# SWAMI PARMATMANAND SARASWATI & ANR v. RAMJ[ TRIPATHI & ANR

- **Citation:** [1975] 1 S.C.R. 790
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1975
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/swami-parmatmanand-saraswati-anr-v-ramj-tripathi-anr-6254
- **Pages:** 7

## Headnote

,
790
SWAMI PARMATMANAND SARASWATI & ANR.
A
v.
RAMJ[ TRIPATHI & ANR.
Augusi 21, 1974
[A. N. RAY, C.J. AND K. K. MA THEW, J .l
Code of Civil Procedure (Act 5 of 1908) s. 92-Suit undt:r-Tcsts for.
B
The head of a math, executed a will by which he nominated a panel of
four persons in order of choice to succeed him as head.
After his death. the
first respondent, who was the first in the panel, accepted the- office.
But a
section of the worshippers installed K. an outsider, as the head of the math.
Th!rea.fter, the appellants, after obtaining the permission of the Advocate General, filed the suit under s. 92. C.P.C., against the first rtspondent. They allege,!
~~~n~h~i~~:i~;dst~~:doffm\~~/
1
~~~ f~~ fi~:t er~~~d~~ h1~ :~il~h~ere~~isi~~
C
learning in Sanskrit and the Vedas; that the first respondent was therefore not
a qualified person; and that the first respondent had committed breach of trust
of the math properth:s.
The appellants prayed for a declaration that K was
the duly installed head of the math, and in the alternative to appoint any other
competent person as head of the math.
They also prayed for the vesting of
the properties of the math in the new head, for rendition of accounts by the
first respondent, and for a direction for. the administration of the trust prop:rties.
The trial court and High Court he·ld that the suit was only for the vindication
D
of the right of K and was therefore not maintainable under s. 92 and Jisrniss·.::d the suit.
Dismissing the appeal to this Court,
HELD· : (I) This Court would not dis~urb the: finding that the suit was
primarily one for declaration that K was the duly installed head of the math
especially when the allegations in the plaint are reasonably susceptible of being
so read.
[SOOE-G]
E
(2) A suit under s. 92, C.P.C., is a suit of a special nature which pre·supt
poses the existence of a public trust of ~ religious or charitable character. \.Yhen
two or more persons interested in the trust bring a suit purporting to be under
the section the question whether the suit is to vindicate the personal or individual
right of a third person or to assert the right of the public ..must be decided
after taking into account the dominant purpose of the suit in the light of the
allegations in thei plaint.
The sui~ can proceed only on the allegations that
there was a breach of such trust, or that the direction of the court is necessary
F
for the administration of the trust, and the plaintiff must pray for one or more
reliefs that are mentioned in the section.
If the allegation of breach of trust
is not subsiantiated or the plaintiff had not made out a case for any direction
by the court for the proper administration of the trust, the very foundation ot
the suit would fail; and, even if all the other ingredients of a suit under s. 92
are made out, if it is clear that the plaintiffs are not suing to vindicate the
right of the public but are seeking a declaration of their individual ('Jr person~!
'
rights or the individual or personal rights of any other person or persons in
G
whon1 they are interestod then the suit would be outside the scope of s. 92.
~
\Vhen the right to the office of the_tru'itees is a·sserted or denied and r{'lief
asked for on that basis, the suit falls outside s. 92.
There is no reason to think
.,
that whenever a suit is brought by t'vo or more persons under s. 92. the suit
~
is to vindicate the right of the public.
In deciding whether the suit falls within
the section the Court must go beyond the reliefs and have regard to the capacity
in which the plaintiffs are suing and to the
purpose for which the suit wns
brought.
[799D-800A]
Sugra Bibi v. Hazi Kununu Afia, (1969) 3 S.C.R. 83, followed.
II
Shan1ukhan v. Govinda, A.LR. 1937 Madras 92. Tinunalai Deva.wha1u11na
v. Krishanayya, A.LR. 1943 Madras 466, approved.
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PARMATMANAND v. RAMJI TRIPATHI (Mathew,!.)
791
( 3) If oli the alle,ations in tho plaint it is clear that tho purpose of the
s.uit was to vindicate th~ indivi

## Text

,
790
SWAMI PARMATMANAND SARASWATI & ANR.
A
v.
