# SUPREME COURT REPORTS· [1963] RAI BAHADUR DIWAN BADRI DAS v. THE iNDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, PUNJAB - **Citation:** [1963] 3 S.C.R. 930 - **Court:** Supreme Court of India - **Decided:** 1963 - **Bench:** P. B. Gajendragadkar, K. c. DAS GUPTA, J. R. Mudholkar - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/supreme-court-reports-1963-rai-bahadur-diwan-badri-das-v-the-industrial-2694 - **Pages:** 27 ## Headnote . . Industrial Dispute-Earned leave-Different rule• for tx'8ting and future emp/;oyees-Whethei' discriminatory-Indu•· trial Tribunal-Power to interfere with contract between employer and employee-Indian Factories ·Act, 1948 (LXIII of 1948), 8. 79. . On July.I, 1956, the appellants made a rule that every workman employed on or before that date would be ·entitled to 30 days leave with wages after working for 1 t months and workmen employed after that date would be entitled to earned leavC in accordance with the provisions of s. 79 of the Indian. Factories Act, 1948. •The State Government referred for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal the question whether all the employees should be allowed 30 days earned leave with full wages fOr every 11 mon1.hs' service without discrimi· nation. The Tribunal held that all the workmen were entitled to 3.0 days earned leave without making any distinction between workmen who joined before July 1, 1956, and those who joined subsequently. The appellants contended that they were entitled to fix the terms of employment on which they would employ the workmen and it was open to the workmen to accept those terms or not and the tribunal was n9t justified in interfering in such a matter. · Held, per Gajendragadkar and Das Gupta, JJ., that the Tribunal was justified in directing the appellants to provide for the same uniform rule as to earned leave fOr all their employees. The doctrine of absolute freedom of contract had to yield to the higher claims for social jus1ice and had to be regulated. In industrial adjudication no attempt . should be made to answer questions in the abstract for evolving any general or• inflexible principles. ·Each dispute has to be decided on its own facts without enlarging the scope of the enquiry. If some principles have to be followed or evolved, care has to be taken not to evolve Jarger..c ,( ··~ ·- .. 3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 931 principles. In order that industrial adjudication should be free from the tyranny of dogmas or the sub-conscious pressure of preconceived notions it is important that the temptation · to Jay down broad principles should be avoided. Accordingly it is not necessary to -decide the broad contention whether industrial adjudication can interfere with the contract between the employers and the employees. In the present case, all the workmen were governed by the same terms and conditions of service, except in regard to earned leave, The discr_imination was not based upon any principle and was bound to lead to disaffection amongst the new employees. The financial burden imposed by the award on the employers was slight. The provisions for earned leave in respect of old employees were not unduly generous or extravagant. Earned leave provided for by s.79 Factories Act was the minimum statutory leave. If the appellants thought it necessary to provide for additional earned leave for their old employees,. there was no reason why they should not make a similar provision in respect of new employees as well. · Western Indian Automobile Association v. Industrial Tribunal, Bombay, A.I.R, 1949 F.C. 112 and Bharat Bank Ltd. v. The Employees of Bh.arat Bank Ltd. [1950] S.C.R. 513, referred to. Per Mudholkar, J .-The Tribunal was not justified in interfering with the rule made by the appellants. It was open to the appellants to grant leave according to s.79 Factories Act, to all the employees but still they did not wish to reauce -the leave of 30 days which they were already giving to the old employees. The __ appellants have put into one category persons who enjoyed the same kind of benefits uptil July I, 1956, and have put in another category persons who did not enjoy such benefits. All persons in each category were treated alike, and the question of dis· crimination did not in fact arise. If the State had provided that persons entering its service after a certain date -' .would be governed by a set of conditions which were different and less favourable than ## Text _Characters 0–39,744 of 53,706. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39744 for what follows._ I9nt Sepfember 'I. • 930 SUPREME COURT REPORTS· [1963] RAI BAHADUR DIWAN BADRI DAS v. THE iNDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, PUNJAB (P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. c. DAS GUPTA and J. R. MUDHOLKAR,.JJ.) . . Industrial Dispute-Earned leave-Different rule• for tx'8ting and future emp/;oyees-Whethei' discriminatory-Indu•· trial Tribunal-Power to interfere with contract between employer and employee-Indian Factories ·Act, 1948 (LXIII of 1948), 8. 