# SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1961(1)] STATE OF U. P v. DEOMAN UPADHYAYA - **Citation:** [1961] 1 S.C.R. 14 - **Court:** Supreme Court of India - **Decided:** 1961 - **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 1 of 1960 - **Bench:** f;. K. DAS, J. L. Kapur, K. Sudba Rao, M. Hidayatullah, J. c. SHAH - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/supreme-court-reports-1961-1-state-of-u-p-v-deoman-upadhyaya-1917 - **Pages:** 51 ## Headnote Criminal Law -Evidence-Statement made to police officer leading to discot:e.,y--SlaJ.ute making stalcmcnt admissible u:lun made by perso11 in custody and inadmissible when made fry persan not in custody-Wlicthcr offends equality before t/ie law-" Persans in custody " - "Person accused of an offeiu:e "-Connotation of-Circumstantial evidence-Indian Evidence Act, I872 (I of I872), s. 27 -Code of Criminal Procedure. I898 (Act 5 of I898), s. I62(2)- Co11stitution of India, Art. I4. The respondent was tried for the murder o! one Sukhdei early on the morning o! June 19. 1958. The evidence against him was entirely circumstantial and consisted o! the following facts: (i) on the 18th evening there was an altercation between the respondent and Sukhdei during which he slapped her and threatened that he would smash her lace; (ii) on the 18th ewning the respondent borrowed a gandasa lrom one Mahesh; (iii) before day break on the 19th he was seen going towards and taking a bath in the village tank; (iv) the respondent absconded immediately thcrPafter; (v) he was arrested on the 20th and on 21st he offered to hand over the gandasa which he said he had thrown in the tank and thereafter he took the gandasaout o! the tank, and (vi) the gandasa was found to be stained with human hlood. The Sessions Judge accepted this evidence, found that the irresistible conclusion was that the respondent had committed the murder and sentenced him to death. On appeal the lltgh Court held that s. 27 o! the Indian Evidence Act offended Art. 14 o! the Constitution and was void as it created an unjustifiable discrimination bet"'·ecn persons in custody whose statement leading to discovery was made admissible and persons not in custody whose statement was not made admissible even if it led to a discovery ; and consequently they held sub-s. (2) o! s. 162 o! the Code o! Criminal Procedure in so !ar as it related to s. 27 o! the Indian E\'ic!ence Act also to he void. As a result, the High Couit ruled out the statement o! the respondent that he had thrown the gm1dasa in the tank as inadmissible. They further held that the story tbat the appellant had borrowed the gandasa from Mahesh was unreliable. The rest o! the evidence in the view o! the High Court was not sufficient to prove the guilt o! the respondent and accordingly they acquitted him. Held, (per S. K. Das, J. L. Kapur, Hidayatullah and Shah, JJ-, Subba Rao, J .. dissenting), thats. 27 of the Indian Evidence Act and sub-s. (2) of s. 162 o! the Code of Criminal "- S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 15 Procedure did not offend Art. 14 of the Constitution and were I960 not void. Article 14 does not provide that all laws must be uniform and universally applicable; it merely forbids imwoper or invidious distinctions by conferring rights or privileges upon a class of persons arbitrarily selected from out of a larger group who are similarly circumstanced, and between whom and others not so favoured, no distinction reasonably justifying different treatment exists. Between persons in custody and persons not in custody the legislature has made a real distinction by enacting distinct rules regarding admissibility of statements confessional or otherwise made by them. In considering the constitutionality of a statute on the ground whether it has given equal treatment to all persons similarly circumstanced it has to be remembered that the legislature has to deal with practical prob.lems; the question is not to be judged by merely enumerating other theoretically possible situations to which the statute might have been but has not applied. A doctrinaire approach is to be avoided. Persons not in custody making statements to the police leading to discovery of facts were a possible but rare class. A person who approaches a police officer investigating an offence and offers to give information leading to· the discovery of an incriminating fact must be deemed to have surrendered himself to the police and to be in custody within the meaning ## Text _Characters 0–39,997 of 114,501. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39997 for what follows._ 19~0 Jo.toy 6. 