RAMJ[ TRIPATHI & ANR.
Augusi 21, 1974
[A. N. RAY, C.J. AND K. K. MA THEW, J .l
Code of Civil Procedure (Act 5 of 1908) s. 92-Suit undt:r-Tcsts for.
B
The head of a math, executed a will by which he nominated a panel of
four persons in order of choice to succeed him as head.
After his death. the
first respondent, who was the first in the panel, accepted the- office.
But a
section of the worshippers installed K. an outsider, as the head of the math.
Th!rea.fter, the appellants, after obtaining the permission of the Advocate General, filed the suit under s. 92. C.P.C., against the first rtspondent. They allege,!
~~~n~h~i~~:i~;dst~~:doffm\~~/
1
~~~ f~~ fi~:t er~~~d~~ h1~ :~il~h~ere~~isi~~
C
learning in Sanskrit and the Vedas; that the first respondent was therefore not
a qualified person; and that the first respondent had committed breach of trust
of the math properth:s.
The appellants prayed for a declaration that K was
the duly installed head of the math, and in the alternative to appoint any other
competent person as head of the math.
They also prayed for the vesting of
the properties of the math in the new head, for rendition of accounts by the
first respondent, and for a direction for. the administration of the trust prop:rties.
The trial court and High Court he·ld that the suit was only for the vindication
D
of the right of K and was therefore not maintainable under s. 92 and Jisrniss·.::d the suit.
Dismissing the appeal to this Court,
HELD· : (I) This Court would not dis~urb the: finding that the suit was
primarily one for declaration that K was the duly installed head of the math
especially when the allegations in the plaint are reasonably susceptible of being
so read.
[SOOE-G]
E
(2) A suit under s. 92, C.P.C., is a suit of a special nature which pre·supt
poses the existence of a public trust of ~ religious or charitable character. \.Yhen
two or more persons interested in the trust bring a suit purporting to be under
the section the question whether the suit is to vindicate the personal or individual
right of a third person or to assert the right of the public ..must be decided
after taking into account the dominant purpose of the suit in the light of the
allegations in thei plaint.
The sui~ can proceed only on the allegations that
there was a breach of such trust, or that the direction of the court is necessary
F
for the administration of the trust, and the plaintiff must pray for one or more
reliefs that are mentioned in the section.
If the allegation of breach of trust
is not subsiantiated or the plaintiff had not made out a case for any direction
by the court for the proper administration of the trust, the very foundation ot
the suit would fail; and, even if all the other ingredients of a suit under s. 92
are made out, if it is clear that the plaintiffs are not suing to vindicate the
right of the public but are seeking a declaration of their individual ('Jr person~!
'
rights or the individual or personal rights of any other person or persons in
G
whon1 they are interestod then the suit would be outside the scope of s. 92.
~
\Vhen the right to the office of the_tru'itees is a·sserted or denied and r{'lief
asked for on that basis, the suit falls outside s. 92.
There is no reason to think
.,
that whenever a suit is brought by t'vo or more persons under s. 92. the suit
~
is to vindicate the right of the public.
In deciding whether the suit falls within
the section the Court must go beyond the reliefs and have regard to the capacity
in which the plaintiffs are suing and to the
purpose for which the suit wns
brought.
[799D-800A]
Sugra Bibi v. Hazi Kununu Afia, (1969) 3 S.C.R. 83, followed.
II
Shan1ukhan v. Govinda, A.LR. 1937 Madras 92. Tinunalai Deva.wha1u11na
v. Krishanayya, A.LR. 1943 Madras 466, approved.
A
B
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PARMATMANAND v. RAMJI TRIPATHI (Mathew,!.)
791
( 3) If oli the alle,ations in tho plaint it is clear that tho purpose of the
s.uit was to vindicate th~ individual right of I<.. to be tho head of the math
there is no reason tn ho!J that the 1uit was brought to uphold the right of -the
b:neficiaries of th~ trust. merely becanse the suit was filed bY two or more
memb:rs of the public tlter obtaining the -sanction :>f the Advocate General
and one or more of thei reliefs specified in the section are claimed therein. Tue
relief regarding· tho appointment of K and tho alternative relief to appoint some
other person as tho head, without any allegations as to the circumstances which
would invalidate. K's installatioo and without implead:ing him as a party, sho'N1
lhe attemPt to make it appca; that the appellants were disinterc!'tej c~.an1n ··ns
of the rieht of the public.
