# SYNDICATE BANK LTD v. K. R. V. BHAT

- **Citation:** [1968] 1 S.C.R. 327
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1967-08-22
- **Bench:** M. Hidayatullah, C. A. Vaidialingam
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/syndicate-bank-ltd-v-k-r-v-bhat-4131
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of. 1947)
s.
33-Dismissal of
employee with immediate effect-Dismwed employee files appealAppeal dismissed-Effective date of dismissal-Industrial dispute
referTed after original dismissal order but befo1'e disposal of appealIf necessaTY to compltJ with. proviso to s. 33(2)(b).
After holding a domestic enquiry the Managing Director of the
appellant-Bank dismissed the respondent-employee with immediate
effect. The employee was informed that he might appeal against this
order to the working committee of the Directors within certain days.
The respondent filed the appeal which the working committee dismissed. Subsequent to the filing of the appeal but prior to its dismissal, the Central ~vernment referred to an Industrial Tribunal
the question as to whether action, by the appellant-Bank, in discontinuing pigmy collection and payment thereof to the workmen,
was justified. The respondent filed a complaint to the Industrial
Tribunal alleging that the appellant contravened s. 33 of the Industrial Dispute Act as the order of dismissal had been passed durin!I
the pendency of an Industrial Dispute, the management should have
asked the Industrial Tribunal for approval of their action, and they
should have paid him one month's wages. The Industrial Tribunal
held that the dismissal of the respondent became effective only after
the working committee disposed of the appeal, and as during this
period an Industrial Dispute was pending the management was bound
to comply with the proviso to s. 33(2)(b) of the Act. In appeal to
this Court.
Held: There was no contravention of s. 33.
An order of discharge or dismissal, can be passed only once; and,
in this case, the order of dismissal was the original or very first
passed by the Managing Director, on which date the Industrial Dispute had not even been referred, for adjudicatioo. No doubt, either
by virtue of the Standing Orders, or by virtue of a contract, of
service, a right of appeal may be given to a workman concerned, to
challenge an order of dismissal. ·But the appellate authority only
considers whether . the order of dismissal has to be sustained or
whether it requires modification. Further, the proviso to s. 33(2) (b)
when it refers to payment of wages for one month, also indicates
t_hat it relates to an order of discharge or dismissal, which comes
into effect immediately, The payment of one month's salary or v.rages,
is to soften the rigour of unemployment that will face the workman, against whom an order of discharge or dismissal, has been
passed, If the m'!"agement has to wait for the minimum period
prescnbed for fihng an appeal, also await the termination of the
appeal when one is filed, considerable time wouJd have elapsed from
the date of the original order, during which period the '''Orkman
would not have received any salary. [333F-334B]
·
_Equitable Coal Ltd. v. Tlgu Singh [1958] 1 L.L.J. 793 The Punjab
National Bank Ltd. v. Its Workmen (1960) 1 S.C.R. 806, and S'tra:wboard Manufacturing Co. v. Gobind [1962) Supp. 3 S.C.R 618 relied
on.
327
328
SUPREME COURT RBl'ORTS
[1968) 1 s.0.11.
The Management of Hotel Imperial v. Hotel Workers' Union
A
[1960) 1 S.C.R. 476, and Collector of Customs, Calcutta v. East India
Commercial Co. Ltd. [1963] 2 S.C.R. 563 held inapplicable.
CIVIL APPELLATE JurusmcnoN: Civil Appeal No. 503 of 1966.
Appeal by special leave from the Award dated November
10, 1964 of the Industrial Tribunal, Andhra Pradesh in Misc. Petition No. 32 of 1964 in Industrial Dispute No. 4 of 1964.
B
R. H. Gokhale, B. K. Seshu, Parameshwara Rao, Jyotana R.
Melkote and R. V. Pillai, for the appellant.
M. K. Ramamurthi, Shyamala Pappu and Vineet Kumar, for
the respondent.

## Text

A
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G
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SYNDICATE BANK LTD.
v.
K. R. V. BHAT
August 22, 1967
[M. HIDAYATULLAH AND C. A. VAIDIALINGAM, JJ.J
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of. 1947)
s.
33-Dismissal of
employee with immediate effect-Dismwed employee files appealAppeal dismissed-Effective date of dismissal-Industrial dispute
referTed after original dismissal order but befo1'e disposal of appealIf necessaTY to compltJ with. proviso to s. 33(2)(b).
