# SURAJ JAGANNATH JADHAV v. THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

- **Citation:** [2019] 15 S.C.R. 84
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2019-12-13
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 1885 of 2019
- **Bench:** Ashok Bhushan, M. R. Shah
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/suraj-jagannath-jadhav-v-the-state-of-maharashtra-33893
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

Penal Code, 1860 - s.300 Fourthly & Exception 4 to s.300;
ss. 302 & 304 Part II - Appellant-accused killed his wife by setting
her ablaze - Convicted u/s.302 - Issue limited as to alteration of
conviction from s.302 to s.304 Part II - Held: Appellant poured the
kerosene on the deceased when she was trying to run out of the
house to save herself and was trying to open the latch of the door
of the house, the appellant threw the match-stick on her person and
set her ablaze - Nothing is on record that the appellant was in
inebriated stage -Even looking to the conversation between the
deceased and the appellant, as stated in the dying declaration given
by the her, it can safely be said that the appellant was in very much
conscious condition when the incident took place - He was very
much in senses and was conscious about what he was doing -He
was fully conscious of the fact that if kerosene is poured and matchstick is lit and put on the body, a person might die due to burns -
Death of the deceased was culpable homicide amounting to murder
and s.300 fourthly shall be applicable and not Exception 4 to s.300,
as contended by the appellant - In complete agreement with the
view taken by the Trial Court and the High Court convicting the
appellant for the offence punishable u/s.302.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD: In the present case, the appellant-accused poured
the kerosene on the deceased when she was trying to run out of
the house to save herself and was trying to open the latch of the
door of the house, the accused threw the match-stick on her
person and set her ablaze. Nothing is on record that the accused
was in a highly inebriated stage. Even looking to the conversation
which took place between the deceased and the accused, so stated
in the dying declaration given by the deceased, it can safely be
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said that the accused was in very much conscious condition when
the incident took place. He was very much in the senses and was
conscious about what he was doing. Therefore, the accused was
fully conscious of the fact that if kerosene is poured and matchstick is lit and put on the body, a person might die due to burns.
Therefore, the case would fall under Section 300 fourthly and
Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC shall not be applicable.
[Paras 5.1][88-C-E]
2. The manner in which the accused poured the kerosene
on the deceased and thereafter when she was trying to run away
from the room to save her, the accused came from behind and
threw a match-stick and set her ablaze, the death of the deceased
was a culpable homicide amounting to murder and Section 300
fourthly shall be applicable and not Exception 4 to Section 300
IPC as submitted on behalf of the accused. In complete agreement
with the view taken by the Trial Court as well as the High Court
convicting the accused for the offence punishable under Section
302 of the IPC. [Para 7][92-B-C]
Kalu Ram v. State of Rajasthan (2000) 10 SCC 324 -
referred to.
Santosh v. State of Maharashtra (2015) 7 SCC 641 :
[2015] 4 SCR 962 ; Bhagwan Tukaram Dange v. State
of Maharasthra (2014) 4 SCC 270 : [2014] 3 SCR
753 - relied on.
Case Law Reference
(2000) 10 SCC 324
referred to
Para 3
[2015] 4 SCR 962
relied on
Para 4.2
[2014] 3 SCR 753
relied on
Para 4.2

## Text

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2019] 15 S.C.R.
SURAJ JAGANNATH JADHAV
v.
THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA
(Criminal Appeal No. 1885 of 2019)
DECEMBER 13, 2019
[ASHOK BHUSHAN AND M. R. SHAH, JJ.]