If the real purpose in bringing the suit was to
vindicate the ,c:eneral ri&h~ of tho public to havo tho rightful claimant appointed
to the office there was no reason why the appellants, as plaJntiffs, omitted to
implead. or at least refer in the plaint to the !hree persons nominated by the
d!!Ccascd head of the math in his will to succeed in .the order indicated therein,
e~peciaUy- when the appellant accepte~ the custom of the math to have
the
succe<asor nominated by th_T incumbent for tho ~mo being. [800CD, F-Hl
( 4) The trial court as well as the High Court found that there was no
evidence to substantiate th:.! allegation~ of breach of truet aga,in.,t the fi
::e?-
pondent. No reasons wcire given in tho plaint for asking the directions of the
court for the administration of trust The plaintiffs did not plead facts and
particulars as regards any c;lefect in the machinery for administration 't\1hich
had crept in. under custom or rules which required rectification.
[~OOH-801Cl
'
· (S) To see whether the suit falls within th"e: ambit of s. 92. only the allega ..
tions in the plaint should be looked into in tho first instance.
But, if after
evid:nco is taken it is found that the breach of trust .alleged has _not been m~de
out and that the prayer for direction of the court is vague and is not baaed
on any foundation of fact or reason, but is mado only with a view to brin&
the· suit under the secti?o, then su:h a suit must be dismissed. "[8010-F]
.As.rdciation of B. D. B. Bagga Sing/a ·v. Gurnam
Singft,
A.I.R.
1972
Raja.sthan 26), Sohan Sing/a v. Achllar Si11g/i & Otilers A.l.R. 196& Punjab
and Haryana 463, and Radha K.riihna &: Others v, Lachr.1€ ·Nund11 and oJhers.
AJ,R. 1948 Oudh 203. referred to,
cThe ··~uestion whether tho word' "'whel-e tho- dirCction of the court is deemed
necessary for· the administration of any such trust''" must bo interpreted to mean
that where the court has to give directions in tho nature of framing a scheme
or otherwise for the administration of the trust, .. or whether those words can
refer only to directions given to an existing trustee or to a new trustee when
one j3 to be appQinl'"d, or to directions when there are allegations of maladm:nis·
tration amounting to breach of trust not decidedJ.
[801C-DJ
' CIVIL AP.PELLATE JURISDICTION·:
Civil Appeal Ne
'1973.
1589 of
Appeal by Special Lrnve from the Judgment and Order dated th~
11th September, 1973 of the Allahabad High Court in First Appe•l
No. 385 ot 1962.
/
D. V. Patel, R. Dwivedi, 0. P. Shah and M .. v. Goswami, for the
appellants.
P. Ram Reddy, R. B. Sharma, S.S. Khanduja, V. K. S. Chaudlwry,
Naravan Swarup and Ya/endra Sjngh Chaudhry, for respondent no. I.
Pramod Swarup, for respondent No. 2.
K. S. Ramcmurthy, Ambrish Kumar and Ramesh Kumar,
for
intervener.
.;, .
792
SUPRllME COURT REPORTS
[1975] 1 s.c.R.
The Judgment c£ the Court was delivered by
A
MATHEW, 1. The appel)ants, as plaintiffs, filed a suit under s. 92
of the Civil Procedure Code allegina breach of a trust created for a
public purpose of a reliaious nature and praying for removal o! the
defendant, the head of thG Math in question claimin& title to the offica
under a will executed by the predecessor-in-office and for c,ther relief!.
The District Court dismissed the suit on the Ground that the suit will
B
nQt lie under s. 92 of the Civil Procedure Code. The High Court, on
appeal, upheld that judgment and, this appeal, by special leave, is
directed aaairuit that judpnent.
Adi Shankaracharya founded Maths at four centres in India about
a thousand years ago.
The math with which we are concerned was
established by him in Himalayas. Thls Math was knqwn by the name
C
Of Jyotir Math Qr Jyotish Peeth.
