# SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1961] THE BAT A SHOE CO. (P) LTD v. D. N. GANGULY & OTHERS

- **Citation:** [1961] 3 S.C.R. 308
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1959-02-24
- **Case number:** Civil Appeals Nos. 32 and 33 of 1960
- **Bench:** P. B. Gajendragadkar, K. N. W Anchoo
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/supreme-court-reports-1961-the-bat-a-shoe-co-p-ltd-v-d-n-ganguly-others-1991
- **Pages:** 17

## Headnote

Industrial Dispute-Illegal Strike-Managerial enquiry and
dismissal of workmen-Settlement without approval of conciliation
officer -
Competence of Reference -
Management's action against
employees-Interference by Tribunal, if and when justified-Industrial Disputes Act, I947 (I4 of I947), SS. I2, IB.
During the course of conciliation proceedings in respect ol a
dispute ,between the appellant company and its workmen a
settlement ':"as arrived at between the parties on February 18,
1954· Despite the settlement some of the workmen went on
strike on February 23, 1954, but eventually it was called off on
March 19 and 20, 1954· On the ground that the strike was illegal
because it took place during the currency of a settlement, the
appellant took steps to serve chargesheets on the workmen who
had joined the strike and, after a managerial inquiry, dismissed
sixty of them. There were conciliation proceedings in respect
of the dismissal of the workmen before the Labour Commissioner
and an agreement was arrived at between the appellant and the
union on September 2, 1954. The Labour Commissioner was
apprised of this settlement, but since it was found that the
union was opposing reinstatement of certain workmen, he proposed to hold further conciliation proceedings. The appellant
was against holding further conciliation steps and, therefore, the
Labour Commissioner reported the matter to the Government
under s. 12(4) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947·
A reference ·was accordingly made and the Tribunal gave
the award under which all the dismissed workmen were to be
reinstated on the ground that they had not been shown to have
taken part in violence and there were extenuating circumstances
in their case inasmuch as they were misled to join the strike in
order to oust the old office bearers of the union so that others
might be elected in their place, and that though a much larger
number of workmen had taken part in the illegal strike and the
union took up the case, only these sixty were eventually dismissed while the rest were reinstated. The appellant objected
to the award on the grounds (1) that as a settlement had been
arrived at during the course of conciliation proceedings on September 2, 1954, which specifically dealt with the case of these
sixty workmen, the reference was incompetent in view of s. 18
of that Act, (2) the reference was also incompetent because
what was referred was not an industrial dispute but a dispute
between the employer and its individual workmen, and (3) the
Tribunal's order of reinstatement was in any case unjustified.
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
309
Held: (1) under ss. 12 and 18 of the Industrial Disputes
1960
Act, 1947• a settlement which is binding under s. 18 on the
ground that it was arrived at in the course of conciliation proBala Sho•
ceedings is a settlement arrived at with the assistance and conCo. (P) Lid.
currence of the conciliation officer, and that a settlement which
v.
is not binding under s. 18 will not be a bar to a reference by the
Gangvly
Government.
In the present case the agreement of September 2, 1954. did
not have the approval of the conciliation officer and, consequently, the reference based on the report of the conciliation
officer under s. 12 of the Act was competent.
(2) that the reference was not bad on the ground that an
individual dispute had been referred to the Tribunal for adjudication, because the dispute in the present case was originally
sponsored by the union and related to the dismissal of a much
larger number of workmen.
(3) that where the finding of the Tribunal was that there
was misconduct which merited dismissal under the Standing
Orders and that the managerial inquiry was proper, the Tribunal
was not justified in interfering with the action of the management unless it found unreasonable discrimination in the matter
of taking back employees, or unfair labour practice or victimisation against the employees.
Indian Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. and Another v. Their Workmen,

## Text

1900
Deceniber I 5.
308
. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
THE BAT A SHOE CO. (P) LTD.
v.
D. N. GANGULY & OTHERS
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR and K. N. W ANCHOO, JJ.)
Industrial Dispute-Illegal Strike-Managerial enquiry and
dismissal of workmen-Settlement without approval of conciliation
officer -
Competence of Reference -
Management's action against
employees-Interference by Tribunal, if and when justified-Industrial Disputes Act, I947 (I4 of I947), SS. I2, IB.