79. . On July.I, 1956, the appellants made a rule that every workman employed on or before that date would be ·entitled to 30 days leave with wages after working for 1 t months and workmen employed after that date would be entitled to earned leavC in accordance with the provisions of s. 79 of the Indian. Factories Act, 1948. •The State Government referred for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal the question whether all the employees should be allowed 30 days earned leave with full wages fOr every 11 mon1.hs' service without discrimi· nation. The Tribunal held that all the workmen were entitled to 3.0 days earned leave without making any distinction between workmen who joined before July 1, 1956, and those who joined subsequently. The appellants contended that they were entitled to fix the terms of employment on which they would employ the workmen and it was open to the workmen to accept those terms or not and the tribunal was n9t justified in interfering in such a matter. · Held, per Gajendragadkar and Das Gupta, JJ., that the Tribunal was justified in directing the appellants to provide for the same uniform rule as to earned leave fOr all their employees. The doctrine of absolute freedom of contract had to yield to the higher claims for social jus1ice and had to be regulated. In industrial adjudication no attempt . should be made to answer questions in the abstract for evolving any general or• inflexible principles. ·Each dispute has to be decided on its own facts without enlarging the scope of the enquiry. If some principles have to be followed or evolved, care has to be taken not to evolve Jarger..c ,( ··~ ·- .. 3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 931 principles. In order that industrial adjudication should be free from the tyranny of dogmas or the sub-conscious pressure of preconceived notions it is important that the temptation · to Jay down broad principles should be avoided. Accordingly it is not necessary to -decide the broad contention whether industrial adjudication can interfere with the contract between the employers and the employees. In the present case, all the workmen were governed by the same terms and conditions of service, except in regard to earned leave, The discr_imination was not based upon any principle and was bound to lead to disaffection amongst the new employees. The financial burden imposed by the award on the employers was slight. The provisions for earned leave in respect of old employees were not unduly generous or extravagant. Earned leave provided for by s.79 Factories Act was the minimum statutory leave. If the appellants thought it necessary to provide for additional earned leave for their old employees,. there was no reason why they should not make a similar provision in respect of new employees as well. · Western Indian Automobile Association v. Industrial Tribunal, Bombay, A.I.R, 1949 F.C. 112 and Bharat Bank Ltd. v. The Employees of Bh.arat Bank Ltd. [1950] S.C.R. 513, referred to. Per Mudholkar, J .-The Tribunal was not justified in interfering with the rule made by the appellants. It was open to the appellants to grant leave according to s.79 Factories Act, to all the employees but still they did not wish to reauce -the leave of 30 days which they were already giving to the old employees. The __ appellants have put into one category persons who enjoyed the same kind of benefits uptil July I, 1956, and have put in another category persons who did not enjoy such benefits. All persons in each category were treated alike, and the question of dis· crimination did not in fact arise. If the State had provided that persons entering its service after a certain date -' .would be governed by a set of conditions which were different and less favourable than those governing the existing servants its action would not be open to an attack under- Art. 14 of the-Constitution. An identical action of a private employer could also not be regarded as discriminatory. An award made with the intention of promoting social justice must take into consideration the interests of the cominunity. Even if there was discrimination it could not be a perpetual source of bitterness as gracfu11.lly the old employees would fade out 1963 Rai Bahadur Diwan Baari Dai v. The I ndu•lrial Tribunal Pun/ab 1962 Rat Bahadu~ £!iwan i3atiri Dos v. The lndusfrir l Trihunul, PUnju/J • • • 932 SUPREME COURT REPORT8 (1963} till only one category of workers would remain. The facts that the ~ispute was co.mparatively of a .μiinor character and that the financial burden imposed on the appellants was small did not entitle the tribunal to alter the contrac·c between the employer and employees. Since the· appellant had provided for its new enLrants such leave faciliue:; as were recognised by the Factories .Act itself' as fair, it was not open to the Tribunal to revise the relevant term of the cor,tract. Budhan v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1956 S, C. 191, Khandige Mam Bhat v. Agricultural Iucomc Tax Officer, [1963] 3 S.C.R. 809, Stcde of M.P. v. Gwalior Sugar Co. Ltd. C.A. No•. 98 & 99 of 1959, dated 30.11.60, Ramjilal v. Income-tax Officer, Mohindargarh, (1951) S.C.R. 127, Sardar Inder Singh v. The State of Rajasthan, (1957) S.C.R. 605 and Hathisingh Mfg. Co. v. Union of India, A.I R. 196l•S. C. 931 referrea to. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 20 of 6~. Appe11l by special leave from the award dated September 29, 1961T; of the Industrial Tribunal, l'unjab, Patiala in reference No. 13 of 1960. 0. K. Daphtary, Solioitor-oenral of India, Bhagirath Das and B. P. Maheshewari, for the appellants . . M. K. Ramamurthi, R. K. Garg, D. P. Singh and S. 0. Aggarwal, for the respondent No. 2(i). ' 1962. September 7. The Judgment of Gajendragadkar and Das Gnpta, JJ., was delivered . by Gajendragadkar, J. Mudholkar J. delivered a dissenting judgment .. Gaj•ndragadkarJ, GAJENDRAGADKAR, J.-This appeal by special leave arises out of an industrial dispute in relation to a comparatively minor demand made. againijtt the appellants by the respondente-their employeesh but in challenging the Talidity of the award passed by the In~ustrial Tribunal in favour of the .)· •. ' ,_ ) -3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 933 respondents on that demand the learned SolicitorGeneral. has raised a general question before us. He contends that in granting the dem.and made by the respondents, the award has illegitimately and unjustifiably trespassed on the appellants' freedom of contract. Th,e appellants as · employers, are entitled to fix the terms of employment on which t-hey would be willing to employ ·workmen and it is open to the workmen either to accept those terms or not; .industrial adjudication should not interfere ·in such a matter. That is the nature of the general contention which has been raised before us in the present appeal. · The facts leading to the dispute are few and. they lie within a very narrow compass. The appellants are the Trustees of the Tribune Presa and pa.per and the Trust is being worked in accordance with the terms of the will executed by Dyal Singh Majithia on June 15, 1895. In carrying out the policy of the Trust, the five appellants have executed a. power of Attorney in favour of Mr. R.R. Sharma and the Press is managed and the paper is conducted to carry out the policy laid ·down by the will. · It appears that before .. Tuly 1, 1956, for the purposes of leave, the appellants had divided their employees into two clttegories ( l) the Lino. operators and (2) the. rest of the workmen in the Press Section;. and Rule 57 made provision for leave on the basis of the said classification. The effect of the said rule was that no Press worker other than the lino-opera.tor was entitled to any kind of paid leave although he w:as given the right to claim 30 days' wages plus dearness allowance payablelin January every year if he had worked for 11 Months. In addition, the said press worker was entitled to Quarantine leave on the terms mentioned in Rule 53. 1912 Rai Bah'1dur Diwon Badri Das . v. The I bdui1rial Tribun•I. Ponjab 1962 Rai Bahaiur · Diwan Badrl Dai •• T/!e lndurtrial Tribrmal, Punjab. .. 934 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] ' This position was substantially altered on the · -·{ July 1, 1956, when the appellants framed a new Rule in respect of earned leave. This rule abolished the two categories of wor!rers on whioh the earlier rule 57 was based and divided the workers into two categories (i) workers who were employed on or before l.7.1956 and (ii) .thoso who were employed after 1.7. 1956. In respect of the former category of workmen, the new Rule made the following provision: "Subject to the provisions of. the Indian Factories Act, 1948, every workman in the service of the Tribune on the 1st Jnly, 1956, will be entitled to 30 days' leave with wages; after having worked for a period of 11 months. This leave shalf cease to be earned, when it amounts to 60 days." In regard to the workmen falling under the latter category, earned leave was to. be governed by the provisions of· s. 79 of the Indian Factories Act. It is common ground that the provision for earned leave made by the said se·ction is a provision for minimum earned leave which the employer iii bound· to give: whether or not additional leave should be granted by way of earned leave is a matter within the discretion of the employer.· As a result of the new rule, the position .was that the employees who had joined the service of the appellants on or before July l, 1956, were enti- ·tled t<;> 30 days' earned leave with wages, whereas those who joined after the said date became entitled to the statutory minimum of 21 days of earned leave. · . . At the time when this rule came into force there were H4 old employees to whom ·the rule applied and 27 new employees to them by virtu.e of the new Rule, s. 79 ot the Factories Act was made ' • ,.. •. 3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 935 applicable. Gradually, new hands have also _been employed and to aU such new employees a. 79 is applicable. It appears that by its resolution passed on January 8,· 1960, the Tribune employees union sent to · the Management · a charter eni bodying about · 20 demands. Attempts at conciliation were made but they failed and so, on April 4, 1960, eight of the said demands were referred by the Punjab Government to the Industrial Tribunal for its adjudication under s. