# SURESH CHAND GAUTAM v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS - **Citation:** [2016] 1 S.C.R. 727 - **Court:** Supreme Court of India - **Decided:** 2016-03-11 - **Bench:** Dipak Misra, Prafulla C. Pant - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/suresh-chand-gautam-v-state-of-uttar-pradesh-ors-31084 - **Pages:** 35 ## Headnote Constitution of India, 1950 - Arts. 16(4-A), 16(4-B) and 335 - Reservation in promotion for Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes - Need for quantifiable data - Whether a writ or direction can be issued to the State Government to collect and gather the necessary data of the SC and the ST in the services of the State for granting reservation in promotion - Held: State is not bound to make reservation for SCs/STs in matters of promotion - There is no constitutional obligation - There is no duty - Writ of mandamus is sought to collect material or data which is in the realm of condition precedent for exercising a discretion which flows from the enabling constitutional provision - Direction of this nature would not come within the principle of exercise of power coupled with duty - To issue a mandamus to collect the data would tantamount to taking a step towards framing of a rule or a regulation for the purpose of reservation for SC and ST in matter of promotions - This would be in a way, entering into the domain of legislation - Thus, writ of mandamus of such a nature cannot be issued. Dismissing the writ petitions, the Court HELD: 1.1 It has been clearly laid down in * M. Nagaraj case that the State is not bound to make reservaticln for SCs/STs in matters of promotion. However, if the State wishes to exercise the discretion and make such provision, it has to collect quantifiable data showing backwardness of the class and inadequacy of representation of that class in public employment in addition to compliance with Article 335. The expression of the opinion clearly demonstrates that the regard being had to the enabling provisions of Articles 16(4-A) and (4-B), the State is not bound to make reservation. It has a discretion to do so and the State's discretion can only be exercised on certain conditions being satisfied. The submission of the petitioners is that a 727 A B c D E F G H 728 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] I S.C.R. A command should be issued to the State of Uttar Pradesh to collect the data as enshrined in the Constitution Bench decision in M. Nagaraj so that benefit of reservation in promotion can be given. The relief sought may appear innocuous or simple but when the Court thinks of issue of a writ of mandamus, it has to apprise B c D E F G H itself of an existing right or a power to be exercised regard being had to the conception of duty. The concept of power coupled with duty is always based on facts. If the relief sought is scrutinized, the prayer is to issue a mandamus to the State and its functionaries to carry out an exercise for the purpose of exercising a discretion. The discretion is to take a decision to have the reservation, and to have reservation there is a necessity for collection of data in accordance with the principles stated in M. Nagaraj as the same is the condition precedent. A writ of mandamus is sought to collect material or data which is in the realm of condition precedent for exercising a discretion which flows from the enabling constitutional provision. Direction of this nature would not come within the principle of exercise of power coupled with duty. A direction for exercise of a duty which has inherent and insegretable nexus with the constitutional provision like Article 21 of the Constitution or a statutory duty. There is an inclination to think so as the language employed in M. Nagaraj clearly states that the State is not bound to make reservation in promotion. Thus, there is no constitutional obligation. [Para 42] [758-E-H; 759-A-F] 1.2 The Courts do not formulate any policy, remains away from making anything that would amount to legislation, rules and regulation or policy relating to reservation. The Courts can test the validity of the same when they are challenged. The court cannot direct for making legislation or for that matter any kind of sub-ordinate legislation. In certain decisions directions have been issued for framing of guidelines or the court has itself framed guidelines for ## Text _Characters 0–39,961 of 80,794. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39961 for what follows._ [2016] 1 S.C.R. 727 SURESH CHAND GAUTAM v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS. (Writ Petition (Civil) No. 690of2015) MARCH 11, 2016 [DIPAK MISRA AND PRAFULLA C. PANT, JJ.] Constitution of India, 1950 - Arts. 16(4-A), 16(4-B) and 335 - Reservation in promotion for Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes - Need for quantifiable data - Whether a writ or direction can be issued to the State Government to collect and gather the necessary data of the SC and the ST in the services of the State for granting reservation in promotion - Held: State is not bound to make reservation for SCs/STs in matters of promotion - There is no constitutional obligation - There is no duty - Writ of mandamus is sought to collect material or data which is in the realm of condition precedent for exercising a discretion which flows from the enabling constitutional provision - Direction of this nature would not come within the principle of exercise of power coupled with duty - To issue a mandamus to collect the data would tantamount to taking a step towards framing of a rule or a regulation for the purpose of reservation for SC and ST in matter of promotions - This would be in a way, entering into the domain of legislation - Thus, writ of mandamus of such a nature cannot be issued. Dismissing the writ petitions, the Court HELD: 1.1 It has been clearly laid down in * M. Nagaraj case that the State is not bound to make reservaticln for SCs/STs in matters of promotion. However, if the State wishes to exercise the discretion and make such provision, it has to collect quantifiable data showing backwardness of the class and inadequacy of representation of that class in public employment in addition to compliance with Article 335. The expression of the opinion clearly demonstrates that the regard being had to the enabling provisions of Articles 16(4-A) and (4-B), the State is not bound to make reservation. It has a discretion to do so and the State's discretion can only be exercised on certain conditions being satisfied. The submission of the petitioners is that a 727 A B c D E F G H 728 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] I S.C.R. A command should be issued to the State of Uttar Pradesh to collect the data as enshrined in the Constitution Bench decision in M. Nagaraj so that benefit of reservation in promotion can be given. The relief sought may appear innocuous or simple but when the Court thinks of issue of a writ of mandamus, it has to apprise B c D E F G H itself of an existing right or a power to be exercised regard being had to the conception of duty. The concept of power coupled with duty is always based on facts. If the relief sought is scrutinized, the prayer is to issue a mandamus to the State and its functionaries to carry out an exercise for the purpose of exercising a discretion. The discretion is to take a decision to have the reservation, and to have reservation there is a necessity for collection of data in accordance with the principles stated in M. Nagaraj as the same is the condition precedent. A writ of mandamus is sought to collect material or data which is in the realm of condition precedent for exercising a discretion which flows from the enabling constitutional provision. Direction of this nature would not come within the principle of exercise of power coupled with duty. A direction for exercise of a duty which has inherent and insegretable nexus with the constitutional provision like Article 21 of the Constitution or a statutory duty. There is an inclination to think so as the language employed in M. Nagaraj clearly states that the State is not bound to make reservation in promotion. Thus, there is no constitutional obligation. [Para 42] [758-E-H; 759-A-F] 1.2 The Courts do not formulate any policy, remains away from making anything that would amount to legislation, rules and regulation or policy relating to reservation. The Courts can test the validity of the same when they are challenged. The court cannot direct for making legislation or for that matter any kind of sub-ordinate legislation. In certain decisions directions have been issued for framing of guidelines or the court has itself framed guidelines for sustaining certain rights of women, children or prisoners or under-trial prisoners. The said category of cases falls in a different compartment. They are in different sphere than what is envisaged in Article 16 (4-A) and 16 (4-B) whose constitutional validity have been upheld by the Constitution Bench with certain qualifiers. They have been regarded as enabling constitutional provisions. Additionally it has been postulated that SURESH CHAND GAUTAM v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH the State is