During the course of conciliation proceedings in respect ol a
dispute ,between the appellant company and its workmen a
settlement ':"as arrived at between the parties on February 18,
1954· Despite the settlement some of the workmen went on
strike on February 23, 1954, but eventually it was called off on
March 19 and 20, 1954· On the ground that the strike was illegal
because it took place during the currency of a settlement, the
appellant took steps to serve chargesheets on the workmen who
had joined the strike and, after a managerial inquiry, dismissed
sixty of them. There were conciliation proceedings in respect
of the dismissal of the workmen before the Labour Commissioner
and an agreement was arrived at between the appellant and the
union on September 2, 1954. The Labour Commissioner was
apprised of this settlement, but since it was found that the
union was opposing reinstatement of certain workmen, he proposed to hold further conciliation proceedings. The appellant
was against holding further conciliation steps and, therefore, the
Labour Commissioner reported the matter to the Government
under s. 12(4) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947·
A reference ·was accordingly made and the Tribunal gave
the award under which all the dismissed workmen were to be
reinstated on the ground that they had not been shown to have
taken part in violence and there were extenuating circumstances
in their case inasmuch as they were misled to join the strike in
order to oust the old office bearers of the union so that others
might be elected in their place, and that though a much larger
number of workmen had taken part in the illegal strike and the
union took up the case, only these sixty were eventually dismissed while the rest were reinstated. The appellant objected
to the award on the grounds (1) that as a settlement had been
arrived at during the course of conciliation proceedings on September 2, 1954, which specifically dealt with the case of these
sixty workmen, the reference was incompetent in view of s. 18
of that Act, (2) the reference was also incompetent because
what was referred was not an industrial dispute but a dispute
between the employer and its individual workmen, and (3) the
Tribunal's order of reinstatement was in any case unjustified.
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
309
Held: (1) under ss. 12 and 18 of the Industrial Disputes
1960
Act, 1947• a settlement which is binding under s. 18 on the
ground that it was arrived at in the course of conciliation proBala Sho•
ceedings is a settlement arrived at with the assistance and conCo. (P) Lid.
currence of the conciliation officer, and that a settlement which
v.
is not binding under s. 18 will not be a bar to a reference by the
Gangvly
Government.
In the present case the agreement of September 2, 1954. did
not have the approval of the conciliation officer and, consequently, the reference based on the report of the conciliation
officer under s. 12 of the Act was competent.
(2) that the reference was not bad on the ground that an
individual dispute had been referred to the Tribunal for adjudication, because the dispute in the present case was originally
sponsored by the union and related to the dismissal of a much
larger number of workmen.
(3) that where the finding of the Tribunal was that there
was misconduct which merited dismissal under the Standing
Orders and that the managerial inquiry was proper, the Tribunal
was not justified in interfering with the action of the management unless it found unreasonable discrimination in the matter
of taking back employees, or unfair labour practice or victimisation against the employees.
Indian Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. and Another v. Their Workmen,
[1958] S.C.R. 667, followed.
I. G. N. and Railway Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen, [1960] 2
S.C.R. 1, distinguished.
CIVIL APPELLATE
JURISDICTION:
Civil Appeals
Nos. 32 and 33 of 1960.
Appeals by special leave from the Award dated
February 24, 1959, of the Industrial Tribunal, Bihar,
Patna, in Reference nos. IO of 1959 and I of 1955.
M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, Nooni
Coomar Chakravarti and B. P. Maheshwari, for the
appellant.
B. C. Ghose and P. K. Chatterjee, for the respondents.
1960. December 15. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
W ANCHOO, J .-These are two connected appeals
W•...,hoo J.
by special leave in an industrial matter and relate to
the dismissal of sixty workmen of the appellant-company. The dispute was referred by two references;
r960
Bata Shos
Co. (P) Ltd.
v.
Ganguly
Wanchoo ].
310
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
one relates to 31 workmen and the other to 29 workmen. They have been disposed of by a common
award, though, as the references were two, there are
two appeals before us.
The brief facts necessary for present purposes are
these: On November 10, 1953, a general meeting was
held by the workmen of the appellant and a no confidence motion was passed against the executives -0f
the workmen's union and Shri Shahabuddin Bari was
elected as the new president of the union. On February 6, 1954, the newly elected president served a
strike notice on the management. On February 18,
1954, a settlement was arrived at between the management and Shri Fateh Narain Singh, the general secretary of the old executive committeee. On February
23, 1954, the strike was launched in accordance with
the notice served by Shri Bari and the strike continued for about a month. The strike was called off on
March 19 and 20, 1954. The case of the appellant was
that the strike which began on February 23, 1954, was
an illegal strike as it took place during the currency
of a settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation
proceedings with the assistance of the Labour Commissioner who acted as conciliation officer. Consequently, the appellant took steps to serve chargesheets
on the workmen, who had joined the illegal strike, on
March 4, 1954. This was followed by the dismissal of
these sixty workmen after a managerial inquiry. It is
said that thereafter there were conciliation proceedings which failed and consequently the two references
were made.
