# SURESH KOSHY GEORGE v. THE UNIVERSITY OF KERALA & ORS - **Citation:** [1969] 1 S.C.R. 317 - **Court:** Supreme Court of India - **Decided:** 1968-07-15 - **Case number:** Civil A;ipcal No. 990 of 1968 - **Bench:** J. M. Shelat, K. S. Hegde - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/suresh-koshy-george-v-the-university-of-kerala-ors-4401 - **Pages:** 11 ## Headnote Kerala University Act, 1957,-Rules fra1ned by Syndica1:e delegating power to Vice-chancellor to hold inquiri?s on malpractices during exa1ni .. nation~rules not followed-if inquiry invalid. 1Vatural Justice-principles of-if require that inquiry report 1nust be furnished ·with show-cause notice. As certain preliminary reports indicated that the appellant had indulged in malpractices during an examination, the Vire-Chancellor of the respondent University appointed the second respondent to conduct an enquiry. The second respondent submitted a report holding the appel· lant guilty of the malpractices and on the basis of this report, a show cause notice was issued to the appeJlant by the Vice-Chancellor. After the appellant had submitted his ~xplanation in response to the notice, and not being satisfied with his exrlanation, the Vicei-chancellor passed an order debarring the appellant from appearing in any examination for a year. This order was subsequently approved by the Syndicate of the University. The appellant challenged the Vice-Chancellor's order by a writ petition under Articl·~ 226 contending inter alia that (i) the rules framed by the Syndic·ate. delegating its povvers to the Vice-Chancellor required that for conducting the inquiry he should have1 appointed an officer designated by the principal of the college in which the appellant appeared for his examination; this was not done in the present case and hence ~ere was no proper inquiry; and (ii) the impugned ordet- was invalid inasmuch as no copy of the report made by the second respondent was made available to the appellant before he was called upon to subn1it his explanation in response to the show cause notice. A Single Bench of the High Court 'a11owed the petition, but his decision was reversed in appeal by a Division Bench. On appeal to this Court, HELD : Dismissing the appeal. (i) The rules made by the Syndicate of the University under which the inquiry was ordered were not statutory rules but nierely rules frarned for guidance. The rule under \vhlch the Vice-Chancellor was required to request the principal of the concerned co11ege to appoint ·an Inquiry Officer merely laid down a convenient precedure. Hence the ViceChanceUor cannot be said to hav~ contravened any Jaw in appoin.ting the Inquiry Officer not designated by the principal. Furthermore, the principal in the present case was the father of the appe11ant; the ViceChancellor was therefore right in not appointing him but an independent person. as the Inquiry Officer. [321 B-C, F-H) H (ii) There was no. breach of the principles of natural justice in the appellant not being furnished with a copy of the rep·ort of the second respondent before he was called uoon to give his explanation. Ihe appellant had been duly informed of the charge against him long before the inquiry began; the inquiry was held after due, notice to him and in L 12 Sup C.l./68-6 318 SL'PRE~IE COIJRT RHORTS (1969] IS.CR· his presence: he \~·as allowed to cross-cxarnimnc the \l+'itnesses examined A in the case ·ani0ns i~_ Art. J 11 of the Constitul!On particularly a.s they stood before the amendment of that Article th;!I e\'ery di~ciplinary proceeding n1ust consist of l\VO inquiries. one before issuing the ~hO\\' cause notice to he follo"·cd by another inquiry thereafter. Such ic; not the requirement of the principle.., of natural ju!-lice. Law m;1y or 1nay not prt.\,crihc such D a course. Even if a sho\v cause notice is provided by law from that it does not folio\\' th•11 }'ith the view expressed in an analogous case by my noble and learned friend Lord Loreburn. In Board of Education v. Rice(') he laid down that, in disposing of a question which was the subject of an appeal to it, the Board of Education was under a duty to act in good faith, and to listen fairly to both sides, inasmuch as that was a d.uty which lay on everyone who decided anything. But he went on to say that he ·did not think it was bound to treat such a question as though it wer<:,_ l!, trial. The Btflard had no power to administer an oath, and need not examine witnesses. It could, he thought, obtain information in any way it thought best, always giving a fair opportunity to those who were parties in ·the controversy to correct or contradict any relevant statement prejudicial to their view. If the Board failed in this duty, its order might be the subject of certiorari and it must itself be the subject of mandamus. 