14 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1961(1)] STATE OF U. P. v. DEOMAN UPADHYAYA (f;. K. DAS, J. L. KAPUR, K. SUDBA RAO, M. HIDAYATULLAH and J. c. SHAH, JJ.) Criminal Law -Evidence-Statement made to police officer leading to discot:e.,y--SlaJ.ute making stalcmcnt admissible u:lun made by perso11 in custody and inadmissible when made fry persan not in custody-Wlicthcr offends equality before t/ie law-" Persans in custody " - "Person accused of an offeiu:e "-Connotation of-Circumstantial evidence-Indian Evidence Act, I872 (I of I872), s. 27 -Code of Criminal Procedure. I898 (Act 5 of I898), s. I62(2)- Co11stitution of India, Art. I4. The respondent was tried for the murder o! one Sukhdei early on the morning o! June 19. 1958. The evidence against him was entirely circumstantial and consisted o! the following facts: (i) on the 18th evening there was an altercation between the respondent and Sukhdei during which he slapped her and threatened that he would smash her lace; (ii) on the 18th ewning the respondent borrowed a gandasa lrom one Mahesh; (iii) before day break on the 19th he was seen going towards and taking a bath in the village tank; (iv) the respondent absconded immediately thcrPafter; (v) he was arrested on the 20th and on 21st he offered to hand over the gandasa which he said he had thrown in the tank and thereafter he took the gandasaout o! the tank, and (vi) the gandasa was found to be stained with human hlood. The Sessions Judge accepted this evidence, found that the irresistible conclusion was that the respondent had committed the murder and sentenced him to death. On appeal the lltgh Court held that s. 27 o! the Indian Evidence Act offended Art. 14 o! the Constitution and was void as it created an unjustifiable discrimination bet"'·ecn persons in custody whose statement leading to discovery was made admissible and persons not in custody whose statement was not made admissible even if it led to a discovery ; and consequently they held sub-s. (2) o! s. 162 o! the Code o! Criminal Procedure in so !ar as it related to s. 27 o! the Indian E\'ic!ence Act also to he void. As a result, the High Couit ruled out the statement o! the respondent that he had thrown the gm1dasa in the tank as inadmissible. They further held that the story tbat the appellant had borrowed the gandasa from Mahesh was unreliable. The rest o! the evidence in the view o! the High Court was not sufficient to prove the guilt o! the respondent and accordingly they acquitted him. Held, (per S. K. Das, J. L. Kapur, Hidayatullah and Shah, JJ-, Subba Rao, J .. dissenting), thats. 27 of the Indian Evidence Act and sub-s. (2) of s. 162 o! the Code of Criminal "- S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 15 Procedure did not offend Art. 14 of the Constitution and were I960 not void. Article 14 does not provide that all laws must be uniform and universally applicable; it merely forbids imwoper or invidious distinctions by conferring rights or privileges upon a class of persons arbitrarily selected from out of a larger group who are similarly circumstanced, and between whom and others not so favoured, no distinction reasonably justifying different treatment exists. Between persons in custody and persons not in custody the legislature has made a real distinction by enacting distinct rules regarding admissibility of statements confessional or otherwise made by them. In considering the constitutionality of a statute on the ground whether it has given equal treatment to all persons similarly circumstanced it has to be remembered that the legislature has to deal with practical prob.lems; the question is not to be judged by merely enumerating other theoretically possible situations to which the statute might have been but has not applied. A doctrinaire approach is to be avoided. Persons not in custody making statements to the police leading to discovery of facts were a possible but rare class. A person who approaches a police officer investigating an offence and offers to give information leading to· the discovery of an incriminating fact must be deemed to have surrendered himself to the police and to be in custody within the meaning of s. 27 of the Indian Evidence Att. A law which makes provision for cases where the need is most felt cannot be struck down becaus~ there are other instances to which it might have been applied. The object of the legislation being both to punish offenders proved to be guilty and to protect persons who may be compelled to make confessional statements, the provisions of s. 27 are reasonable as they make information admissible on. the ground that the discovery of a fact pursuant to the statement made by a. person in custody is a guarantee of the truth' of that statement. Legal Remembrancer v. Lalit Mohan Singh