# SWAMY SHRADDANANDA @ MURALI MANOHAR MISHRA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA

- **Citation:** [2008] 11 S.C.R. 93
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2008-07-22
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 454 of 2006
- **Bench:** B.N. Agrawal, G.S. Singhvi, Aftab Alam
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/swamy-shraddananda-murali-manohar-mishra-v-state-of-karnataka-23458
- **Pages:** 52

## Headnote

Sentence/Sentencing:
A
B
Death penalty/Life imprisonment - Cold blooded murC
der of wife - Circumstantial evidence - Conviction and death
sentence by trial court and High court - Supreme Court upholding conviction - Difference of opinion as regards sentence- Reference to Larger Bench to decide the sentence -
Held: The murder was planned and cold blooded and for highly D
depraved motive - But in view of certain facts of the case and
in view of larger issues such as inept criminal justice system
and want of uniformity in the sentencing process by the Courts
etc., death penalty substituted to imprisonment for life - Since
the sentence of imprisonment for fourteen years which is conE
sidered as life imprisonment, does not commensurate to the
crime of the convict, direction not to release the convict tiff the
rest of his. life - Penal Code, 1860 - ss. 302 and 201.
Life sentence - Computation of - Held: Life imprisonF
ment means imprisonment for the rest of the life of the convict
- s. 57 /PC does not limit the life imprisonment for a term of
twenty years - A convict undergoing life imprisonment has no
right to claim remission -Remission granted to fife convicts
under Prison Manuals by deemed conversion of life imprisonment into one for fixed term of twenty years is without any G
sanction and against the mandate of Supreme Court decisions - There has to be a special category where death penalty is substituted by imprisonment for life or. for a term in excess of fourteen years and that category is required to be put
93
H
94
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2008] 11 S.C.R.
,..
A beyond application of remission - Sentence of life imprisonment as a substitute for death penalty, to be carried out strictly
as directed by the court -Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 -
ss. 432, 433 and 433A (as inserted by amendment made in
1978) - Penal Code, 1860 - ss. 45, 53, 54, 55 and 57 -
B Kamataka Prisons Rules, 1974 - Kamataka Prisons Manual,
1978- Chapter XII- r. 214 (c) - Prisons Act, 1894.
Appellant was cohvicted u/ss. 302 and 201 IPC by
trial court and sentenced to death. High Court confirmed
c his conviction as well as the sentence. Division Bench of
Supreme Court confirmed the conviction, but there was
difference of opinion as regards sentence. Hence the
matter was referred to larger Bench.
!Jisposing of the appeal, the Court .
D
HELD: ·1.1 The court is hesitant in. endorsing the
death penalty awarded to the appellant by the trial court
.ll,
· and confirmed by the High Court. The absolute irrevoca-
' bility of the death penalty renders it completely incom-
· patible to the slightest hesitation on the part of the court.
E
Therefore the death sentence given to the appellant by
the trial court and confirmed by the High court is substituted by imprisonment for life. The sentence of imprisonment for a term of fourteen years, that is generally the euphemism for life imprisonment is equally, if not more, unF
acceptable. The punishment does not commensurate to
the appellant's crime. Therefore, it is directed that the appelf ant shall not be released from prison till the rest of his
life. [Paras 37, 38 and 69] [1:24 D-F- 144 F-G]
I
G
1.2 The crime committed by the appellant was of
course very grave and the motive behind the crime was
highly depraved. The appellant though killed the deceased in a planned and cold blooded manner but at least
this much can be said in his favour that he devised the
;IC"
plan so that the victim could not know till the end and
H even for a moment that she was betrayed by the one she
SWAMY SHRADDANANDA@ MURALI MANOHAR MISHRA 95
v. STATE OF KARNATAKA
;..
trusted most. Further though the way of killing appears
A
quite ghastly it may be said that it did not cause any mental or physical pain to the victim. Thirdly, the appellant
confessed his guilt at least partially before the High
Court.[Paras 36 and 37] [124 8-D]
1.3 There are also some larger issues that make the
B
-~
. Court feel reluctant in confirming the death sentence of
the appe

## Text

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[2008] 11 S.C.R. 93
SWAMY SHRADDANANDA @ MURALI MANOHAR
MISHRA
V.
STATE OF KARNATAKA
(Criminal Appeal No. 454 of 2006)
JULY 22, 2008
[B.N. AGRAWAL, G.S. SINGHVI AND AFTAB ALAM, JJ.]
Sentence/Sentencing:
A
B
Death penalty/Life imprisonment - Cold blooded murC
der of wife - Circumstantial evidence - Conviction and death
sentence by trial court and High court - Supreme Court upholding conviction - Difference of opinion as regards sentence- Reference to Larger Bench to decide the sentence -
Held: The murder was planned and cold blooded and for highly D
depraved motive - But in view of certain facts of the case and
in view of larger issues such as inept criminal justice system
and want of uniformity in the sentencing process by the Courts
etc., death penalty substituted to imprisonment for life - Since
the sentence of imprisonment for fourteen years which is conE
sidered as life imprisonment, does not commensurate to the
crime of the convict, direction not to release the convict tiff the
rest of his. life - Penal Code, 1860 - ss. 302 and 201.
