# • T. B. IBRAHIM v. REGIONAL TRANSPORT AUTHORI'l'Y, TAN JORE

- **Citation:** [1953] 1 S.C.R. 290
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1951-02-06
- **Case number:** Civil Ap~eal No. 16 of 1952
- **Bench:** Patanjali Sastri C.J, Mukherjea, Chandrasekhara Aiyar, Vivian Bose, Ghulam Hasan Jj
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/t-b-ibrahim-v-regional-transport-authori-l-y-tan-jore-12
- **Pages:** 12

## Headnote

•
Madras Motor Vehicles Rules, 1940, r. 268-Amendment in 1950
empowering Transport Authority to alter starting places or termini
of vehicles-Whether ultra vires-Madras Motor Vehicles Act, 1939,
ss. 76, 68(1) and (9) (r)-Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 19 (1)
(g)-Infringement uf right to carry on profession-Reasonableness of
restriction.
Rule 268 of the Madras Motor Vehicles Rules, 1940, as it
originally stood did not empower the Transport Authority to alter
from time to time the starting places and termini for motor
vehicles. The rule was amended in 1950 so as to empower the
Transport Authority to do so, and after giving notice to the appellant who was the owner of a bus-stand in a municipality, which
was being used for several years as the starting place and terminus
for motor buses plying to and from the municipality, the Transport Authority passed a resolution changing the starting place and
terminus for the convenience of the public. The appellant applied
for a writ of certiorari contending that r. 268 as amended was
ultra vires as it went beyond the rule-making powers conferred by
s. 68 (2) (r) of the Motor Vehicles Act and was also repugnant to
art. 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution:
Held, (i) that the fixing and alteration of bus-stands was not a
purpose foreign to the "control of transport vehicles" 1 the purpose for which rules could be made under s. 68 (1), and the power
to make rules prohibiting the picking up or setting down of passengers at specified places mentioned in s. 68 (2) (r) necessarily included the power to alter. the situation of bus-stands, and r. 268
as amended did not therefore go beyonds. 68 (2) (r);
(ii) the restriction placed upon the use of the bus-staud for
the purpose of picking up or setting down passengers to or from
outward journeys cannot be considered to be an unreasonable restriction on the right to carry on any profession, trade or business
of the appellant, and r. 268 was not
in any way repugnant to
art. 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution .
The expression "duly notified stand" in the Madras Motor
Vehicles Act means a stand duly notified by the Transport Autho·
rity. There i~ no warrant for the view that it means a stand
. .
S.C.R.
SUPREME- COURT REPORTS
291
notified by the municipality.
The provisions of s. 270 (b), (c) and
(e) do not affect the power of the Transport Authority to regulate
traffic control or impose restrictions upon the licence of cart-stands.

## Text

1953
Dec. 5.
•
290
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1953]
•
T. B. IBRAHIM
v.
REGIONAL TRANSPORT AUTHORI'l'Y,
TAN JORE.
[PATANJALI SASTRI C.J., MUKHERJEA,
CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR, VIVIAN BOSE and
GHULAM HASAN JJ.J
•
Madras Motor Vehicles Rules, 1940, r. 268-Amendment in 1950
empowering Transport Authority to alter starting places or termini
of vehicles-Whether ultra vires-Madras Motor Vehicles Act, 1939,
ss. 76, 68(1) and (9) (r)-Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 19 (1)
(g)-Infringement uf right to carry on profession-Reasonableness of
restriction.
Rule 268 of the Madras Motor Vehicles Rules, 1940, as it
originally stood did not empower the Transport Authority to alter
from time to time the starting places and termini for motor
vehicles. The rule was amended in 1950 so as to empower the
Transport Authority to do so, and after giving notice to the appellant who was the owner of a bus-stand in a municipality, which
was being used for several years as the starting place and terminus
for motor buses plying to and from the municipality, the Transport Authority passed a resolution changing the starting place and
terminus for the convenience of the public. The appellant applied
for a writ of certiorari contending that r. 268 as amended was
ultra vires as it went beyond the rule-making powers conferred by
s. 68 (2) (r) of the Motor Vehicles Act and was also repugnant to
art. 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution:
Held, (i) that the fixing and alteration of bus-stands was not a
purpose foreign to the "control of transport vehicles" 1 the purpose for which rules could be made under s. 68 (1), and the power
to make rules prohibiting the picking up or setting down of passengers at specified places mentioned in s. 68 (2) (r) necessarily included the power to alter. the situation of bus-stands, and r. 268
as amended did not therefore go beyonds. 68 (2) (r);
(ii) the restriction placed upon the use of the bus-staud for
the purpose of picking up or setting down passengers to or from
outward journeys cannot be considered to be an unreasonable restriction on the right to carry on any profession, trade or business
of the appellant, and r. 268 was not
in any way repugnant to
art. 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution .
The expression "duly notified stand" in the Madras Motor
Vehicles Act means a stand duly notified by the Transport Autho·
rity. There i~ no warrant for the view that it means a stand
. .
S.C.R.
SUPREME- COURT REPORTS
291
notified by the municipality.
The provisions of s. 270 (b), (c) and
(e) do not affect the power of the Transport Authority to regulate
traffic control or impose restrictions upon the licence of cart-stands.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Ap~eal
No. 16 of 1952.
Appeal from the Judgment and Order dated February 6, 1951, of the High Court of Judicature at
Madras (Rajamannar C. J. and Somasundaram J.)
in Civil Miscellaneous Petition No. 11307 of 1950,
arising out of Order
dated November 10, 1950,
made in C. No. 2216-A-3-49 on the file of the Regional
Transport Authority, Tanjore.
G. R. Jagadisa Iyer for the appellant.
V. K. T. Chari, Advocate-General of Madras, (V. V.
Raghavan, with him) for the respondent.
1952. December 5. The Judgment of .the Court
was delivered by
·
GHULAM HASAN J.-This appeal brought by special
leave under article 136 (1) of the Constitution is
directed against the order dated February 6, 1951, of
the High. Court of Judicature at Madras, dismissing
the petition of the appellant under article 226, praying for the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash the
order da. ted N av.ember 10, 1950, passed by the respondent in the following circumstances :-
The appellant is the lessee of a site in the town of
Tanjore in the State of Madras upon which he has a
bus-stand.
The bus-stand originally belonged to the
Tanjore Municipality and the appellant merely held
a licence from that authority. Later on, the title of
the Municipality to the site was questioned by a third
party and in a ci vi! litigation which ensued the title
of the Municipality was negatived.
Thereupon the
appellant obtained the lease-hold right of the site
from the true owner and constructed a bus-stand conforming to the design approved by the Municipality.
Besides sheds for passengers and vehicles it provided
other amenities. It was situate near the Railway
Station and piost of
~hi) l;>us()s leaving Tanjore for
~ll
..
.
.1953
T. B. Ibrahim
v.
Regional
Transport
Authority,
Tanjore.
Ghulam
Hasan J.
1962
T. B Ibrahim
v.
~egi.onnl
Transport
Authority,
Tanjo1·e,
Ghula1n
J[asan J,
292
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1953]
out-station jourueys used this bus-stand both as the
starting point and as the terminus. It appears that the
site was approved as convenient and suitable for the
bu~-stand both by the Municipality and the District
authorities for buses plying from and into 'l'anjore.
Tbe appellant held the licence for running the busstand year after year. In 1939 the Municipality
granted him a licence for four months only instead of
one year as required by section 270 (c) of the Madras
Municipalities Act (V. of 1920), and the appellant
succeeded in vindicating his right for a whole year's
licence in the Civil Court by obtaining the relief for
injunction and an order directing the issue of a
licence against the Municipality for 1940-41.. 'The
appellant carried on the business without let or
hindrance until 1950 when .the Municipality refused
to renew his licence, whereupon he obtained a mandatory injunctron from the Civil Court directing the
Municipality to grant him a licence for the year
1950-51. 'l'his decree was passed on October 7, 1950.
On February 21, 1950, however, the Regional
'l'ransport Authority, Tanjore, which is the respondent in the present appeal, declared the bus-stand as
unsuitable with effect from April 1, 1950, and altered
the starting and tbe terminal points from that date.