Roy, (1921) I.L.R. 49 Cal. 167 and Santokhi Belaar v. King Emperor,. (1933) I.L.R. 12 Pat. 241, referred to. · West Coast Hotel Company v. Parrish, (1937) 300 U.S. 379: - Sr L. Ed. 703, Weaver v. Palmer Bros. Co., (1926) i70 U.S. 402: 70 L. Ed. 654 and Miller v. Wilson, (r9r5) 236 U.S. 373: 59 L. Ed. 628, relied on. The expression "a person accused of any offence" in s. 27 is merely descriptive of the persons against whom evidence is sought to be led in a criminal proceeding. It is not necessary that the person should have been accused of an offence at the time when he made the statement leading to the discovery of a fact. The statement made by the respondent that he will recover State of U. P. v. Deoman Upad~yaya v. J)eomati li padhyara 16 SUPREME coeRT REPORTS (1961(1)] the gandasa which he has thrown in the tank is admissible in evidence.and may be used against him. This statement together with the other facts proved; even if the fact of the respondent borrowing gandasa from Mahesh were excluded, established a chain which . ' - ·'"' S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 19 and in the course of the altercation, Deoman slapped Sukhdei and threatened her that he would smash her "mouth" (face). (b) In the evening of .June 18, 1958, Deoman borrowed a gandasa (Ex. l) from one Mahesh. (c) Before day-break on June 19, 1958, Deoman was seen by a witness for the prosecut.ion hurrying towards the tank and shortly thereafter he was seen by another witness taking his bath in the tank. (d) Deoman absconded immediately thereafter and was not to be found at Anandadih on J nne 19, 1958. (e) Tha.t on June 21, 1958, Deoman, in the presence of the investigating officer and two witnesses, offered to hand over the gandasa which he said he had thrown into a tank, and thereafter he led the officer and the witnesses to the tank at Anandadih and in their presence waded into the tank and fetched the yandasa (Ex. 1) out of the water. This gandasa was found hy the Chemical Examiner and Serologist to be stained with human blood. In the view of the Sessions Judge, on the facts found, the ' only irresistible conclusion ' was that Deoman had committed the murder of Sukhdei early in the morning of June 19, 1958, at Anandadih. He observed, "The conduct of the accused (Deoman) as. appearing from the movements disclosed by him, when taken in conjnction with the recovery at his instance of the gandasa stained with human blood, which gandasa had been borrowed only in the evening preceding the brutal hacking of Sukhdei, lea ~es no room for doubt that Deoman and no other person was responsible for this calculated and cold-blooded murder". At the hearing of the reference made hy the court of Session for confirmation of sentence and the. appeal filed by Deoman before the High Court at Allahabad, it was contended that the evidence that Deoman made a statement before the police and two witnesses on June 21, 1958, that he had thrown the gandasa into the tank a.nd that he would take it out and hand it over, /was inadmissible in evidence, because s. 27 of t.he Indian Evidence Act which State of U. P. v. Upadhyaya Shah ]. State of U. P. , .. De om an Upadhyaya Shah ]. ' 20 SUPREME COCRT HEPORTS [1961(1)] rendered suoh a. statement a.dmissiblo, discriminated between persons in custody a.nd persons not in custody and wa.s therefore void a.s violative of Art. 14 of tho Constitution. The Division Bench hearing tho appeal referred the following two questions for opinion of a. Full Bench of tho court ;- 1. Whether. s. 27 of the Indian Evidence Act is void because it offends against the provisions of Art. 14 of the Constitution ? a.nd 2. Whether sub-s. (2) of s. 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in so fa.r a.s it relates to s. 27 of the Indian Evidence Act is void ? The reference wa.s heard by lit C. Desai, B. Mukhorjee a.nd A. P. Srivastava, JJ. Mukherjee, J., a.nd Sriva.sta.va, J., opined on the first question, tha.t" s. 27 of the lndia.n Evidence Act creates an unjustifiable discrimination between " persons in custody" a.nd "persons out of custody ", a.nd in tha.t it offends a.gs.inst Art. 14 of the Constitution a.nd is unonforcoa.ble in its present form ", and on the second question, they held tha.t sub-s. (2) of s. 