# Surekha Domaji Bele v. Executive Engineer, Testing Division, MSEDCL

- **Citation:** 2026 INSC 639
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2026-06-11
- **Bench:** Sanjay Karol, Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/surekha-domaji-bele-v-executive-engineer-testing-division-msedcl-39283
- **Pages:** 42

## Headnote

Issue arose whether the dismissal order was passed by the
competent authority; whether a fresh show-cause notice for
punishment was required after the de novo proceedings before
the labour court; whether the plea relating to subsistence
allowance requires reconsideration; whether the direction treating
the suspension period as punishment is valid; and whether the
punishment of dismissal is disproportionate.
Headnotes†
MSEDCL Employees Services Regulations, 2005 - Dismissal
from service - Appellant-Upper Division Clerk in the
service of the respondent-management for more than two
decades, suspended from service for the acts of indiscipline,
insubordination, disobedience of superior officers, tampering
with official documents, and later was charge-sheeted -
Two years later served with a show-cause notice after the
domestic enquiry - Domestic enquiry was found not to be
fair - In revision, the matter remanded to the labour court and
permitted the respondent to prove the misconduct before the
labour court rather than hold fresh domestic enquiry - Upon
remand, misconduct held proved - Respondent thereafter
passed the dismissal order relying on the earlier show-cause
notice, and period of suspension was directed to be treated
as punishment - Appellant's challenge to the finding of
misconduct in Revision failed and was not carried further -
Challenge to the dismissal order on the grounds of competence
of disciplinary authority to pass the dismissal order, absence
of proper post-enquiry show-cause notice, non-payment of
subsistence allowance, illegal treatment of the suspension
period as punishment, and disproportionality of the penalty of
* Author
256
[2026] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
dismissal, failed before the labour court, the Industrial Court
and the High Court - Correctness:
Held: Dismissal order set aside as wholly disproportionate to
the charges proved, while leaving the finding of misconduct
undisturbed - Imposition of the second punishment of treating
the suspension undergone as punishment not permissible and
set aside - Finding that misconduct stood proved against the
appellant to remain undisturbed and the adjudication of misconduct
recorded in complaint by the labour court, which was also affirmed
in Revision not reopened - Appellant was a party to the adjudicatory
proceedings before the labour court where the misconduct was
recorded and had the opportunity to lead and in fact led the
evidence in her favour - Not established that the appellant holds
a civil post thus, entitled to the protection as envisaged in Art.311
of the Constitution - No error in the concurrent finding that the
Executive Engineer was competent under the Regulations to
pass an order of punishment against the Appellant-Pay Grade-III
employee - Challenge to the dismissal order on the ground of
lack of competence rejected - Regarding the dismissal order,
the disciplinary authority proceeded substantially on the earlier
show-cause notice, which was based on the domestic enquiry
that was subsequently found not to be valid - After remand, the
misconduct was still established, but in a different manner before
the new forum, based on the evidence led before the labour
court - Disciplinary authority was, thus, required to give another
show cause notice with fresh application of mind to enable the
appellant to submit her representation as regards the nature of
punishment - Before imposing the penalty of dismissal from service,
the disciplinary authority failed to consider the relevant factors
bearing on punishment - Competent authority to determine the
appellant's claim for subsistence allowance - Since the appellant
has already crossed the age of superannuation, no direction for
reinstatement can be issued at this stage - Thus, the impugned
judgment and order passed by the High Court set aside in terms
of the directions. [Paras 111.1-112]
Constitution of India - Art. 311 - Applicability to employees
of Government Companies/Corporations - Civil post under

## Text

_Characters 0–39,907 of 91,876. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39907 for what follows._

[2026] 7 S.C.R. 255 : 2026 INSC 639
Surekha Domaji Bele
v.
Executive Engineer, Testing Division, MSEDCL
(Civil Appeal No(s). 8459-8460 of 2026)
11 June 2026
[Sanjay Karol and Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh,* JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Issue arose whether the dismissal order was passed by the
competent authority; whether a fresh show-cause notice for
punishment was required after the de novo proceedings before
the labour court; whether the plea relating to subsistence
allowance requires reconsideration; whether the direction treating
the suspension period as punishment is valid; and whether the
punishment of dismissal is disproportionate.