not bonnd to make reservation for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in matter of promotions. Therefore; there is no duty. In such a situation, to issue a mandamus to collect the data would tantamount to asking the authorities whether there is ample data to frame a rule or regulation. This will be in a way, entering into the domain of legislation, for it is a step towards commanding to frame a legislation or a delegated legislation for reservation. The relief in the instant case, tantamounts to a prayer for issue of a mandamus to take a step towards framing of a rule or a regulation for the purpose of reservation for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in matter of promotions. A writ of mandamus of such a nature cannot be issued. [Para 43, 44) [759G-H; 760-A-C; 761-AJ *M Nagaraj & others v. Union of India & others (2006) 8 SCC 212:2006 (7) Suppl. SCR 336 - relied on. U.P Power Corporation Limited v. Rajesh Kumar & others (2012) 7 SCC 1:2012 (4) SCR 118; Indra Sawhney & others v. Union of India & others (1992) Supp. 3 SCC 217:1992 (2) Suppl. SCR 454; R.K. Sabharwa/ v. State of Pubjab 1995 (2) SCC 745: 1995 (2) SCR 35; Sura} Bhan Meena & another v. State of Rajasthan & others (2011) 1 SCC 467:2010 (14) SCR 532; Ganga Ram Moolchandani v. State of Rajasthan & others (2001) 6 SCC 89:2001 (3) SCR 992; M.A. Murthy v. State of Karnataka & Others (2003) 7 SCC 517:2003 (3) Suppl. SCR 327; Madhav Rao Jivaji Rao Scindia V. Union of India (1971) 1 sec 85:1971 (3) SCR 9; Ambica Querry Works v. State of Gujarat (1987) 1 SCC 213:1987 (1) SCR 562; State of Rajasthan v. Harishan~er Raiendrapal AIR 1966 SC 296:1965 SCR 402; Brij Mohan Lal v. Union of India & others (2012) 6 SCC 502:2012 (5) SCR 305; Aneesh D. LmMnde & others V. State of Goa & others (2014) 1 sec 554:2013 (17) SCR 55; Dhampur Sugar Mills Ltd. v. State of U.P. and others (2007) 8 SCC 338:2007 (10) SCR 245; Khoday Distilleries Ltd. v. State of Karnataka (1995) 1 SCC 574:1994 (4) Suppl. SCR 477; Commr. of Police v. Gordhandas Bhanji AIR 1952 SC 16:1952 SCR 135; Municipal Council, Rat/am v. Vardichan (1980) 4 SCC 729 A B c D E F G H 730 A B c D E F G H SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] l S.C.R. 162:1.981 (1) SCR 97; D.K Basu v. State of West Bengal & others (2015) 8 SCC 744:2015 (7) SCR 814; Ranveer Yac/av v. State of Bihar (2010) 11 SCC 493:2010 (6) SCR 1073; Nagor Palika Nigam 1~ Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti Affi 2009 SC 187:2008 (14) SCR 419; Ankush Shivaji Gaikwad v. State of Maharashtra (2013) 6 SCC 770: 2013 (8) SCR 863; Province of Bombay v. Khushaldas S. Advani AIR 1950 SC 222:1950 SCR 621; Sub-Committee on Judicial Accountability v. Union of India & others AIR 1992 SC 320; Tara Prasad Singh & others v. Union of India & others AIR 1980 SC 1682:1980 (3) SCR 1042; Markand Dattatreya Sugavkar v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai & others (2013) 9 SCC 136; S.P. Gupta v. Union of India 1981 Supp (1) SCC 87; Supreme Court Advocates011-Record Association & others v. Union of India (1993) 4 SCC 441:1993 (2) Suppl. SCR 659; lmtiyaz Ahmad v. State of U.P. & others (2012) 2 SCC 688: 2012 (1 ) SCR 779; T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India and others (2014) 4 SCC 61:2014 (1) SCR 88; Lafarge Umiam Mining (P) Ltd. v. Union of India & others (2011) 7 SCC 338: 2011 (7) SCR 954; State of Kerala v. A. Lakshmikutt (1986) 4 SCC 632 1987 (1) SCR 136; Dr. Umakant Saran v. State of Bihar and others (1973) 1 SCC 485; Dr. Rai Shivendra Bahadur v. The Governing Body of the Nalanda College 1962 Supp. 2 SCR 144; Sharif Ahmad and others v. Regional Transport Authority, Meerut and others (1978) 1 SCC 1:1978 (2) SCR 761; Director of Settlements, A.P. and others v. MR. Apparao and another (2002) 4 SCC 638: 2002 (2) SCR 661; All India Judges· Association & others v. Union of India & others (2002) 4 SCC 247:2002 (2) SCR 712; Vishaka & others v. State qf Rajasthan & others (1997) 6 SCC 241 :1997 (3) Suppl. SCR 404; Prakash Singh & others v. Un ion of India & others (2006) 8 SCC 1:2006 (6) Suppl. SCR 473; Chairman & Managing Director, Central Bank of India & Ors. v. Central Bank of India SC/ST Employees Welfare Association & Ors. 2015 (1) SCALE 169; SURESH CHAND GAUTAM v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH 731 Census Commissioner & other.1 v. R. Krishnamurthy A (2015) 2 sec 796 - referred to. Julius v Lord Bishop of O)Cford (1880) 5 AC 214; Bake1: Re Nichols v. Baker (1890) 44 Ch D 262 (CA); Padfield v. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (1968) 1 All _ER. 694 (HL); Breen v. Amalgamated Engineering B Union (1971) 2 QB 175 - referred to. Judicial Review of Administrative Action by De Smith 1995, pp. 300-01; Administrative Law by Wade & Forsyth 9th Edn., p.23328; Hals bury s Laws of England Fourth Edn Volume 1 - referred to. c Case Law Reference 20P. (4) SCR 118 Referred to. Paras 2, 3, 7, 8,9,13, 14, 18,19 1992 (2) Suppl. SCR 454 Referred to. Para3 D 1995 (2) SCR 35 Referred to. Para4 2010 (14 ) SCR 532 Referred to. Paras 20()~ (3) SCR 992 Referred to. Para 15 2003 (3) Suppl. SCR 327 Referred to. Para 17 1971 (3) SCR 9 Referred to. Para 19 E 191!7 (1) SCR 562 Referred to. Para 21 1965 SCR 402 Referred to. Para 21 2012. (5) SCR 305 Referred to. Para 22 2013 (17) SCR 55 Referred to. Para 23 2007 (10) SCR 245 Referred to. Para 23 F 1994 (4) Suppl. SCR 477 Referred to. Para 23 1952 SCR 135 Referred to. Para 23 1981 (1) SCR 97 Referred to. Para 23 20t5 (7) SCR 814 Referred to. Para 24 2010 (6 ) SCR 1073 Referred to. Para 24 G 2008 (14 ) SCR 419 Referred to. Para 24 201~ (8) SCR 863 Referred to. Para 24 1950 SCR 621 Referred to. Para 24 AIR 1992 SC 320 Referred to. Para 24 1980 (3) SCR 1042 Referred to. Para 24 (2013) 9 sec 136 Referred to. Para 24 H 732 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] I S.C.R. A 1981 Supp (1) sec 87 Referred to. Para 24 1993 (2) Suppl. SCR 659 Referred to. Para 24 2012 (1.) SCR 779 Referred to. Para 29 2014 (1) SCR 88 Referred to. Para 32 2011 (7) SCR 954 Referred to. Para 32 B 1987 (1.) SCR 136 Referred to. Para 36 (197~) 1 sec 485 Referred to. Para 37 1962 Supp. 2 SCR 144 Referred to. Para 37 1~78 (2) SCR 761 Referred to. Para 38 c 2!)02 (2) SCR 661 Referred to. Para 40 2002 (2) SCR 712 Referred to. Para 41 1997 (3) Suppl. SCR 404 Referred to. Para 41 2006 (6) Suppl. SCR 473 Referred to. Para 41 2015 (1) SCALE 169 Referred to. Para 42 D 2006 (7) Suppl. SCR 336 Relied on. Para 42 (2015) 2 sec 796 Referred to. Para 44 CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition (Civil) No. 690of2015 E UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA WITH W. P. (C) NOS. 715 AND 273 OF 2015 Salman Khurshid, Avtaar Singh Rawat, K. V. Vishwanathan, F Mahalakshmi Pavani, Rajeev Kumar Bansal, Dr. Krishan Singh Chauhan, Ajit Kumar Ekka, Ravi Prakash, Chand Kiran, Murari Lal, Tej Singh Varun, K. K. L. Gautam, Santosh Krishnan for the Petitioner. Dr. Rajeev Dhavan, Kumar Parimal, Aniruddha P. Mayee, Kabir Ghosh, Ravi P. Mehrotra, Ashutosh Kr. Sharma, Varun Thakur, Varinder G Kumar Sharma, Shraddha Saran for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DIPAK MISRA, J. l. In this batch of Writ Petitions preferred under Article 32 of the Constitution oflndia the prayer relates to issue of a direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents to H enforce appropriately the constitutional mandate as contained under the SURESH CHAND GAUTAM v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH fDIPAK MISRA, J.l provisions of Articles 16( 4-A), 16( 4-B) and 335 of the Constitution of India or, in the alternative, directing the respondents to constitute a Committee or appoint a Commission chaired either by a retired Judge of the High Court or Supreme Court in making survey and collecting necessary qualitative data of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes in the services of the State for granting reservation in promotion in the light of direction gives by this Court in M. Nagaraj & others v. Union of India & others'. Let it be clarified in the beginning, apart from this prayer, other reliefs sought for in the petitions have not been argued and rightly so, as the said grievances have already been directed to be dealt with in interlocutory applications to be filed in the case of U.P. Power Corporation Limited v. Rajesh Kumar & others'. 2. At the commencement of the hearing, Dr. K.S. Chauhan, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 715 of2015, had submitted that the decision in M. Nagaraj(supra) by the Constitution Bench requires reconsideration. For the said purpose, he has made an effort to refer to certain passages from Indra Sawlmey & others v. Union of India & others' and R.K. Sabllarwal v. Stale of Pubjab4• We are not inclined to enter into the said issue as we are of the considered opinion that the pronouncement in M. Nagaraj (supra) is a binding precedent and has been followed in number of authorities and that apart, it has referred to, in detail, all other binding previous authorities of larger Benches and there does not appear any weighty argument to convince us, even for a moment, that the said decision requires any reconsideration. The submission on the said score is repelled. 