Life sentence - Computation of - Held: Life imprisonF
ment means imprisonment for the rest of the life of the convict
- s. 57 /PC does not limit the life imprisonment for a term of
twenty years - A convict undergoing life imprisonment has no
right to claim remission -Remission granted to fife convicts
under Prison Manuals by deemed conversion of life imprisonment into one for fixed term of twenty years is without any G
sanction and against the mandate of Supreme Court decisions - There has to be a special category where death penalty is substituted by imprisonment for life or. for a term in excess of fourteen years and that category is required to be put
93
H
94
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2008] 11 S.C.R.
,..
A beyond application of remission - Sentence of life imprisonment as a substitute for death penalty, to be carried out strictly
as directed by the court -Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 -
ss. 432, 433 and 433A (as inserted by amendment made in
1978) - Penal Code, 1860 - ss. 45, 53, 54, 55 and 57 -
B Kamataka Prisons Rules, 1974 - Kamataka Prisons Manual,
1978- Chapter XII- r. 214 (c) - Prisons Act, 1894.
Appellant was cohvicted u/ss. 302 and 201 IPC by
trial court and sentenced to death. High Court confirmed
c his conviction as well as the sentence. Division Bench of
Supreme Court confirmed the conviction, but there was
difference of opinion as regards sentence. Hence the
matter was referred to larger Bench.
!Jisposing of the appeal, the Court .
D
HELD: ·1.1 The court is hesitant in. endorsing the
death penalty awarded to the appellant by the trial court
.ll,
· and confirmed by the High Court. The absolute irrevoca-
' bility of the death penalty renders it completely incom-
· patible to the slightest hesitation on the part of the court.
E
Therefore the death sentence given to the appellant by
the trial court and confirmed by the High court is substituted by imprisonment for life. The sentence of imprisonment for a term of fourteen years, that is generally the euphemism for life imprisonment is equally, if not more, unF
acceptable. The punishment does not commensurate to
the appellant's crime. Therefore, it is directed that the appelf ant shall not be released from prison till the rest of his
life. [Paras 37, 38 and 69] [1:24 D-F- 144 F-G]
I
G
1.2 The crime committed by the appellant was of
course very grave and the motive behind the crime was
highly depraved. The appellant though killed the deceased in a planned and cold blooded manner but at least
this much can be said in his favour that he devised the
;IC"
plan so that the victim could not know till the end and
H even for a moment that she was betrayed by the one she
SWAMY SHRADDANANDA@ MURALI MANOHAR MISHRA 95
v. STATE OF KARNATAKA
;..
trusted most. Further though the way of killing appears
A
quite ghastly it may be said that it did not cause any mental or physical pain to the victim. Thirdly, the appellant
confessed his guilt at least partially before the High
Court.[Paras 36 and 37] [124 8-D]
1.3 There are also some larger issues that make the
B
-~
. Court feel reluctant in confirming the death sentence of
the appellant. The inability of the Criminal Justice Systern to deal with all major crimes equally effectively and
the want of uniformity in the sentencing process by the c
Court lead to a marked imbalance in the end results. The
question of death penalty is not free from the subjective
element and the confirmation of death sentence or its
commutation by this Court depends a good deal on the
personal predilection of the judges constituting the bench.
D
[Paras 33, 34 and 35] [124 A-8 123-D,F]
Bachan Singh vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1980 SC 898;
Jagmohan Singh vs. State of UP AIR 1973 SC 947 - relied
on.
Machhi Singh v. State of Punjab 1983 (3) SCC 470; E
Aloke Nath Dutta vs. State of West Bengal, 2006 (13) SCALE
467- referred to.
McGautha vs. California 1971(402) US 183; Gregg v.
Georgia 428 US 153 - referred to.
F
A report "Lethal Lottery, The Death Penalty in India" compiled jointly by Amnesty International India and Peoples Union
For Civil Liberties, Tamil Nadu ana Puducherry- referred to.
2.1 A convict undergoing life imprisonment has no
G
right to claim remission or commutation under Cr.P.C.,
Prisons Act and the Rules framed by different States. It is
not correct to say that it is not open to the Court to direct
the appropriate government not to consider the case of a
convict for grant of remission in sentence. it cannot be
said that giving punishment for an offence was a judicial H
96
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2008] 11 S.C.R.
A
function but once the judgment was pronounced and punishment awarded the matter no longer remained in the
hands of the Court or that the execution of the punishment when passed into the hands of the .executive, under the scheme of the statute, the Court had no control
B over the execution. [Paras 48, 52 and 56] [130 G- 133 CE;
134 H- 135 A]
c
Gopal Vina.yak Godse vS: The State of Maharashtra, 1961
(3) SCR 440; Mohd.Munna vs. Union oflndia, 2005 (7) SCC
416 - relied on.
State (Government of NCT of Delhi) vs. Prem Raj, 2003
(7) sec 121 - distinguished.
Delhi Administration vs. Manohar Lal, 2002 (7) SCC
222; State of Punjab vs. Kesar·singh, 1996 (5) SCC 495 -
o referred to.