Headnotes†
MSEDCL Employees Services Regulations, 2005 - Dismissal
from service - Appellant-Upper Division Clerk in the
service of the respondent-management for more than two
decades, suspended from service for the acts of indiscipline,
insubordination, disobedience of superior officers, tampering
with official documents, and later was charge-sheeted -
Two years later served with a show-cause notice after the
domestic enquiry - Domestic enquiry was found not to be
fair - In revision, the matter remanded to the labour court and
permitted the respondent to prove the misconduct before the
labour court rather than hold fresh domestic enquiry - Upon
remand, misconduct held proved - Respondent thereafter
passed the dismissal order relying on the earlier show-cause
notice, and period of suspension was directed to be treated
as punishment - Appellant's challenge to the finding of
misconduct in Revision failed and was not carried further -
Challenge to the dismissal order on the grounds of competence
of disciplinary authority to pass the dismissal order, absence
of proper post-enquiry show-cause notice, non-payment of
subsistence allowance, illegal treatment of the suspension
period as punishment, and disproportionality of the penalty of
* Author
256
[2026] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
dismissal, failed before the labour court, the Industrial Court
and the High Court - Correctness:
Held: Dismissal order set aside as wholly disproportionate to
the charges proved, while leaving the finding of misconduct
undisturbed - Imposition of the second punishment of treating
the suspension undergone as punishment not permissible and
set aside - Finding that misconduct stood proved against the
appellant to remain undisturbed and the adjudication of misconduct
recorded in complaint by the labour court, which was also affirmed
in Revision not reopened - Appellant was a party to the adjudicatory
proceedings before the labour court where the misconduct was
recorded and had the opportunity to lead and in fact led the
evidence in her favour - Not established that the appellant holds
a civil post thus, entitled to the protection as envisaged in Art.311
of the Constitution - No error in the concurrent finding that the
Executive Engineer was competent under the Regulations to
pass an order of punishment against the Appellant-Pay Grade-III
employee - Challenge to the dismissal order on the ground of
lack of competence rejected - Regarding the dismissal order,
the disciplinary authority proceeded substantially on the earlier
show-cause notice, which was based on the domestic enquiry
that was subsequently found not to be valid - After remand, the
misconduct was still established, but in a different manner before
the new forum, based on the evidence led before the labour
court - Disciplinary authority was, thus, required to give another
show cause notice with fresh application of mind to enable the
appellant to submit her representation as regards the nature of
punishment - Before imposing the penalty of dismissal from service,
the disciplinary authority failed to consider the relevant factors
bearing on punishment - Competent authority to determine the
appellant's claim for subsistence allowance - Since the appellant
has already crossed the age of superannuation, no direction for
reinstatement can be issued at this stage - Thus, the impugned
judgment and order passed by the High Court set aside in terms
of the directions. [Paras 111.1-112]
Constitution of India - Art. 311 - Applicability to employees
of Government Companies/Corporations - Civil post under
Union or State - Protection u/Art. 311 - Explained. [Paras 35-37]
MSEDCL Employees Service Regulations, 2005 - Regn.88(j) -
Fresh show-cause notice for punishment, if required after the
[2026] 7 S.C.R.
257
Surekha Domaji Bele v. Executive Engineer, Testing Division, MSEDCL
de novo proceedings before the labour court - Disciplinary
authority, if could impose dismissal by relying substantially
on the earlier notice, without independently considering the
findings which ultimately survived after remand and without
giving the appellant an opportunity to place her explanation on
the quantum of punishment in the light of those later findings:
Held: Second opportunity against proposed punishment is not a
mandate in every disciplinary proceeding - However, where the
applicable service regulation expressly provides for a post-enquiry
notice communicating the findings and calling upon the employee
to show cause against the contemplated punishment, the authority
must comply with that regulation - Regn.88(j) contemplates that,
after the enquiry is completed, the competent authority shall
communicate its findings and call upon the employee to show
cause against the contemplated punishment - On facts, the
enquiry which ultimately sustained the charges was the de novo
adjudication before the labour court after the earlier enquiry was
found defective - Thus, decision-making process on punishment
could not be treated as complete merely because the earlier
show-cause notice was held valid - Non-service of a fresh notice
after the labour court's de novo finding does not vitiate the finding
of misconduct, since the appellant was party to the adjudicatory
proceedings before labour court and industrial court - However,
the disciplinary authority was required to apply its independent
mind to the findings which ultimately survived after remand to the
question of appropriate punishment and issue fresh showcause
notice on the proposed punishment, for the period of reply in terms
of the earlier show-cause notice had long expired and the basis
of it also does not exist - While the finding of misconduct remains
undisturbed, matter remitted to the competent authority for fresh
consideration as regards quantum of punishment by issuing a
fresh show-cause notice. [Paras 42, 54,56-57]
MSEDCL Employees Service Regulations, 2005 -
Regns.88(a)(ii)(i), (ii), (iii) - Subsistence allowance - Suspension
order to the effect that during suspension the appellant would
be entitled, as per MSEDCL rules, to subsistence allowance
and it directed the appellant to mark attendance once in a
week at the office of the Executive Engineer - Appellant's
case that she was not paid subsistence allowance during the
entire period of suspension, till the order of dismissal which
continued for nearly eleven years:
258
[2026] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Held: Subsistence allowance is intended to preserve the
suspended employee's minimum means of survival and to enable