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure " in so fa.r a.s it relates to s. 27 of the Indian Evidence Act is void". Desai, J., answered the two questions in the nega.tive. The reference for confirmation of the doa.th sentence a.nd the a.ppea.l filed by Deoma.n were then heared by another Division Bench. In the light of the opinion of the Full Bench, the learned Judges excluded from consideration the statement ma.de by Deoman in the presence of the police officer a.nd the witnesses offering to point out the gandasa which he ha.cl thrown in the village ta.nk. They held that the story that Deo. man ha.cl borrowed a. gandasa in tho evening of .June 18, 1958, from Mahesh wa.s unreliable. They accepted the conclusions of the Sessions Judge on points (a.), (c) a.nd (d) a.nd also on point (e) in so far a.s it related to the production by Deoma.n in the presence of the police officer and search witnesses of the gandasa after wading into the tank, but a.s in their view, the evidence was insufficient to prove the guilt of Deoman beyond reasonable doubt, they acquitted him of the offence of murder. At the instance of the - ~' •• l S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 21 State of Uttar Pradesh, the High Court granted a certificate that " having regard to the general importance· of the question as to the constitutional validity of s. 27 of the Indian Evidence Act", the case was fit for appeal to this court. Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act is one of a group of sections relating to the relevancy of certain forms of admissions made by. persons accused of offences. Sections 24 to 30 of the Act deal with ad mis· sibility of confessions, i.e., of statements made by a person stating or suggesting that he has committed a crime. By s. 24, in a criminal proceeding against a person, a confession made by him is inadmissible if it appears to the court to have been caused by inducement, threat or promise having reference to the charge and proceeding from a person in authority. By s. 25, there is an absolute ban against proof at the trial of a person accused of an offence, of a confession made to a police officer. The ban which is partial under s. 24 and complete under s. 25 apy,Jies equally whether or not the person against whom evidence is sought to be led in a criminal trial was at the time of making the confession in custody. For the ban to be effective the person need not have ~een accused of an offence when he made the confession. The expression, " accused person " in s. 24 and the expression " a person accused of any offence " have the same connotation, and describe the person against whom evidence is sought to be led in a criminal proceeding. As observed in Pakala Narayan Swamy v. Emperor (1), by the JudicialCommittee of the Privy Council," s. 25 covers a confession made to a police officer before any investigation has begun or otherwise not. in the course of an investigation". The adjectival clause "accused of any offence" is therefore descriptive of the person against whom a confessional statement made by him is declared not provable, and does not predicate a condition of that person at the time of 'making the statement for the applicability of the ban. Section 26 of the Indian Evidence Act by its first paragraph provides " No confession (1) (1939) L.R. 66 I.A. 66. State of l..[. P. v. Deoman Upadhyaya Shah ]. 1960 State of i;. P. v. Drun1ati Upadhyaya Shah ]. 22 SCPHEME COCRT llEPORTS [1961(1)) ma.de h.v any person whilst he is in the custody of a. . polire ollic•.,r, unleRR it be ma.de in the immediate prosenco of a. Magistrate, shall be proved as a.go.inst a. person accused ·Of any off en co." By this section, a. confession ma.de by a. person who is in custody is declared not prova.bln unle•• it is made in the immediate presonce of a Magistrate. Whereas s. 25 prohibits proof of a. confession ma.do by a pers.011 to a police officer whether or not at th.., time of ma.king the confession, ho wa.s in custody, s. 26 prohibitR proof of a confession by a pPrsou in cust-Ody ma.do to any person unless the co11fcssio11 is ma.de in tho immediate presence of a :l-1a.gistratc. s .. c1ion 27 which is in form of a proviso state•" Provided that, when any fact is d<'posed to a.s discovered in consequence of information received from a. person accused of any offence, in the custody .of a police officPr, so much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may b~ proved." The expression, "accusod of any offence" ins. 27, as ins. 25, is .. lsode;criptive of the person concerned, i.e., against a person wbo is accused of an offence, s. 27 renders provable certain statements made by him whilf' he was in the custody of a. police officer. Section 27 i:; fouuded ou the principle that even though the evidence relaf.ing to confession1tl or oLher statement a made by a. persou, whilst ho is in the c11study of a poliee officer, is tainted.and therefore inadmissible, if the trut.h of the informa.t.iou given by him is assured by the di~covery .,fa. fac:t, it. m11.y be presumed to be untainted n.nd is therofore declared prova.blo in so far as .it disl inctly relates to the