# SUSHIL KUMAR v. RAKESH KUMAR

- **Citation:** [2003] Supp. 4 S.C.R. 802
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2003-10-16
- **Case number:** Election Petition No.3 of 2002
- **Bench:** V.N. Khare, S.B. Sinha
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/sushil-kumar-v-rakesh-kumar-19435
- **Pages:** 35

## Headnote

Constitution of India-Article I73(b)-Minimum age-Importance
of-Nomination of a candidate objected to on the ground of his being
under-aged-Duty of returning officer-Mandatory duty of the returning
C officer to make inquiry in respect of all objections raised-Election of an
under-aged candidate-Validity of-Held, election would be void even
though the nomination paper had been accepted-Representation of the
People Act-Section 36 (2).
D
Indian Evidence Act, I872-Section I06-Burden of proof-Facts
especially within knowledge-Burden is on the person who has such
knowledge-Election petition-Age of a returned candidate-Should be
determined not only on the basis of the material placed but also
circumstances attending thereto-Certain facts which could show that the
E elected candidate was not below the prescribed age within the special
knowledge of the candidate-Elected candidate fails to disclose those
facts-Held, the candidate failed to discharge his burden-C.onstitution of
India-Article I73 (b).
F
Indian Evidence Act, I 872-Section 35-Entry in public recordRequirements of-Held, school admission register or transfer certificate do
not satisfy requirement of
Indian Evidence Act, I 872-Section 8-Conduct of a party-Relevance
of-Elected candidate had filed a bail application in another case stating
G his age to be around I 4-Election challenged on the ground that, he was
below prescribed age-C.andidate claiming that age in bail application
was mentioned without his instruction and was not on affidavit....:....if eld, in
absence of any satisfactory explanation, court would presume the contents
of application to be true-Representation of the People Act, 1951-Section
H 87.
802
SUSHIL KUMAR v. RAKESH KUMAR
803
Code of Civil Procedure-Order VIII Rules 3 and 5-Written A
Statement-Evasive denial-Effect of-Held, amounts to admission-Facts
so admitted need not be proved-Evidence contrary thereto cannot be
allowed to be /aid-Indian Evidence Act, 1872-Seetion 58.
Indian Evidence Act, I872-Section 65-Proof of document- B
Secondary evidence-Validity of-Witness claiming that the date of birth
of a person had been registered in the police register on the next day of
his birth-Register not produced-Held, an adverse inference can be
drawn that had the document been produced, the same would have gone
against the party.
Representation of the People Act, I95I-Sections 83-Election
petition-Pleadings-Interpretation of-Held, should be strictly construed
c
The appellant and the respondent filed nomination papers for
election to the Bihar Legislative Assembly. The last date for filing D
nomination paper was 31.1.2000 whereas the date of scrutiny of
nomination paper was 1.2.2000. Before the returning officer, the
appellant raised an objection that as the respondent was less than 25
years of age and therefore, not competent to contest elections in view
of· provisions of Article 173(b) of the Constitution of India. The
objection of the appellant was rejected by the returning officer.
E
In the election, the respondent was declared elected.
The appellant filed an election petition before the High Court
challenging the election of the respondent on the ground that at the F
time of filing of nomination paper the respondent was not above the
age of 25 years as required under Article 173 (b) of the Constitution
of India. As per the appellant the date of birth of the respondent was
1.5.1981. To substantiate his case, the appellant contended :-
1. That the respondent was the son of one Shri Sakuni Choudhary G
and was variously known as Rakesh Ku alias Rakesh Kumar alias
Samrat Choudhary alias Samrat Chandra Mourya.
2. That the respondent had appeared in the secondary school
examination as Samrat Mourya son ofShakuni Choudhary in the year H
804
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
A 1996 and the certificate issued by the Bihar Secondary School
Examination Board stated his date of birth to be 1.5.1981.
3. That the respondent had been appointed as a Cabinet Minister
bu

## Text

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A
SUSHIL KUMAR
v.
RAKESH KUMAR
OCTOBER 16, 2003
B
[V.N. KHARE, CJ. AND S.B. SINHA, J.]
Constitution of India-Article I73(b)-Minimum age-Importance
of-Nomination of a candidate objected to on the ground of his being
under-aged-Duty of returning officer-Mandatory duty of the returning
C officer to make inquiry in respect of all objections raised-Election of an
under-aged candidate-Validity of-Held, election would be void even
though the nomination paper had been accepted-Representation of the
People Act-Section 36 (2).
D
Indian Evidence Act, I872-Section I06-Burden of proof-Facts
especially within knowledge-Burden is on the person who has such
knowledge-Election petition-Age of a returned candidate-Should be
determined not only on the basis of the material placed but also
circumstances attending thereto-Certain facts which could show that the
E elected candidate was not below the prescribed age within the special
knowledge of the candidate-Elected candidate fails to disclose those
facts-Held, the candidate failed to discharge his burden-C.onstitution of
India-Article I73 (b).