For centuries, the existence of this
Math was unknown to the public and even the place where the Math
stood had to be found out. In 194-0, a· society known as Bharat
Dharma Maha-Manda! or Kashi made an effort to discover the Math
and the effort proved successful. The relics of the· Math were found
near Badrikashr~m. The land on whleh the relics were found along
with certain other property on the banks of Varona in Kashi was acD
quired by the Scr.:iety and thereafter the Society created an endowment
of the land by a deed dated April 11, 1941 in favqur of Jyotir Math
and Swami Brahmanand Saraswati ('Brahman3nd' for shonJ, a man
renowned for his piety and vedic learning was installed as the Head
ol the Math.
Brahmanand died on May 20, 1953. Before his death, he executed
a will which was published on June 8, 1953. lly the will, he nominated a panel of 4 persons in order d choice indicated in the will to
succeed him as head of the Math. His first choice was Swami Shantanand Saraswati, respondent No. 1. Respondent No. 1 accepted the
office. He was installed as Shankaracharya of the Math on June 12,
1953. Thereafter dispute arose among the worshippers of Jyctir Math.
A section of the worshippers installed Swami Krishnabodhashram
('Krishnabodhashram' for short) as the Shankaracharya of the Math
on Jane 25, 195 3, as according to them, Brahmanand did not execute
any will ncminating his successor, and even if he executed a will, it was
not executed by him whlle he was in a sound disposing state of mind
and that in accordance with the custom and the rules of the Math,
they were entitled to instal a person nominated by them as the Head
of tho Math.
Respondent No. I, who was installed on June 12, 1953, as the
Head of the Math, came intcl possession of the Math properties. The
worshippers who supported the claim of Krishnabodhashram filed
a
suit in January, 1954 in the Munsiff Court at Lucknow for an injunc·
tion restraining respondent No. 1 from interfering with the Math properties. In the meanwhlle, respondent No. 1 applied fc~ a succession
certificate in the Court of District Judge, . Allahabad and that was
granted on December 12, 1956.
Thereafter, four persons alleging
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PARMATMANAND v. RAMJI TRIPATHI (Mathew, J.)
793
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themselves to be interested in the Jyotir Math, after obtaining pennission of the Advocate General, filed the suit under s. 92 of the Civil
Pmcedure Code against respCJJdent No. 1.
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The main allegations in the plaint were that Brahmanand did not
execute the will while he was in a sound disposing state of mind, that
respondent No. 1 had not the requisite learning in Sanskrit and the
Vedas and, therefore, he was not qualified to be nominated as successor
to the headship c~ the Math, that he came into possession of the Math
properties and has committed breach of trust by applying for &rant of
succession certificate and other acts, that Krishnabodhashram was duly
installed as the Shankaracharya of the Math on June 2~, 1953 and that
direction of the Court was necessary fur the administration ct the trust
properties. The plaintiffs prayed for the removal of respondent No. 1
from the headship of the Math, a declaration that Krishnabodhashram
was the duly installed head of the Math and to appoint him as the head,
and in the alternative, to appoint any other competent person as the
head of the Math. They further prayed for vesting of the properties
of the Jyotish Math in the new Head and for rendition of account! by
respondent No. 1, etc., and to restrain him from prosecuting the application for succession certificate and also the mutation proceedings.
The defendant (respondent No. 1) practically denied all the allegations in the plaint and contended that the suit being one primarily
for the vindication of the claim of Krishnabodhashram !Cl be the
Shankaracharya of the Math, was not maintainable tinder s. 92 of the
Civil Procedure Code.
The District Court found that Brahmanand executed the will while
he was in sound disposing state of mind, that respondent Ne!. l being
one of the nominees under the will having the prior claim would have
been entitled tt> succeed as the Head of the Math but for the fact that
he was not learned in Sanskrit and the Ved 1s which was a necessary
qualification for holding the headship ct the Math. It further found
that the allegations with respect to the breach of trust by respondent
No. 1 had not been proved, that Krishnabodhashram was validly installed as the Sbankaracharya of the Math but that the suit as it was
brought for the vindication of the right ct Krishnabodhashram to the
headship of the Math, was not maintainable under s. 92 ct the Civil
Procedure Code.
The High Court dismissed the appeal on the basis that the suit was
incompetent under s. 92 of the Civil Procedure Code.
It is clear from the allegations in the plaint that the plaintiffs pri·
marily wanted a declaration from Court that Krishnabodhashram was
duly installed as the Shankaracharya of the Math on June 25, 1953,
that he came into possession of the properties of the Math and, therefore, the Ccurt should appoint him as the Shankaracharya of the Math.