11 In the above case the Local Government Board acted solelv on the basis of a report submitted by one of the Housing Inspectors of the Board after a public inquiry. The House of Lords held that the procedure adopted did not contravene the principles of natural justice. In De Verteuil v. Knaggs and Anr.(2 ) the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council observed while considering the scope of the powers of the Governor under s. 2 of the Immigration Ordinance of Trinidad : , (1) [1911] A. c. 179. (2) [1918] A.C. 557. 324 SUPRnlE COURT REPORTS [I 96'1] I S.C.R. "Their Lordships are of opinion that in making such an inquiry there ~s, apart from special circumstances, a duty of giving to any person against whom the complaint is made a fair opportunity to make any relevant statement which he may desire to bring forward and a fair opportunity to correct or controwrt any relevant statement brought forward to his prejudice." · Jn B,vme and anr. v. Kinenwtograph Renters Society Ltd. & ors.(') Lord Harman J. observed : "What, then, arc the requirements of natural justice in a case of this kind ? First, I think that the person accused should know the nature of the accusation made; secondly that he should be given an opportunity to state his case; and thirdly, of course, that the tribunal should act in good faith. I do not think that there really is anything 1norc." The decision of the Judicial Committee in University of Ceylon v. Fernando(') appears to go much further than what was laid down in the aforementioned cases. For the purpose of this case it is not necessary to tak~ assistance from the ratio of that decision. Suflicc it to say that in the case before us there was a fair inquiry against the appellant; the officer appointed to inquire was an impartial person: he cannot be said to have been biassed against the appellant; the charge against the appellant was made known to him before the commencement of the inquiry; the witnesses who gave evidence against him were examined in his presence and he was allowed to cross-examine them and lastly he was given every opportunity to present his case before the Inquiry Ofliccr. Hence we sec no merit in the contention that there was any breach of the principles of natural justice. It is true that the Vice Chancc!- lor did not make available to the appellant a copy of the report submitted by the Inquiry Officer. Admittedly the appellant did not ask for a copy of the report. There is no rule requiring the Vice Chancellor to provide the appellant with a copy of the report of the Inquiry OJliccr before he was called upon to make his representation against the provisional decision taken by him. If the appellant felt any difficulty in making his representation without looking into the report of the Inquiry Officer, he could have very well asked for a copy of that report. His present grievance appears to be an after thought and we sec no suhstancc in it. Mr. S. V. Guptc, the learned counsel for the appellant, in support of his contention that the failure of the Vice Chancellor to make available to the appellant a copy of the report submitted by the Inquirv Officer is an infringement of the yrinciplcs of n.a~u ral justice, placed strong reliance on the decision of the Jud1c1al (I} [1958! All E.R. 579. (2) / 1960] (I.) Alt LR .. 6Jl. A .. c () E F G It • • SURESH V. KERALA UNIVERSITY (Hegde, J.) 325· A . Committee in B. Surinder Singh Kanda v. Government of the Federation of Malaya('). Therein, at the instance of the Commissioner of Police, a preliminary inquiry was held against S. S. Kanda. Thereafter a formal inquiry was ordered. On the basis of the conclusions reached at the formal inquiry Surinder Singh B c D E F G Kanda was dismissed. Kanda challenged his dismissal in an action brought in the High Court of Malaya. During the pendency of that proceeding, it came to light that the report made by the Board which held the preliminary inquiry, a report which was highly prejudicial to Kanda had been placed in the hands of the officer who held the formal inquiry but neither the copy of that report nor its substance had been made available to Kanda. That report was likely to have prejudiced the Inquiry Officer against Kanda. Under those circumstances tlie Judicial Committee came to the conclusion that the inquiry held was not fair and consequently quashed the order dismissing Kanda. The ratio of that decision has no application to the present case. The decision of the House of Lords in General Council of Medical Education and Registration