F
Indian Evidence Act, I 872-Section 35-Entry in public recordRequirements of-Held, school admission register or transfer certificate do
not satisfy requirement of
Indian Evidence Act, I 872-Section 8-Conduct of a party-Relevance
of-Elected candidate had filed a bail application in another case stating
G his age to be around I 4-Election challenged on the ground that, he was
below prescribed age-C.andidate claiming that age in bail application
was mentioned without his instruction and was not on affidavit....:....if eld, in
absence of any satisfactory explanation, court would presume the contents
of application to be true-Representation of the People Act, 1951-Section
H 87.
802
SUSHIL KUMAR v. RAKESH KUMAR
803
Code of Civil Procedure-Order VIII Rules 3 and 5-Written A
Statement-Evasive denial-Effect of-Held, amounts to admission-Facts
so admitted need not be proved-Evidence contrary thereto cannot be
allowed to be /aid-Indian Evidence Act, 1872-Seetion 58.
Indian Evidence Act, I872-Section 65-Proof of document- B
Secondary evidence-Validity of-Witness claiming that the date of birth
of a person had been registered in the police register on the next day of
his birth-Register not produced-Held, an adverse inference can be
drawn that had the document been produced, the same would have gone
against the party.
Representation of the People Act, I95I-Sections 83-Election
petition-Pleadings-Interpretation of-Held, should be strictly construed
c
The appellant and the respondent filed nomination papers for
election to the Bihar Legislative Assembly. The last date for filing D
nomination paper was 31.1.2000 whereas the date of scrutiny of
nomination paper was 1.2.2000. Before the returning officer, the
appellant raised an objection that as the respondent was less than 25
years of age and therefore, not competent to contest elections in view
of· provisions of Article 173(b) of the Constitution of India. The
objection of the appellant was rejected by the returning officer.
E
In the election, the respondent was declared elected.
The appellant filed an election petition before the High Court
challenging the election of the respondent on the ground that at the F
time of filing of nomination paper the respondent was not above the
age of 25 years as required under Article 173 (b) of the Constitution
of India. As per the appellant the date of birth of the respondent was
1.5.1981. To substantiate his case, the appellant contended :-
1. That the respondent was the son of one Shri Sakuni Choudhary G
and was variously known as Rakesh Ku alias Rakesh Kumar alias
Samrat Choudhary alias Samrat Chandra Mourya.
2. That the respondent had appeared in the secondary school
examination as Samrat Mourya son ofShakuni Choudhary in the year H
804
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
A 1996 and the certificate issued by the Bihar Secondary School
Examination Board stated his date of birth to be 1.5.1981.
3. That the respondent had been appointed as a Cabinet Minister
but on a complaint, the Governor of Bihar had directed an inquiry to
B be made in respect of the date of birth of the respondent. The inquiry
was conducted by the Chief Electoral Officer. Aft~r giving a hearing
to the respondent, he came to a finding that the respondent was below
25 years of age on the date of filing of the nomination paper. On the
basis of the report of the Chief Electoral Officer, the Governor had
C recommended that the respondent should be removed from the Ministry
and ultimately the respondent was so removed.
4. That in a criminal case in which the respondent had been
implicated, the respondent had filed a bail application stating his age
D to be about 14 years and also stating that he is a school going student.
E
5. That the elder brother of the respondent, Rajesh Kumar, as per
the record of the institution in which he was studying, was aged 22
years in the year 1999 and being younger, the respondent could not
have been more than 25 years of age on the date of filing of the
nomination paper.
To the petition of the appellant, the respondent filed his written
statement in which he denied the allegations of the appellant. However,
the r~spondent did not specifically deny his alias names. In reply to the
F allegation that the elder brother of the respondent was aged! 22 years
in 1999, the respondent stated that Rajesh Kumar has been mentioned
as the elder brother of the respondent merely on imagination and that
the appellant had no knowledge about that and a wrong statement had
been made. In respect of the Governor's recommendation, the
G respondent contended that he had resigned from the post of Minister
few days before the completion of six months in view of the provision
of Article 164(4) of the Constitution of India. The respondent further
contended that the age mentioned in the bail application filed by him
was so mentioned without his instructio!l by his advocate. The court
H ultimately did not accept the contention of the respondent in respect
SUSHIL KUMAR v. RAKESH KUMAR
805
of his age.
A
The respondent contended that his date of birth was 16.11.1968.
He produced his election identity card and the voters' list wherein his
age was shown to be 24 as on 1.1.1995. He also produced the school
admission register and transfer certificate issued by two schools in B
which he had allegedly studied to prove his date of birth. The
respondent also produced his horoscope. The respondent also examined
one 'E' who stated that the date of birth of the respondent was entere<l
in the register maintained in Police Station on the very next date of
his birth. The register was, however, not produced by the said witness. C
The High Court dismissed the petition of the appellant.