This order resulted in the closing of the appellant's
bus-stand. This decision which was given by means
of a resolution was confirmed subsequently by another
resolution passed on March 31, 1950.
The appellant
challenged the validity of these resolutions by a
petition under article 226 before the Madras High
Court on the ground that they were passed without
jurisdiction and were contrary to the principles of
natural justice as they were passed without notice to
the appellant and without giving him an opportunity
to defend his right. The resolutions purported to
have been passed under section 76 of the Motor
Vehicles Act, 1939, which runs thus:-
"The Provincial Government or any authority
authorized in this behalf by the Provincial Governme!ft may, in,
cousulta,~iou with t4!l \oca,l au~l;:\ority
-
..i -
·-..
S.C.R.
,'
,
I
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
293
having jurisdiction in the area concerned, determine
places at which motor vehicles may stand either
indefinitely or for a specified period of time, and may
determine the places at which public service vehi'tlles
may stand either indefinitely or for a specified period
of time, and may determine the places at which
public service vehicles may stop for a longer time
than is necessary for the taking up and setting down
of passengers."
The Division Bench of the Madras High Court consisting of the learned Chief Justice and another learn·
ed Judge quashed the two orders as prayed for by the
appellant on the grounds that the orders were passed
ex parte, and that section 7 6 did not authoril-le the
respondent to close the bus-stand.
In the opinion of
the Bench, section 76 deals with provision for parking places and halting stations and has no application to a permanent bus-stand which is a sort of a
radiating centre of all the bus traffic for the town.
It was held therefore that the Regional Transport
Authority could not under section 76 fix starting and
terminus places for motor-buses.
Reference was made, in the course of the arguments,
to rule 268, Madras Vehicles Rules, 1940, aud the
learned Judges observed that though the rule does
empower the Transport Authority to fix starting
places \tnd termini between which public service
vehicles other than motor cars shall be permitted to
be used, but that this could be done only if starting
places and termini had not already been fixed in
accordance with the provisions of any statute. In
the present case as these had already been fixed in
accordance with rule 27-D, Motor Vehicles Rules,
1923, the Transport Authority could· not fix new
starting places and termini under rule 268 of the
Rules passed in 1940.
The Bench pointed out that
the rule was defective and would lead to an impasse
if the starting places and termini already fixed become unsuitable and have to be shifted. Accordingly
they suggested that the rule should be amended and
a provision introduced conferring on the appropriate
195!1
T. B. Ibi·ahim
v.
Regi.onal
Transport
Authority,
Tanjoi·o.
Ghularn
Hasan J.
1952
T. B. Ibrahint
v.
Regional
Transport
Authoril1f,
Tanj'orc.
Ghulam
Hasan J.
; .".
,
1 ;
c
'
294
SUPREME COURT REPOR'i'S
(1953]
authority the requisite power to alter from
time
to time
the starting places
and termini.
See
T. E. Ebrahim Saheb
v. The Regional Tmnsport
Aut1iority, Tanjore (').
It appears that within two months of the decision
of the High Court rule 268 was· ·amended by the
Government.
Before the decision of the High Court
was given, the bus-stand was shifted to a place belonging to the Municipality in another area. Rule
268 as it originally stood ran thus:-
"In the case of public service vehicles (other than
motor cabs) if starting places and termini have not
been fixed in accordance with the provisions of any
statute, the transport authority may, after consultation with such other authority as it may deem
desirable, fix starting places and termini between
which such vehicles shall be permitted to be used
within its jurisdiction.
A list of such places shall be
supplied by
such authority to every holder of a
permit for such vehicles.
When such places have beeq fixed, every such
vehicle shall start only from such places."
By the amendment the words "if starting places
and termini have not been fixed in accordance with
the provisions of any statute" were deleted, and the
words " and after notice to the parties affected, fix or
alter from time to time for good and proper reasons,"
were added.
As amended, the rule runs thus:-
" 268. In the case of public service vehicles ·(other
·than motor cabs) the transport authority may after
consultation with such other authority as it may consider desirable, and after notice to the parties affected,
fix or alter from time to time for good and proper
reasons, the starting places and termini between
which such vehicles shall be permitted to be used
within its jurisdiction. A list of such places shall be
supplied by such authority to every holder of a permit for such vehicles at the time of grant of or renewal of permits.