The main findings of the tribunal are that the settlement of February 18, 1954, was a bona fide settlement
arrived at during the course of conciliation proceedings and was therefore binding on the workmen; and
consequently the strike which began on February 23,
1954, was in breach of the terms of the settlement and
was therefore illegal. The tribunal further held that
the strike was staged in hot-haste and no reasonable
opportunity was given to the management to reply to
the demands made before launching the strike. It also
held that the trouble arose because of the election of
3 S C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
311
Shri Bari and the new office bearers. This matter was
referred to the Registrar of Trade Unions and he held
that the meeting at which Shri Bari and the new office
bearers were elected was irregular and in consequence
the old office bearers of the union continued to remain
validly elected executives of the union. This decision
was given on February 22, 1954, and the strike was
launched on February 23 immediately thereafter.
The tribunal was not sure whether this decision had
been communicated to Shri Bari before the strike was
launched; but in any case it was of the opinion that
there was no reason to stage the strike in such hothaste after the settlement of February 18, 1954. Having thus held that the strike was illegal and there was
no reason why it should have been launched in such
hot-haste, the tribunal went on to consider the case
of these sixty workmen who were dismissed. It held
that no charge of violence was brought home to these
workmen and even the charge-sheets which were
originally issued to the workmen did not contain arty
charge of violence. The tribunal then divided the
sixty workmen into three batches of 47, 11 and 2.
In
the case of 47 workmen, it held that they must be
assumed to have been served with chargesheets as
they refused to accept them and that proper inquiry
was held into the charges, though in their absence. In
the case of 11 workmen, it was of opinion that charge
sheets had not been served on them and therefore any
inquiry held in their absence was of no avail. In the
case of two workmen, it held that no attempt was
made to serve any charge-sheet on them. Further, it
set aside the order of dismissal with respect to 13 of
the workmen on the ground that they were either not
served with any charge-sheet or no charge-sheet was
issued to them; as for the remaining 4 7, though it
found that charge-sheets had been issued to them and
they had refused to accept them and proper inquiry
had been held in their case, it set aside the order of
dismissal on the ground that they had not been shown
to have taken part in violence and there were extenuating circumstances in their case inasmuch as they were
misled to join the strike in order to oust the old office
Bala Shoe
Co. (P) Lia.
v.
Ganeuly
Wan&hoo ].
Bata Shoe
Co. (P) Ltd.
v.
Ganguly
Wanchoo ].
312
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
bearers of the union so that others might be elected
in their place. It further pointed out that though a
much larger number of workmen had taken part in
the illegal strike and the union took up their case,
only these sixty were eventually dismissed while the
rest were reinstated. It was of the view that there
was no reason for the appellant to make any dist.inction between these workmen and the others who were
reinstated. It therefore ordered reinstatement of
these 47 workmen also. Finally, it held that the
workmen were sufficiently penalised, they being out of
employment from March 1954 to February 1959 when
it made the award and that there was no reason in
the cricumstances to maintain their dismissal. It
awarded 50% of the back basic wages to the two
workmen in whose case charge-sheets were not even
issued and 25 per cent of the back basic wages to the
11 workmen who were not served with chargesheets; no back wages were allowed to the forty-seven
workmen who had refused to accept the charge-sheets.
sent to them.
Three points have been raised on behalf of the
appellant before us; namely, (i) as a settlement had
been arrived at during the course of conciliation pro-.
ceedings on September 2. 1954, which specifically dealt
with the case of these sixty workmen, the references
were incompetent; (ii) the references were incompetent because what was referred was not an industrial dispute but a dispute between the employer and
its individual workman; and (iii) the tribunal's order
of reinstatement was in any case unjustified.
Re. (i).
It appears that after the dismissal of a large number
of workmen consequent on the illegal strike that took
place on February 23, 1954, there were conciliation
proceedings before the Labour Commissioner, Bihar,
with respect to these dismissals and other matters.
These conciliation proceedings appear to have begun
some time before May 1,, 1954, for we find that on that
day the Labour Commissioner wrote to the appellant
that its objection that conciliation proceedings were
illegal and without jurisdiction was baseless. It seem1
1
3 S.C.R; SUPREME COURT REPORTS
313
.