3. The principal submission of Mr. Salman Khurshid, Mr. K.V. Vishwanathan, learned senior counsel and Dr. K.S. Chauhan learned counsel appearing for the respective petitioners is the alternative submission which can be put in three compartments:- (i) the decision rendered in M. Nagaraj (supra) has not been appositely applied (ii) the authority in Rajesh Kunmr(supra) has to apply prospectively and cannot have retrospective effect, and (iii) even if it is assumed, as interpreted in M. Nagaraj (supra), Articles 16( 4-A) and 16( 4-B) are enabling constitutional provisions, the concept of power coupled with duty requires the authorities to perform the duty and they are obliged to collect the 1 (2006) s sec 212 2 (2012)1sec1 2 (1992) Supp. 3 sec 211 • 1995 (2) sec 745 733 A B c D E F G H 734 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2016) I S.C.R. A quantifiable data to enable them to take a decision on reservation in promotion and hence, a mandamus should be issued to all authorities to carry out the constitutional command. We have permitted Dr. Raj iv Dhavan to argue the matter as he had appeared for some of the respondents in the case of R"jesft Kum(lr (supra). B 4. Articles 16(4), 16(4-A) and 16(4-B) read as under:- c D E F G H "Article 16. Equality of opportunity in matters of public employment.- ( 4) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any provision for the reservation of appointments or posts in favour of any backward class of citizens which, in the op in ion of the State, is not adequately represented in the services under the State. ( 4-A) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any provision for reservation in matters of promotion, with consequential seniority, to any class or classes of posts in the services under the State in favour of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes which, in the opinion of the State, are not adequately represented in the services under the State. ( 4-B) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from considering any unfilled vacancies of a year which are reserved for being filled up in that year in accordance with any provision for reservation made under clause (4) or clause (4-A) as a separate class of vacancies to be filled up in any succeeding year or years and such class of vacancies shall not be considered together with the vacancies of the year in which they are being filled up for determining the ceiling of fifty per cent reservation on total number of vacancies of that year". 5. In M. N"g"raj (supra), the Court has encompassed the facts in the following manner:- "The petitioners have invoked Article 32 of the Constitution for a writ in the nature of certiorari to quash the Constitution (Eightyfifth Amendment) Act, 200 I inserting Article 16( 4-A) of the Constitution retrospectively from 17-6-1995 providing reservation in promotion with consequential seniority as being unconstitutional and violative of the basic structure. According to the petitioners, the impugned amendment reverses the decisions of this Court in SURESH CHAND GAUTAM v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH fDIPAK MISRA, J.l Union of India v. Virpal Singh Chauhan', Ajit Singh Januja v. State of Punjab' (Ajit Singh-I). Ajit Singh (JI) v. State of Punjab-, Ajit Singh (III) v. State of Punjab", Indra Sawhney v. Union of India (supra) and MG Badappanavar v. State of Karnataka'. The petitioners say that Parliament has appropriated the judicial power to itselfand has acted as an Appellate Authority by reversing the judicial pronouncements of this Court by the use of power of amendment as done by the impugned amendment and is, therefore, violative of the basic structure of the Constitution. The said amendment is, therefore, constitutionally invalid and is liable to be set aside. The petitioners have further pleaded that the amendment also seeks to alter the fundamental right of equality which is part of the basic structure of the Constitution. The petitioners say that the equality in the context of Article 16(1) connotes "accelerated promotion" so as not to include consequential seniority. The petitioners say that by attaching consequential seniority to the accelerated promotion, the impugned amendment violates equality in Article 14 read with Article 16( I). The petitioners further say that by providing reservation in the matter of promotion with consequential seniority, there is impairment of efficiency. The petitioners say that in Indra Sawhney (supra) decided on 16-11-1992, this Court has held that under Article 16(4), reservation