# SURINDER SINGH v. HARDIAL SINGH AND ORS - **Citation:** [1985] 1 S.C.R. 1059 - **Court:** Supreme Court of India - **Decided:** 1984-10-29 - **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 463 of 1982 - **Bench:** P.N. Bhagwati, V. Balakrishna Eradi, Ranganath Misra - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/surinder-singh-v-hardial-singh-and-ors-8665 - **Pages:** 30 ## Headnote 1059 Constitutioii of India-Art. 136-Supreme Court-When would interfere with findings of the High Court reached on assessmeni of evidence. Representation of the Peoples Act, 1951 i-Section 123-Allegation of Corrupt Practice made in an election petition -How should be established-Whether on basis of preponderance of probabilities as in civil litigation or "proof beyond reasonable doubt" as in Criminal trials. ii-Section 1 !6A (1)-Election appeal-Nature of findings of facts-If could be interfered with by Supreme Court. iii-Sec. 12 3 (2)-Corrupt Practice of" Undue influence" -Nature and proof of-Whether disturbing election meeting a corrupt practice u/s.123(2)-Whether appointment by the returned candidate of a person charged for murder as his polling agent amounts to exercise of"undue 1"nfluence". iv-Sec. 123 (/) (A)-Corrupt Practice of "Bribe"-Whether ameliorating A B c D E grievances of the public while canvassing for votes amounts to corrupt practice. F The appellant was declared elected on May 31; 1980 to the Punjab Legis1ative Assembly from a constituency known as Non-sbehra-Pamuan Assembly Constituency. Respondent Nos. 1 and 2, two voters of the Constituency challenged his election before the High Court on two grounds, namely, (t) that the appellant's supporters disturbed a meeting of the Akali Party by using fire arms and fatally injuring one and otherwise inflicting injuries on many others and thus he committed a corrupt practice of ''undue influence" u/s. 123 (2) of the Representation of the Peoples Act 1951 ; and (2) that the appellant in order to get the votes of one Bagicha Singh Chakiwala and his family members as also of his brotherhood, promised to Bagicha. Singh to get the uncovered electric wires, which were dangerously passing over his house, removed aflcr paying its expenses etc. and so he approached the Punjab State G H A B c D E F G H 1060 SUPREME cotlR T REPORTS [1985)'1 s.c.tt. Electricity Board employees, put pressure on them and got the amount of ex· penses deposited and the wires removed on 30th May 1980 i.e. one day before the poll. Thus, the appellant had committed a corrupt practice of 'Bribery' u/s. 123 (l) (A) of the Act. The High Court declared the election of the appellant void holding that both the corrupt practices had been committed by the appellant himself or through others with his consent and were covered by ss. 123 (I) (A), (B) and (2) of the Act. Hence this appeal, The respondent-petitioners in addition to the above-mentioned two grounds of challenge contended, (i) that the charges of corrupt practice should be allowed to be estabJished .arr the basi-; of preponderance of probabilities as in civil litigation and not by asking for proof of the alJegation beyond reasonable doubt as in a criminal case ; (ii) that it was the practice of the Supreme Court in election appeals not to enter into reappreciation of evidence and disturb findings of fact reached by the High Court and therefore the Supreme Court should not attempt a re-appreciation of the evidence while dealing with this appeal ; and (iii) that the appointment of Gurdial Singh, who had disturbed the Akali Meeting and had also been charged for murder, by the appellant as bis polling agent in the Gandiwind Polling Booth amounted to exercise of "undue influence" within the meaning of the Act. Allowing the appeal, HELD : (1) Section 116-C makes it clear that an appeal to the Supreme Court under the Act is to be treated as a Civil appeal and the jurisdiction to be exercised is as extensive as in the case of an appeal from a matter disposed of in exercise of original civil jurisdiction of the High Court. Section 116-A (1) of the Act clearly indicates that the appeal to this Court has to be disposed of by e:ii;ercising the same jurisdiction as is exercised in an appeal against the original judgment of the High Court. In this view of the matter there can really be no rule, whether statutory or evolved by this Court by long usage as alleged, t ## Text _Characters 0–39,253 of 71,733. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39253 for what follows._ SURINDER SINGH v. HARDIAL SINGH AND ORS. October 29, 1984 [P.N. BHAGWATI, V. BALAKRISHNA ERADI AND RANGANATH MISRA, JJ.J 1059 Constitutioii of India-Art. 136-Supreme Court-When would interfere with findings of the High Court reached on assessmeni of evidence. Representation of the Peoples Act, 1951 i-Section 123-Allegation of Corrupt Practice made in an election petition -How should be established-Whether on basis of preponderance of probabilities as in civil litigation or "proof beyond reasonable doubt" as in Criminal trials. ii-Section 1 !6A (1)-Election appeal-Nature of findings of facts-If could be interfered with by Supreme Court. iii-Sec. 12 3 (2)-Corrupt Practice of" Undue influence" -Nature and proof of-Whether disturbing election meeting a corrupt practice u/s.123(2)-Whether appointment by the returned