Penal Code, 1860 - s.300 Fourthly & Exception 4 to s.300;
ss. 302 & 304 Part II - Appellant-accused killed his wife by setting
her ablaze - Convicted u/s.302 - Issue limited as to alteration of
conviction from s.302 to s.304 Part II - Held: Appellant poured the
kerosene on the deceased when she was trying to run out of the
house to save herself and was trying to open the latch of the door
of the house, the appellant threw the match-stick on her person and
set her ablaze - Nothing is on record that the appellant was in
inebriated stage -Even looking to the conversation between the
deceased and the appellant, as stated in the dying declaration given
by the her, it can safely be said that the appellant was in very much
conscious condition when the incident took place - He was very
much in senses and was conscious about what he was doing -He
was fully conscious of the fact that if kerosene is poured and matchstick is lit and put on the body, a person might die due to burns -
Death of the deceased was culpable homicide amounting to murder
and s.300 fourthly shall be applicable and not Exception 4 to s.300,
as contended by the appellant - In complete agreement with the
view taken by the Trial Court and the High Court convicting the
appellant for the offence punishable u/s.302.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD: In the present case, the appellant-accused poured
the kerosene on the deceased when she was trying to run out of
the house to save herself and was trying to open the latch of the
door of the house, the accused threw the match-stick on her
person and set her ablaze. Nothing is on record that the accused
was in a highly inebriated stage. Even looking to the conversation
which took place between the deceased and the accused, so stated
in the dying declaration given by the deceased, it can safely be
 [2019] 15 S.C.R. 84
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said that the accused was in very much conscious condition when
the incident took place. He was very much in the senses and was
conscious about what he was doing. Therefore, the accused was
fully conscious of the fact that if kerosene is poured and matchstick is lit and put on the body, a person might die due to burns.
Therefore, the case would fall under Section 300 fourthly and
Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC shall not be applicable.
[Paras 5.1][88-C-E]
2. The manner in which the accused poured the kerosene
on the deceased and thereafter when she was trying to run away
from the room to save her, the accused came from behind and
threw a match-stick and set her ablaze, the death of the deceased
was a culpable homicide amounting to murder and Section 300
fourthly shall be applicable and not Exception 4 to Section 300
IPC as submitted on behalf of the accused. In complete agreement
with the view taken by the Trial Court as well as the High Court
convicting the accused for the offence punishable under Section
302 of the IPC. [Para 7][92-B-C]
Kalu Ram v. State of Rajasthan (2000) 10 SCC 324 -
referred to.
Santosh v. State of Maharashtra (2015) 7 SCC 641 :
[2015] 4 SCR 962 ; Bhagwan Tukaram Dange v. State
of Maharasthra (2014) 4 SCC 270 : [2014] 3 SCR
753 - relied on.
Case Law Reference
(2000) 10 SCC 324
referred to
Para 3
[2015] 4 SCR 962
relied on
Para 4.2
[2014] 3 SCR 753
relied on
Para 4.2
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
1885 of 2019.
From the Judgment and Order dated 09.10.2018 of the High Court
of Judicature at Bombay in Criminal Appeal No. 723 of 2013.
Sushil Karanjkar, Nikhilesh Kumar and K. N. Rai, Advs. for the
Appellant.
SURAJ JAGANNATH JADHAV v. THE STATE OF
MAHARASHTRA
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Nishant Ramakantrao Katneshwarkar and Anoop Kandari, Advs.
for the Respondent.
 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
M. R. SHAH, J.
1. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment
and order dated 09.10.2018 passed by the High Court of Judicature at
Bombay in Criminal Appeal No. 723 of 2013, by which the High Court
has dismissed the said appeal preferred by the appellant herein-original
accused and has confirmed the judgment and order of conviction passed
by the learned Trial Court convicting the accused for the offence
punishable under Section 302 of the IPC, the original accused has
preferred the present appeal.
2. At the outset, it is required to be noted that the only submission
made by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant-original
accused is that the death of the deceased can be said to be a culpable
homicide not amounting to murder and the case would fall under
Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC and therefore the case would be under
Section 304 Part II IPC. Even this Court has issued the notice in the
present appeal limited to the nature of offence.