Allowing the appeal against the order of the High Court, the
Court
HELD : 1. The materials on record taken in their entirety
together with the circumstantial evidence goes to show that the
respondent was not above the age of 25 years on the date of filing of
the nomination. The findings of the High Court to the contrary cannot
D
be sustained. [836-E)
E
Relevance of the Prescribed Age
2.1. The Constitution of India, the Representation of the People
Act, 1951 and the rules made thereunder had been enacted to protect
the purity of the election. Article 173 of the Constitution of India F
underlines a salutary object. It postulates that a person shall not be
qualified to be chosen to fill a seat in. the Legislature of a State unless
he is not less than twenty-five years of age in the case of a seat in the
Legislative Assembly. A person although may become entitled to vote
on attaining majority, the makers of the Constitution deliberately G
inserted clause (b) in Article 173 so as to enable the voters to elect a
person who has attained majority and experience in life. Only a
matured and experienced person can represent the people and take
steps which would be beneficial to the electorates. [819-E-G)
H
806
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
A
2.2. Section 36(2) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951
casts a mandatory duty on the returning officer to examine f:he
nomination papers and take a decision of all objections which may be
made upon making an inquiry in that behalf, which would include the
question as to whether the requirement of Article 173 of the Constitution
B. of India has been fulfilled by the candidate or not. The effect of the
aforementioned provision is that a candidate is not qualified unless he
has attained the age specified in Article l 73(b) of the Constitution of
India on the date fixed for scrutiny of nominations. [819-H, 820-A)
Amritlal Ambalal Patel v. Himatbhai Gomanbhai Patel & Anr.,
C (1969) 1 SCR 277, referred to.
2.3. It is beyond any cavil that in the event a person is elected who
does not fulfil the constitutional requirements, the election would be
void despite the fact that the returning officer has accepted his
D nomination paper. Such a question indisputably would fall for
consideration in an election petition where the parties would be entitled
to produce evidence as in support of their respective cases. [820-B-D)
Durga Shankar Mehta v. Thakur Raghuraj Singh and Ors., (19551
1 SCR 267 and Birad Mal Singhvi v. Anand Purohit, (1988) Supp. SCC
E 604, referred to.
2.4. The election Tribunal while determining and issue of this
nature has to bear in mind that Article 173 (b) of the Constitution of
India provides for a disqualification. A person cannot be permitted to
F occupy an office for which he is disqualified under the Constitution.
The endeavour of the court shall therefore shoul<I be to see that a
disqualified person should not hold the office but should not at the
same time, unseat a person qualified therefor. The. Court is required
to proceed cautiously in the matter and, thus, while seeing that an
G election of the representative of the people is not set aside on flimsy
grounds but would also have a duty to see that "the c_onstitutioi?al
mandate is fulfilled. (836-C-D)
Burden of Proof
H
3.1. It is no doubt true the burden of proof to show that candidate
SUSHIL KUMAR v. RAKESH KUMAR
807
who was disqualified as on the date of the nomination would be on the A
election petitioner. It is also true that the initial burden of proof that
nomination paper of an elected candidate has wrongly been accepted
is on the election petitioner. In terms of Section 103 of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872 the burden of proof as to any particular fact lies
on that person who wishes the court to believe in its existence, unless B
it is provided by any law that the proof of that fact shall lie on any
particular person. Furthermore, in relation to certain matters, the fact
being within t~e special knowledge of the respondent, the burden to
prove the same would be on him in terms of Section 106 of the Indian
Evidence Act. However, the question as to whether the burden to prove
a particular matter is on the plaintiff or the defendant would depend C
upon the nature of the dispute. (820-F-H, 821-A-B)
.
Orissa Mining Corporation and Anr. v. Anand Chandra Prusty, AIR
(1997) SC 2274, referred to.
D
3.2. The age of a person, in an election petition has to be determined
not only on the basis of the materials placed on records but also upon
taking into consideration the circumstances attending thereto. The initial
burden to prove the allegations made in the election petition although
was upon the election petitioner but for proving the facts which were E
within the special knowledge of the respondent, the burden was upon
him in terms of Section 106 of the Evidence Act. It is also trite that when
both parties have adduced evidence, the question of onus of proof becomes
academic. Furthermore, and admission on the part of the party to the tis
shall be binding on him and in any event a presumption must be made
that the same is taken to be established. (821-C-E)
F
Union of India and Ors. v. Sugauli Sugar Works (P) Ltd., [1976] 3
SCC 32 and Mis. Cox and Kings (Agents) Ltd. v. Their Workmen and Ors.,
AIR (1977) SC 1666, referred to.