candidate of a person charged for murder as his polling agent amounts to exercise of"undue 1"nfluence". iv-Sec. 123 (/) (A)-Corrupt Practice of "Bribe"-Whether ameliorating A B c D E grievances of the public while canvassing for votes amounts to corrupt practice. F The appellant was declared elected on May 31; 1980 to the Punjab Legis1ative Assembly from a constituency known as Non-sbehra-Pamuan Assembly Constituency. Respondent Nos. 1 and 2, two voters of the Constituency challenged his election before the High Court on two grounds, namely, (t) that the appellant's supporters disturbed a meeting of the Akali Party by using fire arms and fatally injuring one and otherwise inflicting injuries on many others and thus he committed a corrupt practice of ''undue influence" u/s. 123 (2) of the Representation of the Peoples Act 1951 ; and (2) that the appellant in order to get the votes of one Bagicha Singh Chakiwala and his family members as also of his brotherhood, promised to Bagicha. Singh to get the uncovered electric wires, which were dangerously passing over his house, removed aflcr paying its expenses etc. and so he approached the Punjab State G H A B c D E F G H 1060 SUPREME cotlR T REPORTS [1985)'1 s.c.tt. Electricity Board employees, put pressure on them and got the amount of ex· penses deposited and the wires removed on 30th May 1980 i.e. one day before the poll. Thus, the appellant had committed a corrupt practice of 'Bribery' u/s. 123 (l) (A) of the Act. The High Court declared the election of the appellant void holding that both the corrupt practices had been committed by the appellant himself or through others with his consent and were covered by ss. 123 (I) (A), (B) and (2) of the Act. Hence this appeal, The respondent-petitioners in addition to the above-mentioned two grounds of challenge contended, (i) that the charges of corrupt practice should be allowed to be estabJished .arr the basi-; of preponderance of probabilities as in civil litigation and not by asking for proof of the alJegation beyond reasonable doubt as in a criminal case ; (ii) that it was the practice of the Supreme Court in election appeals not to enter into reappreciation of evidence and disturb findings of fact reached by the High Court and therefore the Supreme Court should not attempt a re-appreciation of the evidence while dealing with this appeal ; and (iii) that the appointment of Gurdial Singh, who had disturbed the Akali Meeting and had also been charged for murder, by the appellant as bis polling agent in the Gandiwind Polling Booth amounted to exercise of "undue influence" within the meaning of the Act. Allowing the appeal, HELD : (1) Section 116-C makes it clear that an appeal to the Supreme Court under the Act is to be treated as a Civil appeal and the jurisdiction to be exercised is as extensive as in the case of an appeal from a matter disposed of in exercise of original civil jurisdiction of the High Court. Section 116-A (1) of the Act clearly indicates that the appeal to this Court has to be disposed of by e:ii;ercising the same jurisdiction as is exercised in an appeal against the original judgment of the High Court. In this view of the matter there can really be no rule, whether statutory or evolved by this Court by long usage as alleged, that the Court would not interfere with the findings of fact reached at the trial stage. Ordinarily a finding reached on assessment of the eviden ce particularly when it is oral would not be interfered with but where the Court is satisfied that 0~ account of a wrong approach to a matter, injustice has been done to one of the parties before it, it would not only be within the powers of the Court but it would be its obligation to rectify the mistake and do justice to the party . [1066fl..G, 1070G-HJ Ramabhai Ashabhai Patel v. Dabhi Ajitkumar Fu/sinji & Ors. [1965] IS.C.R. 712 Bhanu Kumar Shastri v. Mohan Lal Sukhadia & Ors. [1971] 3 S.C.R. 522. Mohd. Yasin Shah v. Ali Akbar Khan [1977] 2 S.C.C. 23. Laxminarayan v. Returning Officer [1974] I S.C.R. 822 & Sh. Raghbir Singh Gill v. S. Gurcharan Singh Tohra & Ors. [1980] Suppl. S.C.C. 53, relied upon. Sarju Prasad v. Raja Jwaleshwari Pratap Narain Singh & Ori. [1950] S.C.R. 781. Watt v. Thomas 1947 A. C 484. Narmada Prasad v. Chagan Lal [1966] I S.C.R. 499. Prabodh Chand v. Mohinder Singh AIR 1971 SC 257. Sumitra Devi v. Sheo Shankar Prasad Yadav [1973] 2 S.C.R. 920, Chand Singh v. Shiv Ram - ... . ' -r SURENDER SinGH v. HARDIAL SINGH 1061 AIR 1975 SC 403, Vital Nagaraj v. R. Dayanand Sagar, [1975] 2 S.C.R. 384 and Laxmi Narain v. Chander Singh [1977] 2 S.C.R. 412 referred to. 2. By a catena of decisions of this Court it has by now been very well settled that allegations of corrupt practice dre quasi~criminal charges and the proof that would be required in support of such allegations would be as in a criminal charge:. Therefore, charges of corrupt practice are to be equated with criminal charges and proof thereof would be not preponderance of probabilities as in civil action but proof beyond reasonable doubt as in criminal trials. . [1071A-B; 10750-C) Dr. M. Chenna Reddy•· V. Ramchandra Rao & Onr. 40 E.L.R. 390. Magraj Patodia v. R.K. Bir/a & Ors. [1971] 2 S.C.R. 118, Mohan Singh v. Bhanwar Lal & Ors. [1964] 5 S.C.R. 12. Guruji Shrihar Ba/iram Jivatode v. Vithalrao & On [1969] 2 S.C.R. 766. Mehant Shrea Nath v. Choudhry Ranbir Singh [1970} 3 S.C.C. 647, Abdul Hussain Mir v. Shamsu/ Huda & Onr. [1975] 4 S.C.C. 533, Ch. Razik Ram v. Ch . .Taswant Singh Chouhan & Ors. [ 1975} 4 S.C.C. 769, Surya Kant Roy v. Imamul Hak Khan [1973] I S.C.C. 531, Nizamuddin Ahmed v. Narbada Prasad & Ors. [1976} 1 S.C.C. 1., D. Venkata Reddy v. R. Sultan & On [1976] 2 S.C.C. 455. Bir Chand-a Barman v. Ani/ Sarkar & o,,. [1976] 3 SCC 88. RamjJ Prasad Singh v. Ram Bi/as Iha & Ors. [1977] l S.C.C. 260, Lakshmi Raman Acharya v. Chandan Singh & Ors. [1977] 2 S.C.R. 412, Amolak Chand Chhazed v. Bhagwandas Arya & Ors. [1977] 3 S.C.C. 566, Ramanbhai Nagjibhai Patel v. Jasvant Singh Udeslngh & Ors. [1979] 3 SCC 142, Haji C.H Mohammad. Koya v. I. K .S. M.A. Muthukoya [1979] 2 SCC 8, A. Younus Kunju v. R.S. Unrt/ & Ors. [1984] 3 SCC 346 & Manmohan Ka/ia v. Yash & Ors. [1984} 3 SCC 499 ~ followed. 3, Election disputes are not cases at common Jaw or equity but are strict statutory proceedings and result of an election is not available to be interfered with lightly, [1076B] . Jagannath v. Jaswant Singh & Ors. [1954] 5 SCR 892 D. Venkata Reddy v. R. Sultan & o,,. [1976] 2 SCC 455 ; followed. 4. Sectio.Q. 123 (2) of the Act defines 'undue influence'. Any dire t Id .. , ., h cor n 1rect 1nter1ereoce or attempt to 1nter1ere Wit free exercise of the elccto I right. by a candidate, his agent or any person with his consenr or the candidat~s election agent has be~n made a corrupt practice u{s 123 (2) of the Act. Chapter II of the Act deals with agents and refers to appointments of election agent, polling agent and counting agent. Section 79 (d) defines "Electoral Right" t mean' the right of a person to stand or not to stand as or to withdraw 0 ~ to withdraw from being a candidat~ or to vote or refrain from votin ~ no election. [1080G· H ; 10790] g a any . (5) The fact that firearm~ ~ere freely used first by Gurdial Singh and his ?arthy adnd thhenf by way .of retahat1on by Akali workers and gun shots resulted tn t e eat o Daya Singh and thus a grave situation arose is real] ·1 I b Ynotvery matena ua ess t at would amount to a corrupt practice wit"'o th · ' w ·~~~ A c D E A B c D E F ff 1062 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1985] 1 S.C.R. s. 123 (2) of the Act. Undoubtedly, disturbing the meeting as alleged is ont covered under sub·s. (2) of s. 123 of the Act and is clearly an electoral offence dealt with bys. 127 of the Act. [1079H; 1080A] (6) The High Court clearly overlooked the fact that disturbing the election meeting by itself did not constitute undue influence. For establishing the link between the disturbance of the meeting and the returned candidate the evidence is wholly oral in character and has to be scrutinised with greater rigour. Merely on the statements of son1e of the witnesses who were essentiaily Akali Party workers or supporters a charge of corrupt practice could not have been taken as proved. The approach of the learne4 trial judge to the matter is contrary to law as settled by decisions of this Court relating to corrupt practice and proof thereof. [1084B-C] (7) It is the admitted position that neither t~e Akali candidate S. Ranjit Singh nor the appellant who was another contesting candidate came to the place of the meeting so held on 20.5.80. There is evidence that the meeting so convened was disturbed. The disturbance to the meeting is said to have been caused by a group of people consisting of Gurdial Singh, Hardial Singh, Rachhpal Singh, Ku1want Singh and Gurnam Singh. There is no specific plea that these five persons we:e agents of the appe1Iant. Admittedly, by May 20, 1980, none of these persons was an agent of any of these classes of the returned candidate. The only other aspects by Which the appeJlant would be liable for the action of these five people would be if their act of disturbing the meeting was with his consent. Consent is the life line to link up the candidate with the action of the other petson which may amount to corrupt practice and unless it is specifically pleaded and clearly proved in view of the fact that all ingredients have to be proved beyond reasonable doubt the appellant cannot be charged for the action of Gurdial Singh and his group. [1078B-D; 1083B] (8) Jn the instant case, though there is some oral evidence to implicate the appellant, even for what folJowed the disturbance to the meeting, this Court does not think in the absence of the plea such evidence can be entertained for any effective purpose. The fact that protection had been extended by the appeUant to his supporter Gurdial Singh and members of his family even by raising quarrel with the local police inspector would not lead to a backward presumption of consent for the acts of Gurdial Singh. [1081F; !083A-B] (9) It is difficult to accept the submission of the respondent that by appointing a person charged for murder as polling agent the appellant bed exercised undue influence. There is clear evidence also that l'Oting was free and quite a large percentage of the voters had exercised their electoral right. These are circumstances which clearly militate against the allegation of the election petitioners that voters bad been threatened and their free exercise of electoral right had been affected. Moreover, in the absence of requisite