2.2 Section 57 IPC does not in any way limit the pllnishment of imprisonment for life to a term of twenty years.
Section 57 is only for calculating fractions of terms of
punishment and provides that imprisonment for life shall
E be reckoned as equivalent to imprisonment for twenty
years. The object and purpose of Section 57 will be clear
by simply referring to Sections 65, 116, 119, 129 and 511
IPC. [Para 55] [134 D-E]
Gopal Vina yak Godse vs. The State of Maharashtra, 1961
F
(3) SCR 440- followed
Ashok Kumar alias Golu vs. Union of India 1991 (3) SCC
498 -- relied on.
2.3 Remission cannot be applied to imprisonment for
G life. The way in which remission is allowed according to
the provisions of Prisons Act it can only apply to a fixed
term and life imprisonment being for the rest of life, is by
nature indeterminate. [Para 58] [135-F G]
2.4 In the State of Karnataka as well as in' the State of
H Bihar, remission is granted to life convicts by deemed con-
SWAMY SHRADDANANDA@ MURALI MANOHAR MISHRA 97
~
v. STATE OF KARNATAKA
version of life imprisonment into a fixed term of twenty A
years. The deemed conversion of life imprisonment into
one for fixed term by executive orders issued by the State
Governments apparently flies in the face of a long line of
decisions by this Court and no provision of law was
brought to the notice of the Court to sanction such a B
course. Life convicts are granted remission and released
from prison on completing the fourteen year term without
}
any sound legal basis. One can safely assume that the position would be no better in the other States. This Court
can also take judicial notice of the fact that remission is c
allowed to life convicts in the most mechanical manner
without any sociological or psychiatric appraisal of the
convict and without any proper assessment as to the effeet of the early release of a particular convict on the society. The grant of remission is the rule and remission is de0
)
nied, in the rarest of the rare cases. [Para 63] [139 8-F]
Gopal Vinayak Godse vs. The State of Maharashtra, 1961
(3) SCR 440- followed
Shri Bhagwan vs. State of Rajasthan, (2001) 6 SCC 296;
E
State of M.P vs. Ratan Singh, (1976) 3 SCC 470; Pandit
Kishori Lal vs. King Emperor, AIR 1954 PC 64 - relied on.
2.5 Section 433A was inserted in Cr.P.C. imposing a
restriction on the power of remission or commutation in
""
certain cases. All that is changed by Section 433A is that F
before its insertion an imprisonment for life in most cases
worked out to a dozen years of imprisonment and after
its introduction it works out to fourteen years' imprisonment. But the observation of this Court in Jagmohan's case
that this cannot be accepted as an adequate substitute G
for the death penalty still holds true. [Para 64] [140 8-0]
-i
Jagmohan Singh vs. State of UP AIR 1973 SC 947 -
relied on.
2.6 The legal position as enunciated by this court and H
98
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2008] 11 S.C.R.
A
the unsound way in which remission is actually allowed
in cases of life imprisonment make outa very strong case
to make a special category for the very few- cases where
the death penalty might be substituted by the punishment
ofc imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term in exB cess of fourteen years and to put that category beyond
the application of remission. [Para 65] [143-0 F]
2.7 The issue of sentencing has two aspects. A sentence may be excessive and unduly harsh or it may be
C highly disproportionately inadequate. When an appellant
comes to this court c~rrying a death sentence awarded
by the trial court an.d confirmed by the High Court, this
Court may find, as in the present appeal, tha~ the case
just falls short of the rarest of the rare category and may
feel somewhat reluctant in endorsing the death sentence'.
D But at the same time, having regard to the nature of the
crime, the Court may strongly feel that a sentence of life
imprisonment that subject to remission normally works
out to a term of fourteen years would be grossly disproportionate and inadequate. If the Court's option is limited
E
only to two punishments, one a sentence of imprisonment, for all intents and purposes, of not more than fourteen years and the other death, the court may feel tempted
and find itself nudged into endorsing the death penalty.
Such a course would indeed be disastrous. A far more
F.
just, reasonable and proper course would be to expand
the options and to take over what, as a matter of fact, lawfully belongs to the court, i.e., the vast hiatus between
fourteen years' imprisonment and death. The Court would
take recourse to the expanded option primarily because
G in the facts of the case, the sentence of fourteen years
imprisonment would amount to no punishment at all.
[Para 66] [143-F,C]
2.8 The punishment of imprisonment for life handed
down by the Court means a sentence of imprisonment
H for the convict for the rest of his life. The sentence of life
SWAMY SHRADDANANDA@ MURALI MANOHAR MISHRA 99
v. STATE OF KARNATAKA
lieimprisonment when awarded as a substitute for death A
penalty would be carried out strictly as directed by the
Court. This Court, therefore, must lay down a good and
sound legal basis for putting the punishment of imprisonment for life, awarded as substitute for death penalty,
beyond any remission and to be carried out as directed B
by the Court so that it may be followed, in appropriate
cases as a uniform policy not only by this Court but also
by the High Courts, being the superior Courts in their respective States. [Paras 38 and 54] [125-A C; 134 A]
Maru Ram vs. Union of India 1981 (1) SCC 107; Gopal c
Vinayak Godse vs. The State of Maharashtra and Ors. 1961
(3) SCR 440 - followed
Oa/bir Singh and Ors. vs. State of Punjab, 1979 (3) SCC
745; Subhash Chander vs. Krishan La and Ors. 2001 (4) SCC D
458; State of M.P vs. Ratan Singh, 1976 (3) SCC 470;
)
Bhagirath VS. Delhi Administration, 1985 (2) sec 580; Zahid .