~ ..
that .effo;ts a.t conciliation continued right-up-to .the -·
x96o
end ,of August · 1954, for we find another Jetter· of
Bata Shoa
August 31, 1954, from the , Labour Commissioner to . co. <P> Ltd.
the appellant saying that he had heard that mutual
negotiations were going on between the appellant and
v.
Ganguly
its workmen for the settlement of. their dispute and ·' vSeptember_ 2 had been fixed for that purpose. The
Wanchoo J.
Labour-·Co=issioner therefore gave notice to the
appellant that he would hold conciliation proceedings
on September 3 at 3 p.m. in his office in case the disputes -were .not mutually.settled before that date. It
seems that an agreement was arrived at between the
appellant ·and the. union on September 2. In this
agreement it was noted that 76 dismissed workmen
had already been employed; it was further provided
that 110 workmen would also.be employed in the same
manner as the seventy-six. Further 31 dismissed
workmen were to remain dismissed and would not be
c0nsidered for further employment or for any other
benefit. 30 other dismisBed workmen would for the
time being remain . dismissed and it would be decided
later on between the union and the appellant whether
their dismissal should be confirmed like t!10se of 31
mentioned above or whether they should be given the
option to wait for employment as and when vacancies
a.rose or, should be treated as retired on the date.of
dismissal in order to enable them to receive the benefits· of gratuity and refund of provident fund.· It may
be added that the present references are with respect
to sixty workmen out of these sixty-one. It seems
that the Labour Commissioner was apprised of this·.
settlement. Consequently he wrote on September 3,
1954, to the appellant that the conciliation proceedings proposed to be held on that date were cancelled.
Tl'u- Labour. Commissioner further pointed out that
:fflc tmio~ was opposing reinstatement of certain
wO,rkmen;,he therefore proposed to hold further.conciliation proceedings in thb case of such workmen on
$Qpteruber 6, 1954, at· 3 p.m. before making his final
recommendatfons to government in this matter. ' The
appellant protested .to the Labour . Commissioner
Bata SlttJe
Co. (P) Ltd.
v.
Ganguly
Wanchoo ].
314
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
against the holding of any further conciliation proceedings after the agreement of September 2 and
apparently did not attend the meetiug fixed for
September 6. Nothing further therefore seems to have
taken place in the conciliation proceedings. Presumably the Labour Commissioner must have reported
thereafter to the gevernment under s. 12(4) of the
Industrial Disputes Act, No. XIV of 1947 (hereinafter
called the Act). Then followed the two references by
the government; the first on October 8, 1954, relating
to 31 workmen and the other on January 15, 1955,
relating to 29 workmen.
On these facts the contention on behalf of the appel·
lant is that the references were incompetent because
of the agreement made on September 2, 1954. Reliance in this connection is placed on ss. 18 and 19 of
the Act, as they were at the relevant time. Sec. 18
provided that a settlement arrived at in the course of'
conciliation proceedings would be binding on all parties to the industrial dispute and others indicated
therein and s. 19 provided that such settlement would
come into force on such date as was agreed upon between the parties and if no date was agreed upon then
on the date on which the memorandum of the settlement was signed by the parties. Such settlement
would be binding for such period as was agreed upon
by the parties and if no such period was agreed upon,
for a period of six months and would continue to be
binding upon the parties thereafter until the expiry
of two months from the date on which a notice in
writing to terminate the settlement was given by one
of the parties to the other party or parties to the
settlement. The contention on behalf of the appellant
is that the agreement of September 2, 1954, arrived at
during the course of conciliation proceedings between
the appellant and the union was binding on all workmen and therefore it was not open to the government
to make these references within six months of it.
The question thus posed raises the question as to
what is meant by the words "in the course of conciliation proceedings" appearing in s. 18 of the Act. One
thing is clear that these words refer to the duration
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
315
when the conciliation proceedings are pending and it
may be accepted that the conciliation proceedings with
respect to these dismissals, which began sometime
before May 1, 1954, were certainly pending upto
. September 6, 1954, and may be a little later, as is clear
from the two letters of the Labour Commissioner. But
do these words mean that any agreement arrived at
between the parties during this period would be binding under s. 18 of the Act? Or do they mean that a
settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation procedings postulates that that settlement should have
been arrived at between the parties with the concurrence of the conciliation officer? As we read this
provision we feel that the legislature when it made a
settlement reached during the course of conciliation
proceedings binding not only on the parties thereto
but also on all present and future workmen intended
that such settlement was arrived at with the assistance
of the conciliation officer and was considered by him
to be reasonable and therefore had his concurrence.