After holding a domestic enquiry the Managing Director of the
appellant-Bank dismissed the respondent-employee with immediate
effect. The employee was informed that he might appeal against this
order to the working committee of the Directors within certain days.
The respondent filed the appeal which the working committee dismissed. Subsequent to the filing of the appeal but prior to its dismissal, the Central ~vernment referred to an Industrial Tribunal
the question as to whether action, by the appellant-Bank, in discontinuing pigmy collection and payment thereof to the workmen,
was justified. The respondent filed a complaint to the Industrial
Tribunal alleging that the appellant contravened s. 33 of the Industrial Dispute Act as the order of dismissal had been passed durin!I
the pendency of an Industrial Dispute, the management should have
asked the Industrial Tribunal for approval of their action, and they
should have paid him one month's wages. The Industrial Tribunal
held that the dismissal of the respondent became effective only after
the working committee disposed of the appeal, and as during this
period an Industrial Dispute was pending the management was bound
to comply with the proviso to s. 33(2)(b) of the Act. In appeal to
this Court.
Held: There was no contravention of s. 33.
An order of discharge or dismissal, can be passed only once; and,
in this case, the order of dismissal was the original or very first
passed by the Managing Director, on which date the Industrial Dispute had not even been referred, for adjudicatioo. No doubt, either
by virtue of the Standing Orders, or by virtue of a contract, of
service, a right of appeal may be given to a workman concerned, to
challenge an order of dismissal. ·But the appellate authority only
considers whether . the order of dismissal has to be sustained or
whether it requires modification. Further, the proviso to s. 33(2) (b)
when it refers to payment of wages for one month, also indicates
t_hat it relates to an order of discharge or dismissal, which comes
into effect immediately, The payment of one month's salary or v.rages,
is to soften the rigour of unemployment that will face the workman, against whom an order of discharge or dismissal, has been
passed, If the m'!"agement has to wait for the minimum period
prescnbed for fihng an appeal, also await the termination of the
appeal when one is filed, considerable time wouJd have elapsed from
the date of the original order, during which period the '''Orkman
would not have received any salary. [333F-334B]
·
_Equitable Coal Ltd. v. Tlgu Singh [1958] 1 L.L.J. 793 The Punjab
National Bank Ltd. v. Its Workmen (1960) 1 S.C.R. 806, and S'tra:wboard Manufacturing Co. v. Gobind [1962) Supp. 3 S.C.R 618 relied
on.
327
328
SUPREME COURT RBl'ORTS
[1968) 1 s.0.11.
The Management of Hotel Imperial v. Hotel Workers' Union
A
[1960) 1 S.C.R. 476, and Collector of Customs, Calcutta v. East India
Commercial Co. Ltd. [1963] 2 S.C.R. 563 held inapplicable.
CIVIL APPELLATE JurusmcnoN: Civil Appeal No. 503 of 1966.
Appeal by special leave from the Award dated November
10, 1964 of the Industrial Tribunal, Andhra Pradesh in Misc. Petition No. 32 of 1964 in Industrial Dispute No. 4 of 1964.
B
R. H. Gokhale, B. K. Seshu, Parameshwara Rao, Jyotana R.
Melkote and R. V. Pillai, for the appellant.
M. K. Ramamurthi, Shyamala Pappu and Vineet Kumar, for
the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Vaidialingam, J. This appeal, by special leave, is directed
against the award, dated' November 10, 1964, of the Industrial
Tribunal, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad, attepting a complaint,
filed by the respondent, under s. 33A, of the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947 (Act XIV of 1947) (hereinafter called the Act).
u
The respondent was, at the material time, working in the
mam branch of the appellant, at Belgaum. By order dated March
D
8, 1963, the respondent was transferred to Bhatkal branch, as a
'C' rank Officer, to work there, as an accountant. He was also
informed that he was being relieved, so as to enable him to proceed to duty, at the place of transfer, by March 18, 1963. He was
allbwed three days' joining time.
On March 13, 1963, the Manager of the Branch at Belgaum,
informed the respondent that he was relieved, with effect from
E
that date, to join duty at the Bhatkal branch, by March 18, 1963.