School Admission Register and Transfer Certificate
4.1. The Admission Register or a Transfer Certificate issued by
G
a Primary School do not satisfy the requirements of Section 35 of the
Indian Evidence Act. There is no reliable evidence on record to show
that the date of birth was recorded in the school register on the basis H
808
~Uf>REME COURT REPORTS [2003) SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
A of the statement of any responsible person. [821-G-H]
Brij Mohan Singh v. Pri);a Brat Narain Sinha and Ors., AIR (Jl965)
SC 282; Birad Mal Singhvi v. Anand Purohit, [1988) Supp. SCC 604;
Chittaranjan Das v. Durgapore'Project Limited & Ors., 99 CWN 897 and
B Coal India Limited V; Arun Kumar Sinha & Ors., (1999] 1 SLR 151,
referred to. ·
4.2. The.High Court placed its needle of suspicion in relation to the
school admission register but sti.IJ proceeded to rely thereupon which
amounts to ~isdirection in law. Forgery in the school admission register
C has been done in a crude form. The school authorities must have used
some black space of the register for the year 1980 at the instance of the
respondent. No credence thereto can be given. [827-F, 827-E]
4.3. As the respondent only had special knowledge as to in which
D school did he study; he should have disclosed the same. The respondent
instead of disclosing the said facts took recourse to suppressio veri and
suggestio falsi. He produced documents which ·were apparently forged
and fabricated. [828-D, 829-A)
Punit Rai v. Dinesh Chaudhary, JT (2003) Supp. 1 SC 557, relied
E upon.
Whether Rajesh Kumar was the Elder Brother of the Respondent
5.1. (n terms of Order VIII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
F a defendant is r_"._qii'ired to deny or d~spute the statements made in the
plaint categorically, as an evasive denial would amount to an admission
of the allegation made in the plaint in terms of Order VIII Rule 5 of the
Code of Civil Procedure. U oder Section 58 of the Indian Evidence Act a
fact admitt~d need not be proved. Once it is held that the statements
made in tire election petition have not been specifically denied or dispute
G in the written statement, the allegations made therein would be deemed
to have been admitted. No evidence contrary thereto or inconsistent
therewith could have been permitted to be laid. [831-H, 832-A, 833-C)
Badat and Co. v. East India Trading Co., (1964] 4 SCR 19, .referred
H to.
SUSHIL KUMAR v. RAKESH KUMAR
809
5.2. In the written statement, in reply to contention of the A
appellant that the elder brother of the respondent was aged 22 years
as on 28.1.1999, the respondent has not specifically contended that the
statement made in the election petition are incorrect or how they are
so. Merely the said allegations have been denied as being imagination
of the election petitioner without making a statement of fact that the B
alleged person was not the elder brother of the respondent or in fact
younger to him. Such an evasive denial attracts Order VIII Rule 5 of
the Code of Civil Procedure. The statements made in the election
petition in this respect must, therefore, be deemed to have been
admitted. [832-A-C)
5.3. The approach of the High Court was not correct. It failed to
apply the legal principles as contained in Order VIII Rules 3 and 5 of
the Code of Civil Procedure. The High Court had also not analysed
c
the evidences adduced on behalf of the appellant in this behalf in details
but merely rejected the same summarily stating that the vague D
statements had been made by some witnesses. [833-B-C)
5.4. The pleadings in an election petition must be construed
strictly. The provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure apply to an
election petition. The election petition is not an action at law or a suit
in equity. It is a special proceeding and even withdrawal of an election E
petition may not be permitted. [835-C)
R.M Seshadri v. G. Vasantha Pai and Ors., AIR (1969) SC 692,
referred to.
Atlas Name of the Respondent
F
6. The respondent did not controvert the allegation that his alias
name was Samrat Choudhary. The legal principles contained in Order
VIII Rules 3 and 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure shall apply here.
The name of the respondent's father is the same, i.e. Shakuni Choudhary. G
DW 2 in his examination in chief itself admitted that Sam rat Choudhary
was the second son of Shakuni Choudhary. It may safely be concluded
that the respondent was also known as Sam rat Choudhary. The finding
of the High Court in this behalf is contradictory and inconsistent.
[824-E-F, 825-A-BJ H
810
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
A
Report of the Chief Electnral Officer and the Order of the Governor
7.1. The report of the Chief Electoral Officer had been marked
exhibit without any objection. The counsel for both the parties relied
thereupon and placed the findings recorded therein in extenso. The
parties cannot be permitted to rely upon a part of a document and at
B the same time raise a contention that the same is inadmissible. The said
report is, thus, admissible in evidence, although it may not have any
statutory backing. (825-:C-D]
7.2. The report of the Chief Electoral Officer as also the order of
C the Governor never came to be questioned by the respondent. A person
against whom an allegation of violation of constitutional provision has
been made and who has taken Minister's berth without being prope1rly
qualified therefor, expectedly would question the said decision before
an approp~iate forum, if not for. the sake of 'the office but for
maintaining his own reputation in the public field. It will, thus, be safe
D to infer that the respondent accepted the report of the Chief Electoral
Officer and the order of. the Governor sub-silentio. [825-F, 826-B-D]
Electoral Roll and Identity Card
8. The electoral roll and the identity card issued ~y the Election
E Commission do not conclusively show that the respondent was major
in 1995. In both the documents the age of the respondent was stated
to be 24 years as on 1.1.1995. According to the respondent he was born
in 1968 and, thus, on the said date he would have been more than 24
years of age. Why such an inconsistency crept in has not been
F explained. (826-E-H)
Horoscope
9. The horoscope purported to have been filed by the respondent
does not inspire confidence. The horoscope, therefore, could not have
G been looked 'into by the High Court for any purpose whatsoever.