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. One of these demauds was in. relation to earned leave. The demand was that the employees in the Press Section sllould be allowed 30 days' earned leave with full wages· for every 11 months' service without any disc1'imination. The Tribunal ha.a allowed this demand and it had held that all workmen of the Press are entitled to 30 days' earned leave without making a.ny distinction between workmen who joined before July 1, 1956, and those who joined subsequently. It is the validity of this a.ward which is questioned before . us. by the appellants. · . The broad and general question raised by the learned Solicitor-General on · the ha.sis of the employer's freedom of contract has been frequently raised in indus~rial adjudication, and it has consistently been held that the said right is now subject to certain principles which have been evolved by .industrial adjudication in advancing the cause of social justice. It will be recalled that as early as 1949, it was urged before the Federal Court in Western India Automobile Association v. The Industrial Tribunal Bombay(1) ·that the industrial Tribunal ha.d no. jurisdiction to direct an employer to reinstate his .dismissed employees and the plea ma.de was that such a direction was contrary to the known ' principles which govern the relationship between master and servant. This con-. tention was· negatived by the Federal Court. (l) A.I,R. 1949 F.C. 112, 120. 19111 R ai.Bahadut Diwa11. Badri Das . .. T·•• Indu1lrial Trib.un .t, Pun;•• --. 1962 Bai Bahadur Diwan Badd Das •.. The indust1ial Tribunal, Punjab Gajendraqadkor J • 936 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] Speaking for the Court, Mahajan J. as he then was, observed that the award of the Tribunal may contain provisions for the settlement of a dispute which no Court could order if it was bound by ordinary law, but the Tribunal is not fettered in any way by these limitations. The same plea was again raised before this Court · in The Bharat Bank Ltd.,. Delhi. v. The Employ~es ef The Bharat Bank Ltd., Delhi (I) and Mukherjea J. as he then was, emphatically rejected it. "Insettling the disptites between the employers and the workmen", observed the learned . Judge, "the function of the Tribunal is not confined to administration of justice in accordance with law. It can confer rights and privileges on either party which it considers reasonable and proper, though they may not be within the terms of any existing agreement. It has n:it merely to interpret or to give effect to the contractual rights ·and obligations of tho parties. It can create new rights and obligations between them which it considers essential for keeping industrial peace." This view has been consistently accepted by indus• trial adjudication since 1949. The doctrine of the absolute freedom of contract has thus to yield to the higher claims for social justice. Take, for instance, the •case where an employer wants to exercise his. right to employ industrial labour on any wages he likes. It is not unlikely that in an economically under·developed country where unemployment looms very large, for Industrial work, employees may be found willing to take employment on terms which do not amount to a minimum basic wage. Industrial adjudication does not recognise the employer's right to employ labour on terms below the termS" of minimum basic wage. This, no doubt, is an interference with the employer's (I) (1950)•S.C.R. 459, 513. ... ) 3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS . 937 196$ right to hire lah~mr, but social justice requires that the right should be controlled. Similarly Rai IJahadur the I'ight to dismiss an employee js also controlled Diwm Brdri D11' v. subject to well rocognised limits in· order to Tne.ln:Juslrial guarantee security of .tenure to industrial em-~ lribunul, Punja ployees. In the matter of earned , le.ave., s.79 .of Gajendrag(JJdkar J. · the F 1ctories Act prescribes a minimum in regard to establishments to which the Act applies. ·In the matter of bonus which is not dgarded as an item of d'eferred wages, industrial adjudication· has evolved a formula by the working ofwhich employees are entitled to claim bonus. We have referred to these illustration to show how under the impact of the demand of social justice, the ·doctrine of absolute freed0m of contract has been regulated. It is, however, necessary to add that the general question about the employer's right to ma.nag.a his own affairs in the best way he chooses cannot be answered in the abstract without reference to the facts and ~ircumstances in regard to which the question is raised. If a general question is posed and an answer must be given to it, the answer would be both yes and no. The right would be recognised and industrial adjudication would not be permitted or would be reluctant to trespass on that right or on the field of management functions unless compelled by over-riding considerations of social justice. The right would not be recognised and would be controlled if social justice and.industrial peace require such regulation. That is why we think industrial adjudication always a.ttempts1not to answer questions in the abstract in order to evolve any general or inflexible principles. The est course to adopt in dealing with industrial disputes is to consider the facts of the case, the nature of the demand made · by employees, the nature of the defence raised by 938 SUPREME COURT REPORTS. [1963] the employer and decide the dispute without Rai Bnhadu• unduly enlarging the· ·scope of the enquiry. JJiwa•.