# SUPREME COURT REPORTS · [1964] K. NARASIMHIAH v. H. C. SINGRI GOWDA

- **Citation:** [1964] 7 S.C.R. 618
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1963-10-10
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 223 of 1964
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/supreme-court-reports-1964-k-narasimhiah-v-h-c-singri-gowda-3081
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

1964
April I
618
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ·
[1964]
K. NARASIMHIAH
v.
H. C. SINGRI GOWDA
IK. SuBBA Rl\D, K. C. DAS GUPTA AND RAGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ.]
Municipality-No confidence resolution against PresidentEnactment providing tl'lree clear days notice jor holding special
general meeting-Provision if mandatory-Failure to give such
notice-Effect-Validity-Mysore Town
Municipalities
Act,
1951, ss. 23(9), 24(1) (a). 24(3) and 27(3).
The ap!J€1lant was the elected President of the Municipality.
In a special general meeting of the councillors a resolution expressing no confidence in
him as President \Vas moved and
passed. In the High Court as well as in this Court, the legality
·of the proceedings of the meeting and the validity of the resolution was. challenged by the appellant on the grounds, (i) that
the requisite three days notice under the Act was not served on
all the members and so the meeting was not validly held, (ii)
that the meeting was not properly held as the appellant was
not allowed to preside and thus s. 24(1) (a) of the Act was contravened and (iii) that the requisition for moving the resolution
did not comply with the proviso to s. 23(a) of the Act as fifteen
days notice was not given of the intention to move the resolution. The last two contentions were rejected by the High
Court. On the main contention it held that as the notices were
sent to the councillors on the 10th October 1963, they must be
held to have been given on that date even though they were
actually served on the 11th, 12th and 13th; but, apart from that
it was of opinion that the provisions abOut three days notice
was only directory and not mandatory and so the omission to
give notice would not affect the validity of the resolution.
Held: (i) The High Court was wrong holding that "sending!! a notice amounts to "giving" the notice. There is no authority or principle for the proposition that as soon as the person
in the legal duty to give the notice despatches the notice to
the address of the person to whom it has to be given, the giving is complete. Therefore, it must be held that the notice given
to some of the councillors was of less than three clear days.
(ii) The provision as regards any motion or proposition of
which notice must be given in s. 27 (3) of the Act is only directory
and not mandatory. Therefore the fact that some of the councillors received less than three clear days notice of the meeting did
not by itself made the proceedings of the meeting or the resolution
!>"SSed there invalid. These would be invalid only if the proceedings were prejudicially affected by such irregularity. In the present case, nineteen of the twenty councillors attended the meeting and of these 19, 15 voted in favour of the resolution of no
confidence against the appellant. There is thus no reason for
holddng that the proceedings of the meeting were prejudicially
affected by the "irregularity in the service of notice".
State of U.P. v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava, (1958) S.C.R.
533, referred to.
(iii) On a consideration of the material on the record. it
must be held that it was after the appellant left the meeting that
the Vice President took the chair and thereafter the no confidence resolution was moved and passed. There could therefore
7 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
619
be no question of any contravention of the requirement under
s.24(1) (a) of the Act that the President shall preside.
1964
llr arasinihiaA
v.
(iv) The proviso to s.23(9) of the Act was not contravened.
All that is required is that before the resolut10n is actually
moved, the President has got fifteen days notice. In the present
case, the meeting was held on October 14 and the appellant
received the notice on the 25th September. There was thus more
than 15 days notice given to him.
H. C, Singri Gowda

## Text

1964
April I
618
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ·
[1964]
K. NARASIMHIAH
v.
H. C. SINGRI GOWDA
IK. SuBBA Rl\D, K. C. DAS GUPTA AND RAGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ.]
Municipality-No confidence resolution against PresidentEnactment providing tl'lree clear days notice jor holding special
general meeting-Provision if mandatory-Failure to give such
notice-Effect-Validity-Mysore Town
Municipalities
Act,
1951, ss. 23(9), 24(1) (a). 24(3) and 27(3).