(829-E-F]
Bail Application
10.l. It is difficult to believe the contention raise on behalf of the
H r.espondent that the statements made in the bail application were made
SUSHIL KUMAR v. RAKESH KUMAR
811
without any instruction. The High Court is not correct in observing A
that it is a common experience that all such pleas are taken for the
purpose of obtaining bail. No presumption in this behalf can be raised
as such allegations would be subject to judicial scrutiny. [830-A-CJ
10.2. Making a false statement before the Court whether on B
affidavit or not is not to be treated lightly. The court acts on the basis
of the statement made by a party to the lis. Whether such defence has
been accepted or not is not of much importance but whether a false
statement to the knowledge of the party has been made or not is. In
any view of the matter, the court must draw an adverse inference in C
this behalf against the respondent. (830-H, 831-A)
10.3. A person should not be permitted to take advantage of his
own wrong. He should either stand by his statement made before a
court of law or should explain the same sufficiently. In absence of any D
satisfactory explanation, the court will presume that the statement
before a court is correct and binding on the party on whose behalf the
same has been made. (831-B-CJ
referred to.
ThiruJohn etc. v. The Returning Officer and Ors., [1977) 3 SCC 540,
E
Evidence of 'E'
11. Reliance placed on the witness of 'E' appears to be misplaced.
The register maintained in the Police Station should have been F
produced. Non-production of the said document would give rise to
drawal of adverse inference to the effect that had such document been
produced, the same would have gone· against the interest of the
respondent. (835-F-G)
National Insurance Co. Ltd., New Delhi v. Jugal Kishore and Ors.,
[1988) 1 sec 626, referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 8585 of
G
woo.
H
812
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
A
From the Judgment and Order dated 7.8.2002 of the Patna High Court
B
in E.P. No. 3 of 2000.
Saiyad Uruj Abbas, Md. Akram and Sudhir Nandrajog for the
Appellant.
Pranab Kumar Mullick for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
S.B. SINHA, J: This appeal under Section 116-A of the Representation
C of People Act, 1951 arises out of a judgment and order dated 7.8.2002
passed by the High Court of Patna in Election Petition No.3 of 2002
whereby and whereunder the election petition filed by the appellant herein
was dismissed.
D THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND:
The parties hereto together with other candidates filed their respective
nomination papers for election to the Bihar Legislative Assembly from 181
Parbatta Constituency.
E
The last date for filing the nomination papers was 31.1.2000 whereas
the scrutiny thereof was to be done on 1.2.2000. The candidature could
be withdrawn by 3.2.2000. The date of polling was 17.2.2000 and the
counting of the ballot papers was to be done on 25.2.2000.
F
In the said election the respondent succeeded. The election petition
was filed by the appellant herein solely on the ground that the respondent,
at the time of filing his nomin.ation paper being not above the age of 25
years as mandatorily required under Article l 73(b) of the Constitution of
India was not entitled to file his nomination.
G ELECTION PETITION:
In his election petition, the appellant, inter a/ia, contended that the
objection as regard the age of the respondent was made in writing before
the returning officer but the same was rejected without giving an opportunity
H of hearing to him, purported to be on the ground that such objection had
SUSHIL KUMAR r. RAKESH KUMAR (SINHA, J.]
813
been filed in relation to one Rakesh Kumar alias Samrat Choudhary while A
the nomination paper had been filed by Rakesh Ku. According to the
appellant, the respondent's date of birth was 1.5.1981 which would appear
from a certificate issued by the Bihar Secondary School Examination
Board wherein the respondent appeared as Rakesh Kumar alias Samrat
Morya in the year 1996 as a private candidate from Kritanand Vidya B
Mandir High School and was allocated the Roll Code 3218, Roll No.0019
and he failed therein.
Further contention of the appellant is that the respondent was
appointed as a Minister of the Cabinet rank but having regard to the C
complaint made by one Shri P.K. Sinha before the Hon'ble Governor of
Bihar, an inquiry was made and he was found to be below the age of 25
years, as a result whereof the respondent was removed from the Ministry.