The respondent, by letter dated March 14, 1963, after setting out
the various matters therein, applied for privilege leave, for ninety
days, from March 14, 1963 to June 11. 1963, so as to enable
him to improve his health and also to attend to oertain domestic
matters. But the Bank, the appellant herein, desired him, by their
letter dated March 23, 1963, to join duty and then apply for leave,
if necessary. Some further correspondence ensued, between the
Bank and the respondent, the respondent again making a request
F
tor sanction of his leave and the appellant Bank insisting upon
his joining duty, according to the order of transfer, and then
applying for leave. But, as the respondent did not join duty at
the Bhatkal branch, though he was relieved from the Belgaum
office, the appellant, by their communication, dated July 23, 1963,
G
desired the respondent to offer explanation for not obeying the
order of transfer. The respondent sent a reply, on July 29, 1963,
stating what, according to him, were the reasons for his not joining duty at the transferred office. The appellant' Bank, not satisfied with the explanation, given by the respondent, framed two
char~es against him, and communicated the same, on Aue;ust 7,
l
1963. The charges were to the effect that (a) the respondent, by
wilfully disobeying the lawful and reasonable transfer order of
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SYNDICAl'E BANK v. 1'.R.V. BHAT ( Vaidialingam, J .)
329
the management, has committed gross misconduct, for which the
punishment is dismissal from service; and (b) the respondent had
absented himself from duty from March 14, 1963, without leave,
which again, is a minor misconduct for which also punishment
can be imposed. The respondent was also directed to submit his
explanal!on, if any, to the charges, on or before August 25, 1963.
The respondent offered his explanation to the charges, by his
letter, dated August 21, 1963. The appellant informed the respondent, on October I. 1963, that an enquiry would be conducted
against him, in respect of the charges, on October 5, 1963, and
desired him to be present
at the enquiry, with the necessary
evidence, in support of his defence.
The inquiry was conducted by the Enquiry Officer, in which
the respondent participated. The Enquiry Officer sent a report to
the Managing Director of the Ba!nk, dated October 28, 1963, substantially finding the respondent guilty of both the charges. In
respect of the first charge of gross misconduct, for wilfully disobeying the order of transfer, the Enquiry Officer had proposed
that the respondent should be dismissed and, in respect of the
second charge, of absenting without leave, it was proposed in the
report that the increment be stopped, for a period of six months,
with effect from April 25, 1963. Certain consequential proposals
were also made, as to how exactly the respondent's absence, was
to be dealt with.
The Managing Director of the Bank, after considering the report submitted by the Enquiry Officer, us well as the further explanation, offered by the respondent, in respect of the findings recorded in the said report, by his order dated November 12, 1963,
agreed with the recommendation of the Enquiry Officer, dismissed
the respondent from the service of the Bank with immediate effect,
for the offence of wilful disobedience of the order of transfer. The
respondent was also informed that he might appeal, against the
order of dismissal, to the working committee of the Directors of
the Bank, within forty-five days of receipt of the order.
The respondent filed an appeal, on December 17, 1963, before the working committee of the Directors, wherein he attacked
the various proceedings, culminating in the order of dismissal,
pa~sed against him. Intimation of the hearing of the appeal was
given to the respondent. But, it is seen that on the date when the
appeal was taken up for hearing, viz., March 20, 1964, the respondent was not present either in person or through authorised
representative of his. In consequence, the working committee of
the Directors dismissed the appeal on March 20, 1964. In the
appellate order, the working oommittee has elaborately considered
the various circumstances necessitating the conduct of the enquiry, the enquiry proceedings and the answers given by the respondent; and it has, ultimately, agreed with the findings recorded
330
SUPRJl)li: COUBT BEPOR'fS
(1968) I S.C.11.·
in the enquiry proceedings that the respondent had wilfully disA
obeyed the lawful orders of the management transferring him.
The resuit was that the order of dismissal, passed by the Managing Director on November 12, 1963, was continued.
At this stage it may be mentioned that the Central Government had refe1Ted, on Ja111uary 8, 1964, for adjudication, to the
B
Industrial Tribunal, of which Dr. Mir Siadat Ali Khan was appoin·
ted as the presiding officer, with headquarters at Hyderabad, the
question as to whether action, by the appellant Bank, in disconti·
nuing pigmy collection and payment thereof to the workmen, was
justified. This was numbered as I. D. No. 4 of 1964, and the
award, in this dispute, was given on August 26, 1964, and the
Central Government published the same, in the Gazette of India, C
on September 7, 1964.
The respondent filed a complaint, under s. 33A of the Act,
on June 4, 1964, before the Central Government Industrial Tribunal, at Hyderabad, attacking the enquiry proceedings, conducted against him, and the order of dismissal, passed by the appellant.