Sec. 12 of the Act prescribes duties of the conciliation
offieer and provides that the conciliation officer shall
for the purpose of bringing about settlement of the
dispute without delay investigate the dispute and all
matters affecting the merits and the right settlement
thereof and may do all such things as he may think
fit for the purpose of inducing the parties to come to
a fair and amicable settlement of the dispute: (vide
s. 12(2) ).
Then comes s. 12(3), which provides, "If a
settlement of the dispute or of any of the matters in
dispute is arrived at in the course of the conciliation
proceedings the conciliation officer shall send a report
thereof to the appropriate Government together with
a memorandum of the settlement signed by the parties
to the dispute".
Reading these two provisions along with s. 18 of
the Act, it seems to us clear beyond doubt that a
settlement which is made binding under s. 18 on the
ground that it is arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings is a settlement arrived at with the
assistance and concurrence of the conciliation officer,
for it is the duty of the conciliation officer to promote
Bata Shoe
Co. (P) Ltd.
v .
Ganguly
Wanchoo ].
Bata Shod
Co. (P) Ltd.
v.
Ganguly
~l'anchoo ].
316
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1961]
a right settlement and to do everything he can to
induce the parties to come to a fair and amicable
settlement of the dispute. It is only such a settlement
which is arrived at while conciliation proceedings are
pending that can be binding under s. 18. In the present case it is obvious that the Labour Commissioner
took no steps to promote the actual agreement. which
was arrived at between t.he appellant aml the union
on September -2.
The letter of August 31 made it
clear that the Labour Commissioner would take action
under s. 12(2) on September 3 if no mutual agreement
·was a:rived at between the appellant and the union.
It seems that a mutual agreement was arrived at between the appellant and the union without the assistance of the Labour Commissioner and it did not
receive his concurrence even later; on the contrary
evidence shows that the Labour Commissioner <lid not
approve of the settlement which excluded the reinstatement of a large group of workmen and so he
did not act under s. 12(3). In the circumstances such
a mutmil agreement could not be called a settlement
arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings
even though it may be accepted that it was arrived at
at a time when conciliation proceedings were pending.
A settlement which can be said to be arrived at in the
course of conciliation proceedings is not only to be
arrived at during the time the conciliation proceedings
are pending but also to be arrived <>t with the assistance uf the conciliation officer and his concurrence;
si,ch a settlement would be reported to the appropriate
government under s. 12(3). In the present case the
agreement of September 2, 1954 was not arrived at
with the assistance and concurrence of the conciliat.ion
officer, namely, the Labour Commissioner, which will
be dear from his letter of September 3, 1954. In the
circumstances it is nut a settlement which is binding
un<lcr s. 18 of the Act anrl therefore will not bar a
reference by the Government with respect to these
sixty workmen.
Re (ii).
The next point that · is urged is that. it is not an
in1lnstrial dispute but a dispute between the employer
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
317
and its individual workmen, even though their number may be large and therefore the Government had
no jurisdiction to make the references.
We are of
opinion that there is no force in this contention. We
have already set out the history of the conciliation
proceedings in this case. It is obvious from the letter
of the Labour Commissioner dated September 3, 1954,
that he must have made a report to the Government
under s. 12(4) and it must be on that report that these
references must have been made under s. 12(5) read
with s. 10(1). It is not in dispute that 0riginfLlly the
case of dismissal of a much larger number of workmen
was under consideration during the conciliation proceedings but on SeptE1mber 2, 1954, a mutual agreement
w~is arrived at between the appellant and the uuion,
which in a sense excluded the case of these sixty
workmen. The Labour Commissioner apparently was
not prepared to concur with this action of the parties
as appears from his letter of September 3 and must
therefore have made a report to the Government
under s. 12(4) which was followed by references under
s. 10. In the circumstances we fail to understand
how what began as an industrial dispute and was sponsored by the union, related to the dismissal of a much
larger number of workmen (including these sixty) and
as such became the subject-matter of conciliation proceedings under s. 12(1) would turn into an individual
dispute because a mutual agreement was arrived at
between the appellant a.id the union with which the
Labour Commissioner was not in entire agreement
and in consequence of which he apparently made a
report to the Government under s. 12(4) which was
followed by the two references under s. 10(1). In
these circumstances we are satisfied that the references are not bad on the ground that an individual
dispute had been referred to the tribunal for adjudication.
