# SYED HASAN RASUL NUMA AND ANR v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANR

- **Citation:** [1990] Supp. 3 S.C.R. 165
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1990-11-15
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 1906 of 1976
- **Bench:** K. Jagannatha Shetty, A.M. Ahmadi
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/syed-hasan-rasul-numa-and-anr-v-union-of-india-and-anr-10914
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

ij
Delhi Development Act 1947-Section 44-Master Plan for
Delhi-Modifications made-Change proposed from 'residential' to
'recreational'-Requisites of the notice and necessity for publicationMandatory.
Respondent No. 2, Delhi Development Authority, issued a public
notice dated 5th July 1975 stating that the Central Government proposes to make modifications to the Master Plan for Delhi with respect to
an area known as 'Dargah Shaheed Khan'. It was notified that the land
use of the area in question was proposed to he changed from 'residential' to 'recreational' and any person having any objection or suggestion
to the proposed modification could send his objections/suggestions to
the Delhi Development Authority within thirty days from the date
thereof. The appellants sent in their objection on 18,10.1975 that is two
and half months after the date of expiry of the last date for r.ting the
objections. The authorities seem to have not considered that objection.
thereupon the appellants rited a writ petition in the High Court challenging the validity of the public notice contending that the public notice
was not given publicity in the manner prescribed under Section 44 of
the Delhi Development Act 1957; as it was neither alTJXed in conspicuous place within the locality where the land is located nor was the
same proclaimed by the heat of the drum. According to the appellants
the provisions of section 44 are mandatory. The High Court having
dismissed the writ petition, the appellants have rited this appeal, after
obtaining special leave. The same contentions have been reiterated by
the appellants before this Court.
Allowing the appeal, this Court,
HELD: In matters of interpretation one should not concentrate
too much on one word and pay too little attention to the other words. No
provision in the statute and no word in the section may be construed in
isolation. Every provision and every word must be looked at generally
and in the context in which it is used. [170E-F]
165
c
D
E
F
G
H
A
B
c
166
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1990] Supp. 3 S.C.R.
Section 44 requires that the notice signed by the Secretary of the
Authority shall be widely made known in the locality to be affected by
the proposed modification to the Master Plan. It shall be published by
(i) affixing copies of the notice in conspicuous public places within the
said locality or (ii) publishing the same by best of drum; or (iii) advertisement in local newspaper. [ 170B-C I
There are three alternate methods prescribed. The authorities
will have to follow any of the two methods. This is mandatory. There is
no discretion in this regard. The discretion however, is to follow more
than the two methods. It is also discretionary to follow any other means
of publication that the Secretary may think fit. That is left to the Secretary. This appears to be the only reasonable and sensible view to be
taken by the Overall structure of the section. [170G-171A)
In the instant case, the notice has been published only in the local
newspapers, namely, the Daily Pratap. The Hindustan Times. This is
only one of the three means of publication provided under Section 44
D
and it apparently falls short of the mandatory requirements of the
Section. Since the provisions of Section,44 have not been complied with,
the notice in question has no validity and the action taken pursuant
thereto has also no validity. [172B-C)
Khub Chand & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan, (1967) 1 SCR 120;
E
Collector (District Magistrate) Allahabad and Anr. v. Raja Ram Jaiswa/ etc., (1985) 37 sec 1, referred to.

## Text

..
SYED HASAN RASUL NUMA AND ANR.
v.
UNION OF INDIA AND ANR.
NOVEMBER 15, 1990
A
[K. JAGANNATHA SHETTY 'AND A.M. AHMADI, JJ.]
ij
Delhi Development Act 1947-Section 44-Master Plan for
Delhi-Modifications made-Change proposed from 'residential' to
'recreational'-Requisites of the notice and necessity for publicationMandatory.
Respondent No. 2, Delhi Development Authority, issued a public
notice dated 5th July 1975 stating that the Central Government proposes to make modifications to the Master Plan for Delhi with respect to
an area known as 'Dargah Shaheed Khan'. It was notified that the land
use of the area in question was proposed to he changed from 'residential' to 'recreational' and any person having any objection or suggestion
to the proposed modification could send his objections/suggestions to
the Delhi Development Authority within thirty days from the date
thereof. The appellants sent in their objection on 18,10.1975 that is two
and half months after the date of expiry of the last date for r.ting the
objections. The authorities seem to have not considered that objection.
thereupon the appellants rited a writ petition in the High Court challenging the validity of the public notice contending that the public notice
was not given publicity in the manner prescribed under Section 44 of
the Delhi Development Act 1957; as it was neither alTJXed in conspicuous place within the locality where the land is located nor was the
same proclaimed by the heat of the drum. According to the appellants
the provisions of section 44 are mandatory. The High Court having
dismissed the writ petition, the appellants have rited this appeal, after
obtaining special leave. The same contentions have been reiterated by
the appellants before this Court.