3. Shri Sushil Karanjkar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of
the appellant-original accused has vehemently submitted that, as such,
there was no intention on the part of the accused to kill his wife. It is
submitted that at the time when the unfortunate incident had taken place,
the accused was under the influence of liquor and therefore his condition
was such that he could not understand what he was doing. It is further
submitted by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellantoriginal accused that even thereafter the appellant tried to save the
deceased and poured water to save her and, while doing so, even the
appellant-original accused also sustained the injuries. Therefore, relying
upon the decision of this Court in the case of Kalu Ram v. State of
Rajasthan (2000) 10 SCC 324, it is prayed to alter the conviction from
Section 302 IPC to Section 304 Part II IPC.
4. On the other hand, Shri Nishant Ramakantrao Katneshwarkar,
learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State, while opposing the
present appeal, has vehemently submitted that the decision of this Court
in Kalu Ram (supra) shall not be applicable to the facts of the case on
hand. It is submitted that in that case before this Court, it was found that
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the accused was in a highly inebriated condition, which is not the case
here. It is submitted that, in the present case, as such, after abusing and
assaulting the deceased, the accused poured kerosene on her person
and set her ablaze. It is submitted that when the deceased was trying to
run out of the house to save herself, at which time, the accused came
from behind and threw match-stick on her person and set her ablaze. It
is submitted that at the relevant time, the deceased was carrying
pregnancy of 18 to 20 weeks. It is submitted that, as per the statement/
dying declaration of the deceased, after the deceased came out of the
room making noise, the accused poured the water on her. It is submitted
that the act of pouring kerosene, though on spur of moment, was followed
by lighting a match-stick and throwing it on the deceased and thereby
setting her ablaze are intimately connected with each other and resulted
in causing death of the deceased. It is submitted that the act of the
accused falls under Section 300 fourthly and therefore the death of the
deceased can be said to be culpable homicide amounting to murder. It is
submitted that every person of average intelligence would have the
knowledge that the pouring of kerosene and setting a person on fire is so
imminently dangerous that in all probability such an act would cause
injuries causing death. It is submitted therefore that Section 300 fourthly
shall be attracted and not Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC as submitted
on behalf of the accused.
4.1 It is further submitted by Shri Katneshwarkar, learned counsel
for the State that merely because subsequently the accused might have
poured the water, that is not suffice to alter the conviction from Section
302 IPC to Section 304 Part II IPC. It is submitted that the subsequent
act of pouring the water by the accused on the deceased appears to be
an attempt to cloak his guilt since he did it only when the deceased came
out for help and made the noise. It is submitted therefore that it cannot
be considered as a mitigating factor.
4.2 Making the above submissions and relying upon the decisions
of this Court in the case of Santosh v. State of Maharashtra (2015) 7
SCC 641 and in the case of Bhagwan Tukaram Dange v. State of
Maharasthra (2014) 4 SCC 270, it is prayed to dismiss the present
appeal.
5. Heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respective
parties at length. As observed hereinabove, in the present appeal, the
sole question which is posed for consideration of this Court is, whether,
SURAJ JAGANNATH JADHAV v. THE STATE OF
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in the facts and circumstances of the case, the case would fall under
Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC or Section 300 fourthly and, therefore,
whether Section 302 IPC shall be attracted or the case may fall under
Section 304 Part II IPC?
5.1 It is the case on behalf of the appellant-original accused that
as at the time when the incident took place, the accused was drunk and
under the influence of liquor and he had no intention to cause death of
the deceased-wife and that even subsequently the accused tried to save
the deceased and poured the water on her and therefore the case would
fall under Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC and, therefore the conviction
is to be altered from Section 302 of the IPC to Section 304 Part II IPC,
having relied upon the decision of this Court in the case of Kalu Ram
(supra). However, it is required to be noted that, in the present case, the
appellant-accused poured the kerosene on the deceased when she was
trying to run out of the house to save herself and was trying to open the
latch of the door of the house, the accused threw the match-stick on her
person and set her ablaze. Nothing is on record that the accused was in
a highly inebriated stage. Even looking to the conversation which took
place between the deceased and the accused, so stated in the dying
declaration given by the deceased, it can safely be said that the accused
was in very much conscious condition when the incident took place.