(1) A.LR. 1951 Mad. 419.
. ~
I. -
,)
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..
r
S.C.R.
SUPREME COUR'l' REPORTS
295
When such places have been fixed every such
vehicle shall start only from such places."
The respondent then issued a notice to the app~l
lant on October 25, 1950, to show cause why the busstand should not be shifted, the grounds given being
that it was not satisfactorily maintained and was
situated in a limited space which was inadequate to
accommodate all the buses using the stand and that.
it did not permit of any improvements being carried
out.
The appellant filed a long written statement
objecting to the notice and challenging the grounds,
whereupon the respondent issued a fresh notice on
November 2, 1950, in which the original grounds
were dropped and were substituted by the ground
"from the point of convenience of the travelling
public".
After hearing the appellant and the Municipality, the Board passed a resolution on November
10, 1950, that for good and proper reasons, namely,
the convenience of the travelling public, the Transport Authority had resolved to alter the starting
places and termini of all public service vehicles (other
than motor cabs) arriving at and proceeding from
Tanjore from the existing bus-stand owned by, the
appellant to the Municipal bus-stand in another area
of the town. This order led to another petition being
filed in the High Court at Madras, praying for a writ
of certiorari under article '2'26.
The appellant
questioned the jurisdiction of the 'rransport Authority to pass the order in question. It was contended
before the High Court that rule '268 as amended was
itself nltra vires, firstly, because it was beyond the rulemaking power conferred by section 68, sub-section.
(r), of the Motor Vehicles Act, and secondly because
it was repugnant to article 19(1) (g) of the Constitution. Both these contentions were rejected by the
High Court and the petition was dismissed.
The contentions raised before the High Court have
been repeated before us. vVe are satisfied that there
is no good ground for differing from the view taken
by the High Court. The Motor Vehicles Act contains
10 Chapters. Chapter IV of the Act deals with
1953
T. B. Ibrahim
v.
Regional
Transport
Authority,
Tanjore.
Ghu!am
Hasan J.
1962
T. B Ibrahim
v.
l~egional
Ti·a,,,sport
Authority,
Tanjore.
G1utlani
Ha3an J.
296
8UPREME COURT REPOR'l'S
.
.
[1953]
control oi transport vehicles. 8ection 47(1) lays down
that the Regional 'l'ransport Authority shall, in
deciding whether to grant or refuse a stage carriage
pe'rmit, have
regard
to the following matters,
namely,
(a) the interest of the public generally;
(b) to (f) ............................................... .
Section 48 say, that the Regional Transport
Authority after consideration of the matters set forth
in section 4 7, may attach to a stage carriage permit
any prescribed condition or any one or more of the
following conditions.
Various conditions are set out
one of which (v) is material for our purposes. It is
to the effect" that within Municipal limits and in
su·ch other areas and places as may be prescribed,
passengers shall not be taken up or set down at or
except at specified points." The material portion of
section 68 may be set out here:-
" (1) A Provincial Government may make rules for.
the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of
this Chapter.
·
(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the
foregoing power, rules under this section may be
made with respect to all or any of the following
matters, namely :-
(r) prohibiting the picking up or setting down of
passengers by stage or contract carriages at specified
places or in specified areas or at places other than
duly notified stands or halting places .................. ;"
It is obvious from a plain .reading of sub-section (1)
·that the Government has got full power to make rules
for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions
contained in Chapter IV relating to the control of
transport vehicles and according to sub-section (2),
without prejudice to this power, the Government has
the power to frame rules with respect to matters set
out in sub-sections (2) (a) to (2) (za). It is significant to note that the Act does not follow the ordinary
mode of proYiding at the end of the Act that the
Government is empowered to make rules for the
.-
l
-
~-
S.O.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
297
purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of the
Act but at the end of each of the Chapters, including
Chapter IV, the power has been reserved to the Provincial Government to make rules for the purpose •of
carrying into effect the provisions of the Chapter.
'rhe purpose of Chapter IV is described by the compendious expression "control of transport vehicles"
and the Provincial Government is invested with plenary powers to make rules for carrying out that
purpose.