to the Backward Classes is permissible only at the time of initial recruitment and not in promotion. The petitioners say that contrary to the said judgment delivered on 16-11-1992, Parliament enacted the Constitution (Seventy-seventh Amendment) Act, 1995. By the said amendment, Article 16( 4-A) was inserted, which reintroduced reservation in promotion. The Constitution (Seventy-seventh Amendment) Act, 1995 is also challenged by some of the petitioners. The petitioners say that if accelerated seniority is given to the roster-point promotees, the consequences would be disastrous .... " 6. After referring to a series of authorities, the Court concluded as follows:- ·'(1995) 6 sec 684 '(1996)2SCC715 1 (1999)1 sec 209 ' (2000) 1 sec 430 '(2001) 2 sec 666 735 A B c D E F G H 736 A B c D E F G H SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2016] l S.C.R. "12 l. The impugned constitutional amendments by which Articles 16( 4-A) and 16( 4-B) have been inserted flow from Article 16( 4). They do not alter the structure of Article 16(4). They retain the controlling factors or the compelling reasons, namely, backwardness and inadequacy of representation which enables the States to provide for reservation keeping in mind the overall efficiency of the State administration under Article 335. These impugned amendments are confined only to SCs and STs. They do not obliterate any of the constitutional requirements, namely, ceiling limit of 50% (quantitative limitation), the concept of creamy layer(qualitative exclusion), the sub-classification between OBCs on one hand and SCs and STs on the other hand as held in Indra Sawhney (supra), the concept of post-based roster with inbuilt concept of replacement as held in R.K. Sabharwal (supra). 122. We reiterate that the ceiling limit of 50%, the concept of creamy layer and the compelling reasons, namely, backwardness, inadequacy ofrepresentation and overall administrative efficiency are all constitutional requirements without which the structure of equality ofopportunity in Article 16 would collapse. 123. However, in this case, as stated above, the main issue concerns the "extent of reservation". In this regard the State concerned will have to show in each case the existence of the compelling reasons, namely, backwardness, inadequacy of representation and overall administrative efficiency before making provision for reservation. As stated above, the impugned provision is an enabling provision. The State is not bound to make reservation for SCs/ STs in matters of promotions. However, if they wish to exercise their discretion and make such provision, the State has to collect quantifiable data showing backwardness of the class and inadequacy of representation of that class in public employment in addition to compliance with Article 335. It is made clear that even if the State has compelling reasons, as stated above, the State will have to see that its reservation provision does not lead to excessiveness so as to breach the ceiling limit of 50% or obliterate the creamy layer or extend the reservation indefinitely. 124. Subject to the above, we uphold the constitutional validity of the Constitution (Seventy-seventh Amendment) Act, 1995; the Constitution (Eighty-first Amendment) Act, 2000; the Constitution SURESH CHAND GAUTAM v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH fDIPAK MISRA, J.l (Eighty-second Amendment) Act, 2000 and the Constitution (Eighty-fifth Amendment) Act, 2001. 125. We have not examined the validity of individual enactments of appropriate States and that question will be gone into in individual writ petition by the appropriate Bench in accordance with law laid down by us in the present case." 7. In Rajesfl Kumar's case, a two-Judge Bench, apart from referring to the paragraphs we have reproduced hereinabove, also adverted to paragraphs 44, 48, 49, 86, 98, 99, I 02, 107, I 08, I I 0, I 17, 123 and 124 and culled out certain principles. We think it absolutely appropriate to reproduce the said principles:- "(i) Vesting of the power by an enabling provision may be constitutionally valid and yet "exercise of power" by the State in a given case may be arbitrary, particularly, if the State fails to identify and measure the backwardness and inadequacy keeping in mind the efficiency of service as required under Article 335. (ii) Article 16(4) which protects the interests of certain sections of the society has to be balanced against Article 16(1) which protects the interests of every citizen of the entire society. They should be harmonised because they are restatements of the principle of equality