of
classification. We, therefore, hold that the question
raised in this case does not involve any question oflaw
as to the interpretation of the Constitution.
-
Assuming that the case raif'les a question of law as
to the interpretation of the Constitution, can it be said
that the question raised is a substantial question of
law within the meanintz of cl. (2) of Art 14.
This
aspect was considered b:v the :Federal Court in T. 11!.
K rishnaswamy Pillai v. Governor General In Council (1 ).
That decision turned upon the provisions of s. 205 of
the Government of India Act, 1935.
The material
part of that section says :
S. 205: "{l) An appeal shall lie to the Federal Court
from any judgment, decree or final order of a High
Court if the High Court certifies that the case involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of this Act or any Order in Council made
thereunder .
''
The Madras High Court gave a certificate to the effect
that the case involved a substantial question of law as
to the interpretation of s. 240(3) of the Government of
India Act, 1935. Under s. 240(3) of the said Act, no
person who was a member of civil service of the Crown
in India or held any civil post under the Crown in
India could be dismissed or reduced in rank until he
had been given a reasonable opportunity of showing
cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard
to him. The High Court, on the facts found, held
that the appellant therein had been offered a reasonable opportunity of showing cause within the meanin_
(I} (1947).5~ C.W.N. \F.R.) I,
.•·
....
J
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
353
of the said section, but gave a. certificate under
s. 205(1) of the Government of India. Act, 1935.
In
dealing with the propriety of issuing the certificate in
the circumstances of that case, Za.frulla. Khan, J.,
speaking on behalf the Court, concisely and pointedly
stated at p. 2 :
" It was .urged before us that the case involved a
question relating to t.he interpretation of sub-section (3) of section 240 of the Act. To Lhe extent to
which any guidance might have been needed for the
put·poses of this case on the interpretation of that
sub-section that guidance was furnished so far as
this Court is concerned in its judgment in Secretary
of State for builia v. I.M. Lal [(1945) F.C.R. 103 ].
The rest was a simple question of fact.
In our
judgment no '~substantial question of law '' as to
the interpretation of the Constitution Act was
involved in this case, which could ha.vo formed the
basis of a. certificate under section 205(1) of the
Act.,
On the question of interpretation of Art. 14 of the
Constitution this Court in Budltan Ohoudht'!} v. The
State of Bihar (1) explained the true meaning and
scope of that Article thus :
"It is now well-established that while article 14
forbids class legislation, it does not forbid reasonable classification for the purposes of legislation.
In order, however, to pass the tho wst of permissible classification two conditions must be fulfilled,
namely, (i) that the classification must be founded
on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes
persons or things that are grouped together from
others left out of the group and (ii) that that difl'erentia. must have a. rational t·elation to the object
sought to be achieved by the statue in question.
The classification may be founded qn different
bases: namely, geographical, or according to objects
or occupations or the like. Wha.t is necessary is
that there must be nexus between tho basis of
classification and the object of the Act under
oonsidera.tion.,
(1) [1955}1 S.C.R. 1045, 1049.
Stau of Jammu
bKashmiT
v.
Thakt~r Ganga
Singh
Sttbba Rao ] .
I959
State of Jammu
e;. Kashmir
v.
Thakur Ga11ga
Singh
S1ebba Rao ].
354
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(2)]
This in only a restatement of the law that has been
enunciated by this Court in Ohir.anjit Lal Olwwdhuri
v. The Union of India (1) and in other subsequent
decisions. The said principles were reaffirmed in the
recent decisions of this Court in Rama Krishna
Dalmia v. J'ustice Tendolkar (2) and in Mohammed
Haneef Qureshi v. State of Bihar (3). In view of the
said decision there is no further scope for putting a
new interpretation on the provisions of Art. 14 of the
Constitution vis-a-vis the doctrine of classification.
The interpretation of Art. 14 in the context of classification has been finally settled by the highest Court of
this land and under Art. 141 of the Constitution that
interpretation is binding on all the Courts within the
territory of India. What remained to be done by the
High Court was only to apply that_ interpretation to
the facts before it. A substantial question of law,
•therefore, cannot arise where that law has been finally
and authoritatively decided by this Court.
In the result we accept the preliminary objection
and dismiss the appeal with costs.
, Appeal dismissed.
(1) [195e] S.C.R. 869.
(2) [1959] S.C.R. 279.
(3) [1959) S.C.R. 629.