It has further been contended that the respondent was implicated in a
criminal case being Tarapur P.S. Case No.44of1995 wherein an application
for bail was filed by him or on his behalf on 20.4.1995 before the Chief D
Judicial Magistrate, Munger and it had specifically been stated therein that
he, thence, was a school going student being aged about 15 years.
The appellant further contended that the respondent's elder brother,
Rohit Kumar, who was studying in the Birla Institute of Technology, was E
aged 22 years in the year 1999 and, thus, he could not be aged 25 years
on the date of filing of i:he nomination paper.
WRITTEN STATEMENT :
On the other hand, the respondent in his written statement denied and F
disputed the aforementioned contentions of the appellant herein and in
support of his plea that he was much above 25 years of age on the date
of filing of the nomination paper, he relied upon the election identity card
as also the voter register wherein his age was shown to be 24 years in the
year 1995. He contended that his date of birth is 16.l l.1968 anJ in support G
thereof he relied upon his horoscope and the school admission register of
New St. Xaviers School, Boring Road, Patna as also a transfer certificate
issued by Swami Vivekananda Vidyalaya, Mithapur, Patna wherein it was
alleged that he took admission in Class II in the former school on
12.11.1980 and left the same on 13.l l.1983 whereas he·was admitted in H
814
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
A the latter school on 12.4.1984 and left the same while studying in Class
VII on 31.12.86.
ISSUES BEFORE THE HIGH COURT :
B
The High Court having regard to the rival contentions raised in the
respective pleadings of the parties framed the following issues :
c
D
"i) Whether the election petition is maintainable in the
present fonn?
ii)
Whether the nomination of the sole respondent was
accepted illegally although he was under qualified as
alleged in the election petition?
iii) Whether the election petition suffers from statutory
defects as contemplated under the Representation of
People Act?
iv)
What relief, if any, the election petitioner is entitled
to?"
E JUDGMENT OF THE HIGH COURT:
Issues Nos. (i) and (iii) were decided in favour of the appellant. As
regard Issue No. (ii), the parties adduced both oral and documentary
evidences.
F
For the purpose of analyzing the materials on records, evidences
G
H
brought on records were divided by the High Court in the following seven
categories :
i)
Order of His Excellency the then Governor of the State of
Bihar and the report of the Chief Electoral Officer, Bihar,
which have been marked as Exhibit-4 and Exhibit-8/A.
ii)
The age records of Rohit Kumar son of Sri Shakuni
Choudhary such as Ext.5, Ext.5/1 and Ext.5/2.
iii)
The age recorded of Samrat Chandra Morya son of Shakuni
SUSHIL KUMAR v. RAKESH KUMAR [SINHA, J.]
815
Choudhary as 1.5 .1981 in the application fonn for appearing A
in the examination of Secondary School Annual Examination,
1996 as per Ext.6 and Ext.611.
iv)
Minority mentioned in the bail petition moved for and on
behalf of the respondent Rakesh Kumar, Ext. 2, 2/A and B
2/A/l.
v)
Horoscope of the same respondent Rakesh Kumar, Ext.6.
vi)
Admission Register of the respondent in New St. Xaviers c
Junior School, Ext.D and the transfer certificate from
Vivekananda Vidyalaya, Mithapur, Ext.I.
vii) Certified copy of electoral roll for the year 1995, Ext.E and
the identity card of Rakesh Kumar issued by the Election
Commission of India, Ext.F.
D
The findings of the learned Judge are :
(i) The orders of the Governor on the report of the Chief Electoral
Officer are not binding on the court, as the inquiry was an administrative E
in nature and not a statutory one. The Chief Electoral Officer who made
the said inquiry having not been subjected to cross-examination, the
contents of the report cannot be used in the judicial proceedings and, thus,
the same would not be conclusive on the pointed question of underage of
the respondent.
F
(ii) Although the statements made in paragraph 18 of the election
petition had not been specifically denied or disputed in paragraph 15 of
the written-statement but keeping in view the fact that denial had been
made that Rohit Kumar was the elder brother of the respondent as also the
evidence contrary thereto had been adduced the same did not come in aid G
to the election petitioner to prove the underage of the respondent.
(iii) Although the respondent was named as Samrat Choudhary,
having regard to the denial that he was known as Samrat Choudhary, Ext.6
and Ext.6/1 are not relevant.
H
816
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
A
(iv) The age of the respondent in the bail petition was mentioned
without any instructions from the respondent or his family members, as
alleged by the advocate who had deposed in the matter. Furthermore,
judicial notice of the fact can be taken that for moving the bail application
various grounds are raised for release of the accused from the custody, and,
B thus, such plea cannot be taken seriously for debarring a person ~
contemplated under Article l 73(b) of the Constitution of India.
c
D
E
F
(v) Although the horoscope has not been proved by the maker thereof
but as the same was marked without objection, the same can be taken as
a supporting evidence.