of the United Kingdom v. Spackman(') does not bear on the question under consideration. Therein the House of Lords held. that the General Medical Council was not right in declining an opportunity being given to Dr. Spackman to show that the conclusion of the Divorce Court that he was guilty of infamous conduct was not correct. In that case the General Medical Council took action against Dr. Spackman solely on the basis of the conclusions reached by the Divorce Court in Pepper v. Pepper. Dr. Spackman wanted to negative the court's finding of adultery by tendering evidence which though available was not called in the divorce proceedings. The House of Lords held that the Council's refusal to take fresh evidence prevented their being the due· inquiry required bys. 29 of the Medical Act, 1858 and therefore· an order of certiorari was granted. The ~cope of the principles of natural justice as explained by· the Enghsh Courts was adopted by this Court in a large number of cases. See New Prakash Transport Co. v. New Savarna Transport Co.(3) and Nagendra Nath Bora v. The Commissioner of Hill Divisions( 4 ). Before closing this case we would like to recall the observa-- tions mad~ by Gajendragadkar J. (as he then was) speaking for the Court m The Board of High School and Intermediate Education UP. v. Bagleshwar Prasad and ors.('). His Lordship> observed: "In dealing with petitions of this type, it is necessary H to bear in mind that educational institutions like the (I) [1962] A.C. 322. (3) [1957] S.C.R. 98. (5) (2) [1943] (2) All E. R. 337. (4) [1958] S.C.R. 1240 (1261) .. [1963] (3) S.C.R. 767 (775). 326 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [! 969) J S.CR. Universities or appellant No. I set up Enquiry Commit· tees to deal with the problem posed by the adoption of unfair means by candidates, and normally it is within the jurisdiction of such domestic tribunals lo decide all relevant questions in the light of the evidence 'tdduccd before them. In the matter of the adoption of unfair means, direct evidence may sometimes be available, but cases may arise where direct evidence is not available and !he question will have lo be considered in the light of probabilities and circumstantial evidence. This problem which educational institutions have to face from time to time is a serious problem and unless there is justification to do so, courts should be slow to interfere with the decisions of domestic Tribunals appointed by educa· tional bodies like the Universities. Jn dealing with the validity of the impugned orders passed by Universities under Art. 226, the High Court is not sitting in a appeal over the decision in question: its jurisdiction is limited and though ii is true that if the impugned order is not supported by any evidence at all, the High Court would be justified to quash that order. But the conclusion that the impugned order is not supported by any evidence must be reached after considering the question as to whe· ther probabilities and circumstantial evidence do not justify the said conclusion. Enquiries held by domestic Tribunals in such cases must, no doubt, be fair and students against whom char.ges are framed must be given adequate opportunities to defend themselves, and in holding such enquiries, the Tribunal. must scrupulously follow rules of natural justice; but it would, we think, not be reasonable to import into these enquiries all considerations which l!OVern criminal trials in ordinary courts of law. Jn the present case, no animus is suggested and no ma/a (ides have been pleaded. TI1e enquiry has been fair and the respondent has had an opportunity of making his defence. That hein~ so. we think the High Court was not justified in interfering with the order passed against the respondent." There seems to be an erroneous impression in certain quar· tcrs evidently inOuenced by the provisions in Ari. 311 of the Constitution particularly as they stood before the amendment of that article that every disciplinary proceedin~ must consist of two inquiries, one before issuing the show cause notice to he followed by another inquiry thereafter. Such is not the requirement of the principles of natural justice. Law may or may not prescribe such a course. Even if a show cause notice is provided by law from that it docs not follow that a copy of the report on the basis of which the show cause notice is issued should be made available A B c D E F G H SURESH V. KERALA UNIVERSITY (Hegde, J.) 327 A to the person proce(!jjed against or that another inquiry should be held thereafter. For the reasons mentioned above the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. B R.K.P.S. Appeal dismissed.