Keeping in view the purpose underlying
the Chapter we are not prepared to hold that the fixing or alteration of bus·stands is foreign to that
purpose.
It was contended that section 68, sub-section 2(r),
does not confer the power upon the transport
authority to direct the fixing or the alteration of a
bus-stand and that rule 268 of the rules framed under
that section was, therefore, ultra vires.
We are not
·prepared to accede to this contention.
Sub-section
2(r) clearly contemplates three definite situations.
It prohibits the picking up or setting down of
passengers
(i) at specified places
(ii) in specified areas, and
(iii) at places other than duly notified stands or
halting places.
If the power to make rules in regard to these matters is given to the Government, then it follows that
a specified place may be prohibited from being used
for picking up or setting down passengers.
This will
inevitably result in the closing of that specified place
for the purpose of picking up or setting down of
passengers. Similarly a specified area may be excluded for the same purpose. The expression "duly notified stands" is not defined in the Act, but it is reasonable to presume that a duly notified stand must be one
which is notified by the Transport Authority and by
none other.
There is no warrant for the presumption that it must be notified by the Municipality.
Referen()e w11is rnaict~ to sec~ion 270(b), 270(c)
ai~q
1952
T. B. Ibrahim
v,
Regional
Tran•port
Authority,
Tanjot·e.
Ghu.lani
Hasan J_
19~2
T. B. Ibrahitn.
v.
Regionai
Transport
Authority,
Tanjore.
Ghulam
Hasan J.
298
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1953]
270(e), 1, 2 & 3 of the Madras District Municipalities
Act (V of 1920), and it was argued that the authority
which is clothed with a power to fix a stand is the
Municipality. Section 270(b) empowers the Municipal Council to construct or provide halting places
and cart-stands, and the latter according to the
Explanation ,'appended to the section includes a
stand for motor vehicles as well.
Section 270(c)
merely says that where a Municipal Council has provided a public landing place, halting place or cartstand, the executive authority may prohibit the use
for the same purpose by any person within such
distance thereof, as may be determined by the Municipal Council, of any public place or the sides of any
public street.
Section 270(e) lays down that no
person can open a new private cart-stand or continue
to keep open a private stand unless he obtains from
the Council a licence to do so. 'l'hese provisions do
not affect the power of the Transport Authority to
regulate traffic control or impose restrictions upon
the licence of any such cart-stand. If rule 268 is
therefore within the power of the rule-making authority, it follows that it cannot be challenged as being
void because it is not consistent with some general
law.
Reliance was placed on a passage at page 299 of
Craies on Statute Law as laying down that a by-law
must not be repugnant to the statute or the general
law. But by-laws and rules made under a rule-making
power conferred by a statute do not stand on the
same footing, as such rules are part and parcel of the
statute itself.
Section 68,
sub-sectio.n 2(r), involves both
a
general prohibition that the stand will cease to exist
as well as a particular prohibition, namely that
passengers shall not be picked up or set down
at a specified point.
The order passed by the
Transport
Autho~ity properly
construed
falls
within the ambit of section 68, sub-section 2 (r).
Rule 268 under which the order impeached was
passed is a rule framed under the plenary rule-making
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\
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S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
299
power referred to in section 68, sub-section (1). Subsection (2) (za) says that a rule may be made with
. respect to any other matter which is to be or may be
prescribed.
This shows the existence of residu1try
power vested in the rule-making authority. It follows
therefore that rule 268 is within the scope of the
powers conferred under section 68 of the Act.
The next contention was that the order is repugnant to article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution, according to which all citizens must have the right to
practise any profession or to carry on any occupation,
trade or business. It cannot be denied that the
appellant has not been prohibited from carrying on
the business or running a bus-stand.
What has been
. prohibited is that the bus-stand existing on the particular site being unsuitable from the point of view of
public convenience, it cannot be used for picking up
or setting down passengers from that stand for outstations journeys. But there is certainly no prohibition for the bus-stand being used otherwise for carrying passengers from the stand into the town, and
vice versa. The restriction placed upon the use of the
bus-stand for the purpose of picking up or setting
down passengers to outward journeys cannot be considered to be an unreasonable restriction. It may be
that the appellant by reason of the shifting of the
bus-stand has been deprived of the income he used to
enjoy when the bus-stand was
used for outward
journeys from Tanjore, but that can be no ground for
the contention that there has been an infringement
of any fundamental right within the meaning of
article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution. There is no
fundamental right in a citizen to carry on business
wherever he chooses and his right must be subject to
any reasonable restriction imposed by the executive
authority in the interest of public convenience.