(vi) Although no reliance was placed as regard "Ext. I; as regard
Ext. D, namely, the Admission Register maintained by New St. Xaviers
Junior School, it was held :
" ... Regarding the Admission Register at New St. Xaviers Junior
School, the same has been proved by Mrs. Reshmi Kumari,
D.W.7, who happens to be the in charge Principal of that school.,
Although from the seriality and the other entries maintained in the
register some· question marks are there but .on. the face of the
records it appears that against the entry no.312 wherein the name
of the respondent was being entered with all its particulars
including the date of birth being verified by the father of the
respondent who put his signature acknowledging the veracity of
the particulars being recorded under that serial number ... "
(vii) Although Ext. E and Ext. F are not of much help in construing
the actual date. of birth of the respondent but they are annex7d to show that
in the year 1995 he became eligible to vote.
SUBMISSIONS :
G
Mr. S.U. Abbas, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant
would, inter alia, submit that the respondent was having four !lames,
namely, (i) Rakesh Kumar, (ii) Rakesh Ku, (iii) Samrat Choudhary; and
(iv) Samrat Chandra Maurya. The first three names being admitted, the
finding of the High Court that he was not known as Samrat Choudhary
H must 6e considered in the light of the finding of the Governor of the State
SUSHIL KUMAR v. R~KESH KUMAR [SINHA, J.]
817
of Bihar wherein in no uncertain.tenns it was held that the respondent's A
father name as also the address, as mentioned in Ext. E being the same;
the High Court committed a manifest error in holding that his disqualification
had not been proved.
Taking us through the bail application Ext.3, the learned counsel B
would contend that as therein the following statements had been made
which are not denied :
"4. That the petitioner is school going student and he is aged
about 14 years only,
5. That the petitioner is below 16 years;"
the same was sufficient to prove the underage of the respondent.
c
As regard the question as to whether Rohit Kumar was the elder
brother of the respondent or not, our attention was drawn to paragraph 18 D
of the election petition and paragraph 15 of the written statement and on
the basis thereof the learned counsel would submit that as the respondent
gave a vague reply in his written statement which was accepted by the High
Court, it must be held that an admission in that behalf has been made by
the respondent. In support of his contention, Mr. Abbas placed reliance E
on Badat and Co. v. East India Trading Co., [1964] 4 SCR 19.
The learned counsel drawing our attention to the Admission Register
maintained by the New St. Xaviers Junior School would contend that the
High Court, despite having observed that there were some question marks F
in relation thereto, must be held to have committed a manifest error in
relying thereupon. The learned counsel would urge that as OW 7, the VicePrincipal of New St. Xaviers Junior School, in her cross-examination
categorically admitted that the maximum age of a student for taking
admission in Class I was five years, it is surprising how the respondent
who read in her school from Class II to Class IV could have been G
admitted at an age of more than 12 years.
As regard the transfer
certificate issued by Swami Vivekananda Vidyalaya, Mithapur (Ext.I),
Mr. Abbas would submit that the same was issued on 28.7.1999 when the
inquiry was pending and, thus, the same could not have been admitted in
evidence.
H
818
SUPREl'vtE COURT REPORTS (2003] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
A
As regard horoscope of the respondent (Ext.C), the learned couns(~I
would urge that without examining the maker thereof, it could not have
been admitted in evidence.
The learned counsel would contend that even there exists contradictions
. B between the date of birth of the respondent as evidenced in the school
leaving certificate (Ext.I) and voter register and election identity card
(Exts.E and F), insofar as if the former is taken into consideration, the
respondent would have been of 26 years of age as on 1.1.1995 whereas
he would be aged 24 years as per the voter register and election identity
C card. The learned counsel would lastly contend that the respondent having
not questioned the findings contained in the Inquiry Report of the Chief
Electoral Officer as also the order of the Governor of the State of Bihar,
must be held to be estopped and precluded from contending that he was
major on the date of filing of the nomination.
D
Mr. P.K. Mullick, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
respondent would, on the other hand, submit that the Governor of the State
of Bihar while passing the order (Ext.4) committed an error of fact in
holding that the father's name as also the residential address of the
respondent were admitted despite the fact that no residential address was
E mentioned in the letter of the Secretary, Bihar Secondary School Examination
Board.
The learned counsel would urge that only because the father's name
of the respondent was Shakuni Choudhary, the same by itself could not
have led to the conclusion that he is also known Samrat Choudhary.
F Pointing out to the report of the Chief Electoral Officer, it was argued that
the findings recorded therein in this behalf are in favour of the respondent.
According to the learned counsel, the date of birth as disdosed by 1he
respondent was not accepted by the Chief Electoral Officer only on the
ground that the transfer certificate as also the horoscope had not been
G proved by any witness in that behalf but the said lacuna having filled up
by the High Court, the said evidence had rightly been considered to be
admissible. Mr. Mullick would contend that in terms of Section 146 of
the Representation ofthe People Act, the Chief Electoral Officer can make
an inquiry for the purpose of ascertaining as to whether a member suffers
H from disqualification or not but no inquiry is contemplated for the purpose
~
I
SUSHIL KUMAR v. RAKESH KUMAR [SINHA, J.]