Allowing the appeal, this Court,
HELD: In matters of interpretation one should not concentrate
too much on one word and pay too little attention to the other words. No
provision in the statute and no word in the section may be construed in
isolation. Every provision and every word must be looked at generally
and in the context in which it is used. [170E-F]
165
c
D
E
F
G
H
A
B
c
166
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1990] Supp. 3 S.C.R.
Section 44 requires that the notice signed by the Secretary of the
Authority shall be widely made known in the locality to be affected by
the proposed modification to the Master Plan. It shall be published by
(i) affixing copies of the notice in conspicuous public places within the
said locality or (ii) publishing the same by best of drum; or (iii) advertisement in local newspaper. [ 170B-C I
There are three alternate methods prescribed. The authorities
will have to follow any of the two methods. This is mandatory. There is
no discretion in this regard. The discretion however, is to follow more
than the two methods. It is also discretionary to follow any other means
of publication that the Secretary may think fit. That is left to the Secretary. This appears to be the only reasonable and sensible view to be
taken by the Overall structure of the section. [170G-171A)
In the instant case, the notice has been published only in the local
newspapers, namely, the Daily Pratap. The Hindustan Times. This is
only one of the three means of publication provided under Section 44
D
and it apparently falls short of the mandatory requirements of the
Section. Since the provisions of Section,44 have not been complied with,
the notice in question has no validity and the action taken pursuant
thereto has also no validity. [172B-C)
Khub Chand & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan, (1967) 1 SCR 120;
E
Collector (District Magistrate) Allahabad and Anr. v. Raja Ram Jaiswa/ etc., (1985) 37 sec 1, referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1906
of 1976.
F
From the Judgment and Order dated 28.7.1976 of the Delhi High
Court in Civil Writ Petition No. 59 of 1976.
Rajinder Sachhar, B.V. Desai and D.B. Kalia for the Appellants.
V.C. Mahajan, V.B. Saharya, V.N. Ganpule and C.V. Subba
G
Rao for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
K. JAGANNATHA SHETTY, J. Delhi Development Authority
issued public notice dated 5th July 1975 stating that the Central
H
Government proposes to make modifications to the Master Plan for
•
HASAN RASUL v. U.0.1. [SHETfY, J.l
167
Delhi with respect to an area measuring about 3.66 hects (9 acres),
known as Dargah Shaheed Khan, falling in zone D-5 (D.l.Z. area)
bounded by 45.72 meter (150 ft) r/w Panchkuin Road in the North,
45.72 meter (150 ft) Ramakrishna Road in the East and residential
area in the South-West. It was notified that the land use of this area
was proposed to be changed from 'Residential' to 'Recreational (District Park and Open Spaces)' and any person having any objection or
suggestion with respect to the proposed modifications could send his
objections or suggestions to the Secretary Delhi Development Authority within thirty days from the date thereof.
The first appellant claims to be a religious and charitable
denomination being a dargah of late Hazarat Syed Hassan RasulNuma and the second appellant is the Sajjada Nashin (Spiritual
perceptor) of the.first appellant. The first respon!dent is the Union of
India. The second respondent is the Delhi Development Authority
("DDA").
A
B
c
The appellants allege inter alia, that the need of converting the
D
land use from 'residential' to 'recreational' appears to be a ruse to
deprive the appellants the benefit of their land as there are a number
of such r~oreational parks and open spaces in the vicinity as a mere
· 1ook at the land use Map of the Master Plan for Delhi and the Delhi
Guide Map, 1969 would show. They have named some of the centrally
located parks like Budha Jayanti Park, Ravindra Rangashala and its
E
forests, the Talkatora Garden and yet another across the Panchkuin
Road.
The case of the appellants is that the said notice was not given
publicity in the manner prescribed under Section 44 of the Delhi
Development Act, 1957 ("Act"). It was not affixed in conspicuous
f
places within the locality where the land is located, nor was proclaimed
by the beat of drum. They were therefore, not aware of the notice and
they could not file their objections within the specified period. It is
also contended that the provisions of Section 44 are mandatory and the
notice about the proposed change of land use ought to be published by
two or more means prescribed under the section. However, when they
G
came to know of the notice by other mearis, they sent their objections
though belated. The objection was sent on 18th October, 1975 to the
Secretary of DDA. The. authorities seem to have not considered that
objection. With these and other allegations the appellants challenged
the validity of the public notice. They moved the High Court for relief
under Article 226 of the Constitution.