Hussein VS. State of West Bengal, 2001 (3) sec 750 Shri
Bhagwan vs. State of Rajasthan, 2001 (6) SCC 296; Prakash
Dhawal Khaimar (Patil) vs. State of Maharashtra, 2002 (2) SCC
E
35; Ram Anup Singh and Ors. vs. State of Bihar, 2002 (6)
SCC 686; Mohd. Munna vs. Union of India, 2005 (7) SCC
417; Jayawant Dattatraya Suryarao vs. State of Maharashtra,
2001 (10) SCC 109; Nazir Khan and Ors. vs. State of Delhi,
2003 (8) SCC 461; Sat Pal vs. State of Haryana, 1992 (4)
F
SCC 172; Naib Singh vs. State of Punjab 1983 (2) SCC 454;
Ashok Kumar alias Golu vs. Union of India 1991 (3) SCC 498;
Laxman Naskar(Life Convict) vs. State ofWB.,, 2000 (7) SCC
626; Kama/anantha vs. State of Tamil Nadu, 2005 (5) SCC
194; C.A.Pious vs. State of Kera/a, 2007 (8) SCC 312 - reG.
lied on.
2.9 Further, the formalisation of a special category
~
of sentence, though for an extremely few number of
--
cases, shall have the great advantage of having the death
penalty on the statute book but to actually use it as little H
100
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2008) 11 S.C. R.
-1'
A
as possible, really in the rarest of the rare cases. This
would only be a reassertion of the Constitution Bench
decision in Bachan Singh case besides being in accord
with the modern trends in penology.[Para 67]
B
Bachan Singh vs. State of Punjab AIR 1980 SC 898relied on.
;.....
2.10 There is a good and strong basis for the Court
to substitute a death sentence by life imprisonment or by
a term in excess of fourteen years and further to dire.ct
c that the convict must not be released from the prison for
the rest of his life or for the actual term as specified in the
order, as the case may be.[Para 68]
2.11 This decision deals with the provisions of reD
mission etc. under the Code of Criminal Procedure Code,
the Prisons Acts and the Rules farmed thereunder by the
different States. Any observation of direction in this deci-
.:4.
sion has no bearing on the constitutional provisions
converning remission, commutation, suspension of sentences etc. that are in the nature of the State's sovereign
E power. [134 G- 135-A]
Case Law Reference
AIR 1980 SC 898
Relied on
Para 22
AIR 1973 SC 947
Relied on
Para 22
F
1971(402) us 183
Referred to
Para 25
428 us 153
Referred to
Para 27
fo.-
1983 (3) sec 410
Referred to
Para 27
G
2006 (13) SCALE 467 Referred to
Para 31
1919 (3) sec 745
Relied on
Para 38
1981 (1) sec 101
Followed
Para 40
)o
2001 (4) sec 458
Relied on
Para 40
,,_
H
1976 (3) sec 470
Relied on
Para 40
SWANrf SHRADDANANDA@ MURALI MANOHAR MISHRA 101
v. STATE OF KARNATAKA
1985 (2) sec 580
· Relied on
Para 40
A
2001 (3) sec 750
Relied on
Para 40
2001 (6) sec 296
Relied on
Para 41
2002 (2) sec 35
Relied on
Para 42
2002 (6) sec 686
Relied on
Para 43
B
.....
2005 (7) sec 417
Relied on
Para 44
2001 (1 O) sec 109
Relied on
Para 46
2003 (8) sec 461
Relied on
Para 47
c
1992 (4) sec 112
Relied on
Para 47
1961 (3) SCR 440
Followed
Para 48
2003 (7) sec 121
Distinguished Para 51
2002 (7) sec 222
Referred to
Para 51
D
1996 (5) sec 495
Referred to
Para 51
1983 (2) sec 454
Relied on
Para 54
1991 (3) sec 498
Relied on
Para 54
2000 (7) sec 626
Relied on
Para 54
E
2005 (5) sec 194
Relied on
Para 54
2001 (8) sec 312
Relied on
Para 54
AIR 1954 PC 64
Relied on
Para 65
CRIMINALAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
F
No. 454 of 2006
From the Judgment and Order dated 19.9.2005 of the High
Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in Criminal Reference No. 6
of 2005 c/w. Criminal Appeal No. 1086 of 2005
G
Varinder Kumar sharma, Varun Thakur and Alok Bagrecha
~-
for the Appellant.
Sanjay R. Hegde, Amit Chawla, S.J. Aristotle, A. Rohen
Singh and Vikrant Yadav for the Respondent.
H
102
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2008] 11 S.C.R.
