# SURINDER MOHAN VIKAL v. 'ASCHARAJ LAL CHOPRA

- **Citation:** [1978] 3 S.C.R. 434
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1978-02-28
- **Bench:** S. Murtaza Fazal Ali, P. N. Shinghal
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/surinder-mohan-vikal-v-ascharaj-lal-chopra-7341
- **Pages:** 5

## Headnote

Linlitation for taking cognizance of certain ofjences--Cri111inal Procedu.re
Code (Act 2 of 1974), 1973,-S. 468 r/w. Sections 469(a), 470 & 473Legislative policy behind the statute of limitation.
Section 468 of Criminal Procedure Code (Act 2 of 1974), 1973 bars taking_
cognizance after lapse of the period of limitation.
Under sub"6. (2) of s. 468
the period of limitatiO'Il shall be (a) six months, if the offence is punlshable
\Vith fine only; (b) one year, if the offence is pu'llishable with imprisonment for
a term not exceeding one year and
(c) three years, if the offooce is punishable
\'\»ith i111prisonment for a term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years.
The appel1ant, while working as General Secretary of the Celfltral B1•1nk ot'
India Ernployees Union, Ludhiana, filed a
crimi~al complaint on 15.3-1972
against 1espondents Ascharaj Lal Chopra, who \Vas his predecessor in otticc·
rutd also again~t one Amreek Singh a treasurer for the commission of a•n offence
under ss. 406/420 IPC usjng the words viz., "criminal intention" und "fraur!ulently and with u dishonest intention'' etc.
The trial Court convicted them oo
11-2-1975 but the First Appellate Court by its order dated 1-4-1975 acquitted
them, which was affirmed by the 'High Court by its judgment dated 15-5-1975.
Respondent Ascharaj Lal, therefore, filed a complaint under s. 500 I.P .C. against
the <11ppellant on l 1-2-1976.
The l\fagistrate examined the plaintiff and issued
a summons to the appeila'flt on 15-9-1976. The appellant moved the High Conrt
under s. 482 of th_e Criminal Procedure Code for quashing the l\.fagistrate's order
taking cognizance of the offence against him, and the High Conrt rejected it.
Allo\ving the appeal by special leave, the Court
liELD : 1. The statutes of limita.tion have legislative policy behind them.
They shut out belated and dormant claims in order to save the accused from
unnecessary hanissment and from the risk of facing trial at a time \Vhen his
evidence might have been lost because of the delay on the part of the· pro&ccutor.
[438 B-C]
2. Section 468 of the Criminal Procedure Code not only r&ises bar of limita~
tion but also pre-scribes the period thereof.
The question when the period of
I.imitation could be said to commence lies within the purview of s. 469. Sub-s.
(1) of s. 469 specifically provides that the period of limitation prescribed in
s. 468, in rela'tion to an offence, shall commence inter alia "on the date of the
offence".
[436 F-G]
3. It is an essential requirement of sub-s. (1) of s. 470 Criminal Procedure
Code, 1973 that the person who seeks its benefit should be able to establish that
he was "prosecuting" another prosecution in one Court or the other referred
to in the sub-section.
[437 Gl
4. Jn the instant case, (a) the date of thei offence was Jvlarch 15, 1972
\Vhen defamatory complaint was filed in the Court oe the Magistrate and that
was the starting point for the purposes of calculating the three years' limitation
provided bys. 468; (b) the complaint under s. 500 I.P.C. was filed on 11-2-1976
much after the expiry of three years limitation prescribed for that offence.
It
was therefore, not possible for the Court of the Magistrate to take cognizance
of ihe offence after the expiry of the period of limitation : (c) the question of
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s. M. VIKAL v. A. L. CHOPRA (Shinghal, J.)
435
"'cause of action., contemplated in s. 469 ( 1) (c) could not arise as the co•ntroA
versy iel,;,ted to '·the commission of' an offence" and (d) the provision of subs. ( 1) of s. 470 cannot avail the responde•nt as his case, was not so. He did
not claim the benefit of s. 473 either.
[436 H, 437 A-C, JJ8 A]
CRIWNAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 246
of 1972.
(Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dt. 2-3-77
of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Cr!. Misc. No. 5979-M of
1977).
S. C. Agarual, Swaraj Kaushal & S. C. Patel for th~ Appellant.
B
D. Mookerjee, B. M. Srivast

## Text

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434
SURINDER MOHAN VIKAL
v.
'ASCHARAJ LAL CHOPRA
February 28, 1978
[S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI AND P. N. SHINGHAL, JJ.]
Linlitation for taking cognizance of certain ofjences--Cri111inal Procedu.re
Code (Act 2 of 1974), 1973,-S. 468 r/w. Sections 469(a), 470 & 473Legislative policy behind the statute of limitation.
Section 468 of Criminal Procedure Code (Act 2 of 1974), 1973 bars taking_
cognizance after lapse of the period of limitation.
Under sub"6. (2) of s. 468
the period of limitatiO'Il shall be (a) six months, if the offence is punlshable
\Vith fine only; (b) one year, if the offence is pu'llishable with imprisonment for
a term not exceeding one year and
(c) three years, if the offooce is punishable
\'\»ith i111prisonment for a term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years.
The appel1ant, while working as General Secretary of the Celfltral B1•1nk ot'
India Ernployees Union, Ludhiana, filed a
crimi~al complaint on 15.3-1972
against 1espondents Ascharaj Lal Chopra, who \Vas his predecessor in otticc·
rutd also again~t one Amreek Singh a treasurer for the commission of a•n offence
under ss. 406/420 IPC usjng the words viz., "criminal intention" und "fraur!ulently and with u dishonest intention'' etc.
The trial Court convicted them oo
11-2-1975 but the First Appellate Court by its order dated 1-4-1975 acquitted
them, which was affirmed by the 'High Court by its judgment dated 15-5-1975.
Respondent Ascharaj Lal, therefore, filed a complaint under s. 500 I.P .C. against
the <11ppellant on l 1-2-1976.
The l\fagistrate examined the plaintiff and issued
a summons to the appeila'flt on 15-9-1976. The appellant moved the High Conrt
under s. 482 of th_e Criminal Procedure Code for quashing the l\.fagistrate's order
taking cognizance of the offence against him, and the High Conrt rejected it.
Allo\ving the appeal by special leave, the Court
liELD : 1. The statutes of limita.tion have legislative policy behind them.
They shut out belated and dormant claims in order to save the accused from
unnecessary hanissment and from the risk of facing trial at a time \Vhen his
evidence might have been lost because of the delay on the part of the· pro&ccutor.
[438 B-C]
2. Section 468 of the Criminal Procedure Code not only r&ises bar of limita~
tion but also pre-scribes the period thereof.
The question when the period of
I.imitation could be said to commence lies within the purview of s. 469. Sub-s.
(1) of s. 469 specifically provides that the period of limitation prescribed in
s. 468, in rela'tion to an offence, shall commence inter alia "on the date of the
offence".
[436 F-G]
3. It is an essential requirement of sub-s. (1) of s. 470 Criminal Procedure
Code, 1973 that the person who seeks its benefit should be able to establish that
he was "prosecuting" another prosecution in one Court or the other referred
to in the sub-section.
[437 Gl
4. Jn the instant case, (a) the date of thei offence was Jvlarch 15, 1972
\Vhen defamatory complaint was filed in the Court oe the Magistrate and that
was the starting point for the purposes of calculating the three years' limitation
provided bys. 468; (b) the complaint under s. 500 I.P.C. was filed on 11-2-1976
much after the expiry of three years limitation prescribed for that offence.
It
was therefore, not possible for the Court of the Magistrate to take cognizance
of ihe offence after the expiry of the period of limitation : (c) the question of
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s. M. VIKAL v. A. L. CHOPRA (Shinghal, J.)
435
"'cause of action., contemplated in s. 469 ( 1) (c) could not arise as the co•ntroA
versy iel,;,ted to '·the commission of' an offence" and (d) the provision of subs. ( 1) of s. 470 cannot avail the responde•nt as his case, was not so. He did
not claim the benefit of s. 473 either.
[436 H, 437 A-C, JJ8 A]
CRIWNAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 246
of 1972.
(Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dt. 2-3-77
of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Cr!. Misc. No. 5979-M of
1977).
S. C. Agarual, Swaraj Kaushal & S. C. Patel for th~ Appellant.
B
D. Mookerjee, B. M. Srivastva and Sarwa Mitter for the Respondent.
C
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SmNGHAL, J.-This appeal by Special leave has been filed
by
accused Surindcr Mohan Vikal against the judgment of the Punjab
and Haryana High Court dated March 2, 1977, rejecting bis application for revision of
the Magistrate's order dated September 15,
1976 summoning him as an accused for the trial of an offence under
section 500 I.P.C. at the
instance of
respondent
Ascharaj Lal
Chopra.
The appellant challenged the Magistrate's order for two reasons,
but the controversy before us refers to his claim that the Magistrate
could r,ot take cognizance of the offence under section 500 I.P.C. as
the period of limitation prescribed by section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure had expired.
The controversy thus relates to a short
point of law and can well be examined on the basis of the admitted
facts.
The appellant was working as General 'Secretary of the Central
Bank of India Employees Union, Punjab Ludhiana, which was :iregistered body.
The respondent was employed as Special Assistant in
that Bank, and one Amreek Singh was employed there as a clerk.
The respondent worked as the General Secretary of the Union while
Amre.,k Singh worked as its Treasurer before the appellant took over
as General Secretary. The appellant filed a complaint in the Court of
Judicial '.lfagistrate First Class, Ambala Cantt. 011 March 15, 1972, for
the commission of an offence under section 406/420 J.P.C. alleging
that the respondent and Amreek Singh with "a common intention and
collusion with each other, transferred a donation entry of Rs. 1100/-
in the personal account of accused No. 1 (A. L. Chopra) by adjustment vide voucher dated 19-2-71 at Ambala Cantt." It was also alleged that the accused misappropriated a sum of Rs. 1100/- of the Union
with "criminal intention" and "fraudulently and with a dishonest intention." By his judgment dated February 11, 1975, the Magistrate
convicted the respondent and Amreek Singh .of the o!'fence under section 408/34 I.P.C. and sentenced them to ngorous 1mpmonment for
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1978] 3 S.C.R.
one year and a fine of Rs. 1000/-. The additional Sessions Judge of
Ambala however acquitted both of them by his judgment dated April
1, 1975, and that judgment was upheld by the High Court on May
15,. 1975. Respondent Ascharaj Lal Chopra then filed a complaint
agamst the present appellant Surinder Mohan Vikal in the Court oL
Judicial Magistrate First Class, Ambala, dated February 11, 1976, for
the commission of the offence under section 500 I.P.C.
The Magistrate examined the complainant and his witnesse,, and made the order
dated September 15, 1976 for the issue of summons for the appearance
of the present appellant in that case.
That was why the present appellant applied to the High Court under section 482 Cr!. P. C. for q~h
ing the Magistrate's order taking cognizance of the offence against him.
As his application has been rejected by the High Court, accused
Surinder Mohan Vikal has preferred the present appeal as aforesaid.
Chapter XXXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, deals
with limitaiion for taking cognizance of certain offences. For purposes of that chapter, section 467 defines the exprnssion "period of
limitation" to mean the period specified in section 468 for taking cognizance of an offence.
In its turn, section 468, which bars the taking
of cognizance of an offence after the expiry of period of limitation,
rettds as follows,-
"468 (1) Except as otherwise provided elsewhere in the Code, PO
Court shall take cognizance of an offence of the category specifi.ed in
sub-section (2), after the expiry of the period of limitation.
(2) The period of limitation shall be-
( a) six months, if the offence is punishable with fine only;
(b) one year, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment
for a term not exceeding one year;
( c) three years, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment
for a term exceeding one year but not exceeding three
years."
The section thus not only raises the bar of limitation, but also prescribes
the period thereci. It is not in controversy before us that the period
of limitation in the present case would be three years as prescribed in
clause (c) of sub-section (2). The qnestion is when the period of
limitation could be said to commence for purposes of the present case ?
That is a matter which falls within the purview of section 469.