He was very much in the senses and was conscious about what he was
doing. Therefore, the accused was fully conscious of the fact that if
kerosene is poured and match-stick is lit and put on the body, a person
might die due to burns. Therefore, the case would fall under Section 300
fourthly and Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC shall not be applicable.
5.2 An identical question came to be considered by this Court in
the case of Santosh (supra). In the said decision, this Court also had the
occasion to consider the inebriation due to consumption of alcohol and
when it may be said to be a mitigating factor. In the said decision, this
Court also considered the submission made on behalf of the accused
that as he attempted to extinguish the fire by pouring the water on the
deceased and himself getting burn injuries in that process and, therefore,
the case would fall under Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC. In the similar
facts and circumstances of the case, this Court in the case of Santosh
(supra) has observed in paragraphs 10 to 15 as under:
"11. The question falling for consideration is whether the
act of the accused pouring water would mitigate the offence of
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murder. Where the intention to kill is present, the act amounts to
murder, where such an intention is absent, the act amounts to
culpable homicide not amounting to murder. To determine whether
the offender had the intention or not, each case must be decided
on its facts and circumstances. From the facts and circumstances
of the instant case, it is evident that: (i) there was a homicide,
namely, the death of Saraswatibai; (ii) the deceased was set ablaze
by the appellant and this act was not accidental or unintentional;
and (iii) the post-mortem certificate revealed that the deceased
died due to shock and septicaemia caused by 60% burn injuries.
When the accused poured kerosene on the deceased from the
kerosene lamp and also threw the lighted matchstick on the
deceased to set her on fire, he must have intended to cause the
death of the deceased. As seen from the evidence of PW 5, panch
witness, in the house of the appellant, kerosene lamp was prepared
in an empty liquor bottle. Whether the kerosene was poured from
the kerosene lamp or from the can is of no consequence. When
there is clear evidence as to the act of the accused to set the
deceased on fire, absence of premeditation will not reduce the
offence of murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder.
Likewise, pouring of water will not mitigate the gravity of the
offence.
12. After attending to nature's call, the deceased returned
to the house a little late. The accused questioned her as to why
she was coming late and he also suspected her fidelity. There
was no provocation for the accused to pour kerosene and set her
on fire. The act of pouring kerosene, though on the spur of the
moment, the same was followed by lighting a matchstick and
throwing it on the deceased and thereby setting her ablaze. Both
the acts are intimately connected with each other and resulted in
causing the death of the deceased and the act of the accused is
punishable for murder.
13. Even assuming that the accused had no intention to
cause the death of the deceased, the act of the accused falls
under clause Fourthly of Section 300 IPC that is the act of causing
injury so imminently dangerous where it will in all probability cause
death. Any person of average intelligence would have the
knowledge that pouring of kerosene and setting her on fire by
SURAJ JAGANNATH JADHAV v. THE STATE OF
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throwing a lighted matchstick is so imminently dangerous that in
all probability such an act would cause injuries causing death.
14. Insofar as the conduct of the accused in attempting to
extinguish fire, placing reliance upon the judgment of this Court
in Kalu Ram case [(2000) 10 SCC 324 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 86] , it
was contended that such conduct of the accused would bring
down the offence from murder to culpable homicide not amounting
to murder. In Kalu Ram case [(2000) 10 SCC 324 : 2000 SCC
(Cri) 86], the accused was having two wives. The accused in a
highly inebriated condition asked his wife to part with her
ornaments so that he could purchase more liquor, which led to an
altercation when the wife refused to do as demanded. Infuriated
by the fact that his wife had failed to concede to his demands, the
accused poured kerosene on her and gave her a matchbox to set
herself on fire. On her failure to light the matchstick, the accused
set her ablaze. But when he realised that the fire was flaring up,
he threw water on her person in a desperate bid to save her. In
such facts and circumstances, this Court held that the accused
would not have intended to inflict the injuries which she sustained
on account of the act of the accused and the conviction was altered
from Section 302 IPC to Section 304 Part II IPC.