Apart from attacking the inquiry proceedings, on merits, as mala
D
fide, the respondent contended that the order of dismissal had
been passed against him, without the appellant Bank complying
with the provisions of the proviso to s. 33(2)(b), of the Act. According to him, inasmuch as the order of dismissal had been passed,
during the pendency of I. D. No. 4 of 1964, the management
should have asked the Industrial Tribunal for approval of their
action, and they should have paid him one month's wages. ThereE
fore, inasmuch as these things were ntit done, the appellants have
contravened the provisitins of s. 33 of the Act.
The appellant Bank, in their counter-statement, pleaded that
.he domestic enquiry, conducted by the management, was very
fair and that the action of the management, in dismissing the respondent, was perfectly justified. In this connection, the appetlant 1
raised the contention that the respondent was not a 'wllrkman ',
and that, in any event, he was not a workman concerned with
the dispute covered by I.D. No. 4 of 1964, and therefore he was
not entitled to file an application, under s. 33A. They further contended that there was no contravention tlf s. 33 of the Act, because, at the time when the order dismissing the respondent was
passed, on November 12, 1963, there was no industrial dispute
G
pending, so as to make it obligatory on the part of the appellant,
Ill take action, in accordance with the proviso to s. 33(2)(b), of
the Act.
The Industrial Tribunal, by its order. under attack, has overruled all the objedtions, raised by the management. The Tribunal
II
has held that the respondent was a 'workman' and that he was
also a workman concerned in I. D. No. 4 of 1964, and therefore
SYNDIC.lTll BANX 11. X.B. v. H..lT ( v aulialingam, J.)
331
A
he was competent to file an application, under s. 3 3A. The Tribunal has also held that the dismissal of the respondent became effective only on March 20, 1964, when the working committee of the
Directors of the appellant Bank disposed of the appeal, filed by
the respondent. As this date fell within the period, between Jan-
. uary 8, 1964 and October 8, 1964, (during which I. D. No. 4
B
of 1964 was pending) the management was bound to comply with
the proviso to s. 33(2)(b) of the Act. As this proviso had not been
complied with, the. Tribunal held that there was a contravention
of the provisions of s. 33 of the Act, which gives a right to the
respondent to invoke the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, under
s. 33A of the Act.
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After having held that there is a contravention, of s. 33 of
the Act, the Tribunal then considered the
atta~k levelled, as
against the domestic enquiry proceedings, by 'the respondent, and
recorded a finding to the effect that it was not fair to consider
that the. respondent had wilfully disobeyed the order of transfer,
passed by the management. The tribunal, therefore held, on both
the findings, that the respondent should be reinstated, with continuity of service and back wages.
The same contentions, that were raised before the Industrial
Tribunal, on behalf of' the management, have been urged before
us, by the appellants' learned counsel, Mr. Gokhale. Counsel urged
that the respondent is not a 'workman' and, in any event, he is
not a1 workman concerned with the dispute in I.D. No. 4 of 1964.
Counsel further pointed out that even aissuming that the findings
of the Tribunal, recorded against the appellant, were correct, the
application, under s. 33A, was not maintainable, inasmuch as
there was no contravention, by the management, of any of the
provisions of s. 33, of the Act. In this connection, counsel pointed
out, that the order of dismissal, having been passed by the Managing Director, on November 12, 1963, long before Januaiy 8, 1964,
the date when I.D. No. 4 of 1964, was referred, there was no
obligation, on the part of the management, tt> ask for approval of
the Tribunal, in respect of their action, or of paying one month's
wages. to the respondent. Counsel also urged that even if these
questions were answered against the appellant, the award would
have to be set aside, because the Industrial Tribunal had really
constituted itself as a ·court of appeal, when it set aside the order
of dismissal, passed by the management, which was based on the
findings recorded in a proper domestic enquiry.
Mr. M. K. Ramamurthy, leained. counsel, appearing for the
respondent, has supported the views, expressed by the Tribunal,
on all aspects.
If the contention of the appellant, that there was no Industrial dispute, pending at the time, when the order of dismissal
was passed, is accepted, then, quite naturally, at follows that no
ouestion of contravention of s. 33, of the Act, arises, in which
382
SUl'llEKK COURT RlliPORTS
[1968) l S.C.R.
case, the complaint, under s. 33A, is not maintainable, in law.
A
In an enquiry, under s. 33A, the first question that the TribJ\nal
will have to consider, is regarding the contravention, by the employer, of the provisions of s. 33 of the Act. If this issue is answered against the employee, nothing further can be done, under s. 33A,
of the Act. This position has been settled, by the decisions of this
Court, in Equitable Coal, Ltd. v. A/gu Singh(') and The Punjab
B
National Bank Ltd. v. Its Workmen('). After hearing arguments,
on this aspect, we are inclined, in the instant case. to accept the
contention of the appellant, fa this regard, and hence, no t>ther
questions arise, in the application filed, by the respondent under
s. 33A of the Act.