fact thereby discovered. En>n though s. 27 is in the form of n. proviso to s. 26, the two seetions do not nrcess:uilY deal with the evidence of the same d1ara.cter. The ban imposed bys. 26 is against the proof of confessional statements. Section 27 is cuacerncd with the proof of information whether it amounts to a confession or not., which leads lo discovery of facts. By s. 27, even if a fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information receiVPd, only that much Of tbe information is a.dmis8ible as distinctly relates to the fact discovered. ·- ... S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 23 By s. 26, a confession made in the presence of a Magistrate is made provable in its entirety. Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure also enacts a rule of evidence. This section in so far as it is material for purposes of this case, prohibits, but not so as to affect the admissibility of information to the ext.ent permissible under s. 27 of the Evidence Act, use of statements by any person to a police officer in the course of an inve•tigation under Ch. XIV of the Code, in any enquiry or trial in which such person is charged for any offence, under invest.igation at the time when the statement was made. On an analysis' of ss. 24 to 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, and s. 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the following materia.l propositions emerge:- (a) Whether a person is in custody or outside, a confession made by him to a police officer or the making of .which is procured by inducement, t.hreat, or promise having reference to the charge against him and proceeding from a person in authority, is not pro: vable against him in any proceeding in which he is charged with the commission of an offence. (li~ A confession made by a person whilst he is in the custody of a police officer to a person other than a police officer is not provable in a proceeding in which he is charged with the commission of an offence unless it is made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate. (c) That part of the information given by a person whilst in police custody whether the information is confessional or otherwise, which distinctly relates to the fact thereby discovered but no more, is provable in a proceeding in which he is charged with the commission of an offence. (d) A statement whether it amounts to a confession or not made by a person when be is not in custody, to another person such latter person not being a police officer may be proved if it is otherwise relevant. (e). A statement made by a person to a police officer in the course of an investigation of an offence under· Cb. XIV of the, Code of Criminal Procedure, cannot except to the ext.ent permitted by s. 27 of the State of U. !'. v. Deoinan TJpadhyaya Shah ]. • State of U. P. \'. Deoman Upadhyaya Shah }. • 24 SUPREME COURT ltEPOH.TS (1961(1)] Indian Evidence Act, be used for any purpose a.t a.ny enquiry or trial in respect of a.ny offence under investigation at the time when the statement wa.s ma.de in which he is concerned as a. person accused of a.n offence. A confession made by a. person not in custody is therefore a.dmissiblc in evidence aga.iust him in a crimina.1 proceeding unloss it. is procured in the manner described in s. 24, or is made to a police officer. A statement made by a. person, if it is not confessional, is provable iu all proceedings unless it is made to a. police officer in the course of an investigation, and the proceeding in which it is sought to be proved is one for the trial of that person for the offence under in vestigatiou when he ma.de that statement. Whereas information given by a. person in custody is to the extent to which it distinctly relates to a fact thereby discovered is made provable, by s. 162 of tl:ie Code of Criminal Procedure, such information given by a person not in custody to a. police officer in the course of the investigation of an offonce is not provable. This distinction ma.y appear to be somewhat paradoxical. Sections 25 a.nd 26 wero enacted not because the law presumed the statements to be untrue, but having regard to the tainted nature of the source of the evidence, prohibited them from being received in evidence. It is manifest tha.t the class of persons who needed protection most where those in the custody of the police a.nd persons not in the custody of police did not neod the same degree of protection. But by the combined operation of s. 27 of the Evidence Act a.nd s. 