819
of unseating the elected member on the ground that he was unqualified A
therefor. In that vie·.v of the matter, the learned counsel would contend
that the report of the Chief Electoral Officer and consequently the order
of the Governor of the State of Bihar were inadmissible in evidence. In
any event, the maker of the report having not been examined, no
evidentiary value can be attached thereto. As regard the statements made B
in the application for grant of bail, Mr. Mullick would submit that the same
being not supported by an affidavit and further the advocate who had filed
the same having deposed as regards the circumstances u11der which such
application was made, had rightly been not accepted by the High Court as
a proof of age of the respondent.
As regard the age ofRohit Kumar, Mr. Mullick would urge that DW.9
had asserted that he was younger to the respondent, no credence to the
contention of the appellant had rightly been placed by the High Court.
c
Drawing our attention to the evidence ofDW 3, Md. Ekramul Haque, D
it was argued that the said witness had been examined to show that the
respondent was 33 years old as on 17. l.2002. He would further submit
that the horoscope had been proved by a person in whose presence the same
was prepared, and, thus, the same was admissible in evidence.
RELEVANCE OF PRESCRIBED AGE :
E
The Constitution of India, the Representation of the People Act and
the rules made thereunder had been enacted to protect the purity of the
election. Article 173 of the Constitution of India underlines a salutary
object. It postulates that a person shall not be qualified to be chosen to fill F
a seat in the Legislature of a State unless he is not less than twenty-five
years of age in the case of a seat in the Legislative Assembly. A person
although may become entitled to vote on attaining majority, the makers of
the Constitution deliberately inserted clause (b) in Article 173 so as to
enable the voters to elect a person who has attained maturity and experience G
in life. Only a matured and experienced person can represent the people
and take steps which would be beneficial to the electorates.
Section 36 (2) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 castes
a mandatory duty on the returning officer to examine the nomination
papers and take a decision on all objections which may be made upon H
820
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
A . making an inquiry in that behalf, which would include the question as to
whether the requirement of Article 173 has been fulfilled or not by the
candidate. The effect of the aforementi~ned provision is that a candidate
is ,not qualified unless he has attained the age specified in the clause on
the date fixed for scrutiny of nominations. See Amritl~l Ambalal Patel v.
B. Himatbhai Gomanbhai Patel & Another, (1969] I SCR 277.
It is beyond any cavil that in the event a person is elected who does
not fulfill the constitutional requirements, the election would be void
despite the fact that the returning officer has accepted his nomination paper.
[See Durga Shankar Mehta v. Thakur Raghuraj Singh and Others, (1955]
C I SCR 267.
Such a question indisputably would fall for consideration in an
election petition where the parties would be entitled to adduce evidences
in support of their respective cases. (See Birad Mal Singhvi v. Anand
D Purohit, (1988] Supp. sec 604.
PRESENT CONTROVERSY :
The evidence on record as also the judgment of the High Court are
to be scrutinized keeping the aforementioned legal principles in mind. The
E date of birth of the respondent, according to the appellant, is 1.5.1981
whereas according to the respondent it is 16.11.1968.
BURDEN OF PROOF : ·
p
It is no doubt true that the burden of proof to show that a candidate
G
who was disqualified as on the date of the nomination would be on the
election petitioner.
It is also true that the initial burden of proof that nomination paper
of an ~lected candidate has wrongly been accepted is on the election
petitioner.
In terms of Section I 03 of the Indian Evidence Act, however, the
burden of proof as to any particular fact lies on that person who wishes
the Court to believe in its existence, unless it is provided by any law that
H the proof of that fact shall lie on any particular person.
SUSHIL KUMAR v. RAKESH KUMAR [SINHA, J.]
821
Furthermore, in relation to certain matters, the fact being within the A
special knowledge of the respondent, the burden to prove the same would
be on him in tenns of Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act. However,
the question as to whether the burden to prove a particular matter is on
the plaintiff or the defendant would depend upon the nature of the dispute.
[See Orissa Mining Corporation and Another v. Ananda Chandra Prusty, B
AIR (1997) SO 2274.
The age of a person, in an election petition has to be detennined not
only on the basis of the materials placed on records but also upon taking
into consideration the circumstances attending thereto. The initial burden C
to prove the allegations made in the election petition although was upon
the election petitioner but for proving the facts which were within the
special knowledge of the respondent, the burden was upon him in terms
of Section 106 of the Evidence Act. It is also trite that when both parties
have adduced evidence, the question of onus of proof becomes academic D
[See Union of India and Others v. Sugauli Sugar Works (P) Ltd., [1976]
3 SCC 32, (Para 14) and Mis Cox and Kings (Agents) Ltd. v.