The
restriction may have the effect of eliminating the use
to which the stand has been put hitherto but the
restrictiop. cannot be regarded as ·being unreasonable
if the authority imposing such restriction had the
power to do so.
Whether the !liboli~ion of the st!Jinq
'
1952
T, B. Ibrahim
v.
Regional
Tran.•port
Authority,
Tanjore.
Ghulam
Hasan J •
300
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1953)
1962
was conducive to public convenience or not is a
T. B. Ibrahim matter entirely for the transport authority to judge,
·
v.
and it is not open to the court to substitute its own
Regiana!
opinion for the opinion of the authority, which is in
Transport
the best position, having regard to its knowledge of
. Authority,
local conditions tO appraise the situation.
Tanjore.
It was next contended that rule 268, if it is held to
Ghn!am
he intra vires, was not complied with as the Transport
Hasan J.
Authority could pass such an order only after consultation with such other authority as it may deem
desirable.
It is
admitted that the 'l'ransport
Authority consulted the Municipality before passing
the order in question. Rule 268 therefore was fully
complied with. But then it is urged that the Muni-
.cipality was not the proper authority in the circum-
. stances as it was a partisan to the dispute and bad
.been endeavouring to oust the appellant from the
bus-stand in order to set up its own bus-stand.
The
Municipality is a public body interested in public
welfare and if it sought the assistance of the Government or the Transport Authority to shift the busstand, it was actl!ated only by the demands of public
interest. It was possible for the Transport Authority
to consult the District Board or the Panchayat as
suggested for the appellant, but it was not bound to
do so.
We do not think that in consulting the
Municipality the 'l'ransport Authority acted otherwise
than within the scope of its!powers. Further, according to the language employed the consultation is not
obligatory but only discretionary.
It was suggested that the act of the Municipality
was mala fide and reference was made to paragraphs
18 and 19 of the appellant's affidavit dated November
20, 1950.
They refer merely to the vagueness of the
ground of public convenience and to the amendment
of the rule not being bona fide.
There is, however,
no material to support this suggestion.
The mere
fact that in the first notice certain grounds were
mentioned which were not adhered to in the second
notice and convenience of the travelling public was
al<;me mentioned as the ground cannot !ea,d to the
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\
s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
30i
inference that the order was mala fide.
'l'he rule was
amended in pursuance of the suggestion of the High
Court in order to overcome the difficulty which arose
in the absence of requisite power to alter the busstands. It is significant that no allegation about
mala fides was made before the High Court and the
question was never discussed there. In the petition
for special leave to appeal though there is reference
to the ground of inconvenience being vague, yet there
is no suggestion of mala fides. The question about
mala fides appears to have been raised for the first
time in paragraph 4 (f) and (g) of the statement of
the case. We hold that the plea of mala fides has not
been substantiated by any evidence.
It was also urged that the resolution is invalid as
the District Collector who presided over the meeting
of the Transport Authority which passed this ret\olution had opened the new Municipal bus-stan:d on
April 1, 1950. The suggestion is that he did not
bring to bear upon the q·uestion an impartial and.
unbiased mind. 'fhe District Collector was not acting
in the exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial functions
so tha.t his action can be subjected to the scrutiny
which is permissible in the case of a judicial officer.
He was acting purely in his executive capacity and
his conduct in presiding over the meeting of the
Transport Authority in the exercise of his normal
functions and also opening the Municipal stand
which he was entitled to do as the head of the
District, does not affect the validity or fairness of the
order complained against.
We do not think there is
any merit in this contention.
Accordingly we dismiss the appeal with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
Agent for the appellant: M. S. K. Sastri.
Agent for the respondent: G. H. Rajadhyaksha.
19511
T. B. Ibrahim
v.
Regional
Transport·
Authority,
Tanjore.
Ghulam
Hasan J.