her to effectively defend herself in the disciplinary proceedings
- Reporting condition had a regulatory foundation and cannot
be treated as wholly extraneous - However, the existence of a
reporting condition does not mean that subsistence allowance
can be mechanically denied for the entire period of nearly eleven
years without examining the effect of the remaining parts of
Regn.88 - Object of requiring a suspended employee to report is
to ensure that the employee remains available to the employer,
does not evade the proceedings, and does not take advantage
of suspension by engaging in gainful employment elsewhere or
becoming unavailable - On facts, no finding that the appellant was
gainfully employed elsewhere during the period of suspension -
Appellant's suspension continued till the dismissal, for nearly
eleven years - During this period, she was required to defend
herself in the departmental process, before the Labour Court,
and in connected proceedings - Denial of subsistence allowance
for such a prolonged period directly affects the employee's ability
to survive and to defend herself effectively - For the period from
04.09.2006 to 03.03.2007, the original reporting condition in the
suspension order may be relevant while considering the appellant's
entitlement to subsistence allowance, including whether leave of
absence from reporting ought to have been sought or granted -
For the remaining period, the appellant be treated as eligible for
subsistence allowance. [Paras 58, 68-77]
MSEDCL Employees Service Regulations, 2005 - Regn.91 -
After imposing the penalty of dismissal from service,
the disciplinary authority further directed that the entire
period already spent under suspension also be treated as
punishment - Direction treating the suspension period as
punishment, if valid:
Held: Treating the entire suspension period as punishment may
deprive the employee of the ordinary service and monetary benefits
attached to that period, including arrears of pay and allowances,
continuity-related benefits, increments or other service advantages
depending on the rules, and consequential retiral or terminal
benefits - This consequence is severe because the suspension
period was for nearly eleven years - Thus, treating the entire period
as punishment is not a routine consequential adjustment - It has
[2026] 7 S.C.R.
259
Surekha Domaji Bele v. Executive Engineer, Testing Division, MSEDCL
the practical effect of depriving the appellant of the standard service
benefits for a substantial part of her remaining service, apart from
the subsistence allowance which Regn.88(a)(v) expressly protects
if it was already paid or payable - Appellant's suspension from
04.09.2006 was not, by itself, a punishment - It was a suspension
pending enquiry - Appellant cannot be visited with both dismissal
u/Regn.91(2)(g) and a separate punishment of suspension
u/Regn.91(2)(d) for the same misconduct - Direction in the dismissal
order treating the suspension period as punishment shall not
operate as an independent or additional penalty over and above
the harsher penalty finally imposed - Competent authority, while
passing the fresh order on punishment, to separately decide the
service and monetary consequences of the suspension period only
in accordance with Regn.88(a)(v) - While doing so, it shall keep in
mind that subsistence allowance already paid or payable stands
protected under the said provision, and that the past suspension
period cannot be treated as an independent additional punishment
for the same misconduct, if the disciplinary authority chooses a
more severe punishment. [Paras 79-81, 87-89]
MSEDCL Employees Service Regulations, 2005 -
Regns.86, 91 - Punishment of dismissal, if disproportionate:
Held: Misconduct found proved against the appellant relates to
indiscipline, insubordination, and the consequent tampering with
documents - However, the material presently noticed does not show
corruption, illegal gratification, moral turpitude, misappropriation of
funds, proved pecuniary loss to the employer, public scandal, or
conduct bringing the institution into public disrepute - Allegations
substantially appear to arise out of internal office functioning and
service-related conflict and did not play out in the public domain -
Competent authority did not undertake an exercise of evaluating
various relevant factors - Order does not reflect consideration of
the appellant's long service, past record, age, absence or presence
of dishonesty, or absence or presence of actual loss as also
commended by the Labour Court - Even where the Regulations
include dismissal as one of the permissible punishments for acts
of misconduct, the authority is not relieved of its duty to consider
all relevant factors to see whether the facts of the case truly
warrant the most extreme form of penalty - Mere fact that a
proved act falls within the broad category of "misconduct" under the
Regulations does not mean that dismissal must follow as a matter
260
[2026] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
of course - Dismissal is ordinarily justified where the misconduct is
of such gravity that continuance of the employee would be wholly
incompatible with discipline, trust or institutional functioning -
Cases involving corruption, illegal gratification, moral turpitude,
misappropriation, acts causing substantial loss to the employer, or
conduct showing complete unfitness for continued service stand
on a different footing - However, where the misconduct does
not involve corruption, moral turpitude, financial misappropriation
or proved loss to the employer, and where there is long service
without much blemish, the disciplinary authority must carefully
examine whether any lesser punishment would meet the ends of
justice. [Paras 107-110]
Service - Dismissal from service - Form of penalty - Severest
form. [Paras 106-110]
Case Law Cited
S.L. Agarwal v. General Manager, Hindustan Steel Ltd. [1970] 3
SCR 363 : (1970) 1 SCC 177; Khem Chand v. The Union of India
and Others [1958] 1 SCR 1080 : AIR 1958 SC 300; Managing
Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar [1993] Supp. 2 SCR 576 : (1993)
4 SCC 727; Workmen of Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co. of India
(P) Ltd. v. Management [1973] 3 SCR 587 : (1973) 1 SCC 813;
State of Maharashtra v. Chandrabhan Tale [1983] 3 SCR 337 :
(1983) 3 SCC 387; O.P. Gupta v. Union of India [1988] 1 SCR
27 : (1987) 4 SCC 328; Ajay Kumar Choudhary v. Union of India
[2015] 2 SCR 415 : (2015) 7 SCC 291; Union of India and Anr. v.