pleading, want of any contemporaneous complaint in writing or otherwise to the public officers within the polling booth and the nebulous nature of the oral evidence placed from the side of the election petitioners, it cannot be said_ that any objection 1»uld really be taken \o t)1e elec\ion on a~oun\ of Gurdial Sinl!h havins acted ..,.._ SURENDER SINGH V. HARDiRL SINGH 1063 as poling agent in the particular electoral booth. [1083E·G;] (10) A candidate is entitled to canvass for votes. One who is in the field to be an electoral representative is also entitled to nourish his constituency. Amelioration of grievances of the public is innocuous and cannot be construed against a candidate. We agree that while nourishing is a legitimate activity, it is of paramount importance that nourishing should not transgress the limit so as to corrupt the electoral process. The appe11ant was already in the field as a candidate for the legislature and was entitled to help the people in his constituency in a legitmate way. [l087E·G] (11) There was no clear plea in the election petition that the money had been deposited by the appellant though in paragraph 8 it was stated that on 28.5.1980 appellant had told Bagicha Singh that he (Bagicha Singh) should not bother about the expenses involved. There is no oral evidence even to suggest that the appellant caused the amount to be deposited. There is a presumption that the person in whose name the receipt has been drawn up was the payer of the amount and burden lay on him who wanted to contend that the facts were other\\'ise. In these circuinstances, it cannot be accepted that the appellant had got the estimated demand deposited with the authorties of the Board. Once the allegation that the appellant had deposited the amount of Rs. 944 is discarded his taking up of the cause of Bagicha Singh for early shifting of the elcctri~ wires over-hanging the first floor of his house Would not amount to 'bribe'. At any rate, the evidence on record is only rof PW.12. That evidence even if accepted as a whole would not be sufficient to establish the charae of corrupt practice on this score. Oral evidence, particularly, coming from a tainted source cannot form the sole basis of proof of corrupt practice. Therefore, the High court was wrong in accepting the case of the election petitioners that the appellant had committed corrupt practice for procuring the votes of Bag:icha Singh, merllbers of his family and his friends by gcttin& the over~hanging electric wires removed. After all, if there be any scope for doubt, it must resolve in favour of the appellant who was facing a quasi-criminal charge. [1087B·D; G·H; 1088E-F] A B c D E CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 463 of 1982 F From the Judgment and Order dated the 21st January, 1982 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Election Petition No. 4 of 1980. H.L. Sibbal, D.N. Mishra.and K.K. Lahiri for the Appellant Shanti Bhushan, Jitendra Sharma, Man}il Singh Khaira and Ms. Deepa Bhushan for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Co11rt was delivered by G ff A B c D E F G 1064 SUPREME COURT REP OR TS [1985] 1 s.c.R. RANGANATH MISRA, J. This appeal under section 116-A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 ('Act' for short), is directed against the judgment of the Punjab & Haryana High Court setting aside the election of the appellant to the Punjab Legislative Assembly from Constituency No. 25 known as Naushehra-Pannuan Assembly Constituency. Election was held on May 31, 1980, and the result was declared the following day. Appellant was declared elected with 26980 votes while respondent 3 Ranjit Singh lost with 26739 votes. The election petition was filed by two voters of the constituency (respondents 1 and 2). Respondent 1 (PW. 5) was admittedly the counting agent of respondent 3. The election of the appellant was challenged on two allegations of corrupt practice in the main, namely, disturbing a meeting of the Akali Party at a place called Hadur-Shah in Village Gandiwind on May 20, 1980, where the ' appellant's supporters allegedly used fire-arms and fatally injured one and otherwise inllicted injuries on many others. The relevant allegations in support of this plea are to be found in paragraph 5 of the election petition. The other was an allegation of corrupt practice of bribery with reference to Bagicha Singh Chakiwala. Appellant with his supporters in the course of canvassing is said to have contacted Bagicha Singh on May 28, 1980, at his village Chola-Sahib and asked for votes of his and members of his family. Bagicha Singh was alleged to have told the appellant that uncovered electric wires were dangerously passing over his house and despite his best of efforts he has not been able to get them removed and the sum being demanded for their removal was beyond his means. Bagicha Singh is alleged to have told the appellant that if he got the same removed he would get the votes of himself, members of the family as also of his brotherhood. Appellant promised to get the needful done and approached the Punjab State Electricity Board employees and on putting pressure, got the same done on May 30, 1980, one day before the poll. The relevant particulars of the allegation are contained in paragraphs 8 and 9 of the election petition. Several