Re {iii)
We now come to the merits of the case.
We shall
deal with the sixty workmen in three batches in the
same manner as the tribunal did.
We shall first take
the case of 47 workmen. In the case of these work.
men, the tribunal held that they were guilty of
Bala Sho~
Co, (P) Lid.
V,
<;anguly
'
ivanchoo J.
Bata Shoe
Co. (P) Ltd.
v.
Ganguly
Wanchoo ].
318
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
taking part in an illegal strike and that there was
no reason for staging such an illegal strike in hot
haste. It also held that they were sent charge-sheets
which they refused to take. The Standing Orders provide that a workman who refuses to accept a chargesheet or to submit an explanation on being charged
with an offence will be deemed to have admitted the
charge against him. It also provides that a workman
who refuses to accept any communication addressed
to him by the company will be liable to disciplinary
action for insubordination. The tribunal also held
that in the case of these workmen, a proper inquiry
was held, though in the circumstances in their absence. It further held that such miBconduct as merited dismissal under the Standing Orders was committed by these 47 workmen. On these findings we
should have thought that the tribunal would not have
interfered with the order of dismissal, for the case
would be clearly covered by the principles governing
the limits of the tribunal's power of interference
with the findings of the managerial inquiry laid down
by this Court in Indian Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. and
another v. Their Workmen (1).
Learned counsel for
the respondent-workmen in this connection relies on
Indian General Navigation and Railway Co. Ltd. v.
Their Workmen ('). In that case it was laid down
that-
"to determine the question of punishment, a clear
distinction has to be made between those workmen
who not only joined in such a strike but also took
part in obstructing the loyal workmen from carrying
on their work, or took part in violent demonstrations, or acted in defiance of law and order, on the
one hand and those workmen who were more or
less silent participators in such a strike on the
other hand."
These observations have however to be read in the context of that case, which was (i) that it was not shown
in that case that an employee merely taking part in an
illegal strike was liable to be punished with dismissal
under the Standing Orders and (ii) that there was no
(~) [195BJ S.C.R. 667,
(2) [196o] 2 S.C.R. r.
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
319
proper managerial inquiry. In these circumstances
the quantum of punishment was also within the
jurisdiction of the industrial tribunal. In the present
case, however, the finding of the tribunal is that there
was misconduct which merited dismissal under the
Standing Orders and. that the managerial inquiry was
proper. In these circumstances those observations
torn from their context cannot be applied to the facts
of this case. The reasoning of the tribunal therefore
that as these 47 workmen had not taken part in vio.
lence the appellant was not justified in dismissing
them cannot be accepted on the facts of this case.
The other reason given by the tribunal for setting aside
the dismissal is that the appellant had taken back a
large number of other employees who had taken
similar part in the illegal strike and had absented
themselves and there was no reason to discriminate
between those employees and these 47 workmen. It
is clear from the award of the tribunal that no discrimination was made when taking back the workmen
on the ground that these workmen supported Shri
Bari, for the award shows that a number of other
workmen who supported Shri Bari were taken back.
Reliance in this connection is placed on Messrs. Burn
and Go. Ltd. v. Their Workmen (1), where, it was observed when dealing with the workmen involved in that
case that it could not be said that mere participation
in the illegal strike would justify the suspension or
dismissal particularly when no clear distinction could
be made between .those persons and the very large
number of workmen who had' been taken back into
service although they had participated in the strike.
There is no doubt that if an employer makes an unreasonable discrimination in the matter of taking
back employees there may in certain circumstances
be reason for the industrial tribunal to interfere; but
the circumstances of earh case have to be examined
before the tribunal can interfere with the order of the
employer in a properly held managerial inquiry on
the ground of discrimination. In Burn & Go.'s case (1)
there was apparently no reason whatsoever for
(1) A.LR. 1959 S.C. 529.
Bala Shoa
Co. (P) Lid.
v.
Ganguly
Wane/Joo ].
."'.
\ 320.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
1960
•· making the discrimination.· Iri the present case, however, the circumstances are different. It is not the
c~~·;;,:~~.
appellant which has made the discrimination; in the
present case so far as the appellant· is concerned it
was prepared to take back even those who supported
Shri Bari and did· actually take back a large number
v.