A
U.U. Lalit, Rana Mukherjee, Uttara Babbar, Siddharth
Gautam and Goodwill lr.deevar him for Complainant.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
AFTAB ALAM,J. 1. Death to a cold blooded murderer or
B
life, albeit subject to severe restrictions of personal liberty, is
the vexed question that once again arises before this court. A
verdict of death would cut the matter cleanly, apart from cutting
short the life of the condemned person. But a verdict of imprisonment for life is likely to give rise to certain questions. (Life
C ;:ifter all is full of questions!). How would the sentence of imprisonment for life work out in actuality? The Court may feel that the
punishment more just and proper, in the facts of the case, would
be imprisonment for life With life given its normal meaning and
as defined in section 45 of the Indian Penal Code. The Court
o may be of the view that the punishment of death awarded by the
trial court and confirmed by the High Court needs to be substituted by life imprisonment, literally for life or in any case for a
period far in excess of fourteen years. The Court in its judgment
may make its intent explicit and state clearly that the sentence
E handed over to the convict is imprisonment till his last breath or,
life permitting, imprisonment for a term not less than twenty,
twenty five or even thirty years. But once the judgment is sipned
and pronounced, the execution of the sentence passes Into the
hands of the executive and is governed by different provisions
of law. What is the surety that the sentence awarded to the conF
vict after painstaking and anxious deliberation would be carried out in actuality? The sentence of imprisonment for life, literally, shall not by application of different kinds of remission, turn
out to be the ordinary run of the mill life term that works out to no
more than fourteen years. How can the sentence of imprisonG ment for life (till its full natural span) given to a convict as a substitute for the death sentence be viewed differently and segregated from the ordinary life imprisonment given as the sentence
of first choice? These are the questions that arise for consideration in this case.
H
Jr
•
SWAMY SHRADDANANDA@ MURALI MANOHAR MISHRA 103
v. STATE OF KARNATAKA [AFTAB ALAM,J.]
2. The conviction of the appellant, Swamy Shraddananda A
@ Murali Manohar Mishra under Sections 302 and 201 of the
Indian Penal Code has attained finality and is rio longer open to
scrutiny. The appellant was convicted by the learned XXV City
Sessions Judge, Bangalore City, under the aforesaid two sections by judgement and order dated 20 May, 2005 in SC No.212/ B
1994. The Sessions Judge sentenced him to death for the offence of murder and to a term of five years rigorous imprisonment and fine of rupees ten thousand for causing disappearance of evidences of the offence; in default of payment of fine
the direction was to undergo simple imprisonment for one year. c
The appellant's appeal (Criminal Appeal No.1086 of 2005)
against the judgment and order passed by the trial court and
the reference made by the Sessions Judge under section 366
of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Criminal Referred Case
No.6 of 2005) were heard together by the Karnataka High Court. o
The High Court confirmed the conviction and the death sentence awarded to the appellant and by judgment and order dated
19 September, 2005 dismissed the appellant's appeal and accepted the reference made by the trial court without any modification in the conviction or sentence. Against the High CourtjudgE
ment the appellant has come to this Court in this appeal. The
Appeal was earlier heard by a bench of two judges. Both the
honourable judges unanimously upheld the appellant's conviction for the two offences but they were unable to agree to the
punishment meted out to the appellant. S. B. Sinha J. felt that in
F
the facts and circumstances of the case the punishment of life
imprisonment, rather than death would serve the ends of justice. He, however, made it clear that the appellant would not be
released from prison till the end of his life. M. Katju J., on the
other hand, took the view that the appellantdeserved nothing
but death. It is thus on the limited, though very important and G
intractable question of sentence that this appeal has come before us.
3. This takes us to the facts of the case that has all the
elements of high drama. It has a man's vile greed coupled with
H
104 .
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2008] 11 S.C.R.
A
the devil's cunning; a woman's craving for a son, coupled with
extreme credulity and gullibility and a daughter's deep and abiding love for her mother coupledwith remarkable perseverance
to see through the lies behind her mother's mysterious disappearance. But a man's life can not be decided in three senB tences and we must.see the prosecution case, as established
up to this court in some greater detail.
4. Shakereh, the deceased victim of the crime, came from
a highly reputed and wealthy background. She was the grand
C daughter of Sir Mirza Ismail, a former Dewan of the Princely
State of Mysore and the daughter of Mr. Ghulam Hussain
Namaze and Mrs. Gauhar Taj Na maze. She held vast and very
valuable landed properties in her own right. Among her various
properties was a bungalow at No.81, Richmond Road, Bangalore, constructed over nearly 38000 square foot of land that she
D had got in Hiba (oral gift) from her parent's side. Another was a
large piece of land measuring 40,000 square foot on Wellington
Street that she had got in dowry at the time of marriage.
Shakereh was married to Mr. Akbar Khaleeli, a member of the
Indian Foreign Service. They had four daughters from the marE riage. Shakereh came to know the appellant, Murali Manohar
Mishra who called himself Swamy Shraddananda, for the first
time in 1983 when she and her family were visiting the erstwhile Nawab of Rampur in New Delhi. The appellant was introduced as someone who was looking after the Rampur properF
ties and was said to be quite adept in managing urban landed
estates. Shakereh, at that time was facing some difficulties
under the urban land ceiling law and she asked the appellant to
come over to Bangalore and help her in sorting out the problems concerning her properties. Soon thereafter Akbar Khaleeli
G was posted as a diplomat to Iran. In those days Iran was not a
family-station for Indian diplomats and hence, he went alone
leaving Shakereh behind in Bangalore. The appellant then came
to Bangalore and started living in a part of her house, 81 RichmondRoad, purportedly to assist in the proper management of
H her properties. Apparently, more than helping in property mat-
---
....