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the a.dmissibilty in evidence against a person in a. criminal proceeding of a. statemeut ma.de to a. police officer lea.ding to the discovery of a. fact depends for its determination on the question whether he wa.s in custody a.t the time of ma.king the statement. It is provable if he wa.s in custody a.t the time when he made it, otherwise it is not. Are persons in custody, by this distinction depri vcd of" equality before the la.w, or the equal protection of the laws" within the meaning of Art. 14 of the ·- • S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 25 Constitution ? By the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by Art. 14 of the Constitution, it is not predicated that all laws must be uniform and universally applicable; the guarantee merely forbids improper or invidious distinctions by conferring rights or privileges upon a class of persons arbitrarily selected from out of a larger group who are similarly circurns. tanced, and between whom and others not so favoured, no distinction reasonably justifying different treatment exists: it does not give a guarantee of the same or similar treatment to all persons without reference to the relevant differences. The State has a wide discretion in the selection of classes amongst persons, things or transactions for purposes of legislation. Between persons in. custody and persons not in custody, distinction has evidently been made by the Evidence .\ct in some matters and they are differently treated. Persons who were, at the time when the statements sought to be proved were made, in custody have been given in some matters greater protection com pared to persons not in custody. Confessional or other statements made by persons not in custody may be admitted in evidence, unless such statements fall within ss. 24 and 25 whereas all confessional sta.tements made by persons in custody except those in the presence of a Magistrate are not provable. This distinction between persons. in custody and persons not in custody, in the context of admissibility of statements made by them concerning the offence' charged cannot be called arbitrary, artificial or evasive : the legislature has made a real distinction between these two classes, and has enacted distinct rules about admissibility of statements confessional or otherwise made by them. There is nothing in the Evidence Act which precludes proof of information given by a person not in custody, which relates to the facts thereby discovered; it is by virtue of tlie ban imposed by s. 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, that a statement made to a police officer in the course of the investigation of an offence under Oh. XIV . by a person not in police 4 Stale of U. P. v. Deoman Upadhyaya Shah j. .<:tatt of {i. !'. v. L)to,,1at1 Upadh)·aya Shah }. 26 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1961(1)] custody at t.he time it wa.s made even if it leads to tho discovery of a. fact is not provable aga.inRt him at the trial for tha.t offence. But the di~tinction which it may he rememher.-d dneR not proceod on the sa.me lines as under t.he Evidenco Act., arising in the ma.ttel' of a.dmissibilit.y of sueh statements ma.de to the police officer in the courBo of an investigation between persons in custody a.nd per8ons not in cu8tody, ha.s little pra.ctioal significance. When a person not in onstrnly a.pproa.ches a. police officer inrnstigating an offence a.nd offers t-0 give information lea.ding to the discovery of a. fact, having a bee.ring on the charge which may be made against him he may appropriately be deemed to have surrendered himself to the police. Section 46 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate any formality before a. person can be s1lid to be ta.ken in custody : sub~ission to the custody by word or action by a person in sufficient. A person directly giving to a. police officer by word of month information which may be used a.s evidence against him, ma.v be deemed to have submit.led himself to the "custody " of the police officer within the meaning of s. 27 of tho lndia.p. Evidence Act: Legal Remembrancer v. Lalit Mohan Singh (1), Santokhi Beldar v. King Emperor('). Exceptional oases may cert.a.inly be imagined in which a. person ma.y give information without presenting himself before a. police officer who is in veHtigating an offence. For instance, he ma.y write a. letter and give such information or may Rend a. telephonic or other message to the police officer. But in considering whether a. statute is unconstitutional on the ground that the law has given equal treatment to all persons similarly circumstanced, it mn~t be remembt1red that the legislature has to deal with practical problems; the quest.ion is not to be judged by merely enumerating othur theoretically possible situations to which the statute might have been but is not applied. As