Wanchoo. J.
of such workmen. The genesis of the trouble in this
; i
case was a dispute within the union itself which led
to the illegal strike, the history of which we have
· already given~ -The mutual· agreement of September
2, 1954, shows that the union which represented the
workmen was not agreeable that si.~ty-one workmen
should be taken back and these forty-seven workmen
are out· of these sixty-one. ·. The appellant in this
case was therefore placed· in the position that :t.had
-to choose between the large majority of workmen and
sixty-one workmen whom the union did not waut to
be taken back. It was in these circumstances -that
the appellant did not take back those sixty-one work- - ·
men· out of whom are these forty-seven. The charge
of discrimination therefore cannot be properly laid at
the door of the appellant in this case and if there
is anybody to blame for it it is· the .union. In these
circumstances when the managerial inquiry waJ held
to be proper and tile misconduct·. committed is such•
as to deserve dismissal under. the Standing Orders,
there was no reason for the tribunal to interfere with
the order of· dismissal passed by the appellant" in the
case of these forty-seven- workmen.-: It may 'b·• that
. participatiori in an illegal strike i:nay not necessarily
· and in every case be punished with dismissal; but
where·an inquiry has been-properly held and. the em-:.
player has imposed the punishment of dismissal on
the employee who has been guilty of the misconduct
of joining the illegal strike, the tribunal should not
interfere unless it finds unfair labour practice or victimisation against the employee.
-
·
'. - .- Then we come to the case of1wo worl<men -to whom·-
.. no chari<!~Sheets were_ given at all. They are J"agdiSh Lal (respondent 31). and L. Choudhary (respondent 60).- It is not in dispute· that no charge-sheets
were issued to these, workmen. · · The appellant
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
321
however contends that under the Standing Orders it
was not necessa·ry to issue any charge-sheet to them.
The Standing Orders provide that-
"any worhnan charged with an offence under
these Orders, except in cases of lateness and absenteeism, sha-ll receive a copy of such charge but in
all cases v·ill be given an opportunity of offering
his explanation before any decision is arrived at."
It is said tha', the charge against these two workmen
was only for absenting themselves; it was not therefore necessary to frame any charge-sheet against
them. This is not quite correct so far as J agdish Lal in
concerned as "'ill appear from the letter of dismissal
sent to him; but assuming it to be so, Standing Orders
provide that though the charge-sheet may not be
given no action can be taken against a workman for
any misconduct unless he is given an opportunity of
offering his exp~anation before any decision is arrived
at. There is nc proof in this case that any opportu-
-nity was given to these two workmen of offering their
explanation before the decision of dismissal was arrived at in their case. In these circumstances even
though no charge-sheet might have been necessary in
the case of these two workmen their dismissal was
against the provision of the Standing Orders, for no
explanation was taken from them before arriving at
the decision to dismiss them. The order of the tribunal with respect to these two workmen must be upheld.
This brings us to the case of eleven workmen who
are: Mohd. Mansoor (respondent 6), Ram Kuber Das
(respondent 9), Ramasis (respondent 15), Mohd. Zafir
(respondent 19), Mohd. Islam (respondent 20), Mohd.
Zafir (respondent 22), Rajeshwar Prasad (respondent
26), Chirkut (respondent 27), Lal Das (respondent 43),
Inderdip (respondent 47) and Mohd. Nazir (respondent 58). In their case the tribunal held that though
charge-sheets were issued to them, they could not be
served and the inquiry took place without their knowing anything about the charges or the date of the
inquiry: In those circumstances the tribunal held
41
Bata Shoe
C'- (P) Ltd.
v.
Ganguly
Want:hoo ].
Bata Shoe
Co. (P) Ltd.
v.
Ganguly
U'ani:hoo ].
322
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
that the inquiry was no inquiry and therefore ordered
their reinstatement. It is contended on behalf of the
appellant that the case of these eleven workmen is similar to the case of forty-seven who refused to take the
charge-sheets sent to them by registered post. In any
case it is urged that the charge-sheets were notified on
the notice board and notices were issued in the newspapers and that should be deemed sufficient service of
the charge-sheets on them. In this connection reliance
was placed on Mckenzie & Co. Ltd. v. Its Workmen(').
In that case the Standing Orders provided .that notice
would be served on a workman by communicating the
same orally to the workman concerned and/or by
affixing the same on the company's notice-board and
the company had acted in conformity with the Standing Orders by affixing the notices on its notice-board.
It was found in that case that the company first sent
notices by registered post acknowledgement due to the
workmen concerned. When some of the notices came
back unserved the company wrote to the secretary of
the union asking for the addresses of the workmen
but the secretary gave no reply to the letter. It was
then that the company affixed the notices on the
notice-board both inside and outside the mill-gate. In
those circumstances it was held that the company did
all that it could under the Standing Orders to serve
the workmen and the affixing of the notices on the
notice-board was sufficient service.