SWAMY SHRADDANANDA@ MURALI MANOHAR MISHRA 105
v. STATE OF KARNATAKA [AFTAB ALAM,J.]
...
ters he worked on her suppressed though strong desire for a A
.
son and was able to convince her that with his occult powers he
(
r
could make her beget a son. In 1985, Shakereh and Akbar
Khaleeli got divorced. Shakereh then proceeded to marry the
appellant. She paid no heed to the opposition from family and
friends and finally got married to the appellant on 17 April, 1986 8
under the Special Marriage Act and the marriage was registered at the Sub-Registrar's Office, Mayo Hall, Bangalore. After marriage they lived together at 81 Richmond Road. For domestic chores they engaged a couple, a man called Raju to
work as gardener-cum handyman and his wife Josephine to c
work as maid servant. They lived in the servant's quarter of the
bungalow.
5. The daughters from the first marriage were most of the
time staying abroad.
D
6. After marriage Shakereh not only showered her love
)
and affection on the appellant but also her material wealth. She
executed a testamentary will in his favour besides a general
Power of Attorney appointing him as her agent and attorney.
She opened a number of bank accounts jointly with the appelE
lant and also took several bank lockers in their joint names.
They also started together a private company called S.S. Housing Private Limited of which they alone were the partners.
7. Notwithstanding her matrimonial adventures Shakereh's
relations with her daughters and her parents continued to be F
more or less as before. They met from time to time and kept in
touch by speaking on the telephone at regular intervals.
8. Then by the end of May 1991, Shakereh suddenly and
mysteriously disappeared. She was last met by her mother Mrs.
G
Gauhar Namaze (examined before the trial court as PW-25) on
13April, 1991. Her daughter, Sabah Khaleeli (examined as PW5) last spoke to her on telephone on 19 April, 1991 and accord-
~
ing to the two servants, Raju and Josephine (PWs-18 & 19 re1lf
spectively), they last saw her in the company of the appellant in
the morning of 28 May, 1991. Thereafter, Shakereh was not H
106
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2008] 11 S.C.R.
A
seen or spoken to by anyone. At that time she was about forty
years old.
·
9. When Sabah did not receive any call from her mother
nor was she able to get through to her on telephone she enB quired about her from the appellant who said that she had gone
to Hyderabad. In June 1991, when she contacted again he told
her that her mother had gone'to Kutch to attend the wedding of
a wealthy diamond merchant. A week later he told her that
Shakereh was keeping a low profile due to some income tax
C problems. Exasperated by the evasive and vague replies by
the appellant, Sabah came down to Bangalore but found no
trace of her mother in her house. The appellant then said that
Shakereh was pregnant and she had gone to the United States
of America to deliver the child. He also said that she had got
herself admitted in Roosevelt Hospital. Sabah made enquiries
D and came to learn that Roosevelt Hospital records did not show
admission of anyone by the name of Shakereh or matching her
description. ·she confronted the appellant and accused him of
giving false information about her mother. He tried to explain
that Shakereh had, in fact, gone to London but she wanted to
E keep her whereabouts confidential. However all stories fabricated by the appellant about her mother lay totally exposed to
Sabah when she called on him in a hotel room in Bombay and
chanced upon the passport of her mother lying around. A glance
at the passport made it clear that its holder had not gone to the
F
United.States or the United Kingdom or as a matter of fact anywhere out of the country. At this stage, she came to Bangalore
and lodged a written complaint at Ashok Nagar Police Station
where it was registered on 10 June 1992 simply as a woman
missing complaint bearing Cr.No.417 /1992.
G
10. The search for the 'missing' woman started in a rather
lukewarm way but the appellant thought that the time had come
to start covering his flanks. He went to the court seeking anticipatory bail. In the bail petition he declared his total innocence
and stated that perennial litigation with close _relations drove
H Shakereh to acute depression and in that state, while he was
...
SWAMY SHRADDANANDA@ MURALI MANOHAR MISHRA 107
.._
v. STATE OF KARNATAKA [AFTAB ALAM,J.]
away from Bangalore, she left the house in a fit of anger without A
leaving any signs as to where she was headed. He was able to
obtain anticipatory bail, initially on certain condition that was
later on greatly relaxed.
11. The investigation by Ashok Nagar police station did
B
-...I
not yield any results but the persistence of Sabah paid off. In
March 1994, the Central Crime Branch (C.C.B.), Bangalore took
over the investigation of the complaint about the 'missing'
Shakereh. The case came under the charge of C. Veeraiah,
CPI, CCB (PW 37) who, suspecting the role of the appellant in c
the disappearance of Shakereh, subjected him to close interrogation. Under intense interrogation the appellant broke down
and owned up to having killed Shakereh. He narrated in detail
the manner of her killing and disposing of her body. He stated
that he put the body of Shakereh inside a large wooden box
D
(that he had earlier got made for the purpose) and got the box
..
dropped into a pit (that he had got specially dug up) in the
grounds of 81 Richmond Road just outside their common bedroom. He then got the pit filled up by earth and the ground-surface cemented and covered up with stone slabs. He volunteered
to take the Investigating Officer (10) to the place and identify the
E
exact spot where Shakereh lay buried inside the wooden box.