The ap!J€1lant was the elected President of the Municipality.
In a special general meeting of the councillors a resolution expressing no confidence in
him as President \Vas moved and
passed. In the High Court as well as in this Court, the legality
·of the proceedings of the meeting and the validity of the resolution was. challenged by the appellant on the grounds, (i) that
the requisite three days notice under the Act was not served on
all the members and so the meeting was not validly held, (ii)
that the meeting was not properly held as the appellant was
not allowed to preside and thus s. 24(1) (a) of the Act was contravened and (iii) that the requisition for moving the resolution
did not comply with the proviso to s. 23(a) of the Act as fifteen
days notice was not given of the intention to move the resolution. The last two contentions were rejected by the High
Court. On the main contention it held that as the notices were
sent to the councillors on the 10th October 1963, they must be
held to have been given on that date even though they were
actually served on the 11th, 12th and 13th; but, apart from that
it was of opinion that the provisions abOut three days notice
was only directory and not mandatory and so the omission to
give notice would not affect the validity of the resolution.
Held: (i) The High Court was wrong holding that "sending!! a notice amounts to "giving" the notice. There is no authority or principle for the proposition that as soon as the person
in the legal duty to give the notice despatches the notice to
the address of the person to whom it has to be given, the giving is complete. Therefore, it must be held that the notice given
to some of the councillors was of less than three clear days.
(ii) The provision as regards any motion or proposition of
which notice must be given in s. 27 (3) of the Act is only directory
and not mandatory. Therefore the fact that some of the councillors received less than three clear days notice of the meeting did
not by itself made the proceedings of the meeting or the resolution
!>"SSed there invalid. These would be invalid only if the proceedings were prejudicially affected by such irregularity. In the present case, nineteen of the twenty councillors attended the meeting and of these 19, 15 voted in favour of the resolution of no
confidence against the appellant. There is thus no reason for
holddng that the proceedings of the meeting were prejudicially
affected by the "irregularity in the service of notice".
State of U.P. v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava, (1958) S.C.R.
533, referred to.
(iii) On a consideration of the material on the record. it
must be held that it was after the appellant left the meeting that
the Vice President took the chair and thereafter the no confidence resolution was moved and passed. There could therefore
7 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
619
be no question of any contravention of the requirement under
s.24(1) (a) of the Act that the President shall preside.
1964
llr arasinihiaA
v.
(iv) The proviso to s.23(9) of the Act was not contravened.
All that is required is that before the resolut10n is actually
moved, the President has got fifteen days notice. In the present
case, the meeting was held on October 14 and the appellant
received the notice on the 25th September. There was thus more
than 15 days notice given to him.
H. C, Singri Gowda
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 223
of 1964. Appeal by special leave from the Judgment and order
dated December 6, 1963 of the Mysore High Court in Writ
Petition No. 2273 of 1963.
S.K. Venkataranga Iyengar and R. Gopalakrislman, for
the appellant.
N.S. Krishna Rao and Girish Chandra, for respondents
No. I, 2, 4--10, 12-15.
April 1, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered
by
DAs GUPTA, J.-Is the requirement of three clear days'
Das Gupta, J.
notice for the holding of a special general meeting as embodied in s. 27(3) of the Mysore Town Municipalities Act 1951, a
mandatory provision? That is the main question which arises
for decision in this appeal.
The appellant was elected as the President of Holenarsipur Municipality on September II, 1962. At a special general meeting of the Municipal Council held on October 14,
1963, a resolution was passed in the following terms:-
"This Council has no confidence in the Municipal
President of Holenarsipur Municipality."
On November 2, I 963 Mr. Narasimhiah, the President
of the Council applied to the High Court of Mysore under Art.
226 of the Constitution praying for the issue of an appropriate
writ quashing the proceedings of the meeting which culminated in the resolution of no confidence against him. Prayers
were made also for some consequential reliefs.