S.C. Parashar [2006] 2 SCR 529 : (2006) 3 SCC 167; Ranjit
Thakur v. Union of India [1988] 1 SCR 512 : (1987) 4 SCC 611; B.C.
Chaturvedi v. Union of India [1995] 4 SCR 644 : (1995) 6 SCC 749;
Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Coal India Ltd. v. Mukul Kumar
Choudhuri [2009] 13 SCR 487 : AIR 2010 SC 75 - referred to.
List of Acts
Payment of Wages Act; MSEDCL Employees Services Regulations,
2005; Constitution of India.
List of Keywords
Dismissal order; Fresh show-cause notice for punishment; Treating
suspension period as punishment; Punishment of dismissal
disproportionate; De Novo Proceedings; Subsistence Allowance;
[2026] 7 S.C.R.
261
Surekha Domaji Bele v. Executive Engineer, Testing Division, MSEDCL
Reporting condition; Disciplinary proceedings Notice; Dismissal
from service; Treatment of suspension period as punishment;
Proportionality of punishment.
Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No(s).
8459-8460 of 2026
From the Judgment and Order dated 05.04.2024 and 11.11.2024
of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay at Nagpur in WP No.
1200 of 2023 and MCA No. 357 of 2024, respectively
Appearances for Parties
Adv. for the Appellant(s):
Ms. Asmita Singh.
Advs. for the Respondent(s):
Ms. Archana Pathak Dave, A.S.G., Prabhat Kumar, Bhadresh
Harikant, Ms. Jayati Sharma, Ms. Pallavi Sharma.
Petitioner-in-person.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
 Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, J.
1.
IA No. 61680 of 2025 seeking exemption from payment of court fee
is allowed.
2.
Leave granted.
3.
The present appeal arises out of the judgment and order dated
05.04.2024 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Nagpur
Bench, in Writ Petition No. 1200 of 2023, whereby the writ petition
preferred by the Appellant came to be dismissed. The Appellant
also assails the order dated 11.11.2024 passed by the High Court
in MCA No. 357 of 2024, by which the review application preferred
by her was also rejected.
4.
The dispute arises from the disciplinary proceedings initiated
against the Appellant, who was employed with the Maharashtra
262
[2026] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
State Electricity Distribution Company Limited (hereinafter referred
to as "MSEDCL"). The proceedings culminated in the order dated
12.07.2017, by which the Appellant was dismissed from service and
the period of suspension was directed to be treated as punishment.
The order of dismissal has been upheld by the Labour Court, the
Industrial Court and the High Court. Having failed before the said
fora, the Appellant has approached this Court.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
5.
The Appellant, Surekha Domaji Bele, was appointed as a Lower
Division Clerk in the erstwhile Maharashtra State Electricity Board,
O&M Circle, Chandrapur, pursuant to the appointment order dated
01.04.1985. She joined the service on 02.04.1985. She was thereafter
promoted as an Upper Division Clerk with effect from 11.04.1988.
The Appellant was in the service of the Respondent-management
for more than two decades before the disciplinary proceedings that
form the subject matter of the present appeal were initiated, resulting
in her dismissal from service.
6.
The record indicates that certain service disputes had arisen between
the Appellant and the management of MSEDCL much before the
disciplinary action in issue was initiated. The Appellant had been
reverted to the post of Lower Division Clerk on 29.09.1995, which
she challenged. She was thereafter transferred from Ballarsha to
the Warora Pole Factory on 16.01.2002, which she successfully
challenged, and the said transfer order was set aside on 24.06.2003.
The Appellant also stated that she had initiated proceedings under the
Payment of Wages Act and other proceedings in respect of her service
grievances. According to the Appellant, the subsequent disciplinary
action was a counterblast to the proceedings she initiated against
the management. The Respondent, however, has maintained that
the disciplinary proceedings were founded upon acts of misconduct
affecting discipline and office functioning.