H
A
B
c
168
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1990] Supp. 3 S.C.R.
The claim was heard by a Division Bench of the High Court
perhaps, by way of preliminary hearing. Upon considering the affidavits filed by the parties, the High Court rejected the writ petition
with the following observations on the foregoing contentions:
"It is not disputed that the petitioners did file objections to
the impugned notice though late. Therefore, we are of the
opinion that even if it be assumed that the provisions of
Section 44 of the Act are mandatory and the same have not
been complied with in as much as publication of notice is
not in two or more prescribed manners, the petitioners
have not been prejudiced and there is no cause for interference under our writ jurisdiction."
The appellants now appeal to this Court by Special Leave.
There are two questions for decision: (i) whether the belated
objection filed by the appellants has been considered by the authoD
rities? and (ii) what are the requirements of Section 44; whether they
have been complied with in the instant case?
E
The reasoning of the High Court is not readily comprehensible.
There is no discussion in the judgment on any one of the questions. We
may take up the questions in turn. On the first question, the respondents while resisting the writ petition h_aye filed their respective
affidavits in the High Court. The Secretary, ODA, in his affidavit has
stated that the objection of the appellants was transmitted to the Central Government for consideration. It was his case that the Central
Government alone was competent to consider the objections received
from the interested persons against the public notice. Mr. K. Biswas,
F
Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Works and Housing, Government of
India, in his affidavit has, inter alia, stated:
" ... That a meeting was taken on 25.10.1975 under the
Chairmanship of then Secretary to consider all objections/
suggestions received in response to inter alia the Public
G
Notice dated the 5th July 1975, published by the ODA.
However, as the letter dated 18.10.1975 containing the
objections of the petitioners was received in this Ministry
on 21.10.1975 that is, after the issue of the Memorandum
dated 17.10.1975 convening the aforesaid meeting, the said
objections could not be included in the Agenda for the
H
meeting. However, such of those objections, which were
•
,
HASAN RASUL v. U.0.1. [SHEITY,J.]
169
received late (including those of the petitioners) were read
out in the meeting and were duly considered in the meeting. Since the objections raised by the petitioners were
untenable they were ruled out. Only those objections/suggestions which were included in the agenda and which were
of any significance found place in the minutes of the meetA
ing. Thus it would be seen that although the petitioners · B
filed objections two and half months after the expiry of the
last date for filing objections, it was considered in the meeting held on the 25th October, 1975".
It is evident from these averments that the appellants' statement
of objections was not listed in the agenda of the meeting convened for
consideration of all the objections received. It is, however, claimed
that the appellants' objection was read and ruled out in the meeting.
But there is-no record to indicate that it was considered and rejected.
At any rate, it is not borne out from the proceedings of the meeting. In
fact, it is admitted that there is no record with regard to disposal of the
objection in question. It is not as if the proceedings of the meeting are
not recorded and maintained. It is very much there, but it is confined
only to the listed items in the agenda of the meeting. When the proceedings of the meeting are recorded, one would naturally expect that
all that transpired in the meeting should find a place in the minutes of
the meeting. In the absence of any such record, we find it difficult to
accept the mere allegation of the respondents that the appellants
objection like any other objection was considered by the authorities.
The High Court therefore, seems to be in error in assuming that there
was no prejudice to ihe appellants. We do not however, mean to say
that the appellants have a right to have their belated objection considered by the authorities. If there was valid publication of the notice
as prescribed under the law, they ought to have filed the objection
within the period specified in the notice. They could not file their
objection after the prescribed period and complain that they have
been prejudiced by the non-consideration of the objection. The prejudice could be presumed only when the objection filed within the
prescribed period is not considered by the competent authorities.
The second question relates to the requirements of Section 44 of
the Act and its compliance in the instant case. This is the primary and
all-important question for consideration. Section 44 provides:
c
D
E
F
G
"44. Public notice how to be made Known-Every
public notice given under the Act shall be in writing over
H
A
B
c
D
E
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G
H
170
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1990) Supp. 3 S.C.R.
the signature of the Secretary to the Authority and shall be
widely made known in the locality to be affected thereby by
affixing copies thereof in conspicuous public places within
the said locality or by publishing the same by beat of drum
or by advertisement in local newspaper or by any two or
more of these means, and by any other means that Secretary may think fit."