Holenarsipur Municipality has twenty Councillors. Thirteen out of the them sent a request to the President to convene
a special general meeting to discuss a resolution expn;ssing no
confidence in him as President. This request was handed
over to the President on 25th September 1963. As however
he did not take any steps for convening the meeting the
Vice President acted in the matter-calling a meeting to
discuss the resolution to express no confidence in the President.
A notice under the Vice-President's signature stating that it was prgposed to hold a special general body meeting
620
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
1964
v.
H.O. S·i1t!Jri Gou'tla
of the Municipality on the 14th October 1963 at 10 A.M. in
the office premises and asking the members to be present in
time was served on the Councillors. One copy of the notice
was also posted up at the Municipal Office as required by
27(3) of the Mysore Town Municipalities Act, 1951 (hereinDas Gupta, .1.
after referred to as "the Act"). The notice bore the d;tte 10th
October 1963. On fifteen of the twenty Councillors the notice
was personally served on that very date, i.e., the 10th October.
On three of the Councillors, v_iz., the President Narasimhiah,
Mr. Dasappa and Mr. Sanniah, the notice was served on the
13th October. It was served on Councillor Mirza Mohammad
Hussain on the 12th October and on the Councillor R. G.
Vaidyanatha on the I Ith October 1963.
When the meeting was held on October I 4, 1963, nineteen of the twenty Councillors were present. The President,
Mr. Narasimhiah was among them. He claimed to preside
over the meeting. But, ultimately, he appears to have left the
meeting. The meeting was then held under the presidentship
of the Vice President Mr. Singri Gowda. The no-confidence
motion against the President was moved and was passed, fifteen members having voted for it.
In challenging the legality of the proceedings of this
meeting of I 4th October and the validity of the resolution
of no confidence passed there, ·the petitioner urged three principal grounds. The first is that the requisite three days' notice
was not served on all the members and so the meeting was not
validly held. The second ground urged was that the meeting
cannot be said to be properly held as be was not allowed to
preside and the Vice-President presided, and thus s.24(1)(a)
of the Act was contravened. Thirdly, it was urged that the requisition for moving the resolution of no confidence did not
comply with the proviso to s.23(9) of the Act as 15 days'
notice was not given of the intention to move the resolution.
The High Court held that on the materials before it, it
was not possible to pronounce as to the circumstances under
which the Vice-President presided at the meeting. So, the High
Court rejected the contention that there was any contravention of s.24(l)(a) of the Act. The case made in the pe_tition
that 15 days' notice had not been given of the intention to
move the resolution does not appear to have been pressed at
the bearing; as there is no mention in the judgment of any
such argument. On the question regarding the failure. to serve
three days' notice of the meeting on all the Councillors, the
High Court followed its own decision in another Writ Petition
No. 2280 of 1963 and rejected the petitioner's contention. The
judgment in Writ Petition No .. 2280 of 1963 which was produced before us shows that the High Court took the view that
7 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
621
as the notices were sent on the 10th October they must he
1964
held to have been given on that date even though they were
NarairimhW.
actually served on the I Ith, 12th and 13th; but, apart from
. v:
that the High Court was of opinion that the provision about H.c. 8•119"-
three days' notice was only directory and not mandatory and
na. lhpta, J.
so the omission to give notice would not affect the validity of
the resolution.
All the three grounds raised in the petition were urged
before us in support of the appeal. As regards the petitioner's
contention that the meeting was not held in accordance with
law as he was not allowed to preside, we are of opinion, on a
consideration of what material there is on the record, that it
was after he left the meeting that the Vice President took the
chair and thereafter the no confidence resolution was moved
and passed. There can therefore be no question of any contravention of the requirement that the President shall preside.
There is, our opinion, no substance also in the contention
that the prOIViso to s.23(9) was contravened. The proviso runs
thus:-
"Provided that no such resolution shall be moved unless notice of the resolution is signed by not less
than one-third of the whole number of the Councillors and at least fifteen days' notice has been
given of the intention to move the resolution."