There is no controversy, in this case. that the appellant did
C
not seek the approval of the Industrial Tribunal concerned, nor
did they offer or pay one mt>nth's wages to the respondent. There
is also no controversy that I.D. No. 4 of 1964, can in law be considered to ·be pending only from January 8, 1964, to October 8,
I 964. The order of the Managing Directt>r, dismissing the respondent from service, was made on November 12, 1963, which
date, admittedly, falls outside the duration ·of the pendency of D
I.D. No. 4 of 1964. The order of the working committee of
Directors, rejecting the respondent's appeal, which was passed on
March 20, 1964, certainly falls within the period when I.D. No. 4
of 1964 was pending. Therefore, the question that arises for consideration, in this case, is as to when, it can be stated, that the
respondent was dismissed, i.e., by the order of November 12, 1963,
of the Managing Director, or by the appellate order t>f March 20,
E
1964, passed by the working committee of Directors. According
to the appellant, the order which has to be taken into account,
for considering whether there is a contraventit>n of s. 33 of the
Act, is the original order passed, by the Managing Director, on
November 12, 1963, whereas, according to the respondent, the
appellate order, passed on March 20. 1964, is the effective order,
dismissing him.
F
The respondent's contention, in this regard, is briefly as follows. Under the National Industrial Tribunal (Bank Disputes)
Award, 1962 (known as the Desai Award), a workman, in such
cmes, has got a right of appeal, to the appropriate authority. and
he has got a period of 45 days, for filing the appeal. In this case,
the order of the Managing Director, dated November 12, · 1963,
G
also states that respondent is entitled to file an appeal, against
that order, to the working committee of the Directors, within 45
days of receipt of that order. The respondent, admittedly, filed
an appeal, on December 17, 1963, well within the time. The
appeal was disposed of, on March 20, 1964. The language t>f
s. 33(2), counsel points out, is to the effect that the employer bas B
(1) [1958] I L.L.J. 793.
(2) [1960] 1 S.C.R. 806.
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~YNDICATE BANK 1), K.R.V. BHAT (Vaidialingam, J.)
333
been enabled to take action, 'in ioocordance with the standing
0rders applicable to a workman concerned, in such dispute'. Inasmuch as the standing orders, in this case, give a right to appeal,
to the workman, any order that is passed, by the management, in
respect of which a right of appeal is given to a workman, cannot
be ·considered to be an effective or operative order, till the appellate decision is made known. It will be open to the appellant to
take action, in accordance with the proviso to s. 33(2)(b), at the
time when the appellate order was passed, on March 20, 1964,
as the appellate order is the effective and binding order. So far
as the parties are concerned, the order of dismissal, in this case,
must be considered to have been passed only on March 20, 1964,
which date squarely falls within the period, during which I.D.
No. 4 of 1964, was pending. We are not inclined to accept the
contentions of the learned counsel, for the respondent, in this
regard.
It has been laid down by this Court, in Strawboard Manufacturing Co. v. Govind('), in donstruing the proviso to s. 33(2)(b)
of the Act, that the three things contemplated, viz .. dismissal or
D
discharge, payment of the wages and making of the application,
should be part of the same transaction. Therefore, in our view,
there must be a fixed and certain point of time which will be
applicable to all managements and workmen, when construing th-e
provisions of s. 33 of the Act. The management must definitely
know, as to when they have to take the necessary action. under
the proviso to s. 33(2)(b), and the workman also should, likewise,
E
know the definite time when .. the management should have complied with the requirements of the proviso to s. 33(2)(b), so that
he ct>uld approach the Industrial Tribunal, by way of a complaint,
under s. 33A, of the Act. A reading of the material provisions of
s. 33 shows that the expressibns used are 'dischairge or punish,
whether by dismissal or otherwise', and they clearly indicate, in
our opinion, the point of time, when the order of discharge or disF
missal is passed, by the authority concerned. An order of discharge or dismissal, in our opinion, can be passed only once; and,
in this case, the order of dismissal is the one passed, by the Managing Director, on November 12, 1963. No doubt, either by virtue
of the Standing Orders, or by virtue of a contract, of service, a
right of appeal may be given to a workman concierned, to challenge an order of dismissal. But the appellate authority only consiG
ders whether the order of dismissal has to be sustained, or whether
it requires modification. Therefore, there is no question of tbe
appellate authority passing. again, an order of dismissal. We are
not concerned, in construing the provisions of s. 33, as to the
finality of the orders passed, by the authority concerned, in tbe
first instance, in passing orders of dismissal or discharge.