It requires that the notice signed by the Secretary of the Authority shall be widely made known in the locality to be affected by the
proposed modification to the Master Plan. It shall be published by (i)
affixing copies of the notice in conspicuous public places within the
said locality; or (ii) publishing the same by beat of drum; or (iii)
advertisement in local newspaper. These are the three alternate
methods of publication prescribed under the Section. The section than
speaks of: "or by any two or more of these means, and by any other
means that Secretary may think fit". This is the last portion of the
section which is the bone of contention between the parties. It can be
conveniently split up into two parts. The first part reads "by any two or
more of these means" and the next one reads "and by any other means
that Secretary may think fit". Counsel for the respondents contends
that the last part of the section provides for another alternate method
of publication of the notice and if there is publication in any one of the
methods provided in the section, it would meet the statutory requirement. The argument does seem to proceed only on the word 'or' used
immediately preceding the last part of the section. But in matters of
interpretation one should not concentrate too much on one word and
pay too little attention to the other words. No provision in the statute
and no word in the section may be construed in isolation. Every provision and every word must be looked at generally and in the context in
which it is used. No doubt the provisions of Section 44 are not happily
worded, but if we read carefully the terms of the section, the submission of counsel for the appellants appears to be wholly untenable. The
words used in both the limbs of the last part of the section are significant. The first one refers to 'these means' and the second speaks of
·other means'. The emphasis by the draftsman is on the words 'these
means' which plainly mean any two or more of the means provided in
the Section. There are three alternate methods prescribed. The
authorities will have to follow any of the two methods. This is mandatory. There is no discretion in this regard. The discretion however, is
to follow more than the two methods. It is also discretionary to follow
any other means of publication that the Secretary may think fit. That is
left to the Secretary. This a pears to be the only reasonable and sensi-
HASAN RASUL v. U.0.1. [SHETIY, J.]
171
ble view to be taken by the overall structure of the section.
Section ll(a) of the Act provides procedure for modification to
the Master Plan and the zonal development plan. Sub-section (3)
thereof provides that before making any modifications.to any plan, the
Authority or, as the case may be, the Central Government shall publish a notice inviting objections and suggestions from persons with
respect to the proposed modification before the date specified in t~e
notice. This is to give an opportunity to persons who are likely to be
affected by the modification of the Plan to file objections and suggestions. Indeed, the interested persons or the persons who are likely to
be affected have a right to file their objections and representations
within the time specified. They have further right to have the objections considered by the competent authorities. In order to effectuate
these rights, the prescribed means of publication must be faithfully
followed giving the persons clear notice as specified in the statute. The
provision providing such notice to persons whose rights or intersts are
likely to be impaired must always be considered as mandatory. As
otherwise, it would defeat the very purpose of giving public notice
inviting objections and suggestions against the proposed action.
There is a broad basis for the view that we have taken from the
decisions of this Court although on the provisions of other enactment.
A
B
c
D
The section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 provides for publication of the notification in the Official Gazette and in two daily newsE
papers circulating in that locality where the la.nd is situated of which
atleast one shall be in the regional language. The Section 4(1) further
provides that the Collector shall cause public notice of the substance of
such notification to be given at convenient places in the said locality.
In Khub Chand & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan, [1967] 1SCR120, Subba
Rao, C.J., while construing the object and scope of Section 4(1) expresF
sed the view that provisions of the Section requiring public notice are
mandatory and the legislature thought that it was absolutely necessary
that the owner of the land should have a clear notice of the proposed
acquisition. It was said that the fact that the owner may have notice of
the particulars of the intended acquisition by any other means does not
serve the purpose of Section 4 and does not absolve from the obligaG
tion to follow the method of publication of the notification. It was also
observed that the notification issued under Section 4(1) without
complying with the mandatory direction would be void and the land
acquisition proceedings taken pursuant thereto would also be void.
This view has been reiterated in a number of subsequent decisions of
this Court. In Collector (District Magistrate) Allahabad and Anr. v.
H
172
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1990] Supp. 3 S.C.R.
A
Raja Ram Jaiswal, etc., [ 1985] 3 SCC 1 most of the earlier decisions
have been referred to and the view taken in the Khub Chand case has
been reiterated.
B
c
In the instant case, the notice has been published only in the
local newspapers, namely, the Daily Pratap. The Hindustan Times,
the Statesman, The Indian Express and the Navbharat Times. This is
only one of the three means of publication provided under Section 44
and it apparently falls short of the mandatory requirements of the
Section. Since the provisions of the Sectidn 44 have not been complied
with, the notice in question has no validity and the action taken
pursuant thereto has also no validity.
In the result, the appeal is allowed, the order of the High Court
is set aside, the impugned public notice is quashed with costs here and
in the court below.
Y. Lal
Appeal allowed.
,'