other allegations were made in paragraphs 6, 7 and 10 of the election petition relating to threats to electors of Gandiwind on May 20,'1980, after the meeting was disturbed, improper reception of votes, reception of void votes, terrorisation of the voters at H the booth on the day of polling, etc. but the same \lo not seem to be ( ....,._ • . SURENDER SINGH v. HARDIAL SINGH (Ranganath Misra, J.) 1065 relevant as the High Court has not relied on the same nor in the course of hearing of this appeal have those allegations been pressed into service. It is relevant to indicate here that neither the defeated candidate nor the election petitioners had any personal knowledge of the two incidents referred to above. Verification of the election petition indicated that the allegation in paragraph 5 was true to the information received from Gurmukh Singh, PW. 10 and Milkha Singh, PW, I I while information relating to the Bagicha Singh episode was obtained from Darshan Singh, PW. 12. At the trial, Hardial Singh, election petitioner I was examined as PW. 5. Respondent 3 was, however, not examined as a witness. The evidence in regard to both the incidents-Gandiwind meeting and Bagicha Singh episode-mainly consisted of oral statements of witnesses. Some documents, such as the FIR, injury reports, etc. and the deposit receipt in regard to Bagicha Singh episode do not throw any conclusive light inasmuch as they lack the material aspect of correlating the appellant with the events. The appellant had in his written statement denied the allegations in so far as they implicated him with the incidents. He examined himself and led other evidence to support his stand. The learned single Judge before whom the election petition came up for trial accepted the evidence of the election petitioners and held that both the corrupt practices had been committed by the appe1lant himself or through others with his consent and were covered by ss. 123 (I) (a), (b) and (2) of the Act. The election was declared void. Mr. H.L. Sibal appeared in support of the appeal and Mr. Shanti Bhushan represented the election petitioners. The appeal has been heard at great length and detailed submissions have been advanced by both sides. Mr. Shanti Bhushan emphatically contended that it was the practice of this Court in election ·appeals not to enter into re-appreciation of evidence and disturb findings of fact reached by the High Court. Therefore, we should not attempt a re-appreciation of the evidence while dealing with the appeal. He next contended that election disputes were essentially civil in nature. To require the allegations of corrupt practice to be proved as in acriminal charge was not the proper approach. With a view to preserving the purity of the electoral process and sanctity of the \lewocratic system to whi~h our country is wedded, it is meet and A B c D E F G H 1· A B c D E F G 1066 SUPREME COURTRT REPORTS [1985] 1 s.c.R. proper that charges of corrupt practice should be allowed to be established on the basis of preponderance of probabilities as in civil litigation and not by asking for proof of the allegation beyond reasonable doubt as in a criminal case. We are of the view that these two contentions should be first dealt with in order that a proper approach to the matter can be indicated and once that is done the materials available on record can be assessed for the purpose of disposal of the appeal. Section 116-C of the Act lays down the procedure in appeal. It provides : "(!). Subject to the provisions of this Act and of the rules, if any, made thereunder, every appeal shall be heard and determined by the Supreme Court as nearly as may be in accordance with the procedure applicable to the hearing and determination of an appeal from any final order passed by a High Court in the exercise of its original civil jurisdiction : and all the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and the Rules of the Court (including provisions as to the furnishing of security and the execution of any order of the Court), shall, so far as may be, apply in relation to such appeal ... " This provision makes it abundantly clear that an appeal to this Court under the Act is to be treated ·as a civil appeal and the jurisdiction to be exercised is as extensive as in the case of an appeal from a matter disposed of in exercise of original civil jurisdiction of the High Court. Mr. Shanti Bhushan placed a series of decisions before us in support of his proposition regarding the extent of interference available in an appeal. The first of these cases is Sarju Prasad v. Raja Jwaleshwari Pratap Narain Singh and Ors.(1) This was a regular civil appeal and not under the Act. This Court quotedwith approval the observations of Viscount Simon in Watt v. Thomas.