under Article 14. (iii) Each post gets marked for the particular category of candidates to be appointed against it and any subsequent vacancy has to be filled by that category candidate. (iv) The appropriate Government has to apply the cadre strength as a unit in the operation of the roster in order to ascertain whether a given class/group is adequately represented in the service. The cadre strength as a unit also ensures that the upper ceiling limit of 50% is not violated. Further, roster has to be post-specific and not vacancy based. (v) The State has to form its opinion on the quantifiable data regarding adequacy of representation. Clause ( 4-A) of Article 16 is an enabling provision. It gives freedom to the State to provide for reservation in matters of promotion. Clause ( 4-A) of Article 16 applies only to SCs and STs. The said clause is carved out of Article 16(4-A). Therefore, clause ( 4-A) will be governed by the two compelling reasons-"backwardness" and "inadequacy of 737 A B c D E F G H 738 A B c D E F G H SUPREME COURf REPORTS [20 I 6] I S.C.R. representation", as mentioned in Article I 6( 4). If the said two reasons do not exist, then the enabling provision cannot be enforced. (vi) If the ceiling limit on the carry over of unfilled vacancies is removed, the other alternative time factor comes in and in that event, the timescale has to be imposed in the interest of efficiency in administration as mandated by Article 335. If the timescale is not kept, then posts will continue to remain vacant for years which would be detrimental to the administration. Therefore, in each case, the appropriate Government will now have to introduce the duration depending upon the fact situation. (vii) If the appropriate Government enacts a law providing for reservation without keeping in mind the parameters in Article I 6(4) and Article 335, then this Court will certainly set aside and strike down such legislation. (viii) The constitutional limitation under Article 335 is relaxed and not obliterated. As stated above, be it reservation or evaluation, excessiveness in either would result in violation of the constitutional mandate. This exercise, however, will depend on the facts of each case. (ix) The concepts of efficiency, backwardness and inadequacy ofrepresentation are required to be identified and measured. That exercise depends on the availability of data. That exercise depends on numerous factors. It is for this reason that the enabling provisions are required to be made because each competing claim seeks to achieve certain goals. How best one should optimise these conflicting claims can only be done by the administration in the context oflocal prevailing conditions in public employment. (x)A1ticle 16(4), therefore, creates a field which enables a State to provide for reservation provided there exists backwardness of a class and inadequacy of representation in employment. These are compelling reasons. They do not exist in Article I 6( I). It is only when these reasons are satisfied that a State gets the power to provide for reservation in the matter of employment." 8. Rajesft Kumar's case also referred to the authority in Suntj Bhan Meena & another v. State of Rajastlum & ot/lers' 0 wherein it has been ruled thus:- '" (2011 l 1 sec 467 SURESH CHAND GAUTAM v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH [DIPAK MISRA, J.l "66. The position after the decision in M Nagaraj case (supra) is that reservation of posts in promotion is dependent on the inadequacy ofrepresentation of members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Backward Classes and subject to the condition of ascertaining as to whether such reservation was at all required. 67. The view of the High Court is based on the decision in M. Nagaraj cases(supra) as no exercise was undertaken in terms of Article 16( 4-A) to acquire quantifiable data regarding the inadequacy of representation of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe communities in public services. The Rajasthan High Court has rightly quashed the Notifications dated 28-122002 and 25-4-2008 issued by the State of Rajasthan providing for consequential seniority and promotion to the members of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe communities and the same does not call for any interference." 9. After referring to the said decision, the Court in Rajes/1 Kumar's case took note of the Social Justice Committee Report and the chart and opined that the said exercise was done regard being had to the population and vacancies and not keeping in view the concepts that have been evolved in M. N