has often been said in considering whether there has been a. denial of the equal protection of the laws, a doct.rina.ire approach is to be a.voided. A person who has committed an offence, but who is not in (1) (1921) l.L.R. 49 Cal. 167. (2) (1933) !.L.R. 12 Pat. 241. ) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 27 custody, normally would not without surrendering himself to the police give information voluntarily to a police officer investigating the commission of that offence leading to the discovery of material evidence supporting a charge against him for the commission of the' offence. The Parliament enacts laws to deal with practical problems which are likely to arise in the affairs of men. Theoretical possibility of an offender not in custody because the police officer investigating the offence has not been able to get at any evidence• against him giving information to the police officer without surrendering himself to the police, which may lead to the discovery of an important fact by the police, cannot be ruled out; but such an occurrence would indeed be rare. Our attention has not been rnvited to any case in which it was even alleged that information leading to the discovery of a faot which may be used in evidence against a person was given by him to a police officer in the course of investigation without such person having surrendered himself. Cases like Deonandan Dasadh v. King Emperor (1), Santokhi Beldar v. King Emperor (2), Durlav Namasudra v. Emperor('), In re Mottai Thevar('), In re -- Peria Guruswami ('), Bharosa Ramdayal v. Emperor(') and Jalla v. Emperor(') and others to which our attention was invited are all cases in which t,he accused persons who made statements leading to discovery of facts were either in the a.ctual , custody of police officers or had ,surrendered themselves to the police at the time of, or before making the statements attributed to them, and do not illustrate the existence of a real and substantial class of persons not in custody giving information to police officers . in the course of investigation leading to discovery of facts which may be used as evidence against those persons. . In that premise and considered in the background that " persons in custody " and "persons not in custody " do not stand on the same footing nor require (1) (19281 !LR 7 Pat. 411, (2) (1933) LL.R 12 Pat. 241, (3) (1932) l.L.R. 59 Cal. 1040. (4) A.LR. 1952 Mad. 586. (5) LLR 1942 Mad, 77, (6) LLR 1940 Nag, 670. (7) AJ.R 1931 I.ah. 278, Stcife of U. P.· upadhyttyti Shah ]. v. f)f~!tf/flll l_ fadltyn)rt .'>hali .f. 28 StiPitEME COCRT REPORTS [l96I(l)] identical protect.ion, is the more theoretical possibility nf some degree of inequality of the protection of the laws relating to the admissibility of evidence between persons in custqdy and persons not in custody by itself a ground of striking down a salutory provision of the law of evidenco ? Article 14 of the Constitution of India. is adopted from the last clauso of s. I of the 14th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States of America, and it may reasonably bn assumed that our Constituent Assembly when it enshrined tho guarantee of eq11al protection of the laws in our Constitution, was a.ware of its content delimited by judicial interpretation in the United St.ates of America.. In considering the authorities of the superior courts in the United States, we would not therefore be incorporating principles foreign to our Constitution, or be proceeding upon the slippery ground of apparent similarity of expressions or concepts in an a.lien jurisprudence developed by a society whose approach to similar problems on account of historical or other reasons differs fr,>m ours. In West Coast Hotel Company v. Parrish (1), in gulation to all cases which it might possibly reach. The legislature "is free to recognise degree of ha.rm a.nd it may confine its restrictions to those classes of cases where the need is deemed t-0 be clearest ''. If "the la.w presumably hits the evil where it iH most folt, it is not to be overthrown. ho.cause there aro other instances to which it might have been applied ''. There is no " doctrinaire requirement" that the legislation should be couched in all embracing terms''. ' Holmes, J., in Weaver v. Palmer Bros. Co.