(') Viscount Simon had stated, inter a/ia : "But if the evidence as a whole can reasonably be regarded as justifying the conclusion arrived at the trial, and especially if that conclusion has been arrived at on (!) [1950] $.C.R. 781. H (2) [1947) A.C. 484. SURENDER SINGH HARDIAL SINGH (Ranganath Mesra, J.) 1067 conflicting testimony by a tribunal which saw and heard the witnesses, the appellate court will bear in mind that it has not enjoyed this opportunity and that the view of the trial Judge as to where credibility lies is entitled to great wight." Viscount Simon proceeded further to indicate : "This is not to say that the Judge of first instance can be treated as infallible in determining which side is telling the truth or is refraining from exaggeration. Like other tribunals, he may go wrong on a question of fact, but it is a cogent circumstance that a Judge of first instance, when estimating the valne of verbal testimony, has the advantage (which is denied to Courts of appeal) of having the witnesses before him and observing the manner in which their evidence is given.'' A B c There cannot be much dispute that ordinarily this rule is applicable D to all appellate forums. Mr. Shanti Bhushan then referred to the cases of Narmada Prasad v. Chagan Lal(1); Prabodh Chand v. Mohinder Singh(') ; Sumitra Devi v. Sheo Shankar Prasad Yadav(3) Chand Singh v. Shiv Ram(•); Vital Nagaraj v. R. Dayanand Sagar(') ; and Laxmi Narain v. Chander Singh('). In each of these cases, depending on the facts thereof, the Court has made an observation that the trial judge's assessment was entitled to great weight and respect and was, therefore, not to be ordinarily interfered with. None of these cases, however, indicated that this Court would not go into the matter if the facts and circumstances warranted a detailed examination or a fresh assessment. We shall presently refer to some of the decisions of the Court where this aspect has also been examined. To start with is the case of Ramabhai Ashabhai Patel v. Dabhi Ajitkumar Fulsinji and Ors.(') Ol [19661 1 s.c.R. 499. (2) AIR 1971 S.C 257. (3) [1973] 2 S.C.R. 920. (4) AIR 1975 SC 403. (5) [1975] 2 S.C.R. 384. (6) [1977] 2 S.C.R. 412. (7) p965j 1 S.C.R. nz. E F G H ' • A B l c D E F G H 1068 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1985) 1 S.C.R. disposed of by a five Bench. That was a case prior to amendment of the Act. Under the scheme then prevalent, election disputes were tried by a tribunal and an appeal lay to the High Court and the matter was before this Court by way of appeal by special leave. Dealing with this aspect of the matter, the Court held : "For, as soon as special leave is granted there is an appeal before this Court and while dealing with such an appeal. this Court exercises its civil jurisdiction. It is true that the rules framed by this Court in exercise of its rule making powers do not contain any provision analogous to O. XLI, r. 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure which permits a party to support the judgment appealed against upon a ground which has been found against him in that judgment. The provision nearest to it is the one contained in o. XVIII, r. 3 of the Rules of this Court which requires parties to file statement of cases. Sub-rule (I) of that rule provides that Part I of the statement of the case shall also set out the contentions of the parties and the points of law and fact arising in the appeal. It further provides that in Part II a party shall set out the propositions of law to be urged in support of the contentions of the party lodging the case and the authorities in support thereof. There is no reason to limit the provision of this rule only to those contentions which deal with the points found in favour of that party in the judgment appealed from. Apart from that we think that while dealing with the appeal before it this Court has the power to decide all the points arising from the judgment appealed against and even in the absence of an express provision like 0. XLI, r. 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure it can devise the appropriate procedure to be adopted at the hearing. There could be no better way of supplying the deficiency then by drawing upon the provisions of a general law like the Code of Civil Procedure and adopting such of those provisions as are suitable. We cannot lose sight of the fact that normally a party in whose favour the judgment appealed from has been given will not be granted special leave to appeal from it. Considerations of justice, therefore, require that this Court should in appropriate cases permit a party placed in such a position to support the judgment in his favour even ;r ' . .,.,- 1 SURENDER SINGH v. IiARDiAL SINGH (Ranganath Misra, J.) 1069; . upon grounds which were negatived in that judgment'~. 'J . . ·..; ·_.: .·,' The ratio of this decision makes the position clear that. an appeal laid before this Court whether under a statute conferring a right of appeal or as a result of. grant of leave under Article 136 ofthe Constitution, opens up the normal civil appellate jurisdiction of the Court to be exercised. In Bhanu Kuma~ Shast;i v~ llfoh~n 'Lal ··sukhadia and Ors.,<'> Ray, J. (as _he ihen was), indicated : . ' ' . :•.. . ' r ,; .i· ·' ·:.-, "If the High_ Court ·has overlooked important and .. crucial documents or or~! evidence,; such . evidence. will justify this .Couittd support the contentions of: the respon- .· dent that the findings of fact arrived at by tne'High Court· 'are itgainst clear 'and cogent 'proof of fads. :This C~urt will;- therefore, be justified in recording the correct findings .. ' on ample and abundant materials which. have been 'over-. · "looked and ignored by the High: Court •.. In 'the present · case; we have had occasion to .deal ·with ·these ·aspects. on the rival contentions and ·recorded our findings." · ·.