Admittedly, the notice was signed by more than one-third
of the whole number of Councillors. It is said, however, that
fifteen days' notice of the intention to move the resolution
was not given. This argument which Mr. Iyengar addressed to
us, but which does not appear to have been urged before the
High Court-proceeds on th6 assumption that fifteen days'
notice of the intention to move the resolution has to be given
not only to the President but also to the other Councillors. We
do not think that that assumption is justified. In our opinion,
what. is required is that fifteen days' notice of the intention to
move the resolution has to be given to the .President. In other
words, all that is required is that before the resolution is actually moved the President has got fifteen days' notice. In the
present case, the meeting was held on October 14 and the
President received the notice on the 25th September. There
was thus more than 15 days' notice given to him.
This brings us to the main contention that three days'
notice of the special general meeting was not given and so the
meeting is invalid. We find it difficult to agree with the High
Court that "sending" the notice amounts to ·'crivina" the
•
Q
Q
notice.
1964
J.l arasimhiah
v.
H.C. Singri Gowda
Da.s Gupta, J.
622
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
< (1964!]
"Giving" of anything as ordinarily understood in the
English language is not complete unless it has reached the
hands of the person to whom it has to be given. In the eye of
law however giving is complete in many matters where it
has been offered to a person but not accepted by him. Tendering of a notice is in law therefore giving of a notice e".en
though the person to whom it is tendered refuses to accept it.
We can find however no authority or principle for the proposition that as soon as the person with a legal duty to give the
notice despatches the notice to the address of the person to
whom it has to be given, the giving is complete. We are therefore of opinion that the High Court was wrong in' thinking
that the notices were given to all the Councillors on the !0th
October. In our opinion, the notice given to five of the Councillors was of less than three clear days.
The question then is: Is the provision of three clear days•
notice mandatory, ie., does the failure to give such notice
make the proceedings of the meeting and the resolution passed there invalid? The use of the word "shall" is not conclusive on the question. As in all other matters of statutory construction the decision of this question depends on the ascertainment of the legislature's intention. Was it the legislature's
intention in making the provision that the failure to comply
with it shall have the consequence of making what is done invalid in law? That is the question to be answered. To ascer-·
tain the intention the Court has to examine carefully the object of the statute, the consequence that may follow from insisting on a strict observance of the particular provision and
above all the general scheme of the other provisions of which
it forms a part. In the State of U.P. v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava (') where the question arose whether the provisions of
Art. 320(3)(c) of the Constitution are mandatory (which provides that the Union· Public Service Commission or the State
Public Service Commission shall be consulted on certain disciplinary matters), this Court laid stress on the fact that the
proviso to. the Article contemplates that the President or the
Governor as the case may be make regulations specifying
the matters in which either in general or in any particular class or in any particular circumstances, it shall not be
necessary for the Public Service Commission to be consulted:
Speaking for the Court Sinha J. observed:-
"If the provisions of Art. 320 were of a mandatory
character, the Constitution would not have left it
to the discretion of the Head of the Excutive Government to undo those provisions by making regulations to the contrary."
(') [1908] S.C.R. 533.
'l S.C.R.
SUPRElIE COURT REPORTS
623
This appears to have been the main reason for the court's
1961
decision that the provisions of Article 320 (3)(c) are not manXamimhiah
datory. Naturally, strong reliance has been placed on this deci-
. v •.
sion on behalf of the respondents. It is pointed out that while Il.O. Smgn Gowda
providing that three clear days' notice of special general meet·
Daa Gupta, J.
ing shall be given to the Councillors, the legislature said in the
same breath that "in cases of great urgency, notice of such
shorter period as is reasonable should be given to the Councillors of a special general meeting." The decision of what
should be considered to be a case of "great urgency" was left
enlirely to the President or the Vice-President on whom the
duty Lo call such a meeting is given under s.27(2). It is urged
by the learnecl Counsel that if the intention of the legislature
had been to make the service of three clear days' notice mandatory it would not, have left the discretion of giving notice
for a shorter p~riod for some of the special general meetings
in this manner. We see considerable force in this argument.