~•dri D••. If in the decision of .the dispute, some principles n, Jndutrial have to be full owed or evolved, that must be done: Tribunal Pu,jab . but care .must be taken not to evolve larger princiGajeniragadkar ;J. pies which would tend to pre-judge issues not directly raised in the case before th.e Industrial Tribunal. That is why we think we would not be justified in giving any general answer to the broad contention raised by the learned Solicitor-General before us in the present appeal. · . The development and growth of industrial law during the last. decade presents a close · analogy to the development and growth of oons· titutional law during the same period. In some respects, it is well-know that Art. 19 of the Constitution has guaranteed fundamental rights to individual citizens and at the same time, bas provided for the regulation of the said fundamental rights subject to' the prov1s1ons of clo. (2) to (6) of the said . Article. Where a. conflict arises between the citizen's fundamental right . to bold property and a restriction sought to be imposed upon that right in the interest of the general public, cour~s take the precaution of confining their deoi.siOn to the points raised before them and not to lay down unduly broad and general propositions. As in the decision of constitutional questions of this· kind, eo in industrial adjudication it is always a matter of making a reasonable adjustment between two competing claims. The fundamental right of the individual citizen is guaran- . teed and its roasonable restriction is permissible in the interest of the general public, so, the claims of the . interest of the general public have to be weighed and balanced against the claims of the individual citizen in rega.rd to his fundamental right. So too, in ·the case of industrial adjudication . . . . . 3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 939 ~ ' the claims . of the employer baised on the free· dom of contract have to be adjusted with the claims of indmitrial employees for soI Tribunal, Punjab . The process of making a reasonable adjustment is not always easy, and so, in reaching aonclusions in such a matter, it is essential not to decide more than is necessary. If industrial adjudiotion pur· Ga.j1ndrag2tllt.ar J, -' ports to lay tlown broad general principles, it · is likely to make its approach in future oasea inflexible and that must always be avoided. In order that industrial adjudication should be completely free from the tyranny of dogmas or the sub-conscious pressure of pre-conceived notion, it is of utmost importance that the temptation to lay down broad principles should be avoided. In these matters, there are no absolutes and no' formula can be evolved which would invariably give an answer to differernt problems which may be posed in different cas11s on different facts. Let us, therefore, revert to the facts of this case and ·decide whether the appellant's attack against ..- tl}e validity· of the propriety of the award can be sustained. • In dealing with the narrow dispute presented by this appeal, it is necessary to remember that all the . employees of the appellants are governed · by the same ~erms and conditions of service, except in regard to earned leave. It ii only in respect of this term and condition of service that a distinction is made between workmen employed on or before 1. 7. 56 and those employed after that date. Generally, in the matter of providing leave. rules, industrial adjudication prefers to havfl similar conditions of service in the same industry situated in the same region. 'fhere is no evidence adduced in this case in · regard to the condition of earned ieave · prevailing· in the comparable industry in this region. But we cannot ignore the fact that this 940 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] 1962 very concern provides for better facilities of earned ' .o.( Ra; Bahadu, leave to a section of its employees when other terms D•wan Bad.i Da," and conditions· of service are the same in respect Thelndustrial of bot]} the categories of employees. It is not Tribnnal, Punjob difficult to imagine that the continuance of these ~aj'"''"c•dkar J. two different provisions in the same concern is likely to lead to dissatisfaction and frustration amongst the new employees. It cannot be denied that -.. the existence of industrial peace and harmony and the continuance of the said peace and harmony are releva:it factors, but their importance should not be unduly exaggerated. If a frivolous demand is made by the e'Ilployees and it is accompanied by a threat. that non-compliance with the demand would lead to industrial dis-harmony or absence of peace, it would be unreasonable to· treat the throst 1\8 relevant in deciding the merits of the demand. In this connection, it