The facts in the present case however are different.
All that the Standing Orders provide is that the workmen charged with an offence shall receive a copy of
such charge. It is also provided that a workman who
refuses to accept the charge-sheet shall be deemed to
have admitted the charge made against him. There
is no provision in the Standing Orders for affixing
such charge-sheets on the notice-board of the company. The charge-sheets in this case were sent to
the eleven workmen by registered post and returned
unserved, because they were not found in their villages.
On the same day on which the charge-sheets were
sent by registered post it appears that notices were
(1) [1959] Suppl. I S.C.R, 222.
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
323
issued in certain newspapers to the effect that a group
of workmen under a common understanding had
engaged in an illegal strike from February 23, 1954,
and that all such workmen were liable to strong disciplinary action and that in consequence they had
been charged under the Standing Orders and Rules of
the company and such charge-sheets had been sent to
them individually by registered post acknowledgement
due and had also been displayed on the notice-boards
inside and outside the factory gate and they were
required to submit the explanations by March 9, 1954.
These notices did not contain the names of the workmen to whom charge-sheets were sent and in whose
case charge-sheets were displayed on the noticeboards. In the circumstances it can hardly be said
that these eleven workmen would have notice that
they were among those to whom charge-sheets had
been sent or about whom charge-sheets had been displayed on the notice-boards. The proper course in
our view was when the registered notices came back
unserved in the case of these eleven workmen to publish notices in their nanies in some newspaper in the
regional language with a wide circulation in Bihar
along with the charges framed against them. It would
have been a different matter if the Standing Orders
had provided for service of charge-sheets through
their display on the notice-boards of the appellant. In
the absence of such provision, the proper course to
take was what we have mentioned above. If that
course had been taken, the appellant would have been
justified in saying that it did all that it could to serve
the workmen; but as that was not done, we agree with
the tribunal that these eleven workmen had no notice
of the charges against them and the date by which
they had to submit their explanations as well as the
date of inquiry. In these circumstances the order of
the tribunal with respect to these eleven workmen
must also be upheld.
We therefore allow the appeal so far as the first
group of forty-seven workmen are concerned and set
aside the order of the tribunal reinstating them. We
dismiss the appeals so far as the remaining thirteen
Bala Sho1
Co. (P) Ltd.
v.
Ganguly
JVanchoo J.
Bata Shoe
Co. (P) Ltd,
v.
Ganguly
Wanchoo J.
1960
December I6,
324
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
are concerned, namely, Jagdish Lal (respondent 31),
L. Choudhary (respondent 60), Mohd. Mansoor (respondent 6), Ram Kuber Das (respondent 9), Rama.sis (respondent 15), Mohd. Zafir (respondent 19), Mohd. Islam
(respondent 20), Mohd. Zafir (respondent 22), Rajeshwar Prasad (respondent 26 ), Chirkut (respondent 27),
Lal Das (respondent 43),.Inderdip (respondent 47) and
Mohd. Nazir (respondent 58) and confirm the order of
the tribunal with respect to them. In the circumstances the parties will bear their own costs of this
Court.
Appeal partly allowed.
SARJOO PR.ASAD
v.
THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
(J. L. KAPUR, M. HIDAYATULLAH and J. c. SHAH JJ.)
Food Adulteration-Sale of adulterated oil by servant-Servant,
whether liable-Mens rea, if necessary-Second offence-Sentence,
lesser than minimum prescribed when can be given-Prevention of
Food Adulteration Act, I954 (37 of I954) ss. 7, r6.
The appellant was an employee of one T, a vendor of edible
oils. He was found to have sold adulterated mustard oil and
he and T were prosecuted for an offence under s. 7 read with
s. r6 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. Both
were found guilty; Twas sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. zoo, but
in view of a previous conviction the appellant was sentenced to
one year's rigorous imprisonment and Rs. 2,000 fine, the minimum prescribed bys. r6(ii). The appellant contended: (i) that
a servant who sold food on behalf of his employer was not liable
unless it was known that he had done so with the knowledge
that the food was adulterated, and (ii) that there were special
and adequate reasons justifying the imposition of a penalty less
than the minimum prescribed for a second offence.
Held, that s. 7 of the Act enjoins everyone, whether an
employer or a servant, not to sell adulterated food, and anyone
who contravenes this provision is punishable under s. 16 ¥.•ithout proof of mens rea.