B
Further, the proviso to s. 33(2)(b), when it refers to payment of wages for one month, also indicates that it relates fo ali
L/SllSOI-S
(1) [1962] Supp, 3 S.C.R. 618, 630.
334
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1968] 1 S.C.R.
brder of discharge or dismissal, which comes into effect immediateA
ly, which, in this case, is the order passed, on November 12, 1963.
The payment of one month's salary or wages, is to soften the
rigour of unemployment that will face the workman, against whom
an order of discharge or dismissal, has been passed. If the management has to wait for the minimum period prescribed for filing an
appeal, and also await the termination of the appeal when one
is filed, considerable time would have lapsed from the date of the
original order, during which period the workman would not have
received any salary. It will be anomalous to hold that even after
the lapse of such a long time, the payment of one month's salary
would satisfy the requirements of the section.
B
In this case, if the contention of the respondent is accepted,
it will lead to very anomalous results, and the time when a manageC
ment has to comply with the proviso to s. 33(2)(b), will radically
differ. For example, according to the respondent, the management,
in this case, will have to wait for the minimum period of 45 days,
which is the time given for the respondent, to file an appeal. If
an appeal is filed, according to the respondent, the management
will have to wait further, and await the disposal of the appeal.
That means, in such a case, the proviso will come into effect only
at the time when the appeal is disposed of. On the other hand.
if, after the expiry of 45 days, the workman concerned does not
file an appeal. the management, aocording to the resnondent, will
have to comply with the proviso immediately after the period of
limitation is over. That is, the point of time when the proviso to
s. 33(2)(b) will have to be comolied with, by the management, will
deiiend uoon the filing or non-filing of an appeal. by the workman
concerned. Further. if at the time, when the original order of dismissal is passed. there is no disoute pending. and when the anneal
aiiainst the order of rlismissal is pendinri. a disPute is referred
for adjudication, it will be open to the management lb prolon!!
its decision, in the appeal. till after the Industrial dispute has
come to an end. Tt cannot be the intention of the Legislature that
such variable and indeterminate periods are contemplated in construing the proviso to s. 33(2)(b). The natural and reasonable intemretation, to be placed on s. 33, is. in onr oninion. that the
order of discharge or dismissal. is the original or the very first
oroer passed bv t'he management: which in this case is the one
nassed. by the Managing T)irector. on November 12. 196'.l Tt
follows that on that date. T. n. No. 4 of 1964. had not even been
referred, for adjudication. which, as we have alreadv indiroted.
was by an order of Government. datecl January 8. 1964. Hence
there is no contravention of s. 33. in this case. ·
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Before we close the discussion, it is neeessary to state that
Mr. Ramamurthy,, learneif counsel for the respondent, referred
us to two decisions of this Court. in Thr Management ·nf Hntel
H
Imperial v. Hoiel Workers' Uninn ·(') and ('nl!rrtnr nf Custnms.
- ------- -- . -
-- ---
-
(!) [1960] 1 SCR 476.
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SYNDICATE BANK v. K.R.V. BHAT ( Vaulialingam, J.)
335
Calcutta v. East India Commercial Co. Ltd.('). In the first decision, this Court has recognised that a term should be implied, by
Industrial Tribunals, in the contract of employment, that, if the
master has held a proper enquiry and come to the conclusion that
the servant should be dismissed, and in consequence, suspends
him, pending the perm'ssion, required under s. 33 of the Act, he
has the power to order suspension, thus suspending the contract
of employment temporarily, so that there is no obligation on him
to pay wages, and no obligation on the servant, to work. In the
9eeond decision, th;s Court held that in cases where an appellate
authority reverses the order under appeal, or modifies the order
or merely dismisses the appeal and thus confirms the order appealed against without any modification, the operative order is
the order of the appellate authority. In our opinion, these decisions do not assist 1he respondent and the principles laid down
therein, have no bearing on the point to be determined in the
instant case.
The result is that the award of the Industrial Tribunal is set
aside and the application, filed by the respondent before it, will
stand dismissed. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed, but without
costs.
Y.P.
Appeal allowed
(1) [1963] 2 S.C.R. 563; 568
L/SOOI(a)-8
.