is necessary to remember that the continuance of harmonious relations between the employer and his employees is tre'ated as relevant by industrial adjudication, because it leads to more production and thereby has a healthy impact on national ec~nomy, and so it is necessary that in dealing with" several industrial disputes, industrial. adjudication has to bear in mind the effect of its deciRions on national economy. In their zest to fight for their respective claims, the parties may choose to ignore the demand of national economy, but industrial adjudication cannot. If the demand is plainly frivolous, it has to be rejected whatever the conse- . quences may be. In the present case, the argument that the continuance of two different provisions would lead to dis-harmony c"nnot,. however, be treated as frivolous. It is difficult to understand on what principle the discrimination is based. The only argument urged in support of the discrimioa· ti.on is the employer's right ·to provide for new terms of service to the new entrants in service. in our · 3 S.C.R. SUPR~ME COURT REPORTS 941 opinion, the validity of this argument cannot be accepted in the cir<:mmstances of this case. Take the case of the wages or dearness allo-. wance which the appellants paid to their employees. Would the appellants bE:i justified in assertion of their right of freedom . of contract to offer less favourable terms of wages or dearness allowance to employees who would be employed after a certain . date ? If the general point raised by the learned . Solicitor-General is upheld without any qualifications, then it would be open to the employer t.o fix different wages for different sets of workmen who are doing the same kind of work in his concern_. We have rarely come across a case where such a claim has either been made or has been upheld. It is well known that both industrial legislation and industrial adjudication seek to attain similarity or uniformity of terms of service in the same industry _existing in the same region, as far as·it may be prac.ticable or possible, without d'oing injustice or harm to any particular employer or a group of employers. '!hat being so, we do not think the Tribunal was in error in holding 'that in the matter of earned leave, there should be uniformity of ·conditions of service governing all the employees in the service of the appellants. · There ·1s another aspect of this question to which referen_.Tribunal, Punjab of rupees in 1949, have shown an upward tendency -·- and have reached almost rupees eight lacs in 1959. · 6JJ1nar~gadka•.J. That is another factor whioh has to be borne in • mind in dealing with the present dispute. It i~ not suggested by the appellants that the provision made by them for earned leave in respect of old' employees is unduly generous of extravagant and. so, it has become necessary to invoke the provisions of section .79 of the Factories Act in . respect 'of new employees. On the other hand, ' earned leave provided by s. 79 ia the minimum statutory leave to which employees are entitled and . if the E1ppellants thought it neoessary to provide for additional earned leave to their old employees, there" is no reason why. they should not make ·a similar · provision ·in respect of the new employees as well .. We ought to add to that on the record, it does appear that the appellants are good employees and they are treating their employees in a liberal manner. It, however, appears that they have brought the present dispute to this Court more for asserting the genera.I principle of the employer's ·right to fix conditions of service with his new employees than Ior vindicating any real or substantial grievance against the award which would prejudicially affect their interest. In our opinion, having regard to the nature of the dispute raised in the present appeal and the other relevant facts and · circumstances, it cannot be said. that the Industrial Tribunal erred in law in direoting the appellants to provide for the same ·uniform rule as to earned leave' fo~ all their employees. We are satisfied ·.that ·the a.ward under appeal cannot be set a.side •. only· on ·the a.oa.demic or .abstract point of law raised by the appellants. · · " 3 s:c.R. SUPREME co RT REPORTS 943 . .. The result is, the a.ppeal fails and is dismissed with costs. MunHOLKAR, J.-This is an appeal by special leave from the award of the Industrial Tribunal, Pupj~b. The appellants before us are the trustees of ~ ••The T.ribune", Ambala Cantt. and the opposite party to the appeal consists of the workmen of the Tribune through their two unions, one the Tribune Employees' Union and the other the Tribune ·Workers' Union. The Trust was founded in Lahore by the late Sardar Dayal Singh Majithia on February l, 1881. . ~ It publishes the newspaper "Tribune". By the will of the founder dated June 15, 1895 the Management of tlie Tribune was vested in a public trust in September, 1898. After the partition of India the offices of the newspaper had to be shifted from ·Lahore and they are now located at Ambala. The Trust naturally had to leave the entire machinery , and other equipment of t.he Tribune Trust along with its immovable property in