In order to enable the Court to give that declaration, the plaintiffs
wanted a declaration that the will nominating respondent No. 1 as
successor of Brahmanand was not executed by Brahmanand when he
was in a sound disposing state of mind and that even if the will was
'
794
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1975] l s.c.a.
validly executed, respc111dent No. 1 did not have the requisite learning
in Sanskrit and the Vedas and so, he was not qualified to be nominated
as the Head of the Math and, therefore, his installation as the Shankaracharya of the Math on June 12, 1953 was invalid. There was no
allegation in the plaint questioning or even casting any doubt on the
validity of the installaticin of Krishnabodhashram as the Shankaracharya
of the Math and there was also no allegation against his as respects
his management of the trust properties. Then, how was it that the plaintiffs prayed in the alternative for appointment of some other person
as Shankaracharya ? The relief for the appcintment of Krishnabodha-
. shram as the Shankaracharya of the Math by the Court and the alternative relief to appoint some other person as the Shankaracharya, without any allegation as to the circumstances which would invalidate the
installation of Krishnabodhashram and w;th,.mt imnleading him as a
party tci the suit would show the strain of the draftsman to dress up
the plaint with prayers to make it appear that the plaintiffs were the
disinterested champions of the right of the public and not the mere
partisan advocates of the personal cause of Krishnabodhashram.
A suit under s. 92 is a suit of a special nature which presupposes
the existence of a public trust of a religious or charitable character.
Such a suit can proceed only on the allegation that there was a breach
of such trust or that the directicln of the Court is necessary for
the
administration of the trust and the plaintiff must pray for one or more
of the reliefs that are mentioned in the section. It is, therefore, clear
that if the allegation of breach of trust is not substantiated c~ that the
plaintiff had not made out a case for any direction by the Court for
proper administration of the trust, the very foundation of a suit under
the secticin would fail, and, even if all the other ingredients of a suit
under s. 92 are made out, if it is clear that the plaintiffs are not suing
to vindicate the right of the public but are seeking a declaration of
their individual or personal rights or the individual or personal rights
of any other person or persrns in whom they are interested, then the
suit would be outside the scope of s. 92 [see Shamukhan v. Govinda(')
Tiruma/ai Devasthanams v. Krishnayya('). Sugra Bibi v. Ilazi Kummu
Mia(') and Mulla: Civil Procedure Code (13th ed.), Vol. 1, p. 4001.
A suit whose primary object or purpose is tci remedy the infringement
of an individual right or to vindicate a private right does not fall under
~ the section.
It is not every suit claiming the reliefs specified in the section that can be brought under the section but only the suits which,
besides claiming any of the reliefs, are brciught by individuals as representatives of the public for vindication of public rights; and in deciding
whether a suit falls within s. 92, the Court must go beyond the reliefs
and have regard to the capacity in which the plaintiffs are suing and
to the purpose for which the suit was brought. This is the reason why
trustees of public trust d a reli!!ious nature are precluded from suing
under the section to vindicate their individual or personal rights. It
(I) A.LR. 1938 Madras 92.
(2) A.l.R. 1943 Madras
~66.
(3) [1969] 3 S.C.R. 23.
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PARMATMANAND v. RAMJI fRIPAIHI (Mathew, l.)
795
is quite immaterial whether the trustees pray for declaration of their
personal rights or deny the personal rights of one or more defendants.
When the right tct the office of a trustee is asserted or denied and
relief asked for on that basis, the suit falls outside s. 92.
We see no reason why the same principle should not apply, if what
the plaintiffs seek to vindicate here is the individual or personal right
of Krishnabodhashram to be installed as Shankaracharya of the Math.
Where two or more persons interested in a trust bring a suit purporting
to be under s. 92, the question whether the suit is to vindicate the
personal or individual right of a third person or to assert the right of
the public must be decided after taking into account the dominant
purpose of the suit in the light of the allegations in the plaint. If, on
the allegations in the plaint, it is clear that the purpose of the suit was
to vindicate the individual right of Krishnabodhashram to be the
Shankaracharya, there is no reason to hold that the suit was brought OID
uphold the right o[ the beneficiaries of the trusts, merely beca.use the
suit was filed by two or more members of the public after obtaining tlre
sanction of the Advocate General and claiming one or more of the
reliefs spec;fied in the section. There is no reasci:i to think that when·
ever a suit is brought by two or more persons under s. 92, the suit is
to vindicate the right of the public. As we said, it is the object or the
purp:ise o1 the suit and not the reliefs that should decide whether it is.
one for vindicating the right o[ the public or the individual right of the
plaintiffs or third persons.