Clause (a) of sub-section (1) of that section provides that the period of
limitation, in relation to an offender. shall commence,-
"( a) on the date of the offence;"
It is not urged before us that clause (b) o.r ( c) of the sub-section,
or Sub-section (2), have any bearing on the present controversy. It
has therefore to be examined on what date the offence under secti-on
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500 l.P.C. could be said to have been committed.
It will be recalled that the complaint for the commission of the
offence under section 406/420 1.P.C. was filed on March 15, 1972,
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s. M. VIKAL v. A. L. CHOPRA (Shinghal, J.)
437
It has specially been stated in the respondent's complaint under section
500 I.P.C. that the defamatory matter was contained in that complaint.
So, according to the complaint, the offence under section 500 I.P.C.
was committed on March 15, 1972, which was the date of the offence
within the meaning of section 469 (1) (a) of the Code, and the period
of three vears' limitation would be calculated with reference to that
,date for purposes of the bar provided by section 468. But, as has been
stated, the complaint under section 500 I.P.C. was filed on February
11, 1976, much after the expiry of that period. It was .therefore not
permissible for the Court of the Magistrate to take cogmzance of the
offence after the expiry of the period of limitation.
The High Court ignored the bar of limitation on the ground that
the "cause of action for proceeding for defamation could not arise
before he (respondent) was acquitte'd by the Court of Session." As
the respondent was acquitted on April 1, 1975, it appearsl that the
High Court took the view that the "protection of section 468 ( c)"
was not available to the appellant.
We are constrained to say that
the question of "cause of action" could not really arise in this case
as the controversy relates to the cqmmission of an offence. It has
been stated, sub-section (1) of section 469 of the Code specifically
provides that the period of limitation prescribed in section 468, in
relation to an offender, shall commence (inter alia) on the date of
the offence. It would therefore follow that the date of the offence
was March 15, 1972, when the defamatory complaint was
filect in
the Court of the Magistrate, and that was the starting point for the
purpose of calculating the three years' period of limitation. The
High Court clearly erred in taking a contrary view.
An attempt was made to argue before us that the respondent
was, at any rate, entitled to the exclusion of time under sub-secticill
(1) of section 4 70 of the Code in computing the period of limitation.
·Tue sub-section reads as follows,-
"470 fl) In computing the period of limitation, the time
during which any person has
been prosecutin_g with due
diligence another prosecution, whether in a Conrt of first
instance or in a Conrt of appeal or revision,
against the
offender, shall be excluded :
Provided that no such exclusion shall be made unless
the prosecution relates to the same facts and is prosecuted
in good faith in a Court which from defect of jurisdiction
or other cause of a like nature, is nnable to entertain it."
1t is an essential requirement of the sub-section that the person who
seeks its benefi~ should be able to establish that he was "prosecuting" another prosecution in one Court or the other referred to in
the sub-section.
But it is not the case of
the respondent that he
was prosecuting the appellant in any other prosecntion.
It is also
not his case that that prosecution related to the "same facts" Within
the meaning of the provi'so to the sub-section.
The provision
of
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1978] 3 S.C.R.
sub-section (1) of section 470 cannot therefore avail the respondent, and he is not entitled to the exclusion of any time thereunder.
It may: be mentioned that the respondent has not sought the benefit of sub-section ( 1) of section 4 73 which permits the extension of the
period of limitation in certain cases.
It would thus appear that the appellant was entitled to the beneB fit of sub-section (1) of section
468 which
prohibits every Court
from taking cognizance of an offence of the category specified in
sub-section (2) after the expiry of the period of limitation. It is
hardly necessary to say that statutes of limitation have legislative
policy behind them.
for instance, they shnt out belated and dormant claims in order to save the accused from unnecessary harassment.
They also save the accused from the risk of having to face
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trial at a time when his evidence might have been lost because of
the delay on the part of the prosecutor.
~s has been stated, a
bar to the taking of cognizance has been prescribed under section
468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and there is no reason why
the appellant should not be entitled to it in the facts and circumstances of this case.
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The appeal is allowed, the impugned
judgment of the High
Court dated March 2, 1977 is set aside and the order of the Magistrate dated September 15, 1976 taking cognizance of the offence
against the appellant is quashed.
S R.
Appeal allowed.
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