7.
On 04.09.2006, the Appellant was placed under suspension
pending enquiry. The suspension order alleged acts of indiscipline,
insubordination, disobedience of superior officers, tampering with
official documents and negligence. The suspension order also
recorded that during the period of suspension the Appellant would be
entitled to the subsistence allowance as per rules. It further directed
[2026] 7 S.C.R.
263
Surekha Domaji Bele v. Executive Engineer, Testing Division, MSEDCL
her to mark attendance once every week, on Wednesday, at the
office of the Executive Engineer, O&M Division, MSEDCL, Warora.
The Appellant's case is that the direction to report at Warora was
unjustified because her earlier transfer to Warora had already been
set aside. The Respondent's case is that the reporting condition was
validly imposed under the Service Regulations and that the Appellant
did not comply with the same.
8.
A charge-sheet dated 19.09.2006 was then issued to the Appellant.
Broadly stated, the charges alleged indiscipline, insubordination
or misbehaviour, disobedience of superior officers, tampering with
official documents, negligence in the discharge of duty, and misuse
of company property. The Appellant did not file a reply to the chargesheet, but instead sought copies of certain documents. According to
her, although she requested those documents on 26.11.2006, they
were supplied only on 18.02.2008.
9.
The domestic enquiry was thereafter taken up in March 2008. The
Appellant's case is that the enquiry was scheduled on 24.03.2008, but
she was required to appear as a witness in another proceeding on that
date. The enquiry then was adjourned to 25.03.2008. On 25.03.2008,
the Appellant appeared before the Enquiry Officer and sought further
time of 8 to 10 days to participate in the enquiry. However, the request
was declined. The Enquiry Officer then proceeded ex parte, examined
five witnesses in the absence of the Appellant and closed the enquiry.
10. The Enquiry Officer submitted his report on 25.04.2008. Based on
the said enquiry report, the Respondent issued a show-cause notice
dated 25.04.2008 proposing dismissal from service. The Appellant
challenged the said show-cause notice by filing Complaint (ULP)
No. 34 of 2008 before the Labour Court, Chandrapur.
11. The Labour Court, by order dated 29.11.2014, held that the enquiry
was not fair and the finding was perverse. The Respondentmanagement then challenged the said order of the Labour Court
before the Industrial Court by filing Revision (ULP) No. 4 of 2015.
By order dated 14.08.2015, the Industrial Court set aside the Labour
Court's order dated 29.11.2014 and remanded the matter to the
Labour Court by permitting the Respondent-management to establish
the misconduct by leading evidence before the Labour Court, since
the domestic enquiry had been found not to be fair.
264
[2026] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
12. After remand, proceedings in Complaint (ULP) No. 34 of 2008
resumed before the Labour Court. The Respondent-management
led evidence before the Labour Court to prove the misconduct. The
Appellant sought an opportunity to respond to the charge-sheet
in view of the post-remand proceedings, but the said request was
declined. Upon consideration of the evidence adduced before it, the
Labour Court, by judgment dated 27.06.2017, held that the misconduct
stood proved. The Labour Court also held that the show-cause notice
dated 25.04.2008 was legal and proper and accordingly, dismissed
the Complaint (ULP) No. 34 of 2008.
13. The judgment dated 27.06.2017 of the Labour Court is material for the
present appeal because the misconduct was ultimately sustained in a
manner different from the earlier domestic enquiry. The show-cause
notice dated 25.04.2008 had been issued based on the domestic
enquiry. That enquiry, however, did not remain the effective foundation
for sustaining the misconduct, since it was held to be perverse and
the management was thereafter permitted by the Industrial Court to
prove the charges by leading evidence before the Labour Court after
remand. The misconduct was ultimately held proved based on such
evidence led before the Labour Court. Thus, though the finding of
misconduct has attained finality, the foundation on which such finding
rested was the post-remand adjudication before the Labour Court,
and not the earlier domestic enquiry report. This distinction has to be
kept in mind while we examine the Appellant's grievance regarding
Regulation 88(j) of the MSEDCL Employees Services Regulations,
2005 (hereinafter referred to as "Service Regulations").
14. After the Labour Court dismissed the Complaint (ULP) No. 34
of 2008 on 27.06.2017, the Respondent passed the order dated
12.07.2017 dismissing the Appellant from service. By the same
order, the Respondent directed that the period of suspension shall
be treated as punishment. The dismissal order records that the
Appellant had not submitted any explanation to the show-cause
notice dated 25.04.2008. The Appellant's grievance is that the
Respondent relied on that earlier show-cause notice, though the
misconduct was ultimately sustained on the basis of evidence led
before the Labour Court after remand. No fresh notice was issued
after the findings recorded in the de novo proceedings before the
Labour Court.
[2026] 7 S.C.R.