Tho trial Court, after reading the allegations in the plaint and after
looking into the entire evidence in the case, came to the conclusion
that the suit was primarily one for declaration that Krishnabodhashram
was duly installed as the Shankaracharya of the Math on June 25,
1953 and that respondent No. 1 had no right to be nominated as the
Head of the Math by Brahmanand as he did not possess the requisite
qualification and that his possession of the trust property was only in
the capacity of a trustee de son tort, and so he must be removed from
the headship of the Math. The High Court saw no reason to differ
from that finding.
We would be slow to disturb a finding of this
nature especially when we see that the allegations in the plaint are
reasonably susceptible of being so read. We think that the purpose·
c1f the suit was to settle the controversy as to whether Krishnabodhashram or respondent No. 1 had the better claim to the headship of the
Math and to the possession a.nd management of its properties by obtaining a declaration of the Court. If the real purpose in bringing the
suit was tci vindicate the general right of the public to have the rightful
claimant appointed to the office, there was no reason why the plaintiffs
omitted to implead or at least refer in the plaint to the three persons
nominated by Brahmanand in his will to succeed him in the order indicated therein especially when it is seen that the plaintiffs accepted the
custom of the Math tci have the successor nominated by the incum·
bent for the time being of the office of Shankaracharya.
The Trial Court as well as the High Court found that there was
no evidence to substantiate the allegations regarding the breach of trust
796
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(l975) J S.C.R.
said to have been oommitted by respcndent No. J.
Jn paragraph 20
of the plaint, there was an allegation that the direction of the Court
was necessary for the administration of the trust. But no reasons were
given in the plaint why the plaintiffs were seeking the direction of the
Court. There were nq clear allegatioos of maladministration viz., that
respondent No. 1 was diverting the trust properties for his personal
benefit or that he was committing any devastavit. The High Court
was of the view that since the plaintiffs did not plead facts and particulars as regards the defect in the machinery for administration which
had crept in under custom or rules which required rectificaticin,
the
prayer for direction was a mere pretense to bring the suit under s. 92.
A direction cannot be given by the Court unless it is shown that it is.
necessary for the proper administration of the trust.
We do not think
it necessary tci decide for the purpose of this case whether the words
"where the direction of the court is deemed necessary for the administration of any such trust" must be interpreted as meaning that where
the court has to give directions in the nature of framing a ~cheme or
otherwise for the administration of the trust cir whether those words
can refer only to directions given to an cxi~ting tn1stt>e wb.cn there js one
or to a new trustee when one is to be appointed or to directions when
there are allegations of maladministration amounting to breach of
trust. It is si.:1licient for the purpose of this case to say that the prayer
foe direction was a prayer in vacuum without any basis in reason or
facts.
It is, no doubt, true that it is only the allegations in the plaint that
should be looked intci in the first instance to see whether the suit falls
within the ambit of s. 92 [see Association of B.D.B. Bagga Singh v.
Gurnam Singh ('), Sohan Sin!ih v. Achhar Singh & Others(') and
Radha Krishna & Others v. Lachmi Narain & Others(')]. But; if after
evidence is taken, it is found that the breach of trust alleged has not
been made out and that the prayer for direction of the court is vague
and is not based on any solid foundation in facts or reason but is made
only with a view to bring the suit under the section, then a suit purporting to be brought under s. 92 must be dismissed. This was one
of the grclunds relied on by the High Court for holding that the suit
was not maintainable under s. 92.
We think that the High Court was right in dismissing the suit on
the ground that it did not fall within s. 92 of the Civil Procedure Code.
We, therefore, dismiss the appeal but, in the
circumstances, without
nny order as to costs.
V.P.S.
Appeal dismissed.
(!) A.LR
1972 Rajasthan 263.
(2) A.LR. 1963 Punjab & Haryana 463.
(3) A.LR. 1943 Oudh. 203,
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