The appellant made the following statement before the 10 on
28 March 1994.
"If I am taken I will show the place where the wooden box F
was prepared and the person who prepared it, the persons
who transported the box and the people who helped in
digging out the pit and the crow bar, spade, pan used for
digging pit, the cement bags and the spot where Shakereh
is buried and I exhume the dead body of the deceased
G
and show you. The statement what all I had earlier given
to Ashok Nagar police was a false statement given
-
intentionally just to escape myself."
'
The 10 then obtained an exhumation order from the Magistrate and after completing the other legal formalities, on March
H
108
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2008] 11 S.C.R.
A
30, 1994 brought the appellant to 81 Richmond Road along
with the exhumation team. They were taken by the appellant to
the rear of the house passing through the dinning hall and the
kitchen. The place was open to the sky but was enclosed on all
the four sides by high walls; the floor was made of kadapa slabs
B cemented at the joints. The place had no other access apart
from. the entry, through the kitchen. There the appellant identified t~e exact spot where the wooden box, with the body of
Shakereh inside it, lay buried and marked it with a piece of
chalk. The exhumation process started at 10.30 a.m. and the
c whole process was video graphed (as per M018).
12. As pointed out by the appellant, first the stone slabs
were removed and the cemented portion below the slabs was
broken up. Then the ground below was dug up and sure enough
D
a large-wooden box was found lying deep under. The box had
inside it, on top, a foam mattress, a pillow and a bed-sheet.
Under the mattress was a skeleton with a sleeping gown around
,1.
it. The bones had all become disjointed. The skeleton and the
long hair tufts lying around the skull were taken out and the forensic experts rearranged the bones and also fixed the skull
E
and the mandibles. There was no doubt that it was a human
skeleton. Mrs. Gauhar Taj Namaze identified a red stone ring
and two black rings found in the wooden box (that must have
slipped down the fingers after the flesh decayed away) as belonging to her daughter Shakereh. The sleeping gown that was
F
around the skeleton was identified by the maid as belonging to
her mistress Shakereh.
}<.
13. The post mortem examination was held on the same
day from 4.45 to about 6 p.m.
G
14. The skull along with an undisputed photograph of
Shakereh was sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory for
matching and identification by Photo Superimposition method.
The skeletal remains were subjected to D.N.A. fingerprinting.
/
Both the tests gave the same result and left no room for doubt
....
H that the skeleton was of Shakereh.
SWAMY SHRADDANANDA@ MURALI MANOHAR MISHRA 109
v. STATE OF KARNATAKA [AFTAB ALAM,J.]
15. On 31 March, 1994the10 once again took the appelA
lant to 81 Richmond Road. This time the appellant took the 10
to the bedroom and showed the window that opened on the
enclosed space from where the skeleton of the deceased was
recovered on the previous day. He also explained that he had
got the lower part of the room's wall broken down to make a 8
J..
clearing through which the wooden box containing Shakereh's
body was pushed out of the room and into the pit. He also produced before the 10 pills of eight different kinds and the cheque
books of different bank accounts. ,
16. The other aspect of the case is equally significant in c
that it provides the motive for the murder. It came to light during
investigation that after Shakereh disappeared (or, in retrospect,
was killed by the appellant) he went about selling off her properties as fast as possible. On 30 and 31 March, 1992, in two
D
days, the appellant sold 34 plots carved out of Shakereh's properties to various people under registered sale-deeds using the
General Power of Attorney executed by her in his favour. The
joint bank accounts were simply used to deposit large sums
being the sale proceeds of the lands sold by him and to withdraw the amounts as soon as those were credited to the acE
count. Needless to say that from May 1991, it was the appellant
alone who operated the joint bank accounts. He also literally
cleaned out the bank lockers that Shakereh had taken in their
joint names.
17. In all the meetings of the S.S. Housing Company, he
F
~
represented the presence of Shakereh and signed the proceedings for himself and for her as holder of her General Power of
Attorney. The proceedings of the meetings were regularly sent
to their Chartered Accountant.
G
18. The appellant also gave regular replies to the queries
of the Income Tax authorities, one of which, of the year 1993
contains his signature and the signature of Shakereh which is
apparently forged.
19. In light of the large amount of evidences unearthed H
-1
J
110
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2008] 11 S.C.R.
A
against the appellant he was charged with the commission of
murder of his wife Shakereh. As is evident, the case against
the appellant was completely based on circumstantial evide~ce.
But the prosecution proved its case to the hilt by examining 39
witnesses and producing before the court a large number of
B
exhibits, both material (MOs. 1 to 33) and documentary (P1 to
P267) ..