265
Surekha Domaji Bele v. Executive Engineer, Testing Division, MSEDCL
15. The Appellant challenged the Labour Court's judgment dated
27.06.2017 by filing Revision (ULP) No. 37 of 2017 before the
Industrial Court. The said revision was dismissed by the Industrial
Court on 08.06.2018. The Appellant did not challenge that order
further.
16. The Appellant subsequently challenged the dismissal order dated
12.07.2017 by filing Complaint (ULP) No. 28 of 2017 before the Labour
Court. In the said complaint, she questioned the dismissal order on
several grounds, including the competence of the disciplinary authority
to pass the dismissal order, absence of proper post-enquiry showcause notice, non-payment of subsistence allowance, illegal treatment
of the suspension period as punishment, and disproportionality of
the penalty of dismissal.
17. By judgment dated 08.08.2019, the Labour Court dismissed the
Complaint (ULP) No. 28 of 2017. It held that the Appellant could not
reopen the finding of misconduct, since the said finding had already
been recorded in Complaint (ULP) No. 34 of 2008 and affirmed in
revision by the Industrial Court. The Labour Court further held that
the Executive Engineer was competent to impose the punishment
of dismissal, that no fresh show-cause notice was required, that the
treatment of the suspension period as punishment was valid, and
that the punishment of dismissal could not be said to be shockingly
disproportionate.
18. The Appellant carried the matter in Revision (ULP) No. 14 of 2019
before the Industrial Court. By judgment dated 18.01.2023, the
Industrial Court dismissed the revision and affirmed the Labour
Court's judgment dated 08.08.2019. The Industrial Court held that
the issue of misconduct had attained finality, that the dismissal order
was passed by the competent disciplinary authority, and that no
interference was warranted with the punishment imposed.
19. The Appellant thereafter filed a writ petition, viz., Writ Petition No.
1200 of 2023 before the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Nagpur
Bench. The High Court, by judgment dated 05.04.2024, dismissed
the writ petition. It upheld the concurrent findings of the Labour Court
and the Industrial Court. The High Court rejected the Appellant's
contentions regarding lack of competency of the disciplinary authority,
non-conformity to the prescribed format of the dismissal order, showcause notice, treatment of suspension period and proportionality of
266
[2026] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
punishment. The review application filed by the Appellant in MCA No.
357 of 2024 was also dismissed by the High Court on 11.11.2024.
20. The Appellant had earlier approached this Court in SLP(C) No. 1400
of 2025. By order dated 14.02.2025, this Court permitted withdrawal
of the said petition with liberty to file a fresh petition on the same and
subsequent cause of actions and further directed that delay would
not come in the way if the fresh petition was filed within the time
indicated. The present appeal arises in this background.
21. The material sequence may therefore be stated briefly. The Appellant
was suspended on 04.09.2006. She was charge-sheeted on 19.09.2006
and was served with a show-cause notice dated 25.04.2008 after the
domestic enquiry. The domestic enquiry was thereafter found not to be
fair. In revision, the Industrial Court remanded the matter to the Labour
Court on 14.08.2015 and permitted the Respondent-management
to prove the misconduct before the Labour Court rather than hold a
fresh domestic enquiry. Upon remand, evidence was led before the
Labour Court and misconduct was held proved by judgment dated
27.06.2017. The Respondent thereafter passed the dismissal order
dated 12.07.2017 relying on the earlier show-cause notice dated
25.04.2008. The Appellant's challenge to the finding of misconduct
in Revision (ULP) No. 37 of 2017 failed and was not carried further.
Her separate challenge to the dismissal order also failed before the
Labour Court, the Industrial Court and the High Court.
22. The finding of misconduct has, therefore, attained finality and is
not being reopened in the present appeal. The question before us
is narrower. It is whether, after the domestic enquiry was found
defective and the misconduct was thereafter proved before the
Labour Court in the de novo proceedings, the Respondent could
impose dismissal by relying substantially on the earlier show-cause
notice dated 25.04.2008 which was based on the domestic enquiry
was earlier found to be vitiated by the Labour Court. The connected
questions relate to the competence of the disciplinary authority, denial
of subsistence allowance, treatment of the suspension period as
punishment, and proportionality of the dismissal order.
SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES
23. The Appellant submitted that the order of dismissal is without
the authority of law. According to her, she was appointed by the
[2026] 7 S.C.R.
267
Surekha Domaji Bele v. Executive Engineer, Testing Division, MSEDCL
Superintending Engineer and, therefore, could not have been
dismissed by the Executive Engineer a post lower to Superintending
Engineer. It was urged that the courts below failed to appreciate that
the punishment of dismissal could not be imposed by an authority
lower than the appointing authority.