·,~\. "':· - .. - '· '"' i·~-.-.:, .• ·.::'--:-'..\.·?,,·; . , In _Sumitra Devi's case. (supra), a decision.· of a three. Judge Bench on· which . Mr. Shanti Bhushan also relied, tne Court · observed : ~'It has been the consistent practice of this ·Court not to interfere with findings on questions.of fact unless th~re, is some grave or palpable error in the appreciation of the . . evidence on the basis of which the findings were arrived at.''. • .. :: In Jlfohd. Yasin Shah v. Ali Akbar Khan,(') a three Judge' Bench 'referred•with :approval to the ratio in Laxminarayan v. Returning Officer<'> and said : · " · · "' : . :. "The propositions enunciated by this Court-.: are well established .and there can be no dispute with the proposi- · , tions mentioned above. In the instant case, however, we ·. find that the approach of the learned. Judge was not .· (I) [1971] 3 S.C.R. 522. (2) [1977] 2 s.c.c. 23. (3) [1974) I S.C.R. 822. . : . r A I B c D E F G HI A B c D / / 1010 Stil'REMI! COURT REPORTS· ·. . '// .. [198 5) 1 S.C.R. correct. We have already pointed out a number of salient features appearing in the evidence which have rendered the case of the petitioner inherently· improbable. The· learned Judge appears to have overlooked these essential features. · Further, the learned Judge himself had observed ·that issue No.I which he had framed was wide enough to Include the plea of the appellant, and even if the order of the Returning Officer in rejecting the nomination paper on the ground of the absence of the candidate or his proposer was wrong, it could still be supported on the ground that the signature of the proposer was not genuine. The learned Judge has not determined this ·aspect of the ·matter: . Jn these circlimstances, therefore, we feel that the judgment of the High Court is erroneous both on fact and in Jaw and although the appellate Court is extremely slow in disturb- . ing the findings of fact, in the instant case, we are satisfied that the judgment of the High Court is against the .. weight of the evidence on record and preponderance . of probabilities." t . In S. Raghbir Singh Gill v. S. G-;;rcharan Singh Tohra. and Ors.,(1) it was again pointed out that if something is radically wrong with the approach of the learned Judge trying the election petifun E it would be for this Court to r.ectify the error. · F G The jurisdiction to exercise in an appeal under the Act, therefore, appears to be as wide as in any other civil appeal. Section 116-A (I) of the Act clearly indicates that the appeal to this Court bas to be disposed of by exercising the same jurisdiction as is exercised in an appeal against the original judgment of the High Court. In this view of the matter there can really be no rule, · .whet'.ler statutory or evolved by this Court by Jong usage as alleged, that the Court would not interfere with the findings of fact reached at the trial stage. Ordinarily a finding reached on assessment of the evidence particularly when it is oral would not be interfered . with but where the Court is satisfied that on account of a wrong approach to a matter, injustice bas been done to one of the parties before it, it would not only be within the powers of the Court but it would be its obligation to rectify the mistake and do justice to the party. H . (I) [1980) Suppl. S.C.C. SJ. ' -..; • 'r'· ' y l ... • r .. SURENDER SINGH v; llARDIAL SINGH (Ranganath Misra, J.) . 1071 We shall now::turn to the other submission of Mr. Shanti /·A Bhushan. ' By: a cat en a . 0f decioions of. this Court it has by now/ been very well settled that allegations of corrupt practice are quasicriminal charges and the proof that would be . required in supporf .of such allegations would be as in.a criminal charge; Mr: . Shanti Bhushan has canvassed.that the standard of proof.required in such a case would be dependent upon the gravity of the charge·and there · B is no justification to adopt the rule thaf in every case of allegation of corrupt. practice the standard applicable to j a~ criminal trial involving a grave charge like niurder should be adopted .. He has drawn'support from the observations of this Court in Dr. M. Chenna Reddy v. V Ramchandra Rao & Anr' (1) It may be pointod 'out here that the ratio in Chenna Reddy'• case runs counter to the current of C judicial thought on the point. Jn· fact, quite close in' point of time after Chenna Reddy's case came. the case or: Magraj Patadia v: R.K. Bir/a & Ors. ('l Hegde, J. indicated: I . ,, ·,: ~ ;· -, ·; · · • 'l.', - ' " ·'.·'It is true that as observed in Dr. M. Chenoa Reddy ,· v. V.•Ramachandra Rao& Anr., that a charge of corrupt practice cannot be equated to a criminal charge in· all respects. . While the accused in a criminal ·case can refuse · to plead and decline to adduce evidence on his behalf and yet ask the prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt such is not the position in an election petition. But the fact remains.that burden of proving the commission of the corrupt practice pleaded is on the petitioner and he has to discharge that burden satisfactorily. In doing so he cannot depend on preponderance of probabilities .. Courts do not 'set at naught the verdict of the electorate e~~ept ·on good grounds." · · · · ·' . Charges · of corrupt practice have been ·dealt ·with by this Court for over 20 years now in. election appeals under ·the ·Act. The first important case which came before this Court was· disposed of by a five judge bench in the case of Mohan Singh v. Bhanwar Lal & Ors. (3) Shah, J. (as he then was), spoke for the Court thus; "The onus of establishing a corrupt practice is undoubtedly un the person· who sets it up, and the onus is not (I) 40 E.L.R. 390 (2) [1971] 2 S.C.R. 118. (3) (1964] S S.C.R. 12. ,. E F G H 'B c D E G. H 1072 .. SilPREME COURT REPORTS · [198511 S.C,R. discharged on proof of mere preponderance of probability, as in the trial of a civil suit; the corrU.pt_ practice must be -, : · established beyond reasonable doubt by evidence which is clear and unambiguous.""