Lahore. The value of that property is stated by the appellants to be Rs. 25 lakhs or so. The Trust was however, able to tranefer its bank accounts and Government "securitieH to India ia few days before the partition. With the help. of these assets it re-established the Tribune Press and office at Ambala and established new machinery at a cost of Rs. 15 lakhs or so. , . Gradually the Trust has been able to rehabilitate its fortunes. It, is not disputed before us that despite the heavy loss entailed by the Trust by reason of being uprooted from Pa.kistll.n, the employees quite a number of whom are old employees who were ab]e to migrate to India, have been treated with a. great· >deal of consideration. After the Tribune started miking profitll the employees are oeing given bonus every year. Moreover .ev~n before the Employees Provident Fund boheme applicable to newspaper 1962' ~ Rai J3ahatfur. Diwan Ba'dri .Dai. v. The 'Industrial, Tribunali [1unjal> , M udholkar J' .· ' ' • • 944 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1963.] · llU industry and even before the scheme of gratuity for R 1 R h ""' all categories of employees were enforced by statute Di~.,. ;.~,; Das the Tribune had provided for both provident fund and T•. i:",m,1,;81 gratuity to its employees. In addition to this it has T 1982 : ·Ral Bahidu.;. Diwan B idri_ Dos v. ' ·r1r.·e tticJu.abial Trib~I. ·PJJrcjab . Mwlholk .. J • 948 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] ponsible for the heart burning, resentment and dissatisfaction of the workmen. It is further urged with emphasis that all workers . for the Press .Section should in the matter of earned leave be treated equally. · For the long space of seven years even after the Factories Act had come into force the management had continued to treat all workmen of the Press Section alike irrespective o:f .the date of their employment. There is no reason why a distinction of a discriminatory nature and effect be made between the two artificially created sets of workmen belonging to the same section." It seems to me that the Tribunal's ultimate finding is. vitiated by a misconception entertained by it. The first sentence in the above quotation would show that the Tribunal thought that those persons who were employed after July 1, 1956 were treated in the matter of ·leave on par with those employed before. July 1, 1956, "till. July 1, 1956" but were sought to be discriminated against only thereafter .. It is difficult to und1orstand how persons who were employed after July l, 1956, could possibly be treated before July 1, 1956, equally with employees who were in service on that day. Apparently it is this confusion in the mind of theTribunal which has influenced its ultimate conclusion. That apart, it is quite clear that what the Trust has done is to put in one category persons who enjoyed in substance the same kind of benefit uptil July l, 1956 and permit them to enjoy the benefit they had hitherto enjoyed. Then it put in a separate category those persons who could never possibly lay any claim to have enjoyed a similar benefit because they were not its employees till July 1, 1956, and decided that they will get leave only as provided ins. 79 of the Factories Act. All persons in !Jach -category are intended to be alike and, therefore the 3 S.C;R. SUPREME~COURT'REPOR:TS 949• question of discrimination does not in fact arise. It was, in my opinion; open to the management to offer to the new entrants new terms. When the new entrants entered service accepting the new terms and knowing fully well that one of those terms i. e., th~ one relating to annual leave was different and less beneficial from .·the one which obtained in the case of the old employees, it is not reasonable for·· them now to sa.y that they are being discriminated against. The Tribunal, however, thinks otherwise. It has held that the Trust, by treating the new entrants less favourably in the matter of leave than its old employees has practised discrimination and that this discrimination has caused heart burning .. Presumably,. therefore, the Tribunal felt impelled to interfere and direct that the new entrants should be treated in the matter of leave -on par with 0 the· old employees in order to avoid industrial unrest which may result 'from' heart burning amongst the new entrants. · What we must first consider is whether the existing of heart burning has at all been established in this case. It is said that the continuance of different provisions in the same concern has caused heart burning, dissa~isfaction and frustration among . the new employees and this would lead to unrest ' in the industry. For one thing, there is no evidence, before us to show that the · new employees are making a very serious grievance of the fa.ct that they would get a few days less of leave than the old employees. All that Mr. Ramamurti could point 0ut to us was the statement in the evidence ·of Som Nath, A. W. 7. that he should also be given 30 days, privilege leave in a year. Merely saying that he should be given privilege- leave does not mean that he is harbouring bitterness in his mind. Apartfrom that it would· be extremely unreasonable .