24. The Appellant submits that the Regulation 88(j) of the MSEDCL
Employees Service Regulations contemplates a notice after the
departmental enquiry is completed, communicating the findings of
the competent authority and calling upon the employee to show
cause against the contemplated punishment. The show-cause
notice dated 25.04.2008 was issued based on the domestic
enquiry, but the Labour Court subsequently found that enquiry
defective. Pursuant to the remand by the Industrial Court, the
Respondent-management led evidence before the Labour Court
and the misconduct was proved in the de novo proceedings
before the Labour Court and not by way of a domestic enquiry.
According to the Appellant, once the finding was based on the de
novo adjudication before the Labour Court, a fresh notice under
Regulation 88(j) was mandatory before imposing the penalty of
dismissal. It is urged that reliance on the earlier show-cause notice,
which was based on a domestic enquiry that was held defective,
is contrary to the mandate of Regulation 88(j).
25. The Appellant has also urged that she was not paid subsistence
allowance during suspension from 04.09.2006 till the date of dismissal
on 12.07.2017, a period of nearly eleven years. It is submitted that
subsistence allowance is a means of survival and of effective defence.
While the Appellant acknowledges that the suspension order required
reporting at Warora, she contends that complete denial of subsistence
allowance for such a long period could not be mechanically justified
merely on that basis, especially when there is no finding of gainful
employment elsewhere and when the Service Regulations themselves
require review of suspension beyond six months.
26. The Appellant also submits that the punishment of dismissal was
grossly disproportionate, and that, in addition, the dismissal order also
treated the period of suspension as punishment, thereby imposing
two consequences by way of punishment for the same misconduct
arising out of the same proceeding. She also submitted that she had
rendered about twenty-one years of service before the disciplinary
268
[2026] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
proceedings were initiated. It is submitted that several allegations
resemble minor lapses under Schedule A of Regulation 86, and that
there was no allegation of financial misappropriation, corruption, moral
turpitude or pecuniary loss to the employer, and that the competent
authority did not apply its mind to the long service, previous conduct
and the possibility of imposing a lesser penalty.
27. Per contra, the Respondent supports the judgments of the Labour
Court, the Industrial Court and the High Court. The Respondent
submits that the misconduct had been proved before the Labour
Court after the management led the evidence. That finding of the
Labour Court was tested in revision before the Industrial Court and
attained finality. The Respondent submits that the Appellant cannot
now be permitted to reopen the finding of misconduct in the later
proceedings challenging the dismissal order.
28. The Respondent further submits that no fresh show-cause notice
was required, since the earlier show-cause notice had been held
legal and proper by the Labour Court and Industrial Court. On the
quantum of punishment, it is submitted that the charges were serious,
related to discipline and office functioning, and therefore dismissal
could not be said to be disproportionate. On the issue of subsistence
allowance, the Respondent relies on the reporting condition in the
suspension order and contends that the Appellant did not comply
with the said condition.
ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION
29. Upon considering the record and the rival submissions, the following
questions arise for consideration:
Firstly, whether the dismissal order dated 12.07.2017 was passed
by the competent authority;
Secondly, whether a fresh show-cause notice for punishment was
required after the de novo proceedings before the Labour Court;
Thirdly, whether the plea relating to subsistence allowance requires
reconsideration;
Fourthly, whether the direction treating the suspension period as
punishment is valid; and
Fifthly, whether the punishment of dismissal is disproportionate.
[2026] 7 S.C.R.
269
Surekha Domaji Bele v. Executive Engineer, Testing Division, MSEDCL
FIRST ISSUE - WHETHER THE DISMISSAL ORDER DATED
12.07.2017 WAS PASSED BY THE COMPETENT AUTHORITY
30. The Appellant has laid considerable emphasis on the fact that she
was appointed by the Superintending Engineer but dismissed by the
Executive Engineer. According to her, the dismissal order is invalid
because it was passed by an authority lower than the appointing
authority.
31. The courts below examined the applicable MSEDCL Employees
Service Regulations and found that the Appellant was a Pay Grade-III
employee. They further held that, under the relevant regulations and
schedules governing disciplinary action, the Executive Engineer was
competent to impose punishment on an employee belonging to that
category. The High Court also considered the Appellant's reliance
on the schedule relating to transfers and held that the said schedule
did not govern dismissal from service.
32. The question of competence has to be determined with reference to
the service regulations governing the employee. If the regulations
empower a particular authority to impose punishment on a specified
category of employees, the order cannot be set aside merely on a
general proposition that the authority that passed the punishment
order should not be below the authority that issued the appointment
order. The Appellant has not established that the Executive Engineer
was excluded from exercising the power of disciplinary authority
under the applicable Regulations.
33. The relevant entry in the Service Regulations expressly deals with
the authority competent to dismiss or remove an employee from
service. The relevant entry reads as follows:
"Sr. No. 44 - Regulation No. 25 - To dismiss or
remove from service after following the prescribed
procedure.