· · .. Hegde, J. in Guruji Shrihar Baliram Jivatode ~. Vithalrao & Ors.,(1) reiterated the proposition.by saying :. ·"It is trite to say th.it the burden of proving ev.eryone of the ingredients of the corrupt practice alleged is ori him . who alleges it; If. he fails to establish. any one of them to the satisfaction of the Court he must fail.'' . In Mahan/ Shreo Nath v. Choudhry Ranbir Singh, (2) it _was again obse..Ved : . "A plea in an· election petition· that a candidate or his .election agent or any person with his consent has committed · ~-corrupt practice raises -~grave charg~, proof of which · results in disqualification from taking part in. elections for six years. The charge in its very nature must be established by clear and cogent evidence by those who seek to prove it. The Court does not hold such a charge proved merely on preponderance of probability: the Court requires that the ·conduct attributed to the offender is proved by evidence which establishes it beyond reasonable doubt." In Abdul Hussain Mir v. Slzamsul Jluda & Anr., '<3J 'Krishna · Iyer, J. indicated : "Charges, such as have been imputed here, are viewed as quasi-criminal carrying other penalties than losing a . . seat, and strong testimony is needed to subvert a Returning Officer's declaration .....• Wheri. elections are challenged on grounds with a criminal lain( the . benefit of doubt in testimonial matters belongs to the returned candidate· .. Oral evidence ordinarily is inadequate especially if it is of indifferent quality or orally procurable. (I) [1969] 2 S.C.R. 766. (2) [19701 3 s.c.c. 647. (3) [197S) 4 S.C.C. S33. • -( • l~ ' ' ... • SiJRINDER SINGH v. UARDiAL SiNGll (Ranganath Misra, J.) 1013 In Ch. Razik Ram v. Ch. Jaswant Singh Chouhan & Ors.I 1) Sarkaria, J. spoke for this Court in the following terms : "Before considering as to whether the charges of corrupt practice were established, it is important to remember the standard of proof required in such cases. It is well settled that a charge of corrupt practice is substantially akin to a criminal charge. The commission of a corrupt practice entails serious penal consequences. It not only vitiates the election of the candidate concerned but also disqualifies him from taking part in elections for a considerably long time. Thus, the trial of an election petition being in the nature of an accusation, bearing the indelible stamp of quasi-criminal action, the standard of proof is the same as in a criminal trial. Just as in a criminal case, so in an election petition, the respondent against whom the charge of corrupt practice is levelled, is presumed to be innocent unless proved guilty. A grave and heavy onus therefore rests on the accuser to establish each and every ingredient of the charge by clear, unequvocal and unimpeachable evidence beyond reasonable doubt; It is true that there is no difference between the general rules of evidence in civil and criminal cases, and the difinition of "proved" in section 3 of the Evidence Act does not draw a distinction between civil and criminal . cases. Nor does this definition insist on perfect proof because absolute certainty amounting to demonstration is rarely to be had in the affairs of life, Nevertheless. the standard of measuring proof prescribed by the definition, is that of a person of prudence and practical good sense. 'Proof' means the effect of the evidence adduced in the case. Judged by the standard of prudent man, in the light of the nature of onus cast by law, the probative effective of evidence in civil and criminal proceedings is markedly different. The same evidence which may be sufficient to regard a fact as proved in a civil suit, may be considered insufficient for a conviction in a criminal action. While in the former a mere preponderance of probability may constitute an adequate basis of decision, in the latter (I) [197S] 4 S.C.C. 769. A B c D E F G H • ' I' L 1 \ ~ ""I- ·~ ... ! ' ,' • ,I , i.:,.;,, ,. /' • A B c D II F 1074 SUPRRME COURT REPORTS [1985j 1. S.C.R. a far higher degreed of assurance and juicial certitude is requisite for a conviction. The same is largely true about proof of a charge of corrupt practice, which cannot be established by mere balance of probabilitles, and, if after giving due consideration and effect to the totality of the evidence and circumstances of the case, the mind of the Court is left rocking with reasonable doubt-not being the doubt of a timid, fickle or vacillating mind-as to the veracity of the charge, it must hold the same as not proved." To the same effect are the following decisions of this Court in Surya Kant Roy v. lmamul Hak Khan