('), in his dissonting judgment observed :- " A classification is not to be pronounced arbitrary (1) (1937) 300 U.S. 379: 81 L. Ed. 703. (2) (<926) 270 U.S. 402 : 70 L. Ed. 654. ..... -, S.C.R. . SUPREME COURT REPORTS 29 because it goes on practical grounds and attacks only those objects that exhibit or foster an evil on a large scale. It is not required to be mathematically precise and to embrace every case that theoretically is capable of doing the same harm. "if ~he law presumably hits the evil, where it is most felt, it is not to be overthrown because there are other instances to which it might have been applied." Miller v. Wilson(1). -McKenna, J., in Health and Milligan Mfg. Co. v. Worst (2), observed : "Classification must have relation to the purpose of the legislature. But logical appropriateness of the inclusion or exclusion of objects or persons is not required. A classification may not be merely arbitrary, but necessarily there must be great freedom of discretion, even though it. result in 'illadvised, unequal, and oppressive· legislation'. ..... Exact wisdom and nice adaption of remedies are not required by the 14th Amendment, nor the crudeness nor the impolicy nor even the injustice of state laws redressed by it." Sections 25 and 26 are manifestly intended to hit at an evil, viz., to guard against the danger of receiving in evidence testimony from tafoted sources about statements made by persons accused of offences. But these sections' forin part of a statute which codifies the law relating to the relevancy of evidence and prodf of facts in judicial proceedings. The State is as much concerned with punishing offenders who may be prayed guilty of committing offences as itis concerned with protecting persons who may be compelled to give confessional statements. If s. 27 renders information admissible on the ground that the discovery of a fact ' . . pursuant to a statement made by a person m custody is a guarantee of the truth of the statement made by him, and t.he legislature has chosen to make on that ground an exception to the rule prohibiting proof of such statement, that rule is not to be deemed unconstitutional, because of the possibility of abnormal instances to which the legislature might have, but has not extended the rule. The principle of admitting (1) (1915) 236 U.S. 373; 59 L. Ed. 628. (2) (1907) 207 U.S. 338; 52 L. Ed. 236. State of U. P. v. Deom.an Upadhyaya Shah j. SttJlr '>f U P. v. /Jf'f)l)l(Jli l;pridhyn.ra Shnh j. 30 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1961(1 )j evidl'nco of statoments me.do by a person giving iniormation leading to the discovery of facts which may be used in evidence l\gainst, him is manifostly reasonable. The fact that the principle iH restricted to persons in custody will not by itself be 11 ground for holding that there is a.11 attempted hostile discrimination because the rule of admissibility of evidence is not extended to a. possibfo, but an uncommon or abnormal class of cases. Counsol for the defence contended that in any event Deuman was not a.t the time when he made tho stat.cmrnt. attrihutod to him, accuHed of any offence and on that. a.ccount also ape.rt from tho constitutional pica., the statement was not provable. This contention is unsound. As we havo already ob81lrved, the expression "accused of any offence " is descript.ive of the person against whom evidcnco rr.•lating to information e.ll~ged t.o be given by him is made prove.hie by s. 27 of the Evidence Act. It docs nut. predicate 1~ formal accusation against him at tht1 time of making tho statement sought to be proved, as a. condition of its applicability. In that view, tho 11igh Court wati in error in holding thats. 27 of the Indian Evidence Act. 1rnd ;;. 162, sub-s. (2), of the Code of Criminal Procedure in •o fo.r as 'that sect.ion relates to s. 27 of the Indian Evidence Act' are voicJ e.s offending Art. 14 of the Const.iLution. The High Court acquitted Deoman 011 t.110 ground that his statement which led to tho discovery of tho gundasa is inadmissible. As we differ from 0 t.hc High Court on that guofition, we must proceed to review the evidence in the light of that statement in so far as it distinctly rPlates to thr. fact thernby discovored boing ad m issi blc. The evidence disclo~os th .. t Deuman arid his uncle, Mahabir, were anxious to di8pose of tho property of Sukhdoi and of Dule.ri 1rnd Sukhdei obstructed such dispo8al. Jn the e\•ening of Juuc 18, 1958, there was an altercation between Sukhdei and Denman over the proposed disposal of t.ho property, in the presence of witnesses, Shobhuath and MaheHh,-and Deome.11 sla.pped Sukhdei and threatened that he would " smash her ' -· ). ::r -I ->· ) ' - \ r ' ( • ~ S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 31 mouth". In the morning of June 19, 1958, the dead body of Sukhdei with severa.l incised injuries caused by a gandasa was found lying in her court.yard. Deoman was seen in the villa.ge on that day early in the morning hurrying· towards the villagA tank and 'taking a bath', but thereafter he absconded from the village and was not found till sometime in the afternoon of the 20th.