15. The decision in Kalu Ram case [(2000) 10 SCC 324 :
2000 SCC (Cri) 86] cannot be applied in the instant case. The
element of inebriation ought to be taken into consideration as it
considerably alters the power of thinking. In the instant case, the
accused was in his complete senses, knowing fully well the
consequences of his act. The subsequent act of pouring water by
the accused on the deceased also appears to be an attempt to
cloak his guilt since he did it only when the deceased screamed
for help. Therefore, it cannot be considered as a mitigating factor.
An act undertaken by a person in full awareness, knowing its
consequences cannot be treated on a par with an act committed
by a person in a highly inebriated condition where his faculty of
reason becomes blurred."
In the case of Bhagwan (supra), while considering the defence
of the accused - at the time of the pouring the kerosene and litting a
match-stick, he was under the influence of liquor and intoxication and,
therefore, the intoxication can be said to be a mitigating circumstance
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and therefore the case would fall under Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC,
this Court negatived the said defence by observing in paragraphs 12 and
13 as under:
"12. Intoxication, as such, is not a defence to a criminal
charge. At times, it can be considered to be a mitigating
circumstance if the accused is not a habitual drinker, otherwise, it
has to be considered as an aggravating circumstance. The question,
as to whether the drunkenness is a defence while determining
sentence, came up for consideration before this Court
in Bablu v. State of Rajasthan [(2006) 13 SCC 116 : (2007) 2
SCC (Cri) 590] , wherein this Court held (SCC p. 129, para 12)
that the defence of drunkenness can be availed of only when
intoxication produces such a condition as the accused loses the
requisite intention for the offence and onus of proof about reason
of intoxication, due to which the accused had become incapable
of having particular knowledge in forming the particular intention,
is on the accused. Examining Section 85 IPC, this Court held that
the evidence of drunkenness which renders the accused incapable
of forming the specific intent essential to constitute the crime should
be taken into account with the other facts proved in order to
determine whether or not he had the intention. The Court held
that merely establishing that his mind was affected by drink so
that he more readily gave way to some violent passion, does not
rebut the presumption that a man intends the natural consequences
of his acts. This Court, in that case, rejected the plea of
drunkenness after noticing that the crime committed was a brutal
and diabolic act.
13. We find it difficult to accept the contention of the counsel
that since the appellant-accused was under the influence of liquor,
the offence will fall under Section 304 Part I or Section 304 Part
II. A-1 was presumed to know the consequences of his action, of
having lit the matchstick and set fire on the saree of the deceased,
after A-2 sprinkled kerosene on her body. In our view, the accused
was correctly charge-sheeted under Section 302 IPC and we find
no reason to interfere with the conviction and sentence awarded
by the trial court and affirmed by the High Court."
6. Therefore, the decision of this Court in the case of Kalu Ram
(supra) upon which the reliance has been placed by the learned counsel
SURAJ JAGANNATH JADHAV v. THE STATE OF
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appearing on behalf of the appellant-accused shall not be of any
assistance to the accused, more particularly, in absence of any evidence
led by the accused that he was in a highly inebriated condition and/or he
was such a drunk that he lost all the senses.
7. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the cases of
Bhagwan (supra) and Santosh (supra) to the facts of the case on hand
and the manner in which the accused poured the kerosene on the
deceased and thereafter when she was trying to run away from the
room to save her, the accused came from behind and threw a matchstick and set her ablaze, we are of the opinion that the death of the
deceased was a culpable homicide amounting to murder and Section
300 fourthly shall be applicable and not Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC
as submitted on behalf of the accused. We are in complete agreement
with the view taken by the learned Trial Court as well as the High Court
convicting the accused for the offence punishable under Section 302 of
the IPC.
8. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the
present appeal fails and the same deserves to be dismissed and is
accordingly dismissed.
Divya Pandey
Appeal dismissed.