Competent Authority: Appointing Authority as prescribed
in Third Schedule.
OR
The Competent Authority prescribed in Schedule 'C'."
34. Relevant portion of Schedule 'C' reads as follows:
270
[2026] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Sr.
No.
Category of
employees
Competent
Authority
Appellate
Authority
(for 1st Appeal)
2nd Appellate
Authority if
2nd appeal is
permitted by
the Appellate
Authority
iii) Employees
in Pay Gr.III
in the Field
(excluding
employees in
Security Deptt.)
Officers of
the rank
of E.E./
A.C.P.O./
E.E.(Stores)/
A.C.O.S. or
equivalent &
above.
Officers of the
rank of S.E. or
equivalent &
above.
Head of
Department.
35. The Appellant's challenge to the competence of the Executive
Engineer also rests substantially on the protection contained in
Article 311(1) of the Constitution of India. There can be no dispute
that if Article 311(1) applies, no service regulation can override that
constitutional protection. However, the threshold question is whether
the Appellant, being an employee of MSEDCL, has established that
she held a civil post under the Union or the State. In S.L. Agarwal v.
General Manager, Hindustan Steel Ltd., (1970) 1 SCC 177, a
Constitution Bench of this Court considered whether an employee
of Hindustan Steel Ltd. could claim protection under Article 311. The
relevant portion reads as follows:
"6. The question that arises in this case is : whether the
employees of a Corporation such as the Hindustan Steel
Ltd., are entitled to the protection of Art. 311? This question
can only be answered in favour of the Appellant if we hold
that the Appellant held a civil post under the Union. It was
conceded before us that the Appellant could not be said
to belong to the civil service of the Union or the State. Art.
311, on which this contention is based, reads as follows :
'311. Dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of persons
employed in civil capacities under the Union or a State.
(1) No person who is a member of a civil service of the
Union or an all-India service or a civil service or a State
or holds a civil post under the Union or a State shall be
[2026] 7 S.C.R.
271
Surekha Domaji Bele v. Executive Engineer, Testing Division, MSEDCL
dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that
by which he was appointed."
The Constitution Bench thereafter rejected the argument that
employment under a Government-controlled company would, by
itself, amount to holding a civil post under the Union. The relevant
concluding paragraph reads as follows:
"10...The existence of shareholders, of capital raised by
the issuance of shares, the lack of connection between the
finances of the corporation and the consolidated fund of
the Union rather make out a greater independent existence
than that of the corporation in the English case. We must,
therefore, hold that the corporation which is Hindustan
Steel Limited in this case is not a department of the
Government nor are the servants of it holding posts
under the State. It has its independent existence and
by law relating to Corporations it is distinct even from its
members. In these circumstances, the Appellant, who was
an employee of Hindustan Steel Limited, does not answer
the description of a holder of 'a civil post under the Union'
as stated in the article. The Appellant was not entitled to
the protection of Art. 311. The High Court was therefore
right in not affording him the protection. The appeal fails
and is dismissed but in the circumstances of the case we
make no order about costs."
36. The broader principle is that a corporation or company having a legal
personality distinct from the Government is not, merely because of
Government ownership or control, is to be treated as a Government
department for the purpose of Article 311. What is material is whether
the employee holds a civil post under the Union or State or not. In
the present case, it has not been established that the Appellant holds
a civil post thus, entitled to the protection as envisaged in Article
311 of the Constitution.
37. We therefore find no error in the concurrent finding that the Executive
Engineer was competent to pass the order of dismissal.
SECOND ISSUE - WHETHER A FRESH SHOW-CAUSE NOTICE
FOR PUNISHMENT WAS REQUIRED AFTER THE DE NOVO
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE LABOUR COURT
272
[2026] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
38. The Appellant's principal submission is that the show-cause notice
dated 25.04.2008 was issued on the basis of the domestic enquiry.
That enquiry was thereafter found to be not fair. The Industrial Court,
by order dated 14.08.2015, remanded the matter to the Labour
Court and permitted the Respondent-management to establish the
misconduct before the Labour Court. According to the Appellant,
once misconduct was proved in the de novo proceedings before the
Labour Court, the Respondent could not have mechanically acted
upon the earlier show-cause notice issued based on the earlier
domestic enquiry which was found to be defective.
39. The submission requires consideration in the light of Regulation 88(j)
of the MSEDCL Service Regulations. Regulation 88(j), titled "Show
Cause Notice", reads as follows:
"After the enquiry is completed, the Competent Authority
shall serve a notice on the employee communicating to
him its findings and asking him to show cause within a
specified time as to why the contemplated punishment
involving dismissal, removal or reversion or withholding of
increment/s should not be inflicted on him.