~-
20. These are, in brief, the facts of the case. On these
facts, Mr. Sanjay Hegde, learned counsel for the State of
c
Karnataka, supported the view taken by Katju J. (as indeed by
the High Court and the trial court) and submitted that the appellant deserved nothing less than death. In order to bring out the
full horror of the crime Mr. Hegde reconstructed it before the
court. He said that after five years of marriage Shakereh's inD
fatuation for the appellant had worn thin. She could see through
his fraud and see him for what he was. a lowly charlatan. The
appellant could sense that his game was up but he was not
willing to let go all the wealth and the lavish life style that he had
gotten used to. He decided to kill Shakereh and take over all
her wealth directly. In furtherance of his aim he conceived a terE
rible plan and executed it to perfection. He got a large pit dug
up at a 'safe' place just outside their bed room. The person who
was to lie into it was told that it was intended for the construetion of a soak- pit for the toilet. He got the bottom of one of the
walls of the bedroom knocked off making a clearing to push the
F wooden box through; God only knows saying what to the perso_n who was to pass through it. He got a large wooden box
,.__
(7x2x2 feet) made and brought to 81 Richmond Road where it
.,
was kept in the guest house; mercifully out of sight of the person for whom it was meant. Having thus completed all his prepa-
.
.
G rations he administered a very heavy dose of sleeping drugs to
her on 28 May, 1991 when the servant couple, on receiving in-
.•
formation in the morning regarding a death in their family in a
-.
village in Andhra Pradesh asked permission for leave and some
>-
money in advance. However, before giving them the money
H asked for and letting them go, the appellant got the large wooden
SWAMY SHRADDANANDA@ MURALI MANOHAR MISHRA 111
>-
v. STATE OF KARNATAKA [AFTAB ALAM,J.]
box brought from the guest house to the bedroom by Raju (with
A
the help of three or four other persons called for the purpose)
where, according to Raju, he saw Shakereh (for the last time)
lying on the bed, deep in sleep. After the servants had gone
away and the field was clear the appellant transferred Shakereh
along with the mattress, the pillow and the bed sheet from the
B
""'
bed to the box, in all probability while she was still alive. He then
shut the lid of the box and pushed it through the opening made
in the wall into the pit, dug just outside the room, got the pit filled
up with earth and the surface cemented and covered with stone
slabs.
c
21. What the appellant did after committing murder of
Shakereh was, according to Mr. Hegde even more shocking.
He continued to live, like a ghoul, in the same house and in the
sam!3 room and started a massive game of deception. To Sabah,
D
who desperately wanted to meet her mother or at least to talk to
~
her, he constantly fed lies and represented to the world at large
that Shakereh was alive and well but was simply avokling any
social contacts. Behind the fa9ade of deception he went on
selling Shakereh's properties as quickly as possible to convert
those into cash for easy appropriation. In conclusion Mr. Hegde E
submitted that it was truly a murder most foul and Katju J. was
perfectly right in holding that this case came under the first, second and the fifth of the five categories, held by this Court as
calling for the death sentence, in Machhi Singh & Ors. vs. State
of Punjab, (1983) 3 SCC 470.
F
-"'!
22. In order to properly appreciate the decision in Machhi
Singh it would be necessary to first go to its precursor, the Constitution Bench decision in Bachan Singh vs. State of Punjab,
AIR 1980 SC 898 and to an earlier Constitution Bench decision in Jagmohan Singh vs. State of U.P, AIR 1973 SC 947, G
that is the precursor of Bacl)an Singh. The decisions in ·
Jagmohan Singh and Bachan .Singh deal with the recurrent
debate on abolition of death penalty and are primarily concerned
with the question of legitimacy of the death sentence. Jagmohan
relates to the period when the requirement for the court to state H
..
112
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2008] .11 S.C.R.
A
-(
reasons for not giving death sentence but giving the alternate
sentence of life imprisonment in a capital offence was done .
I
away with by deletion of Section 367(5) in the Code of Criminal
~
Procedure, 1898 and the requirement to state reasons for giv:-
I
ing de_ath sentence and not the alternate of life imprisonment
I
B
under Section 354(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
~
.
.
.-
was yet to be introduced. Bachan. Singh ·relates to the period
>-
after the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 carrie into force
tnat gives to the accused the; right of pre-sentence hearing under Section 235(2) and unqer Section 354(3) casts. an obliga·-
c
fi6'n ·on the court to state the 'special reasons'.for awarding the
, '
sentence of death and not its alternate, the imprisonmenf for
'·
life o.r imprisonrnent for a term of years. On both occasions the
c.purt upheld the Constitutional validity of death .sentence for
;.-
;-
murder and the-other .Qapital offences in the .Penal Code.
. .
.
,
D
23. :We are· n~t concerned tie re with the issue of the ·constitutionality of death sentence that stands· conclusively settled
~-
by two Constitution Bench·deCisions·. What is of importance for
ourpre~ent purpose is tlla't both the Constitution Benches firmly
declined ,to be drawn into makin'g any" standardisation ·o"r
E
categorisation of cases for awarding death penaity? It was
,.
strongly urged before the Court that in order to save the sen-
~
tence of death from the vice of arbitrariness it was imperative
for the Court to lay down guide lines, to mark and identify the
...
'
types of murder that would attracfthe punishment of death, leav-
~
F
ing aside the other kinds of murder for the lesser option of the
sentence of imprisonment for life. In Jagmohan the Court turned
down the submission-observing (in paragraph 25 of. the judg-
;....
ment) as follows:
G
''In India this onerous duty is cast upon Judges and for
more than a century the J_udges are carrying out this duty
under the Indian Penal' Code.