The very fact that while three clear days' notice is not to be
given of all special general meetings and for some such meet·
ings notice only of such shorter period as is reasonable has to
be given justifies the conclusion that the "three clear days",
mentioned in the section was given by the legislature as only
a measure of what it considered reasonable.
It is necessary also to remember that the main object of
giving the notice is to make it possible for the Councillors to
so arrange their other business as to be able to attend the
meeting. For an ordinary general meeting the notice provided
is of seven clear days. That is expected to give enough time
for the purpose. But a lesser period-of three clear days'---is
considered sufficient for "special general meetings"' generally.
The obvious reason for providing a shorter period for such
meetings is that these are considered more important meetings
and Councillors are expected to make it convenient to
attend these meetings even at the cost of some inconvenience
to themselves. Where the special general meeting is to dispose
of some matter of great urgency it is considered that a period
of even less than three clear days' notice would be sufficient.
A consideration of the object of these provisions and the
manner in which the object is sought to be achieved indicates
that while the legislature did intend that crdinarily the
notice as mentioned should be given it could not have intended that the fact that the notice is of less than the period men.
tioned in the section and thcs the Councillors had less time
than is ordinarily considered reasonable to arrange his other
business to be free to attend the meeting, should have the serious result of making the proceedings of the meeting invalid.
1964
Narasimhiah
v.
624
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
It is important to notice in this connection one of the provisions in s. 36 of the Act. lt is in these words : -
H. 0. Singri Gowda
"No resolution of a municipal council or any committee appointed under this Act shall be deemed
invalid on account of any irregularity in the
service of notice upon any councillor or member
provided the proceedings of the municipal
council or committee were not prejudicially affected by such irregularity."
Das Gupta, J.
•
v
It is reasonable to think that the service of notice mentioned in this provision refers to the giving of notice to the
Councillors. Quite clearly, any irregularity in the manner of
giving the notice would be covered by the words "irregularity
in the service of the notice upon any Councillor". lt appears
to us however reasonable to think that in making such a provision in s.36 the legislature was not thinking only of irregularity of the mode of service but also of the omission to give
notice of the full period as required.
It is interesting to notice in this connection that the
. English law as regards meetings of. borough councils and
county councils contain a specific provision that
want of
service of a summons to attend the meeting (which is required
to be served on every member of the council) will not affect
the validity of the meeting. It may be presumed that the legislature which enacted the Mysore Town Municipalities Act,
1951, was aware of these provisions in English law. It has not
gone to the length of saying that the failure to serve the notice
will not make the meeting invalid. It has instead said that any
irregularity in the service of notice would not make a resolution of the Council invalid provided that the proceedings were
not prejudicially affected by such irregularity. The logic of
making such a provision in respect of irregularity in the service of notice becomes strong if the fact that the notice given
was short of the required period is considered an irregularity
The existence of this provision in s.36 is a further reason
for thinking that the provision as regards any motion or proposition of which notice must be given in s.27(3) is only directory and not mandatory.
We are therefore of opinion that the fact that some of the
Councillors received less than three clear days' notice of the
meeting did not by itself make the proceedings of the meetin!!
or the resolu~ion passed there invalid. These would be invalid
only if the proceedings were prejudicially affected by such irregularity. As already stated. nineteen of the twentv Councillors
attended the meeting. Of these 19, 15 voted in favour of the
resolution· of no-confidence against the appellant. There is
7 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
625
thus absolutely no reason for thinking that the proceedings of
the meeting were prejudicially affected by the "irregularity in
the service of notice."
We have therefore come to the conclusion that the failure
19G4
v.
IJ. C. Singri Gou•d(_.
to give three clear days' notice to some of the Councillors did
n,,.., Gup'"• J.
not affect the validity of the meeting or the resolution of no
confidence passed there against the appellant.
In the result, we dismiss the appeal with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
'